Recovering normal: A qualitative study of grief following bereavement by Pearce, Caroline
Open Research Online
The Open University’s repository of research publications
and other research outputs




Pearce, Caroline (2016). Recovering normal: A qualitative study of grief following bereavement. PhD thesis
The Open University.
For guidance on citations see FAQs.
c© 2016 The Author
Version: Version of Record
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright
owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies
page.
oro.open.ac.uk
Recovering normal: A qualitative study of grief 
following bereavement 
Caroline Pearce 
BA (Hons) Sociology, University of Derby 
MA Sociology, University of Manchester 
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
Faculty of Health and Social Care 
The Open University 
June 2016 
"" '.. \ .. to 1.' ' _ l~.' r I 1 i ~ t , .. , 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the notion of 'recovery' from grief following bereavement and 
answers the question, what happens when people 'fail' to recover? Researchers and 
practitioners promote a linear, staged, 'normal course' of grief, yet people who fail to 
follow this course are understood as experiencing 'complicated grief: a form of 
psychiatric disorder. In particular, the thesis explores the debates and issues around 
the highly contested notion of recovery from grief, drawing on an analysis of the 
theory and policy of grief and recovery, and empirical qualitative interview data from 
bereavement care practitioners and bereaved people in England. Arguing for the 
acknowledgment of the experience of 'non-recovery', this thesis draws on a 
Foucauldian approach to problematise the notion of recovery, highlighting how 
'recovery' is a socially constructed notion linked to the individualised vision of health 
and happiness promoted by neo-liberal govern mentality. 
The study concentrates on three areas: the political and cultural factors that 'frame' 
grief and recovery in England; how grief is managed, through the example of 
bereavement counselling, and the ways in which bereaved people make sense of grief. 
The findings of this study present the experience of grief as one of navigating a 
'liminal space'. Recovery from grief was achieved or resisted through the negotiation 
of a variety of political, medical and social discourses. These discourses provided 
guidelines for the bereaved person, where they were encouraged to make sense of 
grief, engage in certain practices and work towards the building of new identities, in 
order to recover from grief. Further, through the incorporation of 'non-recovery' this 
study proposes an alternative way of theorising grief, arguing for the need to 
emphasise the relational and embodied aspects of grief. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to thank the Faculty of Health and Social Care at The Open University for 
awarding me the studentship that enabled me to carry out this research. I have to 
thank my excellent and supportive supervisors Dr Carol Komaromy and Dr Sam 
Murphy for their wonderful supervision. I feel privileged to have received such great 
support and our regular supervision meetings and stimulating conversations have 
very much been a highlight of my PhD. A special note of thanks to Carol for her 
tireless support and critical feedback and for always challenging and inspiring me to 
make this thesis the best it could be. Thank you to Lindsay O'Dell and all the research 
students in the Faculty for providing a supportive and stimulating research 
environment. 
I wish to acknowledge the organisations that kindly participated in this project: Caris 
Islington Bereavement service, Cruse Bereavement Care, St Christopher's Hospice, 
and Grief Recovery UK. This thesis owes a great deal to all of the participants that 
generously shared their stories of bereavement and recovery with me; thank you to 
all. 
A thank you to family, friends and the cats who had to endure my various moods and 
antisocial behaviour during the PhD process, particularly those who had the privilege 
of living with me. 
Final thanks to my partner for being my muse, source of stability and patient proof-
reader of each page of this thesis. 
ii 
CONTENTS 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... i 
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................... ii 
Chapter 1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Recovery and grief: conflicting perspectives ................................................................... 3 
1.1.1 My own 'recovery' ............................................................................................................................. 5 
1.1.2 A recovery movement ...................................................................................................................... 7 
1.1.3 What is non-recovery? ..................................................................................................................... 9 
1.2 Aims of the thesis .................................................................................................................... 11 
1.3 The structure of the thesis ................................................................................................... 13 
Chapter 2 Literature review ............................................................................................... IS 
2.1 Introduction to the chapter ................................................................................................. 15 
2.2 A brief histol'Y of the study of grief ........................................ 1 .......................................... 16 
2.2.1 Freudian beginnings ...................................................................................................................... 16 
2.2.2 Grief as a syndrome ....................................................................................................................... 21 
2.2.3 Grief as a process ............................................................................................................................ 25 
2.3 A 'new dawn' of bereavement research? ........................................................................ 29 
2.3.1 Continuing bonds ............................................................................................................................ 31 
2.3.2 Meaning-making and stories ..................................................................................................... 33 
2.3.3 A medical model of grief? ............................................................................................................ 35 
2.4 The social construction of grief .......................................................................................... 38 
2.4.1 The policing of grief ....................................................................................................................... 41 
2.4.2 The disciplining of grief ............................................................................................................... 43 
2.5 Summary of the literature .................................................................................................... 47 
Chapter 3 Towards an alternative way of theorising grief: Emotions, bodies 
and practices .............................................................................................................................. 49 
iii 
3.1 Introduction to the chapter ................................................................................................. 49 
3.2 Grief and liminality ................................................................................................................. 51 
3.2.1 Theorising emotions ..................................................................................................................... 56 
3.2.2 Theorising bodies ........................................................................................................................... 64 
3.2.3 Managing emotions and bodies: affective practices ........................................................ 73 
3.2.4 Theorising 'the blob' ...................................................................................................................... 79 
3.3 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 82 
Chapter 4 Methodology and Methods ............................................................................. 84 
4.1 Introduction to the chapter ................................................................................................. 84 
4.2 Methodology .............................................................................................................................. 85 
4.2.1 Problematisations .......................................................................................................................... 86 
4.2.2 Explanations, technologies and authorities ......................................................................... 89 
4.2.3 Subjectivities .................................................................................................................................... 91 
4.2.4 Studying subjectivities ................................................................................................................. 94 
4.2.5 Qualitative methodology ............................................................................................................. 97 
4.3 Methods: How the research was carried out ................................................................. 99 
4.3.1 Mapping the field .......................................................................................................................... 100 
4.3.2 Ethics of researching grief and bereavement ................................................................... 102 
4.3.3 Recruitment of participants and negotiating access ...................................................... 1 04 
4.3.4 Participant information ............................................................................................................. 1 07 
4.3.5 Conducting the interviews ........................................................................................................ 111 
4.3.6 The reflexive research process ............................................................................................... 115 
4.3.7 The analysis of the data .............................................................................................................. 118 
4.4 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 122 
Chapter 5 The cultural and political framing of grief .............................................. 124 
S.1 Introduction to the chapter ............................................................................................... 124 
5.2 Changing attitudes to grief and bereavement in England ...................................... 127 
iv 
5.2.1 Grief as a mental disorder ......................................................................................................... 128 
5.2.2 A private vocabulary for grief. ................................................................................................. 134 
5.3 A happiness agenda .............................................................................................................. 140 
5.3.1 No health without mental health ........................................................................................... 143 
5.4 The joumeyto recovety ...................................................................................................... 151 
5.4.1 A culture of trauma ...................................................................................................................... 156 
5.4.2 Resistance to recovery ............................................................................................................... 158 
SIS Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 162 
Chapter 6 Navigating the grief journey: The helpers .............................................. 164 
6.1 Introduction to the chapter .............................................................................................. 164 
6.2 The state of bereavement services in England ........................................................... 166 
6.2.1 The need for expert help ........................................................................................................... 167 
6.3 What makes 'grief work' work? ....................................................................................... 171 
6.3.1 The type of counselling approach and method ................................................................ 172 
6.3.2 The making of the bereavement expert .............................................................................. 177 
6.3.3 Assessing clients for treatment. .............................................................................................. 181 
6.3.4 Counselling as normalisation .................................................................................................. 183 
6.3.5 The importance of safety ........................................................................................................... 185 
6.3.6 Emotion work. ................................................................................................................................ 187 
6.4 Agents of change .................................................................................................................... 190 
6.4.1 Negotiating recovery ................................................................................................................... 192 
6.4.2 Resisting recovery ........................................................................................................................ 201 
6.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 205 
Chapter 7 Navigating the liminal space of grief: Making the journey ................ 209 
7.1 Introduction to the chapter ............................................................................................... 209 
7.2 Making sense of grief ........................•.•...........................................................................•..•. 210 
7.2.1 Rational and symbolic explanations ..................................................................................... 210 
v 
7.2.2 Failing to make sense of grief .................................................................................................. 218 
7.3 Affective practices and recovery work .......................................................................... 222 
7.3.1 Rituals ................................................................................................................................................ 223 
7.3.2 Distractions ..................................................................................................................................... 227 
7.3.3 Negotiating space and objects ................................................................................................. 232 
7.4 Inhabiting and resisting identities .................................................................................. 237 
7.4.1 New identities ................................................................................................................................ 238 
7.4.2 Relational identities ..................................................................................................................... 241 
7.4.3 Resistant identities ...................................................................................................................... 247 
'.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 251 
Chapter 8 Discussion of key themes: Meanings, practices and identities ........ 254 
8.1 Introduction to the chapter ............................................................................................... 254 
8.2 Making sense of grief and recovery ................................................................................ 255 
8.2.1 Public and private narratives about grief and recovery ............................................... 256 
8.2.2 Failing to make sense of grief .................................................................................................. 260 
8.3 Affective practices ................................................................................................................. 263 
8.3.1 Grief work ........................................................................................................................................ 264 
8.3.2 Performing grief ............................................................................................................................ 267 
8.3.3 Failing to perform grief .............................................................................................................. 270 
8.4 Constructing identities ........................................................................................................ 274 
8.4.1 Recovered identities .................................................................................................................... 275 
8.4.2 Relational identities ..................................................................................................................... 277 
8.4.3 Unrecovered identities ............................................................................................................... 281 
8.S Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 286 
Chapter 9 The other side of recovery ............................................................................ 288 
9.1 Theorising grief: Suggesting an alternative view ...................................................... 289 
9.1.1 Problematising grief as a psychological object of study ............................................... 289 
vi 
9.1.2 Highlighting relationality and ambivalence ...................................................................... 291 
9.2 Why 'non-recovery' matters .............................................................................................. 294 
9.3 The 'complicated griever': Construct or reality? ........................................................ 298 
9.4 Limitations of the research ................................................................................................ 301 
9.5 Implications for further research and practice .......................................................... 302 
Appendices ............................................................................................................................... 306 
Bibliography ......................................... 11 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 320 
List of figures and tables 
Figure 1 The recovery star ................................................................................................................ 154 
Figure 2 The grief wheel .................................................................................................. 195 
Table 1 Bereavement care professional participants ......................................................... 316 
Table 2 Bereaved participants ..................................................................................................... 317 
Table 3 Participants from mental health services ............................................................... 317 
vii 
CHAPTER 1 
I ntrod uction 
This thesis examines the notion of recovery from grief following bereavement. I 
explore the concept of recovery and how it frames the theory, policy, and practice of 
bereavement care, and the lives of bereaved people in England. 
The origins of this study arose from three separate debates within bereavement care 
and mental health care. First, within bereavement care and practice I noted how the 
term 'recovery' was increasingly contested or rejected, epitomised in a special issue 
on the use of recovery in the Death Studies journal (Volume 32, Issue 1, 2008). 
Second, I observed a growing interest in recovery within UK national health care 
services, particularly mental health, where service users and providers were 
embracing a 'recovery model' of care. Third, 'complicated' and 'prolonged' forms of 
grief were increasingly a focus of psychiatric classification, becoming a concern for 
both bereavement care and mental health care, and producing a burgeoning field of 
research into 'complicated grief (Prigerson et al., 1995, 2009; Shear, 2010). 
These debates heralded the contested nature of the ways in which grief and recovery 
were being conceptualised and practiced. Within bereavement research and practice, 
grief was commonly understood as 'normal' and 'natural' and not something from 
which one recovered but rather something that one lived through. Yet the rising focus 
on 'complicated' forms of grief suggested there were times when grief was 'derailed' 
from its natural course (Shear, 2012). There was thus a growing theme in grief 
research of measuring abnormal forms of grief, suggesting that in some cases people 
'fail' to progress through grief to recovery. Largely the researchers who were 
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articulating these debates were psychologists and psychiatrists, who maintained an 
understanding of recovery from grief as something to be managed and measured in 
the individual psyche. This dominant notion of recovery failed to incorporate the shift 
towards social understandings of grief, as demonstrated by work across the social 
sciences (Hallam et al., 1999; Hockey et al., 2010; Klass et al., 1996). 
It was amid these disputes and contradictions that I developed this thesis, taking 
'recovery' as my focus, from which to examine how the boundaries around what 
constitutes successful grieving were being drawn. With a background in sociological 
theory, I turned to theories and research from across the social sciences and cultural 
studies to critique the dominant notion of recovery and work towards an alternative 
understanding of grief. My aims were formulated from an interest in finding out how 
recovery and the failure to recover were being negotiated: in bereavement care 
practice and by those who experience bereavement. In order to address these aims I 
undertook a qualitative approach using data from semi-structured interviews both 
with bereavement care practitioners working across England and people who had 
been bereaved, to gather insight into how recovery and definitions of 'complicated 
grief were expressed in practice and experienced in the lives of bereaved people. 
In what follows I describe the professional and personal motivations that led me to 
research the contentious term 'recovery' and its relevance to grief and bereavement 
research and practice. I explain how I was led to the alternate notion of 'non-
recovery' that informed my aim to uncover what happens to people who 'fail' to 
recover. 
2 
1.1 Recovery and grief: conflicting perspectives 
In 2008 the journal Death Studies published a special issue on 'recovery from 
bereavement'. The special issue was in part a response to an article written by Balk 
(2004) in the same journal that addressed how bereavement researchers and 
practitioners considered the terms 'recovery' and 'recover' as 'problematic' and 
actively discouraged their use. Balk (2004) described how researchers and 
practitioners favoured other terms such as 'manage', 'adapt', 'deal with', 'adjust' over 
recovery. Balk provided two accounts from his personal and professional experience 
to illustrate the 'unseemly' nature of recovery from bereavement. He detailed his 
experience of including the phrase 'recovery from bereavement' in a manuscript only 
to have it returned from the reviewer with the suggestion that the usage of such a 
phrase was counter to 'current thinking in bereavement research'. Balk also 
recounted a conversation over lunch with psychiatrist Colin Murray Parkes1 who 
expressed regret over the title of his co-authored book Recovery from Bereavement 
(Parkes & Weiss, 1983). I contacted Parkes to clarify this remark and he replied that 
on reflection he did not think Recovery from Bereavement was a bad title but that 
recovery pinned down something and made it simple: 'it promises an ending, a 
solution to a problem that cannot be solved, or not completely'2. 
In the article Balk expressed puzzlement at the dislike of the term 'recovery' 
proposing that on the contrary it was 'belittling' to insist that people were unable to 
recover from grief. Balk referred to the dictionary definitions of recovery, to suggest 
recovery has much broader meaning than that associated with the medical definition 
1 Parkes' research on grief heavily shaped the nature of bereavement care as described in 
Chapter 2. 
2 Personal email communication, 7 May 2016. 
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of recovery, which implies a return to prior functioning, and further positions grief as 
an illness - a notion repellent to bereavement researchers and practitioners. Balk 
referred to the Oxford English Dictionary, which defined recovery as 'the cure or 
healing of an illness, wound, etc' and also 'the restoration of a person (or more rarely, 
a thing) to a healthy or normal condition, or to consciousness', For Balk, recovery did 
not refer to the retrieval of the lost person, or a prior way of life, but to the recovery 
of one's self, 'one's humanity'. Balk suggested this recovery of the self following 
bereavement was through 'redefining' and 'reintegrating' into life. 
Four years later in the dedicated special issue Balk (2008) similarly contended that it 
is 'nonsense' to reject recovery, and that the 'usual' outcome of bereavement is 
recovery, claiming it is 'obvious' bereaved people 'typically recover'. Balk again 
described the 'widespread resistance' to using recovery in bereavement, and the 
'distaste' towards recovery that is 'at times visceral'. He also acknowledged the rise in 
popularity of the term 'resilience', across a variety of mental and physical health 
concerns, and its preferred use over recovery, which Balk found 'ironic' due to the 
definition of resilience being 'to recover quickly'. One of the main proponents of the 
theory of resilience during bereavement, Bonanno (2009), argued that rather than 
following a trajectory of recovery, people display resilience in the face of adverse 
events, maintaining a sense of mental equilibrium. For Balk, the notion of resilience 
and the belief that people 'bounce back' from bereavement was against the 
understanding that people experience 'growth' through the process of grieving. 
Accordingly, if one's self and world is resilient and has not been devastated and 
challenged by bereavement, there is nothing to grieve and from which to recover. 
In the remainder of the special issue on recovery the authors suggested alternatives 
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to recovery, including resilience and 'adaptation'. Rosenblatt (2008a) took a different 
perspective by exploring how recovery has different meanings and plays different 
roles depending on the context. Instead Rosenblatt suggested recovery should be 
viewed as a metaphor that highlights some things and obscures others. Metaphors 
are a term of language that compare a literal experience with a figurative concept, in 
order to suggest a resemblance, or as a way to represent an experience. Influenced by 
Rosenblatt's suggestion, I too began to feel that recovery as a metaphor was being 
used as a 'figurative' concept to describe the 'literal' experience of grief, and that as a 
metaphor, recovery was obscuring more issues than it was highlighting. It was clear 
that there was a hesitancy, and as Balk described at times, an almost 'visceral distaste' 
for using the term recovery in reference to grief. However, it was precisely the 
contested nature of the term, and increasing preference towards 'resilience', that 
meant exploring the notion of recovery felt like an important area of inquiry. I now 
detail some of the personal motivations that led me to question the meaning of 
recovery from grief. 
1.1.1 My own 'recovery' 
Embarking on this research, investigating the meaning of recovery caused me to 
reflect on my own recovery. Before beginning the PhD research I had focused my 
research on the experience of grief (Pearce, 2008, 2010, 2011). My initial interest in 
exploring grief and bereavement in academic research stemmed from a personal 
experience of bereavement. In one respect my motivation for reflecting on grief 
through the assistance of academic theory was a way to make sense of the experience 
when other methods had failed. This process of making sense of my own experiences 
was explicit in my first publication based on my undergraduate degree dissertation 
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(Pearce, 2008). At the time I was influenced by writings that described the healing 
power of voicing one's narrative of trauma (Bury, 2001; Charmaz, 1999; Gilbert, 
2002). I contended, and believed, that in voicing my own experiences I had resolved 
the rupture in identity caused by grief and recovered my 'self, an argument not 
dissimilar to Balk's understanding of recovery described above. 
According to models of grief as a staged process, I was 'recovered' and had 
successfully returned to 'normal' functioning. Yet I also knew that my 'recovery' was 
something in flux and was constantly renegotiated. Furthermore, I certainly was not 
keen on describing my life as one of recovery or not, which I felt meant my life was 
determined by events that had happened before I was 16 years old. In my earlier 
research, as I began exploring the literature around grief, I was dismayed by articles 
that claimed young people bereaved of their parents were in effect destined for an 
array of mental health problems; from depression and addictions to having intimacy 
problems (Gray, 1987; Harris, 1991; Harrison & Harrington, 2001; McLeod, 1991; 
Raphael et al., 1990). When I stopped taking it too personally I decided to explore the 
experiences of other young women. In the data from the six participants, I discovered 
a variety of responses and ways of managing grief that I argued were marked by an 
ambivalent tie to their deceased mother (Pearce, 2011). 
The presence of a continuing ambivalence in the young women's relationship with 
their mothers resonated much with my own feelings towards my deceased mother. 
The presence of an ambivalent bond did not fit easily into understandings of grief that 
suggested a movement through stages and a time limit to grieving, which I expand on 
in Chapter 2 in my detailed review of the grief literature. Rather ambivalence 
revealed a back and forth movement with no clear resolution: a double-bind. 
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Personally, acknowledging ambivalence meant realising the idea of recovering the 
self was not only impossible but also relied on an inaccurate understanding of what 
constitutes the 'self. The self as revealed through ambivalent ties, rather than an 
autonomous individual, was relationally formed and socially constructed. The 
discovery of ambivalence was the starting point for the current investigation into 
recovery from grief, where, as I demonstrate throughout this thesis, ambivalence 
served to counteract the narrative of recovery and also brought into question 
contemporary understandings of grief. 
1.1.2 A recovery movement 
As I moved away from my own experience of recovery, I learned of the considerable 
growth of interest in the concept of recovery in mental health care (Department of 
Health, 2001; McPherson et al., 2009). Stemming from a melange of beliefs and values 
that emerged from anti-psychiatry, the psychiatric survivors movement, and the 
consumer rights movement, recovery began as a radical movement, that critiqued the 
paternalistic nature of health care and sought to reclaim power back to the patient or 
service user (Braslow, 2013; Roberts & Wolfson, 2004; Travis, 2009). The move 
towards recovery sought to bring acceptance to living with a mental illness and to 
broaden the notion of recovery outside of medical requirements. The introduction of 
recovery into health care policy was an attempt to remedy what is considered to be 
the 'epistemic injustice' at the heart of the way health care services have been 
administered (Carel, 2013). 
Arguably, as recovery began to be co-opted and incorporated into mainstream 
practices, radical demands coincided with, or indeed were diluted by, a government 
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agenda of autonomy and individual responsibility (Braslow, 2013). This was perhaps 
a result of the 'plastic' nature of recovery that was designed to be inclusionary unlike 
the exclusionary nature of the healthcare of the past As I describe in Chapter 5, 
service users began to express their dissatisfaction with a notion of recovery that had 
come to be shaped by government directed outcomes rather than being individually 
defined. It appeared that implementing a recovery model in mental health was 
beginning to experience similar troubles to defining recovery from grief in 
bereavement care. What was being established were two dividing notions of 
recovery, one that could be decided from a clinical perspective, and that had to be 
proved to have universal application; and one that was defined individually and that 
could reaffirm, resist or be completely detached from normative beliefs around 
recovery. However, neither of these definitions of recovery incorporated a socially 
informed model of recovery, for instance one that emphasised how recovery was 
achieved by being in relation to certain ideas, people, organisations, rather than 
simply being a matter of individual choice and will. 
The recovery movement was complemented by a government agenda focused on 
individual happiness and well-being. In 2010 the UK government set out to measure 
the population's level of happiness, in the belief that happiness and well-being was an 
indicator of national progress in the same way as gross domestic product (GDP). 
Policies were created to directly target and improve well-being, through schemes that 
aided access to psychological therapies (Improving Access to Psychological 
Therapies) and enabled people to recover from depression. Through government 
driven initiatives, improving one's well-being and recovering from mental illness 
were understood as a matter of individual choice and responsibility, as was the trend 
in public health. In such a climate, focused on improving happiness and human 
flourishing, 'negative' emotions like grief, and mental disorders like depression, 
became things not to live with but to overcome, not only in the name of individual 
health but also for the economic stability of the nation. As I discuss in Chapter 5, a 
thriving economy is key to many mental health reforms due to the huge financial 
costs of mental health within the National Health Service (NHS) budget, estimated at 
an annual cost of £105 billion in 2016. 
In this thesis, I discuss how people are politically and socially obligated to recover 
from grief. I illustrate this through exploring the question of what happens when 
people fail to recover. The question of what it means to not recover is what I asked 
myself when confronted with the variety of conflicting discourse around recovery. 
Debates over how best to define recovery are divided between a deep attachment to 
recovery, and an equally strong aversion to not recovering. I argue that this is 
because of what not recovering represents and the threat it poses to ideas about grief 
and the person who grieves. Failing to recover from grief reveals the difficulties 
people have in 'detaching' from deceased people, blurring the modern divide between 
life and death (Howarth, 2000). Further, in a climate where mental distress is 
construed as a heavy 'burden' not recovering from grief presents a problem to the 
political and economic running of society. 
1.1.3 What is non-recovery? 
In exploring the possibility of not recovering, or rejecting dominant notions of 
recovery, I returned to an essay by Kauffman (2008), also included in the Death 
Studies special issue on recovery. Kauffman's essay was entitled: 'What is "no 
recovery"?'. Kauffman's article drew on philosophical and clinical insight to suggest 
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that following bereavement, no one recovers. Kauffman suggested, 'no recovery' was 
not a transitional state but a condition of human existence. In such a state one might 
claim recovery if he or she finds that they can adapt to such conditions, but for 
Kauffman this was only a display of social adjustment not a resolution of mourning. 
Often theories of grief sought to give grief a function whether enabling social 
cohesion or an opportunity for social transformation. Kauffman's state of no recovery 
suggests that no norms are sufficiently adequate to take care of the disruption caused 
by death, and so recovery becomes a moral or symbolic act, put simply a socially-
framed performance. 
Kauffman's essay provided a concept to explore: the question of no recovery, which I 
refer to in this thesis as 'non-recovery'. In exploring the possibility of non-recovery, 
recovery appears as only one way to respond to grief. It opens the ways to explore 
how recovery might instead be a socially informed and constructed performance. In 
order to conceptualise the possibility of 'non-recovery' I have drawn on van Gennep's 
(1960) and Turner's (1969) use of the concept 'liminality'. In this thesis I describe the 
experience of grief as one of inhabiting a liminal space. I suggest that within this 
liminal space the bereaved person is searching to make sense of and manage grief, 
negotiating the ideas, norms and discourses around grief and recovery, following a 
trajectory of 'recovery' or 'non-recovery'. The growth of interest in the psychiatric 
categories of 'complicated grief and 'prolonged grief disorder' provide clear 
classifications of what constitutes 'abnormal' or 'problematic' grieving in 
contemporary research and practice. The emergence of the 'complicated griever' 
supplied an empirical example to examine the contested boundary between recovery 
and non-recovery. The ways in which recovery from grief comes to be constructed, 
defined and managed thus became the focus of the thesis. 
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1.2 Aims o/the thesis 
I have detailed how the aims of the thesis were structured around exploring the 
notion of recovery following bereavement in theory, policy and practice in England. I 
recognised that because recovery is a contested term in bereavement care practice 
embarking on a study of this was potentially controversial. However, I argue that an 
examination of the notion of recovery from grief is required in order to unpack some 
of the implications that surround the contested views on recovery for research and 
practice, as well as to challenge the assumptions that underpin grief and bereavement 
and also for the benefit of the person who experiences bereavement. 
In bereavement research and practice, grief is understood as the subsequent natural 
emotional response that emerges following bereavement. In this thesis, I use the term 
bereavement to refer to the event of losing someone from death. I refer to grief as the 
emotion or feelings that arise in response to bereavement. This distinction between 
the event of bereavement and the response of grief is important for I contend in this 
thesis that though bereavement is an event which befalls many, grief as a response 
can be felt, expressed, and managed differently. 
In seeking to highlight the shortcomings of the way grief is currently theorised, and 
shed light on the possibility of 'non-recovery' and the person who 'fails' to recover, I 
turn to the work of Foucault (1961, 1963, 1970, 1975) who consistently critiqued the 
normative understandings of ideas, practices and subjectivities by highlighting how 
ideas about society and people are constructed through 'discourses', and identities 
are produced at the intersections between discourse and practice. Focusing on 
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discourse involves analysing how certain ways of describing and practising ideas, 
people, or experiences, dominate in a particular historical context. Foucault analysed 
how certain ideas come to be governed by focusing on 'problematisations': how 
certain people, ideas, and practices come to considered 'problematic' at key points in 
history in certain societies or cultures, and the strategies used to manage them. My 
aim was to analyse the bereaved person using this framework, to explore how grief 
had become a problem through the dominance of discourses of recovery, shaping 
grief and the bereaved person as something to be managed. Within this was the 
subsequent aim of bringing alternatives to recovery into view, an aim demonstrated 
in Foucault's work through critiquing the 'figure of man' that western thoughts had 
relied upon. My aim was thus to bring to light the shape of the 'non-recovered' figure 
through revealing the ways in which current theories of grief and recovery were 
formulated around a particular vision of the bereaved person, that had highlighted 
and obscured different aspects of grief and the bereaved person's experiences. 
The aims of the thesis are: 
• To consider the implications of the broader move within mental health care 
towards recovery for grief and bereavement care. 
• To give insight into how recovery following bereavement is defined and 
managed in current policy and practice. 
• To provide empirical data on what happens when people are seen as failing to 
recover from bereavement; when someone's grieving behaviour is categorised 
as 'complicated', 'complex' or 'prolonged' as well as giving voice to the 
narrative of 'non-recovery'. 
• To add to the body of social literature on alternative ways of theorising grief 
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and bereavement that incorporates the idea of non-recovery. 
To carry out these aims I adopted a qualitative approach to research. I conducted an 
analysis of a variety of documents relating to how people make sense of and manage 
recovery and grief in a contemporary UK setting. I drew upon government policy 
documents from 2001 onwards; literature from bereavement care organisations; and 
lay literature on grief, such as first person memoirs. Following this I carried out 27 
semi-structured interviews with both practitioners working across a variety of 
organisations delivering bereavement care and support and with people who had 
experienced bereavement. The data draw on interviews with people working within 
organisations such as the national bereavement charity Cruse Bereavement Care, a 
local bereavement counselling service and the non-profit organisation Grief Recovery 
UK. 
1.3 The structure of the thesis 
In the next chapter I review the literature on grief and bereavement I move 
chronologically beginning with Freud's (1917) essay 'Mourning and Melancholia' up 
to the present day debates concerning 'complicated grief and 'prolonged grief 
disorder'. I argue that the dominance of psychological studies into grief has 
transformed grief into a problem of the individual psyche, necessitating the creation 
of bereavement counselling and therapies. I explore the type of assumed subject that 
the psychological view rests on, questioning its validity. In Chapter 3, I critique the 
psychological notions of grief and the bereaved person by exploring other literature 
on grief, in particular taking a different angle on Freud's understanding of mourning 
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and melancholia. I argue for the need for grief researchers to look beyond the 
psychology of grief into the study of emotions and affect to suggest an alternative 
multidisciplinary way of theorising grief. I introduce the concept of 'affective 
practices' to explore how grief can be both an individually felt and socially practiced 
emotion. In Chapter 4, I outline my methodological approach indebted to the 
methodology of Foucault, and how I utilised his ideas to focus on the 
'problematisation' of grief, and critique the essentialising of grief and subject. I also 
detail the methods I used and provide background to the participants of the study. 
Chapter 5 details the cultural and political framing of grief and raises issues about 
how grief and recovery are framed and shaped by a variety of social, political and 
economic factors such as psychiatric diagnosis, literary narratives, economic policy 
on happiness and well-being and the growth of a 'recovery model' in mental health 
care. This sets the scene for Chapter 6 in which I describe the role of bereavement 
care services in England through an examination of bereavement counselling. I 
present the data from the bereavement care participants, exploring what 'grief work' 
involves and how recovery is negotiated in practice. In Chapter 7, I draw on the 
interview data from the bereaved participants, analysing how they described the 
experience of grief, how they managed grief and the sense of self-identity they 
narrated. In Chapter 8 I synthesise the key themes of meaning, practices and 
identities that emerged from the data before drawing together the final conclusions 




2.1 Introduction to the chapter 
In this chapter I review the key thinkers and theories that have populated the field of 
grief and bereavement research over the last century. This review begins 
chronologically to provide a brief history of the ideas that have sought to make sense 
of grief, from a largely western, psychological perspective, into what has evolved into 
the expansive field of the study of grief and bereavement I aim to show how some 
theories and models such as the work of Kubler-Ross (1970) and the five stages of 
grief remain popular to this day, while others either lost favour or suffered from 
misinterpretation over time. 
The work of Freud (1917) is an exemplar of the latter case and is commonly where 
most literature reviews of grief and bereavement begin. However, I argue that the 
largely psychological field of contemporary grief research has inherited and 
reiterated overly simplistic renderings of Freud's writings in 'Mourning and 
Melancholia' where definitions of successful mourning are often still considered to be 
about 'letting go' and 'detaching' from the deceased. The dominance of psychological 
understandings of grief has, I demonstrate, led to particular ways of understanding 
grief as an individual, internal emotion. Crucially it configured recovery as a 
psychological process with various stages and tasks to 'work through'. To contrast I 
highlight the work of sOciologists and anthropologists who critiqued this linear 
process view of grief and recovery by demonstrating the cultural variations in 
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understandings and practices of grief and mourning. From this work has emerged the 
'continuing bonds' thesis of grief (Klass et al., 1996) and an interest in the stories of 
bereaved people which its proponents argued was a more accurate means to capture 
how people actually experience and recover from grief (see, for example, Walter, 
1996). I also discuss research into grief informed by the work of Foucault (Arnason, 
2001,2007; Arnason & Hafsteinsson, 2003; Foote & Frank, 1999) to demonstrate the 
ways in which changes in theories of grief and recovery can be viewed alongside 
transformations in government rationality, where the aim of grief theories and 
practices is the production of autonomous individuals. In closing I consider the 
paradox that lies at the heart of grief theories and practices, that of the formation of a 
subject who is simultaneously autonomous and independent and yet liable to 
devastation at the death of another. 
2.2 A brief history of the study of grief 
2.2.1 Freudian beginnings 
The academic study of grief is a relatively modern phenomenon with systematic 
research on death and dying only emerging in the aftermath ofthe Second World War 
(Small, 2001). The study of grief and its expression was previously the domain of the 
arts and literature (Archer, 1999). The publication of Freud's essay 'Mourning and 
Melancholia' in 1917 is considered as the first attempt at a 'scientific' understanding 
of grief, though Freud himself acknowledged his thoughts were not a claim to general 
validity and that the empirical material upon which the study was founded was 
'insufficient' (Freud, 1917, p. 243). In his essay, Freud sought to delineate the nature 
of the state of melancholia by comparing it to the condition of mourning. For Freud 
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the states of both mourning and melancholia shared the same causal influence: that of 
the loss of an object The lost object was not only the loss of a person but could also 
be 'the loss of some abstraction which has taken the place of one, such as one's 
country, liberty, and ideal, and so on' (p. 243). Melancholia was not strictly the 
consequence of failed mourning as it came to be understood in later research but 
rather that in both cases loss was the 'environmental influence' yet this loss could be 
entirely abstract Melancholia was characterised by: 
A profoundly painful dejection, cessation of interest in the outside world, loss 
of the capacity to love, inhibition of all activity, and a lowering of the self-
regarding feelings to a degree that finds utterance in self-reproaches and self-
revilings, and culminates in a delusional expectation of punishment (Freud, 
1917, p. 244) 
The same traits were to be found in mourning aside from a disturbance in self-regard. 
What happened in melancholia was that the reproach one might feel towards a lost 
object was, in the absence of the object, turned inward appearing as a reproach 
against oneself, or in Freud's terms against one's ego. Freud viewed the psyche as 
structured into three parts: the 'ego', the 'super ego' and the 'id'. The 'id' refers to the 
unconscious drives, composed of the life and death instincts. The life drive includes 
the 'libido', which is often interpreted as referring to love or desire. The ego is the 
rational response between the id's unconscious urges and the societal norms and 
demands. The superego's function was to control the instincts of the id by 
incorporating the moral values of the society in which one is situated, learned from 
parents and others. The reproach one felt towards the other person that in their 
absence was turned against one's self, was an action of the 'libido'. The libido is 
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always seeking out new connections. It is this belief that led Freud to suggest that the 
frustration of a desire caused by the absence of the object of desire turns back on to 
the person's ego, overwhelming it and causing a shadow of the object on the ego. 
This understanding of how attachments and desire work framed the way Freud 
understood successful mourning. This was through a long and painful process of 
'reality-testing' where 'each single one of the memories and expectations in which the 
libido is bound to the object is brought up and hyper-cathected' leading to a 
detachment of the libido so that the 'ego becomes free and inhibited again' (p. 245). 
To understand the implications of this process there is a need to unpack some of the 
terms Freud used as well to put his ideas into the context of the rest of his work First 
of all, 'reality-testing' involved recognising which aspects of the self were located in 
the dead person and retrieving them to better understand oneself. By contrast in 
melancholia one does not know what she or he has lost: 'one cannot see clearly what 
it is that has been lost, and it is all the more reasonable to suppose that the patient 
cannot consciously perceive what he has lost either' (p. 245). Melancholia is brought 
about by the inability to recognise not that someone has died but what she or he has 
lost in him or herself: 'he knows whom he has lost but not what he has lost in him' (p. 
245). The distinction then is that in melancholia what has been lost is withdrawn 
from consciousness, whereas in mourning nothing about loss is unconscious. 
As I outline below, later theorists construed this to mean melancholia or the failure to 
mourn was largely caused by an inability to face the reality of the death. However the 
question caused by the condition of melancholia: what it is that has been lost, also 
seeks the extent to which parts of the self, or ego, have been lost. Why this process is 
so difficult and prone to failure is because of the way in which objects of desire - a 
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person or a perception of a person - become incorporated into oneself through a 
process Freud described as 'identification'. For Freud all love relationships were 
fraught with ambivalence due to the way in which identification with an object meant 
the sustenance of one's existence was at least in part reliant upon the continuation 
and endurance of another object outside of oneself. The loss of the loved object thus 
brings that ambivalence out into the open, to be managed laboriously or experienced 
as a reproach towards oneself. 
Klein (1940) further developed Freud's thoughts on mourning and melancholia, to 
understand mourning as the experience of losing one's internal 'good' objects. For 
Klein the success of mourning in later life was dependent on how well the infant 
identified with a stable good object, which is in the form of the primary caregiver, and 
how these objects were internalised. This process of identifying with an external 
object was crucial to the stability of the ego and its capacity to integrate experience. 
The loss of a loved person is one where the mourner feels he or she has lost their 
internal good objects as well. As Klein describes, '[h]e then feels that his internal 'bad' 
objects predominate and his inner world is in danger of disruption' (p. 353). Normal 
mourning seeks to reinstate the object as well as the internal objects that have been 
felt to be lost, therefore recovering what has been already attained in childhood. 
Melancholia results when the experience of losing one's internal objects was not 
completed in childhood. The melancholic mourner fails to rebuild the disintegrated 
inner world and re-own the 'projective identification' that was lodged in the now 
deceased person. 
For Klein and Freud, objects were mental images of a loved other that become 
internalised into the person's sense of self. Objects were not representative of the 
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whole person but rather parts of the other that maintained and sustained the 
person's own self. Klein made the further distinction of recognising that objects can 
be 'good' and 'bad'. Furthermore, in Klein's theory it is possible to understand how 
objects go from good to bad in the event of bereavement. The melancholic figure is 
not then just holding on to lost objects but overwhelmed by bad objects, in part 
according to Klein because the first mourning was not completed. 
In the theory of Freud and Klein, responses to bereavement, whether described as 
mourning or melancholia, are seeking to reconcile with the same problem: the loss of 
a loved object. It is only that those expressions take different guises but are not 
inherently pathological. One reason why Freud might contend mourning is necessary 
is his understanding of the 'life drive'. In brief, the life drive is what impels the ego to 
preserve life - being alive - at all costs. Severing attachments to a dead object is thus 
more about the drive of the ego that is now faced with deciding 'whether it shall share 
this fate' (p. 255). Mourning then is about the success of the life drive, of the ego, but 
this seems to leave unanswered why precisely the libido goes about directing its 
energies onto objects. The libido is formulated both as an energy independent of 
objects in which it can invest or divest itself whenever necessary and also as 
something that derives pleasure from, and is reconfigured by, the process of attaching 
to objects itself. So there's a contradiction in Freud but this is not Freud's 
contradiction alone. The paradox of why people form relationships only to have to 
mourn them is one that faces understandings of grief more generally, and one that, as 
will be demonstrated, has sought to be resolved through a variety of perspectives. 
I return to Freud in the next chapter to discuss feminist interpretations of Freud that 
utilised his ideas quite differently. What remains important to mention here is that 
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certain interpretations of Freud became the basis on which later work on grief was 
established, either affirming or rejecting his claims. Other academics have noted this 
disservice to Freud, as Small (2001, p. 25) argued, 'simply to talk about letting go and 
moving on ( ... ) does not do justice to the idea of resolution presented by Freud'. 
Further, many have gone to pains to emphasise that Freud's intimation into what 
might be happening was not necessarily an invitation to do something about it 
(Granek, 2013; Small & Hockey, 2001). In fact intervention into mourning was clearly 
opposed: 'We rely on its [mourning] being overcome after a certain lapse oftime, and 
we look upon any interference with it as useless or even harmful' (Freud 1917, p. 
244). The question I will seek to address in the rest of this chapter is why certain 
interpretations have survived and what or in whose interests they might serve. 
2.2.2 Grief as a syndrome 
Whether influenced by Freud and the burgeoning community of psychoanalytic 
practitioners or as a consequence of the mass deaths suffered in the First and Second 
World Wars, the inter-war period saw an increase in research interest in grief that 
proposed categories of adjustment (Eliot, 1932) and began to describe the process of 
grief, as well as focusing on recovery from war bereavement (Fulconer, 1942). 
Lindemann (1944) is commonly credited as carrying out the first systematic and 
empirical study of grief. In 1944 Lindemann published his article 'Symptomatology 
and management of acute grief. The article was based upon 101 interviews he 
carried out largely based on 'psycho-neurotic' patients who were bereaved during 
their treatment, as well as relatives of hospital patients. Lindemann also spoke to 
survivors of the Coconut Grove nightclub fire in Boston in 1942. Lindemann's work is 
notable for the fact he described grief as a distinct syndrome with its own 
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symptomology. Lindemann described grief as a universal syndrome that could be 
known and measured involving symptoms such as somatic distress, preoccupation 
with the image of the deceased, guilt, hostile reactions, and loss of patterns of 
conduct What Lindemann's work sought to prove was thus a normal course of grief 
from which abnormal grief could be identified. This allowed for grief to become a 
matter to be dealt with by psychiatry that could aid people along the 'right' course. In 
fact Lindemann was quite clear that grief was something only psychiatrists could 
assist with (Granek 2013, p. 59). 
Establishing grief as a definite syndrome also had implications for what was 
considered a successful recovery. Grief required work and psychiatrists were 
encouraged to monitor whether people did the appropriate grief work, where grief 
work was understood as involving 'efforts at extricating himself from the bondage of 
the deceased and finding new patterns of rewarding interaction' (Lindemann, 1944, 
p. 147). Echoes of Freud are clearly audible in this interpretation of grief work as 
implying a willing detachment from the deceased person, but Lindemann also 
emphasised the need to identify 'delayed' or 'absent' reactions to grief. Here 
Lindemann introduced the element of time into grief and its recovery, where grief 
was comprehensible as something that occurred and dissipated in a set time period. 
This also justified the need for intervention where the gaze of the psychiatrist could 
both identify and measure a person's movement along the now established normal 
course of grief. 
Lindemann's research has since received criticism for the weakness of his 
methodology and lack of analysis. For example Archer (1999) points out that 
Lindemann derived much of his argument from the Coconut Grove survivor accounts 
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but they only made up 13 of the 101 participants. Methodological issues 
notwithstanding, Lindemann's work appeared to be driven by the ambitions of the 
psychiatric and psychological fields of practice at the time and the desire of both to 
establish themselves as scientific disciplines with procedures and classifications 
comparable to the rest of western medicine. Lindemann's work set forward an 
understanding of grief that subsequently became unquestioned, the idea of grief as 
distinct and measurable and involving a normal course from which any deviation was 
deemed to be abnormal. For some, grief becoming a matter for psychiatry and 
psychology provided new opportunities for research and practice, while in retrospect 
others, as Klass (2014) remarked, view Lindemann's study and its implications as 
contributing to a narrowing in understandings of grief in the twentieth century. 
On the one hand the expanding fields of psychology and psychiatry were changing the 
way grief was understood and managed, positioning grief as an object for psychiatric 
concern. Another factor influenCing the management of grief was the declining 
significance of religion in the UK. This was the contention of Gorer's (1965) study first 
published in 1955. Gorer's research is notable by its absence in psychological reviews 
of the literature, though with his anthropological inclinations that may be 
unsurprising. Gorer carried out a survey of 359 people in the UK, 80 of whom took 
part in qualitative interviews. What was apparent from the survey and interview data 
was that there was a lack of religious belief and ritual in how people experienced or 
dealt with their grief, leading Gorer to claim that people had lost the art of grieving. 
Gorer, however, in line with his psychologist contemporaries viewed grief as a 
psychological process. For Gorer, grief involved three stages: the initial stage of shock, 
followed by a period of intense mourning and withdrawal from the world, leading to a 
re-establishing of 'homeostasis'. Gorer also highlighted different 'styles of mourning' 
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such as a 'denial' of mourning, 'hiding grief, 'mummification', and 'time-limited 
mourning'. For Gorer, religious and traditional rituals provided a time frame and 
activities to the mourning period, the absence of which led to 'unlimited mourning' or 
melancholia. As with Lindemann, time limits became an important measure of types 
of grief and Gorer suggested that time-limited mourning was the best means to 
achieving recovery or homeostasis. Gorer also viewed these styles of mourning as an 
individual choice, drawing parallels with Lindemann's study where grief work 
became viewed as an individual action. 
Gorer's work, like Lindemann's, has received criticism for its clumsy and generalised 
analysis (Jalland, 2010). However what is evident from Gorer's study is the focus on 
individual patterns of mourning and time-limited mourning that resonated in later 
understandings of bereavement. I suggest that the emphasis on establishing phases 
and time limits on acceptable and unacceptable grieving served the interests of the 
psychologist and practitioners working within bereavement care. Having time limits 
and phases provides a rationale for intervention under the guise of assisting people 
along the healthy, normal course. Shortly after the publication of Gorer's study the 
first national bereavement charity Cruse Bereavement Care was established in the UK 
and the rise of the hospice movement witnessed the creation of the first modern 
hospice in 1967 at St Christopher's Hospice in South London. Bereavement care was 
growing into a profession in its own right, with its own designated institutions and 
organisations along with theories of bereavement, classifications and measures, and 
therapeutic interventions. Bereavement care practitioners, therefore, had a stake in 
perpetuating the relevance and demand for their services. 
It is not without note, I argue, that the research carried out into grief and 
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bereavement over the twentieth century to the present day was, and is, 
overwhelmingly authored by psychologists and psychiatrists, and to a lesser extent, 
psychoanalysts. The growth of the field of bereavement care and research was 
situated within what Rose (1985, 1989) has described as the growth of the 'psy' 
disciplines: psychology, psychoanalysis and psychiatry. For Rose the 'psy' disciplines 
were established in relation to organisational practices in many European states in 
the late nineteenth century that sought to organise people en masse in relation to 
particular objectives such as education, reform and cure. Later, the creation of the 
National Health Service necessitated the need to manage physical and mental health 
at the level of the population. The tools developed by psychology aided the 
institutionalisation of public health by constructing a psychological knowledge of the 
individual that through statistics and graphs showed 'normal' distribution and 
identified similarity and difference between individuals. The dominance of the field 
by a psychologically informed outlook, aimed to build an objective science of grief, 
shaping the concerns and the type of research that was produced. I return to this 
point later in Section 2.4 when I review writers who have highlighted the socially 
constructed nature of grief. 
2.2.3 Grief as a process 
The following two decades of grief research were marked by the pioneering work of 
Bowlby (1979, 1980), and further developed in the empirical studies carried out by 
the psychiatrist Parkes (1972, 2006; Parkes & Weiss, 1983). Bowlby viewed grief as a 
biological reaction arising from natural selection. Bowlby's starting point was the 
idea already put forward by Darwin (1872) in his book The Expression o/the Emotions 
in Man and Animals in which he sought to demonstrate how humans and animals both 
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express emotions through similar facial expressions: these included grief. Grief was 
described as a universal emotion: one that was biologically programmed. Bowlby 
viewed grief as a separation response, a response that was first experienced in 
childhood. How people coped with bereavement in adulthood, Bowlby claimed, was 
largely determined by their experience of separation from their primary caregiver as 
a child. Bowlby described four phases of grief in adults: 'numbness', 'yearning, 
searching and anger', 'disorganisation and despair' and 'reorganisation'. Bowlby 
provided the first successive phase model of grief setting a standard that soon 
became common practice. This was despite Bowlby's caveats that there should not be 
any time limits on grief nor were the phases to be considered discrete. 
Parkes' work (1972), following from Bowlby, is often considered as providing the 
beginning of a sound empirical basis for scientifically minded bereavement research 
(Archer, 1999). A lot of Parkes' initial research focused on the experience of widows, 
which led to the creation of a phase model that shared much similarity to Bowlby's 
original model. Parkes described grief as a process rather than a state, a process that 
involved a 'psychosocial transition'. This referred to the change in identity required in 
order to adjust to life without the significant other. Parkes also developed the concept 
of 'assumptive worlds' (1972) to describe how an individual's internal world 
ruptured in the face of loss. What is present in both Bowlby's and Parkes' work is an 
understanding of the relational nature of grief. The emphasiS on the searching stage 
of grief, the separation anxiety caused by the other's absence, sought to bring to light 
a biological reasoning for the experience of grief. For Parkes (2006), grief was the 
'cost of commitment'. Earlier in the chapter I described how for Freud attachment to 
other people and objects was central to the drives of the libido. Bowlby's and Parkes' 
work provide further explanation for the role of attachment and its cost 
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The legacy of Parkes' and Bowlby's research and writing however is that of creating a 
stage model of grief. The stage model soon became well-established in bereavement 
research and became a tool for researchers and practitioners alike to identify 
bereaved people along a linear course and recognise deviations. It therefore provided 
a basis for psychiatrists and psychologists on which to intervene. The stage model 
reached its pinnacle in Kubler-Ross' (1970) five stages of dying that were borrowed 
and applied to the grief process. It was perhaps the succinct nature of the five stages -
'denial', 'anger', 'bargaining', 'depression', and 'acceptance' - which led to their 
popularity and prevalence not only within the field of bereavement care and research 
but in the popular imagination (Konisberg, 2011). Davies (2005) noted how the 
popularity of Kubler-Ross' stages of dying coincided with a shift in palliative care 
where death was becoming increasingly professionalised and less domestic. From the 
1960s onwards, Davies suggested, people were becoming less familiar with first-hand 
experience of death. The stages were of use in filling this 'experience gap' in people's 
lives. The beginning of the 1970s also witnessed the beginning of two of the key 
journals in the field: Omega: The journal of death and dying and Death Studies. The 
study of death, dying and bereavement was growing in theory and practice with 
bereavement and the management of grief always high on the research agenda. A 
recent overview of the history of publication trends in both Death Studies and Omega 
showed how research on grief and bereavement, largely quantitative, has 
overwhelmingly dominated the pages of both journals above other areas such as 
attitudes to death and dying and end of life research (Wittkowski et aI., 2015). 
The next major contribution to the field came from Worden (1982). Worden 
developed a task model of bereavement in response to the stage model. Worden's 
task model set out four tasks the bereaved person was to accomplish in order to 
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successfully resolve his or her grief. The four tasks were: accepting the reality of a 
bereavement; experiencing the pain of grief or emotionally accepting the reality of 
the loss; adjusting to a new environment; withdrawing emotional energy from the 
deceased person and investing in new relationships. Worden (1991) later changed 
the last task to be concerned with relocating the dead person within one's life and 
finding ways to memorialise the person, pre-empting perhaps a move away from a 
model of detaching to one of 'continuing' bonds. The task model Worden described 
did not have to be completed in a set order and it allowed the bereaved person to 
become an active participant in their grief, whereas the phases implied passivity. 
However, the tasks also shifted responsibility for one's grief work to the individual. 
Further it provided bereavement practitioners with a set number of things to be 
accomplished before someone could be deemed 'recovered'. Worden's model shaped 
grief as something to be achieved and overcome individually yet accompanied by 
counsellors or other practitioners who could guide the individual to resolution. This 
emphasis on individual agency and responsibility for one's health and well-being, 
demonstrated through tasks and activities, are early symptoms of recent government 
policy on happiness, well-being and recovery (discussed in Chapter 5). 
Bowlby, Parkes and Worden's phases, stages and tasks remain influential in 
contemporary bereavement research and practice. All three figures and the results of 
their work emerged repeatedly in my interviews with bereavement counsellors, 
presented in Chapter 6, which it could be claimed is proof of their accuracy in 
describing grief. Alternatively it could simply highlight how well suited such a phase 
or task-orientated model is to the counselling profession that requires both an 
assumed normal course from which to identify pathology and justify therapeutic 
intervention, and also a time-limited model of grief to suit the demands of the 
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counselling endeavour. 
In the next section I discuss some theories and ideas that emerged as a critique of the 
stage models. However, the early and mid-twentieth century had already laid down 
some solid foundations in bereavement research that had configured grief as a 
concern for the 'psy' disciplines. This was achieved by identifying a normal course of 
grief initiated by Freud and elaborated by Lindemann that allowed for the 
demarcation of abnormal forms of grief. Detecting and classifying abnormal forms of 
grief provided psychologists and psychiatrists with a basis for therapeutic 
interventions, the shape of which was defined by the clarification of the grief process 
into phases, stages and tasks. In the next section I describe how this established 'risk 
factors' for certain types of bereavement as well as the formation of certain types of 
grief as a psychiatric disorder. Within the creation of multiple models of grief, 
recovery emerged as something prescribed whether through tasks or monitored on a 
linear process of phases, and as something to be achieved within a given time period. 
All the while though grief was assumed as a universal phenomenon, a natural 
response to death. Yet at the same time grief required work whether from the 
bereaved individual alone or accompanied by a counsellor or expert. This paradox 
sits uneasily through the psychological accounts described above as well as in the 
research that followed it, which I now go on to outline. 
2.3 A 'new dawn' of bereavement research? 
Towards the end of the twentieth century researchers and practitioners influenced by 
sociological and anthropological studies of grief and bereavement began to question 
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the orthodoxy of the stage model of grief. The stage theories of grief were criticised 
for being too rigid and not capturing the complexity and diversity of the grief 
experience. What followed was a 'new dawn' of bereavement research (Hall, 2014; 
Rothaupt & Becker, 2007) that proposed non-linear models of grief, and where 
psychologists sought to emphasise how people construct meaning from loss and how 
people continue rather than relinquish bonds with the deceased. This 'revolutionary 
phase' (Walter, 1999) emerged in light of several critiques of the stage models that 
put the notion of a 'normal' process of grief into question. 
Rosenblatt et al. (1976) in their book Grief and Mourning in Cross-Cultural Perspective 
sought to demonstrate how grief was dealt with in different cultures. Their efforts 
went some way to destabilising the idea that grief had a universal process of 
recovery, however, they still assumed that grief itself was a universal emotion, which 
consisted of a set number of symptoms. Wortman and Silver (1989) went further to 
undermine the assumptions that had already become ingrained in bereavement 
research and practice, by outlining some of the 'myths' about grief such as the 
assumption that every person bereaved will feel distress or that the absence of 
reactions is pathological. They also criticised the idea of 'grief work', as did Stroebe 
and Stroebe (1991) who argued that the need to do grief work was a 'truism' rather 
than empirically founded. Stroebe and Stroebe discovered in a study of 60 widows 
and widowers that avoiding the loss can actually be more beneficial for long-term 
outcomes. Furthermore, Rodgers and Cowles (1991) highlighted that the growing 
lack of consensus concerning the parameters of 'normal' grief, seriously jeopardised 
any attempts to discuss aberrations from the expected response (p. 455). 
Later, in 1999 Stroebe and Schut set out their 'dual process model of coping with 
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bereavement' (Stroebe & Schut, 1999) that intended to critique the 'grief work 
hypothesis' that formed part of the stage theories of grief. The dual-process model 
suggested that people oscillate in their grief from a 'restoration-orientation' to 'loss-
orientated' activities. A loss orientation would be characterised with facing the loss 
and focusing on emotions. The restoration orientation would be where the person 
would focus on new activities, distractions from their grief and building new roles 
and identity. The aim of the model was to counteract the idea that grief had to move 
on progressively, and Stroebe and Schut argued that people experienced grief as an 
oscillation between two different modes. Further, the dual process model aimed to 
highlight how people continued bonds with the deceased person, an idea proposed by 
another highly influential new theory of grief: the continuing bonds thesis. 
2.3.1 Continuing bonds 
Klass et al. (1996) in their edited collection, Continuing Bonds: New Understandings of 
Grief, argued that psychological theories of grief had thus far emphasised the 
importance of detaching from the deceased as the means to successful recovery. In 
the introduction to the book Silverman and Klass (1996) instead proposed 'that it is 
normative for mourners to maintain a presence and connection with the deceased, 
and that this presence is not static' (p. 17). Their argument was in direct reference to 
the work of Freud, Bowlby and Parkes, which they viewed as stating that severing ties 
was the only way to resolve grief. These models, Klass et al. (1996) claimed, were 
based on a view of the self and the world that saw people as separate from each other. 
They promoted a modern western world view that prized autonomy and 
independence and judged dependence as 'bad' (p. 14). Silverman and Klass called for 
recovery to be replaced with 'accommodation', a term that captured how people 
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incorporated past relationships into their ongoing lives. 
The idea of continuing bonds certainly had an impact on how grief was theorised, yet 
I suggest that Klass et al.'s argument was not as revolutionary as they made it appear. 
Throughout the work of Freud, and also that of Bowlby and Parkes, are attempts to 
articulate the problem that loss poses to human attachments. Grief emerges precisely 
because it is believed that human attachment is a vital, if not a biological, imperative. 
So while the stage theories of grief came to be interpreted in a way that emphasised 
'separateness', the models were based around the belief that humans were already 
inherently dependent on others. Furthermore, the continuing bonds theory itself does 
not overcome this problem, as Amason (2012) has remarked, to continue bonds still 
assumes a prior separation. The starting point of the continuing bonds theory is the 
grieving person who experiences the presence of the deceased, which suggests that 
what gets continued is a matter of choice by the bereaved person. The very question 
of what precisely is continued and what is relinquished remains a matter of debate 
(Field & Filanosky, 2009; Stroebe & Schut, 2005). After all, continued bonds in the 
form of being haunted by the deceased might be quite unpleasant and somewhat 
problematic in finding the means to safely accommodate the deceased into one's life. 
Continuing bonds thus became about how the living can make choices about what 
ways they might incorporate the dead, whether through keeping photographs on 
display in home or carrying out rituals that celebrate and honour the dead. The 
continuing bonds theory, then, was not necessarily one that had the notion of human 
interdependence at its centre, as it shaped presence only as an inner relationship 
with the deceased, one that the individual has a level of control over. In this way the 
work of Klass et al. served to affirm the western values of autonomous agency and 
individual choice they originally sought to critique. 
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2.3.2 Meaning-making and stories 
Finding a way to continue a relationship with the deceased person might be one way 
to make the experience of grief meaningful. Neimeyer (2005; Neimeyer et aI., 2006; 
Neimeyer et aI., 2010) has claimed that finding meaning from loss is the principal task 
in coping with grief. Neimeyer based his work on the idea that humans are by nature 
meaning-making beings that need to make sense of their world and build a coherent 
narrative. Neimeyer argued bereavement is an instance that challenges established 
beliefs about the world and people struggle to assimilate the loss into their existing 
self-narratives. Successful recovery from loss is achieved by reconstructing new 
narratives through techniques of 'narrative retelling' and 'therapeutic writing' that 
Neimeyer (2005) recommends. Meaning reconstruction is about 'benefit finding', so 
that loss can actually serve to strengthen meaning. The failure to reconstruct meaning 
is associated with chronic and complicated forms of grief. This method thus lends 
itself well to therapeutic intervention as counsellors can aid the bereaved in 
reconstructing meaning through retelling the story of the death and finding new 
narratives. What remains unclear in Neimeyer's work is what types of meaning are to 
be constructed. Meaning is assumed as a neutral good, but of course having a purpose 
in life can be directed to many different things, not all that might fulfil the criteria of 
beneficial. Meaning is also posited as a thing to be found rather than, as the event of a 
meaningless death suggests, one constructed story of events, a story that is unstable 
and always in flux. At the heart of the meaning-making endeavour then, is the belief in 
universal meanings and values, where narratives are tools to find the 'truth'. 
Walter (1996), in the first volume of the interdisciplinary journal of death, dying and 
bereavement Mortality, claimed to have found a 'new model of grief that went against 
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the 'clinical lore' of past bereavement research. Walter's model shared many parallels 
with new approaches to grief in psychology and the emphasis on continuing bonds 
and constructing meaning, in that he described how the work of grief should be about 
constructing a 'durable biography' of the deceased. The aim was to create a true and 
accurate picture of the deceased in order to integrate the deceased into one's life. This 
was in contrast to dealing with or expressing emotions. For Walter healing was 
achieved not through emotion work but through talking about the deceased with 
others. Walter's model received criticism from others (Footman, 1998; Mclaren, 
1998; Stroebe, 1997) who questioned whether Walter's model contributed anything 
new. Walter's critics argued that the ideas of talking about the deceased in order to 
integrate their memory was already part of common counselling practice. 
Furthermore Walter's model, in striving to build an 'accurate' picture of the deceased, 
suffered the same shortcomings as the meaning-making approach in that both relied 
upon the idea that talking about the deceased can construct a 'true' biography or 
retelling of the deceased. Arnason (2000) pointed out that what is being constructed 
is not a biography but stories about the deceased, and that these stories are a creative 
achievement rather than reflecting reality. The stories people tell about the deceased 
are as much about the bereaved storyteller as they are the person who died. People 
use devices such as emplotment and build characters to convey their stories. Within 
stories then, different truths about grief are to be found and these are constantly 
changing in each retelling. As Valentine (2008) also demonstrated, narratives are 
socially constructed; people draw on cultural scripts to express their meanings. 
Narratives and stories thus reveal a complex interplay between the private 
experience of grief and cultural discourses about grief. Telling one's story is a strategy 
to preserve the personhood of the dead but it is also a mode of reaffirming the 
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personhood of the living. Walter drew on the work of sociologist Giddens (1991) who 
argued that late modern western society has witnessed the rise of individualism 
where individual identity has become a reflexive project no longer tied to traditions 
of the past, but freed to be shaped by individual choice and agency. The imperative to 
individually story one's experience of grief, as well to memorialise individuals, I will 
argue in Chapter 5, is part of this reflexive project of the self, where identity becomes 
something to be constantly worked upon, and preserving individual legacy becomes 
paramount 
2.3.3 A medical model of grief? 
While the focus on continuing bonds and narrating meaning remains strong in 
current bereavement counselling practice (see Chapter 6), research interests appear 
to remain true to the psychologists' originating desire to establish a scientifically 
measurable definition of the normal and abnormal course of grief. As mentioned in 
Chapter 1, research seeking to define the categories of 'complicated grief and 
'prolonged grief disorder' have dominated psychiatric and psychological research 
into grief and bereavement over the past two decades (Horowitz et al., 1997; 
Prigerson et al., 1996; Shear et al., 2011; Zisook & Shear, 2009). In an edited volume 
dedicated to complicated grief, Stroebe et al. (2013) remarked that: 'In our view 
complicated grief is perhaps the most important contemporary topic of concern both 
for the scientific community of bereavement researchers and for health care 
professionals supporting bereaved people' (p. 3). While the draft of the 11th edition of 
the International Classification of Diseases (lCD-ll) includes the category 'prolonged 
grief disorder' (PGD) and the DSM-5 featured 'persistent complex bereavement 
disorder' (PCBD) for further research, abnormal forms of grief are becoming not only 
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theories but also recognisable psychiatric diagnoses to be implemented in practice. 
In the studies, successful mourning is described in much the same terms: to be re-
engaged in daily life, reconnected to others, to experience hope for a future, for grief 
to be transformed and integrated. Equally, symptoms of complicated grief mirror 
those of 'normal grief such as: intense yearning, intrusive and preoccupying 
thoughts, loss of meaning in life, incessant questioning and ruminating, caught up in 
counterfactual thinking rather than reflecting on the reality of death. Yet the 
emphasis is on the length of time the 'symptoms' are shown and the 'level of 
impairment' to social functioning (Stroebe et al., 2013). 
It could be argued that the ambitions Lindemann first set out in his study in 1944 
have now reached fulfilment. Previous research that sought to uncover the normal 
process of grief has enabled the discovery of complicated or prolonged grief. By 
continuing in the assumption of the existence of a normal course of grief, the 
identification of abnormal forms was made possible. Furthermore the normal course 
of grief is described as an instinctive psychological mechanism that humans possess 
in order to heal after loss (Shear, 2012). Complicated grief emerges specifically when 
there is difficulty in progressing through the natural healing process (Zisook & Shear, 
2009). The normal course of grief is time-bound to six months, persisting in grief 
longer is an instance of grief becoming 'derailed'. Intervention is thus warranted as a 
means to get people 'back on track'. After all, states Shear (2012) it would be 
'inhumane to leave such anguish untreated'. Shear further describes how 
bereavement is analogous to an injury where grief is the 'inflammatory response' and 
complicated grief the 'superimposed infection'. 
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There continues to be debate over what complicated grief involves as well as 
competing definitions by two different groups of researchers. One might expect that if 
normal grief were instinctive and measurable, complicated grief would, too, be self-
evident. Yet whatever constitutes 'normal grief remains just as contested. However, 
even those that seek to critique the empirical validity of the diagnostic category of 
complicated grief (Wakefield, 2013; Walter, 2006) agree that it does exist. In addition, 
bereavement has now become a focus of neuroscientific research which claims that 
complicated grief patterns can be identified in the brain (Gundel et al., 2003; 
O'Connor, 2005, 2012). A study by O'Connor et al. (2008) asserted that in people with 
complicated grief the part of the brain associated with rewards was activated when 
viewing a picture of their dead loved one, leading researchers to argue that 
complicated grief is prolonged partly because people find pleasure in reveries over 
the deceased. 
Biological explanations for successful recovery from grief are present too in the 
growing research interest in resilience. Bonnano and colleagues (Bonanno, 2009; 
Bonanno & Keltner, 1997; Bonnano et al., 2005;) have argued that the majority of 
people who experience grief have a brief period of distress and then return to 
functioning at the same level as before. This, claims Bonnano, is due to the fact that 
most people are naturally resilient to difficult conditions including bereavement. 
Bonnano's claims have disputed the idea that people go through stages and phases. 
Bonnano and Keltner (1997) also questioned the need to carry out grief work by 
suggesting that avoiding emotions in grief leads to better adjustment, demonstrated 
by a study that analysed facial expressions. Those that showed negative emotions 
lead to poor outcomes later whereas those that displayed positive emotions resulted 
in better adjustment. 
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Interestingly while talk of recovery has lost favour in bereavement research, 
resilience is growing in popularity (Sandler et aI., 2008). Balk (2008) described his 
confusion over this, as resilience implies an even speedier return to normal than 
recovery. Further, Balk questioned where the element of personal growth was in 
resilience. However, Balk viewed grief and recovery as a moral endeavour, whereas 
the discourse of resilience is seeking a scientific reasoning for how people respond 
differently to bereavement. To claim people are naturally resilient makes sense when 
grief is a natural and instinctual process. Yet if this were so, then there would be little 
requirement for bereavement counselling and models of grief. Hence complicated 
forms of grief provide pathology for the 'psy' disciplines to focus on and provide 
interventions for. As I argue in Chapter 5, the prominence of research on resilience 
might be less about instinctual reactions and more about a social context that 
commends the type of traits resilience involves. In either case increasing reference is 
made to the brain and biology to provide the explanation for why people succeed or 
fail in their recovery from grief. This is quite a different notion to thinking about 
constructing stories and narratives and finding meaning. What remains from this 
'new dawn' of bereavement research is a combination of both a broadening in 
perspective in how grief is conceptualised and a moving away from the grief process, 
yet an increasing medicalisation of grief that relies upon the presumed normal course 
of grief that many others have rejected. Subsequently, there has been a polarisation of 
certain forms of grief as abnormal, justifying the need for psychiatric intervention. 
2.4 The social construction of grief 
In this section I turn away from psychology and psychiatry to explore ideas that have 
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questioned the belief that grief is a natural process by emphasising the ways in which 
grief is shaped and policed by different societal influences. As outlined in the previous 
sections, the psychological canon of grief research made it appear as though Freud 
was the culprit for promoting a particular definition of grief, yet research from the 
historical, sociological and anthropological diSCiplines presents a different picture. 
Historical perspectives on grief and grieving culture have illuminated how grief might 
be considered as at least to some extent culturally constructed. Stearns and Knapp 
(1996) present how a rich Victorian grief culture was in various ways unseated by 
modernity. Stearns and Knapp, and the historical work of Jalland (2010), have 
demonstrated that the changing attitudes towards grief and the management of grief 
over the nineteenth to twentieth century were not quite the simple narrative 
proposed in some work (see Walter, 1999). Rather the shift in emotional culture 
emerged as a reaction against Victorian sentimental grief practices which Stearns and 
Knapp illustrated through an 'anti-grier campaign that featured in middle-class 
popular commentary in newspapers and magazines. The shift was also framed by 
Enlightenment ideals that regarded excessive grief as unnecessary, as well as 
religiOUS beliefs in the survival of the soul, which outpourings of grief appeared to 
contradict. This increasingly modernist and pragmatic outlook on emotions was 
reinforced by the ubiquity of death that occurred during the First World War that 
called for people to maintain self-control over their grief. 
Yet as Stearns, Knapp and Jalland all emphasise, how grief was experienced did not 
change, however, the changes in societal norms did foster a disjuncture between the 
private experience of grief and the changing social prescriptions. In this view there 
still remained some belief in the reality of the experience of grief apart from its social 
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norms. Indeed, work that explored the social construction of grief tends to either 
retain the assumption that grief is natural while granting its cultural differentiation 
(Klass et al., 1996; Rosenblatt et al., 1976) or alternatively view grief as something 
that is produced by cultural norms to the extent that it is not possible to speak of any 
natural 'real' (Amason, 2001, 2007; Amason & Hafsteinsson, 2003; Foote & Frank, 
1999). A Durkheimian perspective takes the latter view to the extreme, as for 
Durkheim all emotions were socially produced: 'Mourning is not the spontaneous 
expression of individual emotions ( ... ) it is a duty imposed by the group' (Durkheim, 
1915, p. 397). Durkheim's work on suicide was highly significant for presenting how 
society produces behaviours, by arguing that a state of 'anomie' is caused by 
alienation from society not a dysfunctional pathology in the individual psyche. Yet 
because for Durkheim human behaviours were socially produced and to be 
understood by reference to the social group of which people belong, the biological 
individuality of human beings was downplayed, overlooking why people require 
interdependence in the first place that leads to a state of anomie. 
However, sociological perspectives on grief have tended to rest their analysis on the 
belief that grief is a universal human emotion. Jakoby's (2012) notable proposal for 
understanding grief as a social emotion highlighted how grief is framed by cultural 
rules and affected by social structures, yet her theory still depended on the belief that 
grief is an 'elementary human experience' and integral to human life. Jakoby's 
contention lay more with the argument that grief involves a higher order of cognitive 
processes than simply a reaction to biological separation. Grief is a social emotion 
because it 'emerges from relationships, attachments, expectations, and obligations' 
(Jakoby, 2012, p. 680). The work of Klass and Rosenblatt (Klass, 2014; Rosenblatt. 
2008b) has provided many rich examples of the way in which different cultures 
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manage grief in diverse ways. In their research the focus is on the diversity of the 
grief responses and rituals but there is no question that the feeling and emotion of 
grief is the same. Interestingly, Rosenblatt's perspective on grief shifted in his later 
works. In his remarks here it is possible to see how Rosenblatt was beginning to see 
how whatever individual grief was, it could not be separated from the cultural 
context: 'Culture is such a crucial part of the context of bereavement that it is often 
impossible to separate an individual's grief from culturally required mourning' 
(Rosenblatt, 1993, p. 104). More recently in an interview in Bereavement Care, 
Rosenblatt (Rosenblatt & Bowman, 2013) spoke openly about how when he first 
began publishing work on grief he thought he knew what grief was. However, now he 
critiques research that assumes grief as an identifiable 'thing'. Grief is not a discrete 
object, he argues, but a 'sociolinguistic construction'. In Rosenblatt's view, much 
contemporary work features a great deal of assertiveness and definiteness about 
what grief is that implies there is an underlying commonality across grieving. 
2.4.1 The policing of grief 
Rosenblatt's change of perspective highlights how grief is often taken as self-evident 
even in work that seeks to emphasise the cultural and social influences on grief. 
Sociological perspectives on grief have striven to relocate grief in a social context by 
focusing on the social norms around types of death, the 'hierarchy' of grief and how 
grief responses are managed (Charmaz & Milligan, 2006; Lofland, 1985; Robson & 
Walter, 2013; Walter, 2007, 2010). Lofland's (1985) article, for example, questioned 
the universality of grief by emphasising the social shaping of grief, yet as important as 
her argument is, grief was still pOSitioned as a 'thing' upon which social structures or 
cultural norms have a lesser or greater level of influence. Because of this, studies that 
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looked at the social construction of grief tended to view the social as an additional 
factor that explains variability in how grief is done, but not of what grief is. 
This work is certainly not without its value, often emerging in response to the 
dominant 'clinical lore' of the psychological definition of grief (Walter, 1999). Walter 
(1999) described the ways in which grieving was policed in modern and postmodern 
Western society, adopting a broadly Durkheimian view that emotions, namely grief, 
are disruptive to modern rational industrial society and so require policing or 
managing. The 'anomie' that can result from feeling alienated from one's social group 
is underlined in modern societies where there is an absence or decline in traditional 
mourning rituals to help the grieving person through grief. Instead postmodern 
society encourages a mode of self-policing one's grief as part of the individual 
reflexive project of self, as mentioned in Section 2.3.2, of which the maintenance of a 
coherent self-narrative is part 
There is a large body of work that has described a condition of 'disenfranchised grief 
that is seen to occur when someone's grief is not socially acceptable or recognised 
(Doka, 1989). Proponents of disenfranchised grief theory proposed that all grief 
should be considered in equal terms and that restrictive social norms around grief 
should be eradicated. As Fowlkes (1990) described, different types of losses are 
assigned differential social merit Some losses are conferred a socially legitimate right 
to grieve while others are not For Fowlkes these normative criteria have implications 
for how people experience grief and role they are assigned, thus forming a hierarchy 
of grief. Walter and Robson (2013) argued against the very concept of 
disenfranchised grief itself by stating that a person can undergo a 'process of 
disenfranchisement' but grief itself cannot be 'disenfranchised.' Walter and Robson 
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(2013) instead argued that norms are essential to grieving and that all losses are not 
equal and thus hierarchies of grief are required to determine appropriate responses 
to grief. 
It seems that at the centre of discussions of disenfranchised grief is the need for social 
recognition and the consequences of failing to be recognised. This suggests that 
dealing with grief is an interdependent and socially informed activity. A hierarchy of 
types of loss expects different modes of behaviour and emotional expression 
appropriate to each loss. The hierarchy is thus constructed and maintained through 
an understanding of what lives are considered 'grievable'. To be considered grievable 
one has to have been recognised as living a life worth living while they were alive 
(Butler, 2004). As Walter and Robson comment, to grieve too little or too much might 
require careful presentation of the self to appear to be grieving appropriately and 
thus elicit the appropriate responses from those around them. The grieving individual 
therefore might be recognised via the hierarchy yet might also still feel a sense of 
disenfranchisement due to the gap in felt emotion and the emotions they present to 
others. 
2.4.2 The disciplining of grief 
I now go on to discuss work that sought to question the 'truth claims' of the 
psychological and psychiatric theories of grief. Curiously, psychologists tend to be 
blind to the effects of their own theories on the concept of grief, so much so that when 
they seek to outline the social and cultural nature of grief and how cultural contexts 
'oppress' or 'police' expressions of grief they neglect to identify how counselling or 
therapeutic interventions contribute new regulatory norms and perpetuate existing 
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ones (Harris, 2010; Neimeyer et al., 2014). It is apparent in this lack of reflexivity that 
psychologically informed theories of grief are understood not in the same terms as 
cultural discourses about grief but as revealing a fundamental 'truth' about grief. 
Wambach's study (1985) presented well what happens when the construct that was 
supposed to reflect reality becomes more real than the actual reality that it purported 
to demonstrate. In her study of widow support groups she found that the grief 
process, composed of stages, was taken as a factual account of the experience of grief. 
When Wambach herself sought to challenge the order of the process she was 
dismissed by the women who retorted: "You can tell you've never been through it" (p. 
204). Often the women's experience would contradict the stages, which caused 
distress and yet the process was so naturalised most widows did not realise the grief 
process had an origin and was a social creation. Instead the process was a means to 
monitor themselves against a timetable and to judge their progress. 
Foote and Frank (1999) adopted a Foucauldian approach in their analysis of 
bereavement counselling and theory. They argued that grief was a 'site of disciplinary 
power' upon which claims about the truth of grief were made. These claims, they 
argued, were productive in Foucault's sense of the word, in that certain claims on the 
truth of grief, such as the grief process, create bereaved people as 'docile' subjects. 
This was demonstrated in Wambach's (1985) study where the women began to 
monitor their own progress against a timetable they assumed was true. For Foote and 
Frank the bereaved become objects of knowledge to be known by therapy and shaped 
by therapeutic knowledge. This, they claim, reiterating sentiments expressed earlier 
in this chapter, was possible because of an assumption of normal grief upon which 
the clinical criteria of abnormality could be established, criteria that continue to 
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expand until the normal is defined out of existence. The normal thus remains less a 
reality than a therapeutic ideal. Yet the normal is required to support the technology 
that relies upon it As discussed in this chapter, therapeutic intervention in 
bereavement has been based on the premise that there are normal and abnormal 
responses to death and loss. This division, argue Foote and Frank, must exist in order 
to demarcate the abnormal as the legitimate object of therapeutic intervention: 
'Abnormal is what can be brought back to normal by means of therapeutic fixing' (p. 
164). Further, Foote and Frank suggest complicated grief could be interpreted as an 
'embodied refusal' to adhere to the norms of bereavement. 
Arnason's work (1998, 2001, 2007; Arnason & Hafsteinsson, 2003) also employed a 
Foucauldian perspective in his ethnographic research of bereavement counselling 
organisation Cruse Bereavement Care carried out in the late 1990s. Arnason explored 
how bereavement counselling produced certain ideas and 'truths' about grief and 
served to produce bereaved clients as individual autonomous beings 'encouraged to 
govern themselves, as befits a liberal and democratic regime' (2007, p. 49). What 
Arnason demonstrated in his work was the notion of personhood implicated in 
bereavement counsellors' understanding of grief and emotions. It is a paradoxical 
personhood that is both individual and autonomous yet liable to devastation at the 
death of another. Arnason's study linked together the management of grief in Cruse 
and the theories it used with the discourse of neo-liberal govern mentality. 
Bereavement counselling was viewed as a technology through which individuals 
learned to govern themselves and their emotions in accordance with political 
processes of subjectification. Contrary to theories and practices of grief that assumed 
an idea of personhood as individual and autonomous with a need to express 
emotions, Arnason argued this was an idea of the self that was produced through 
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techniques such as bereavement counselling. In response to Walter's claim of the 
postmodern 'revival of death' that emphasised choice, individuality and a liberation 
from previous restrictive norms, Arnason and Hafsteinsson (2003) highlighted how, 
to describe the postmodern revival of death as the efforts of ordinary people to 
express their emotions freely, 'is not only to naturalise the need for emotional 
expression but misses sight of the effects of neo-liberal govern mentality' (p. 59). 
Bereavement counselling was a device for meaning production, one that naturalised 
the notion of the self and its emotional expression, as individuals with an 'inner' 
emotional life. This links to an earlier point raised in Section 2.3.2 referring to the 
rising interest in narrating stories as a means to recovery. The belief that stories can 
liberate someone from trauma depends upon the assumption of this particular notion 
of personhood that needs to tell one's story and will find autonomy and freedom in 
doing so, an idea I return to in Chapter 5. 
In this section I have attempted to show the ways in which the psychological notions 
of grief have been criticised and relocated to a social context to highlight how grief is 
shaped, regulated and policed. Throughout much of this work however, grief is still 
positioned as 'a thing' upon which the social has its influence to varying degrees. Grief 
is universal but its recovery is context dependent. Complicated grief is then a 
consequence of a missing, inadequate or twisted larger cultural response (Klass, 
2014). However, as elucidated by Arnason, the ethos of bereavement counselling 
produces a certain type of personhood, a personhood that coincides with a neo-
liberal governmentality. The way in which identities are produced through 
bereavement counselling will be analysed in depth in Chapter 6. 
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2.5 Summary of the literature 
In this chapter I have traced the growth of research into grief and bereavement, 
attempting to unpack how grief has been theorised and the implications this has had 
for notions of recovery. Throughout there has been an assumption of a certain type of 
person who has a natural, instinctive capacity to grieve. Arnason's work mentioned 
above has critiqued this type of personhood by exploring how an autonomous, 
individual subjectivity is produced and naturalised through bereavement counselling. 
Throughout the psychological theories of grief was an absence of critical reflection on 
both what type of person is being assumed in the models and further what type of 
person might be produced through therapeutic interventions. What emerged was a 
paradoxical figure, first highlighted in Freud, who seeks attachment as a means of 
survival but, in the event of losing the loved object, must regain autonomy in order to 
recover successfully. This is an autonomy that appears to prefigure the bereavement 
and yet to feel grief it would imply that one must have already relinquished one's 
autonomy by entering into relationality. 
It would seem from much of the work reviewed in this chapter that this paradox is a 
biological one. Yet from an evolutionary perspective grief poses a puzzle. Grief can be 
construed as a by-product of natural selection, which, as Bowlby sought to 
demonstrate, was an important reaction to separation. Anxiety and distress at the 
separation of a primary caregiver was an adaptive response, as their absence poses a 
threat to survival. However, it is clear that grief is not considered to have any 
adaptive function. Rather grief is widely viewed as maladaptive, hence the wealth of 
studies outlined in this chapter that have sought to remedy its negative effects on the 
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morbidity of the population. The puzzle grief poses thus might explain why many 
have viewed grief as a disease or pathology (Engel, 1961). Archer (1999) concluded 
that grief is a 'trade-off, and like Parkes viewed grief as the cost incurred 'in pursuit 
of something which has an important adaptive consequence' (p. 250). 
Grief is a response, suggests Archer, 'an alarm reaction set of by a deficit signal in the 
behavioural system underlying attachment' (p. 153). This alarm reaction, involves a 
link between evolutionary principles and a behavioural mechanism that is 
characterised by the strength of the attachment. As Darwin claimed, it is not only 
humans who show signs of grieving. Other studies have sought to explain that 
animals grieve in similar ways to humans (King, 2013). This appears to suggest that 
there is a common evolutionary response to absence. However, it is also clear that the 
forms grief and its recovery takes are strongly culturally determined. It is pertinent to 
ask then, how and why 'prolonged' or maladaptive forms of grief occur. For, if grief is 
a natural response, why does grief require 'work' and why does its recovery take 
'unnatural' forms? 
In the next chapter I seek to remedy this paradox by drawing upon work that has 
problematised the notion of the autonomous individual by emphasising the embodied 
and relational nature of human beings, to suggest that people are always already not 
the autonomous person they (or others) might take themselves to be. This leads me 
to detail how I am theorising grief in this thesis and to pose the question: when the 




Towards an alternative way of theorising grief: Emotions, bodies 
and practices 
3.1 Introduction to the chapter 
In Chapter 2 I reviewed the theories of grief that have dominated the field of grief and 
bereavement research over the last century, since Freud first proposed his theory of 
mourning and melancholia. In reviewing the ways in which grief has been 
conceptualised I highlighted some key assumptions in the literature. In this chapter I 
challenge these assumptions by highlighting the role of emotions, bodies and 
practices, often overlooked in a predominantly psychological and psychodynamic 
view of grief. By drawing on this alternative literature I seek to challenge the 
disembodied view of the bereaved person that appears in dominant grief theories and 
bring into the view the embodied, relational and liminal experience of grief. In this 
respect I also challenge the Cartesian (Descartes, 1649) divide between the 
understanding of mind and body that I argue persists in theories of grief and the 
study of emotions more broadly. 
I begin this chapter by explaining the concept of liminality and describe how I have 
used liminality as a conceptual basis on which to problematise the boundaries around 
emotions, bodies and practices. Drawing on the work of van Gennep (1960) and 
Turner (1969, 1982), I argue that following bereavement people may find themselves 
in a space of liminality where their sense of identity is destabilised, and the usual 
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order of everyday life has been suspended. I suggest that bereaved people are liminal 
bodies, 'matter out of place', due to the threat they pose to the dominant 
understandings of the emotions and the body. 
In the following sub-sections I focus on emotions, bodies and practices in turn to 
explore further how an emphasis on liminality can provide an alternative perspective 
to theorising grief. First I refer to the large field of research into understanding and 
categorising emotions. Rather than emotions being discrete and easily measurable, I 
present how the interdisciplinary study of the emotions has yet to find a conclusive 
answer to the question: 'What is an emotion?'. Further, I describe the recent 'affective 
turn' where emotions are being rethought as non-conscious bodily processes, as a 
way to reconsider grief as an embodied and relational experience. This leads me to 
the second section where I focus on the 'lost' body (Tanner, 2006) in grief theories, 
and highlight literature that has emphaSised the embodied experience of grief. Within 
this I return to Freud's theory of mourning and melancholia through the work of 
Butler (2003, 2004, 2010) to consider grief as an instance that reveals a radically 
relational model of self, foregrounding vulnerability and precarity as fundamental to 
the human condition. In emphasising the relational aspect of bodies, I argue that in a 
society that favours individual autonomy and recovery, bereaved people become seen 
as problematic bodies to be managed. 
I then bring together the discussions on the body and emotions by borrowing 
Wetherell's (2012) concept of 'affective practices'. I suggest that an analysis of 
practice can allow for an account of grief that views grief as both a bodily felt, 
affective experience and something that is managed and maintained through social 
practices. Emphasising the role of practices and social activity, I seek to build towards 
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an alternative way of theorising grief where grief is not something that exists purely 
in the psyche but is a socially constructed object, framed and produced by various 
discourses, including the psychological ideas outlined in the previous chapter. In the 
final section I piece together the vision of the person that is implied in the claim that 
grief is both an embodied, felt experience that reveals the fundamentally relational 
nature of human beings, and yet also a socially constructed category that refers to a 
range of emotional behaviours, none of which can be defined conclusively as 'natural'. 
3.2 Grief and /iminality 
In this section I suggest that the experience of grief is one of entering into a space of 
liminality. The word liminality derives from the Latin 'limen' meaning threshold or 
margin. Turner (1974, 1982) described a stage of liminality as one where the usual 
order of things is suspended, the past is momentarily negated and the future has yet 
to begin. By comparing grief with liminality, I argue that following bereavement 
people may experience their sense of identity, and their sense of reality, has been 
suspended. Turner (1969) described those in a liminal stage as 'threshold people' 
who elude the classifications that normally locate people in space. In the liminal 
period the characteristics of the subject become ambiguous. As Turner states: 
'Liminal entities are neither here nor there; they are betwixt and between the 
positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention, and ceremonial' (p. 95). 
In a state of liminality people exist outside not only their own social position, but all 
social positions. Being 'betwixt and between' causes one to literally and figuratively 
lose one's sense of being in the world. 
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By focusing on liminality I seek to highlight how grief can be an experience that 
destabilises familiar boundaries around identity, social norms and behaviour. A state 
of liminality can provide opportunity for creativity and subversive acts due to the 
eradication of the normal structures that tend to inhibit or obstruct behaviour 
(Turner, 1974). As Turner (1982, p. 47) described: 'Liminality is both more creative 
and more destructive than the structural norm'. However, in such a state people 
might be prone to suggestibility, social influence, imitation, and contagion, for under 
liminal conditions there is no structure to objectively measure against. Stenner and 
Moreno (2013) suggest that when the taken for granted is swept away, people can 
easily lose 'grasp of external reality' and their 'sense of inner self-coherence'. The 
ambiguity of liminality from which stems its potential may also be the scene of 
disease, despair, death, or suicide: of a breakdown without replacement of well-
defined social ties and bonds (Turner, 1982). 
In conceptualising grief as an experience of liminality I seek to problematise the idea 
of a linear process of grief often promoted in grief theories. In his anthropological 
studies van Gennep (1960) defined liminality as the middle phase of a 'rite of passage' 
undergone by members of tribal societies: the initial stage of separation from one's 
group or society, the middle stage of liminality and the final stage of reintegration. By 
comparing the experience of grief to one of liminality I seek to argue that the liminal 
phase can become the new permanent reality for bereaved people. Rather than a 
phase in a staged process, I am arguing for an understanding of grief as something 
from which people do not always recover. Describing grief as a liminal space then, I 
am not suggesting grief follows the logic or structure of ritual, but on the contrary is 
an experience where familiar structures have been destablised. 
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Rituals such as funeral rites and traditional burial customs have historically been 
considered as aids to move people through the mourning process. Van Gennep (1960, 
p. 147) described mourning as a transitional period that was entered through 'rites of 
separation' and emerged from by 'rites of reintegration' into society. Van Gennep 
highlighted the fact that often the duration of the mourning period would correspond 
exactly with societal ideas about the amount of time it might take for the deceased to 
become incorporated into the world of the dead. Before this reincorporation, both 
mourners and the deceased are suspended in a space between the world of the living 
and the world of the dead. In contemporary western societies, interventions such as 
bereavement counselling, or popular self-help books that proscribe steps through the 
process, similarly act as guides through the liminality of grief to what is considered to 
be an agreed 'good' resolution. 
Rosaldo (1993) critiqued the way the anthropology of death and mourning had 
focused on ritual at the expense of the study of the emotional experience of grief, 
highlighting the problem of studying grief through the logic and order of mourning 
rituals. Rosaldo argued that the over-emphasis on ritual meant that the ritual process 
had been conflated with the process of mourning; rituals were viewed as 'containing' 
emotions, and conveying social and cultural attitudes towards death. Rosaldo drew 
on his study of the Ilongot tribe in the Philippines, whose members felt impelled to 
hunt and chop the head of a person following bereavement. The 'rage' expressed by 
the Ilongot's, Rosaldo argued was an example of the way the study of mourning 
rituals had failed to convey the emotions of grief. 
However, Rosaldo's critique of the anthropological study of grief still relied upon an 
understanding of grief as a universal emotional experience that is, for instance, 
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overwhelming and powerful, which as Amason pointed out (1998) is a particularly 
western notion. This is highlighted in the way Rosaldo describes how sharing the 
experience of bereavement enables him to understand those of a different social and 
cultural background. In the following sections of this chapter I will address the 
common assumption that emotions are universal, biological phenomenon and 
suggest instead that what are understood as overwhelming emotions such as the rage 
discussed by Rosaldo are also shaped and constructed by the social context 
For Durkheim (1915), as mentioned in Chapter 2 Section 2.4, emotions were central 
to ritual action. Rituals reinforced social values, fostered identity and built solidarity 
aided by emotional responses. Ritual practices and emotions are thus intertwined 
and may play an important role in producing social stability, particularly at moments 
when people are undergoing periods of liminality. For Bloch and Parry (1982), 
mortuary practices served to reassert social order at death. Yet they further 
described how social order is itself a product of rituals: social order does not exist 
prior to ritual. Ritual thus has a productive role in the liminal space of grief in 
reasserting current norms of grief and recovery but also the potential to create new 
ideas about grief. Davies (2011) also emphasised the role of the body in such ritual 
action in his term 'moral-somatic' processes, which referred to how people respond 
to social values through embodied action. In this thesis I highlight the different types 
of rituals bereaved people might engage in, including everyday informal rituals and 
practices (see Chapter 7 Section 7.3). Ritual and emotion then, rather than separate 
fields of experience are intricately intertwined, as I demonstrate in Section 3.2.3 by 
using Wetherell's concept of 'affective practices' to argue that grief cannot be 
understood apart from the rituals that societies use to manage, express and perform 
grief. 
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In this thesis I conceptualise grief as a virtual space of liminality that is experienced 
within the psyche but also in interaction with other people, organisations and 
institutions. So while a liminal space provides opportunities and possibilities to 
inhabit new identities, the space is also filled with various people and ideas to guide 
people in a particular direction. Becoming reincorporated into structure, as in the 
final stage of a rite of passage, is a way to control the danger the liminal person poses 
to the smooth running of society. For example, the time restraints placed on grieving, 
as demonstrated in the diagnosis of 'prolonged grief disorder' where the display of 
grieving symptoms at six months following bereavement might signal the need for 
clinical intervention, could be seen as a way to reintegrate people who have been cast 
into liminality back into a linear ordered sense of time. In Turner's (1969) description 
of liminality, these rituals and customs serve to provide staging to the process, not in 
order to close down options but to facilitate a productive 'becoming'. In using the 
concept of liminality to describe the experience of grief, I aim to explore how the final 
stage of reintegration, or 'recovery', is socially and culturally constructed. I argue that 
what constitutes recovery or reintegration, while achieved or resisted with varying 
degrees of success, is something that must be continually negotiated and maintained, 
and this negotiation takes place within the shifting boundaries of the liminal space of 
grief. 
In the following sub-sections I highlight the intertwined nature of emotions, bodies 
and practices that play an important role in enabling people to find meaning and 
construct identities in the liminal space of grief. Furthermore, ritual practices, 
whether a funeral or a bereavement counselling session, seek to manage people 
across the transitional space of grief, maintaining the boundaries and 'margins' of 
what is taken to be reality in society. As Douglas (1966, p. 122) has argued, pulling 
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margins 'this way or that' is a dangerous act that can alter 'the shape of fundamental 
experience'. By drawing upon liminality I am attempting to illustrate the 
'vulnerability' (Douglas, 1966) of taken for granted assumptions about grief that 
persist in modern western societies. Bereaved people have the potential to challenge 
these boundaries by existing between the divided worlds of the living and the dead 
and inhabiting this margin, or space of liminality. 
3.2.1 Theorising emotions 
In Chapter 2, I argued that even among studies that analysed the socially constructed 
nature of grieving behaviours, grief was still assumed as an entity located somewhere 
in internally felt emotions that could be differently shaped and expressed. In a similar 
way, the study of the emotions has historically rested on the Cartesian divide 
between body and mind and emotion and reason, where the biological and the social 
constructionist understanding of emotions have been unhelpfully positioned as 
separate phenomena that can only be studied in isolation. However, as I discuss in 
this section, the study of the emotions has long been a focus of a variety of disciplines 
from the biological and psychological, to the philosophical, sociological, and 
anthropological and more recently as a focus of neuroscientific research. 
Nevertheless, defining emotions has remained a contentious topic across the 
disciplines. As Dixon (2012) has shown, a glance at the history of the term 'emotion' 
reveals that what actually constitutes an emotion is not as fixed as it has been 
purported to be by researchers of emotions. Dixon detailed how 'emotion' did not 
become a word to describe mental states until the mid-nineteenth century, prior to 
which the terms 'passions' and 'affections' were more commonplace. The term 
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emotion gained favour along with the rise of psychology as a discipline that sought to 
move away from both the religious connotations of 'passions' and the medical usage 
of 'affections'. Dixon traced how the term emotion originally denoted a physical 
agitation or disturbance in people and animals alike and later came to be 
accompanied by mental feelings. Thomas Brown, who first established the term 
'emotions' within psychology in 1820, admitted that emotions cannot be defined 
(Dixon, 2012), and later James' essay published in 1884 entitled 'What is an emotion?' 
(James, 1884) captured the sentiment, yet concluded without an answer. 
It is not surprising that something that could not be defined from the outset continues 
to resist easy classification. Yet the meaning of terms generally considered to 
designate emotions - such as anger, fear, sadness, happiness, disgust or surprise -
appear obvious not only to researchers who have produced vast fields of studies 
under such categories but also in everyday discourse where the terms apparently 
possess a universal understanding. The belief in a set of basic emotions, commonly 
including the ones listed above, was a development arguably beginning with Darwin's 
(1872) theory of the emotions as primitive, innate and involuntary instincts. Darwin's 
description of grief, for example, described the expression of grief in terms of a 
contraction of the 'grief muscles' that produced a particular facial expression. In 
Darwin's understanding there was no acknowledgement of the caqse of, or the 
context of, emotions but rather they were something that passed through the body 
over which the person has no control. The evolutionary view of emotions then, was 
that these were common to all humans and non-human animals. 
The belief in a universal set of emotions was extended in the work of Ekman (1992, 
1993) who carried out studies in which people from a range of cultural backgrounds 
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were asked to identify different emotions from facial expressions, from which Ekman 
concluded there was a set number of 'basic emotions' common to all humans. 
Ekman's work was and remains highly influential while the ambiguous origins of the 
term emotions have been somewhat lost Instead, emotions have been classified 
further into varying numbers of primary and secondary ones. Kemper (1987) 
outlined four primary emotions - happiness, fear, anger and sadness - that qualify as 
such due to having five features, which are: 
1) Evolutionary survival value 
2) Appear in earliest stages of human development 
3) Universally recognised in the face 
4) Have unique autonomic responses 
5) Emerge in all social relations 
Secondary emotions were formed from a combination of primary emotions, for 
example anger and sadness constitute the secondary emotion of grief. For while it is 
believed that primary emotions are 'hardwired', it is unclear whether secondary 
emotions are innate or culturally defined. Primary and secondary emotions are also 
described as 'lower' or 'higher' emotions where, as Descartes (1649) noted, the 
higher emotions emerged from initial 'lower' emotions. Lower emotions were thus 
considered as body automatic responses to external stimuli, whereas higher emotions 
demanded the intellect and involved cognition3• However, many have found fault in 
Ekman's extensive studies (Barrett, 2006; Mead, 1975), not least with his 
interpretation of the findings, where the identification of facial expressions to 
3 This distinction between bodily instincts and urges and rational intellectual reasoning is 
found in Freud's description of the two competing forces of the unconscious: the 'id' that 
refers to human primal urges, and the 'superego' that guides behaviour according to societal 
norms. 
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emotions had a variable success rate. It would be presumed that something universal 
would occur in the vast majority of cases. Ekman's model also relied on facial 
expressions as being the defining feature of emotions, as though emotions are purely 
bodily responses rather than viewing facial expressions as communicative and 
intentional. 
The neglect of emotions in sociology began to be addressed by work that emerged 
from the 1970s onwards that highlighted the culturally diverse appearance of 
emotions as well as exploring how emotions are socially constructed (Dixon, 2012; 
Harre & Parrott, 1996). As Turner and Stets (2005) argued, biology had become the 
'black box' sociologists refused to enter. Williams (2001) detailed the dualism of 
emotion and reason evident in the foundational, and overly masculine, works of 
sociology by Durkheim, Marx and Weber that served to perpetuate the understanding 
of emotions in sociology as irrational and separate from the rational mind. A 
challenge to this thinking emerged in different forms: feminist critiques of the 
rational body, a growth in interest in the role of the body in social theory as well as 
research into consumer culture and emotional labour (Hochschild, 1983; Lupton, 
1997; Shilling, 1993; Turner, 1984). The sociology of emotions thus sought to bring 
together the social, cultural, and biological to rethink emotions as not only a bodily 
agitation, but as intentional and involving a moral order (Harre & Parrott, 1996). 
Harre (1986) critiqued the psychological study of emotions and what he saw as the 
psychologist's belief in an abstract 'it' that assumed the existence of emotions as 
discrete entities and studied them as such. Rather, for Harre, emotions could not be 
studied without close attention to the local language and 'moral order' in order to 
understand the differences in the meanings and uses of emotions. Harre proposed a 
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need to explore emotion 'vocabularies' that would focus analysis on the strategic use 
of emotion. He also noted the need to acknowledge the social function of emotional 
displays and the system of rules that maintained and taught emotional expression. 
However, it is only after focusing on language, discourse, and social rules, Harre 
claimed, that the physiological details of the various bodily 'perturbations' that 
accompany the activities can be engaged with and tracked, as the extent to which the 
perturbations are important and how they are managed will vary according to local 
culture. 
Harre's argument, by separating the analysis of language and the body presents an 
example of how the Cartesian divide between mind and body is often repeated in the 
study of emotions. Ahmed (2004) described this thinking as either an 'outside-in' or 
'inside-out' perspective. An outside-in perspective would consider emotions as 
properties of social and cultural practices that 'get inside' the individual whereas an 
inside-out perspective would see emotions as something innate to the individual that 
emanate from within out onto the world. For example, Harre above was arguing for 
an outside-in study of the emotions, where the discourse of an emotion produces 
bodily perturbations; whereas the psychologists believe emotions are something 
'inside' that comes 'out'. Hatfield et al. (1994) in their book on 'emotional contagion' 
argued that emotions can leak out of one individual and can be 'caught' and 'infect' 
others. Their argument highlights well the problems with thinking about emotions as 
something that can come from outside and 'infect', or 'leak' out from inside. In each 
case emotions are viewed as things that people have or gain, or that they catch and 
have little control over. Following Ahmed (2004), I argue that rather than stating 
people come to be infected by or leak out emotions, emotional expression can blur 
the boundaries between bodies. This way of thinking about emotions therefore 
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maintains neither an 'outside in' nor an 'inside out' perspective. 
The recent interest in the study of 'affect' provides a way of theorising emotions that 
attempts to overcome this divide between emotions and bodies. The trend towards 
studies of affect regards emotions as both biological and social phenomenon, capable 
of inhabiting and moving between bodies. The use of the term affect refers to the 
human bodily capacity to affect and be affected. From this, two different meanings 
have emerged in social and cultural analysis: one is to develop the notion of 
embodiment to appreciate the non-verbal. non-conscious aspects of human bodies. 
This also includes thinking about emotions as less structured and less socio-
linguistically fixed (Ngai, 2005). Second, the affective turn has heralded an ontology 
that thinks beyond or post human. The capacity to be affected by other bodies but 
also non-human objects and the environment at large is seen to provide a way of 
overcoming divides between not only mind and body, but nature and culture as well 
as self and other. In this way affect theory owes much to feminist work on the body 
(Haraway, 1991), but is greatly inspired by Deleuze and Guatarri (1984, 1988) and a 
select group of neuroscientists (Damasio, 1994; Massumi, 2002). 
Biology is reconfigured in affect theory so that biological explanations for social 
behaviour are no longer considered essentialist and reductionist but as a creative 
space that injects potentiality in understandings of the human body. This is curious 
considering that the term 'affect' has quite a different legacy in psychology where 
affect is often used interchangeably to refer to emotions where emotions and affect 
are innate, largely physiological responses that can be categorised and measured. By 
contrast, the embrace of biology by certain cultural theorists writing on affect, depict 
a dynamic, mutable material body that defies all boundaries. Affect theory is 
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positioned as a response to 'old' structuralist or constructionist social and cultural 
theory that distanced itself from biology as well as a theorising of the body and 
emotions that over-valued rationality and reason producing tidy disembodied 
accounts. The body in affect theory rather is not fixed but fluid, composed of 'lines of 
flight' (Deleuze & Guattari, 1984) or intensities rather than Freudian drives. 
Affects are characterised by their movement and how they are 'transmitted' between 
bodies. For Brennan (2004), the transmission of affect counteracts western notions of 
the 'affectively contained' individual by showing how the social and psychological 
produce physical, bodily changes. Affect seeks to capture the 'puzzle' of suggestibility 
that therapists and analysts described as the concept 'transference' (Blackman, 
2013). As Blackman details, this notion of suggestibility captured in psychoanalytic 
understandings of the unconscious or psychic realm lost favour but has now returned 
in a scientific and biologically informed manner. Psychoanalytic understandings of 
grief in Freud (1917) and Klein (1940) relied upon a belief in the way in which people 
incorporated others within themselves, described as object-relations or attachment, 
where the ambivalence experienced at the actual or imagined loss of the object risked 
destabilising the ego or self. However, affect theory that depends on neuroscientific 
findings tends to dismiss psychoanalysis as part of the theoretical framework that 
promoted the bounded and separate human being. Yet arguably the melancholic 
presents the perfect affective subject, for the melancholic has no conscious 
knowledge of what has been lost in her or himself; the boundaries between the 
deceased and the living, self and other, are blurred and fluid. 
Many scholars privilege the use of affect over emotions. Fox (2013, 2015), for 
example, claims that affect can go beyond what he considers the limitations of the 
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sociology of emotions. Emotions are only a sub-component of a broader 'affective 
interactivity' between bodies and non-human entities. Viewing emotions in this way 
overcomes the distinctions between structure and agency, nature and culture to 
which Fox claims sociology falls prey. Thus Fox borrows from Ahmed (2004) to 
suggest a mode of studying emotions that looks at not what emotions are but what 
they do. This shifts attention away from the individual to address 'emergence' rather 
than 'substance'. Tracking the impersonal flows of affect is Fox's attempt to decentre 
the human, individual, rational actor as the starting point of enquiry to explore how 
the individual is but one element in the circulation of affects. 
However, a key problem in Fox's argument, which is often repeated in other writings 
on affect, is that the flow or intensity of affect is given undifferentiated power. So 
while I would agree that an acknowledgement of the ways in which people are 
relationally constituted is beneficial for destabilising the notion of the autonomous 
individual, attention needs to be given to precisely the different ways in which people 
are affected, as well as how people might not be similarly affected by the same 'flow' 
of affect (Anderson, 2009). The emphasis is overwhelmingly on how affect flows but 
not how affect gets stuck, on how some bodies become stuck rather than move in a 
continual flow (Ahmed, 2004, 2011). Thinking about how some bodies get stuck 
might allow researchers to consider what makes it possible for a body to become 
affected and what makes a body resistant. The overemphasis on the 'free' and 
'flowing' nature of affect and emotions negates the role of bodies and structure 
(Stenner & Moreno, 2013). 
The affective turn is an interesting move in the study of emotions that has shed some 
light on the importance of thinking about the affective capacities of bodies. However, 
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the multi-disciplinary study of the emotions remains conflicted over the question of 
what emotions actually are. Situating the study of grief within this broader multi-
disciplinary field I argue is important in order to challenge the idea that grief is a 
'natural' and stable category of the emotions. From this starting point the study of 
grief takes quite a different perspective. Nonetheless, the varieties of disciplines that 
have studied the emotions have failed to appreciate the role of the body in 
experiencing and expressing emotions. In the next section I turn to explore the role of 
the body in grief and highlight studies that emphasise the embodied and relational 
aspects of grief to address the disembodied understandings of the emotions 
discussed so far. 
3.2.2 Theorising bodies 
While suggestions of the biological underpinnings of grief reactions are present in 
psychological theories of grief, the body remains markedly absent Grief is 
understood as an emotional response that occurs in the individual psyche. Tanner 
(2006) has argued that within theories of grief the body becomes 'lost' where 
mourning, as many have argued is to be found in Freud's theory, is described in 
symbolic, disembodied terms. For Tanner, grief is unavoidably an embodied 
experience and definitions of mourning that disavow the embodied dynamics of grief 
reflect a cultural discomfort with the 'rupture of autonomy' manifest in both the fact 
of embodiment and recognition of intercorporeality (Csordas, 1994, 2008). 
The discomfort with intercorporeality in western theories of the body is all the more 
present when dealing with dead and dying bodies. The body in death is a reminder 
that human beings are in constant flux and subject to change. As Hallam et al. (1999) 
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have noted, there has been a under theorising of the body in death studies. Where 
embodiment has appeared it has tended to imply bounded, alive bodies. They argue 
that embodiment needs to expand its focus to 'vampires': the 'disembodied dead', to 
selves not bounded by the body; and to 'vegetables', mortal, permeable and not 
autonomous bodies. Switching focus to the socially dead/biologically alive and the 
socially alive/biologically dead, circumvents the Cartesian dualism between body and 
mind to a human embodiment which situates itself at and beyond the boundaries of 
the body. 
It would seem that some bodies are allowed to be present and others are encouraged 
to be absent Bennett and Bennett (2000) found in their study of bereaved people 
who had experienced the presence of the dead that their participants would move 
between a materialist domain of thought and a supernaturalist domain to make sense 
of their experiences. The study revealed how participants in their narration of their 
experience drew on the sorts of modern rational discourse that classified dead bodies 
as separate from living ones, as well as the participants' own fears of being 
considered delusional at seeing and feeling the dead. Within a rationalist logic, 
experiencing the presence of the dead would be considered illusionary and 
dismissed. Bennett and Bennett argued for the need to embrace alternative ways of 
thinking that would allow for such experiences of the presence of the dead to be 
considered as equally rational and real. 
The ways in which certain bodies are made absent also reveals the boundaries placed 
on bodies to perform and appear in socially normative ways. Hockey et al. (2010) 
drew on Douglas's (1966) notion of 'matter out of place' to describe how certain 
bodies, in particular dying and dead bodies, become matter to be managed. Howarth 
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(2000) argued that a scientific approach to mortality is the product of modernity that 
relies on the assumption that life and death are clearly separate, developing 
classificatory systems and from which the models of grief have emanated. Bereaved 
people appear to embody this divide, posing a problem in a society orientated around 
life and troubled by death. This division between life and death, claimed Howarth, is 
not a fact but rather a false boundary borne out by a modern need to segregate and 
classify. What is needed is not to find yet another model of grief, but to work to blur 
the boundaries between life and death. 
As described in the opening Section 3.2, this 'polluting' of boundaries is managed 
through ritual, which Douglas (1966, p. 97) described as separating the person from 
their old status, and segregating them 'for a time' before publicly declaring their entry 
into a new status. The 'danger' lies in this act of being in transition: of being neither 
one state nor another. The person who is in transition and indefinable is himself or 
herself in danger and emanates danger to others. 'Complicated grievers' for example 
may be considered polluted and in need of classification due to what is considered 
their proximity to the deceased person. The bereaved person is thus 'betwixt and 
between' the margins of life and death: they are not wholly living, as their 
bereavement means they are emotionally distanced from the world as they cling to 
the memory of the dead, but nor are they wholly dead, for of course they are in fact 
literally alive. 
'Out of place' bodies also gain a level of power due to being on the wrong, or neither, 
side of the boundary. As Foucault's work (1963, 1973, 1976) has demonstrated, non-
normative bodies require forms of diSCipline that act upon the body through 'bodily 
regimes'. Power over bodies, or 'biopower', is not total and fixed but mobile and ever 
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changing just like human biology. Where power is present so also is resistance, or at 
least the possibility of resistance. Foucault alluded to bodily agency in his concept of 
'biopower' where he described 'life' as a force that resists and escapes power and can 
never be quite fully controlled (Foucault, 2003). Foucault argued it was the 
materiality of the body, prone to errors and dysfunction, which necessitated the need 
for power in the first place. Yet what are considered as 'errors' or abnormal are 
precisely dependent on the historical context. 
Foucault received criticism for his failure to explain resistance (McNay, 2009), but I 
interpret Foucault's description of biopower as one where resistance is not 
necessarily conscious or intentional but a description of how 'unruly' bodies can 
challenge boundaries. Resistance is the failure to embody the 'figure of man' I 
referred to in Chapter 1 that underpinned Foucault's work and which he sought to 
challenge. People and actions then get read as resistant when they do not fit into the 
discursive 'regimes of truth', when for instance they blur the boundaries between 
mind and body. Resistance to power therefore finds its possibility in that 'life' which 
escapes power, in the materiality of the human body that cannot be quite grasped by 
power and discourse. In Chapter 4 I detail further Foucault's understanding of 
authority and power and how authorities exert power over people through the 
surveillance and monitoring of bodies, as well as how people come to monitor their 
own bodies. 
In the next section I consider how practices, both rational and symbolic, can act to 
'control' this 'danger' posed by the liminality of grief. But first I want to consider how 
people might continue an embodied connection to a person after they die, as it is 
'holding on' to the deceased that bereavement researchers have identified as the 
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problem in need of professional intervention and management among bereaved 
people. 
The continuing bonds theory, discussed in Chapter 2, was first proposed as an 
antidote to theories that emphasised detachment from the deceased as the way to 
resolution or recovery. However, I argue the continuing bonds theory tends to rely 
upon the individualised and largely disembodied subject it attempted to critique. 
Ribbens McCarthy and Prokhovnik (2013) similarly have critiqued the notion of 
'internalising' the dead person that the continuing bonds theory describes, 
contending that it remains predicated on the mind/body split by psychologising and 
locating the deceased other within the individual's psyche. Instead Ribbens McCarthy 
and Prokhovnik recommend the need to move beyond the binary thinking that is 
implied in models such as the continuing bonds theory to think about how people 
maintain a material and embodied relationality after death. 
Ribbens McCarthy and Prokhovnik highlight how within a western secular 
framework that assumes the mind/body and life/death divide, it is unclear what 
happens to personhood following the death of the body. However, for Ribbens 
McCarthy and Prokhovnik while the biological body dies, the embodied relationship 
does not. The material presence of the dead person remains as well as the 'us' formed 
in the relationship between the two bodies. This 'us' remains written in the body of 
the living person as an ongoing embodied presence. In contrast to the disembodied 
continuing bonds theory, Leichtentritt et al. (2016) in their qualitative study found 
that bereaved people made attempts to blur the boundary between living and dead 
bodies, 'by focusing on physical aspects of the post-death relationship using their own 
body as well as that of the deceased' (p. 5). The exploration of the ways in which the 
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bereaved person experiences the presence of the deceased in their absence has led a 
number of authors to consider the notion of 'absence-presence', positioning the 
grieving person at the boundaries between the living and the dead and blurring the 
edges of the bounded subject (Frers, 2013; Maddrell, 2013; Meier et aI., 2013). 
An embodied approach focuses on how absence becomes not only something to be 
dealt with through individual psychic work but shifts bodily orientation in space. As 
Krasner (2004) argues, grief is a 'series of slight physical adjustments based on the 
fact that a body that was always here, in a certain relation to our own, is now gone' (p. 
219). Grief is the experience of the absence of a body by which one was once 
orientated and constituted. For Krasner grief has a disabling or crippling effect as the 
particular physical relation in space has been disrupted. He illustrates this through 
reference to literature and descriptions of people stumbling, reaching out and falling 
in the face of grief. Bodies become compromised in grief and have to renegotiate 
themselves in space. 
Krasner describes how grieving can be considered a bodily disposition because 
bodies are already in relation with each other in varying degrees of intimacy. The 
experience of absence is rooted in the corporeal 'embeddedness' of people. Absence 
emerges because bodies are already in a state of 'being-in-the-world' with others, 
whether human or non-human (Frers, 2013). Frers further explains that, to 
experience absence, the object must have already been part of the person's 'habitus'. 
Here, Frers draws upon the concept popularised by Bourdieu (1990). Habitus is a 
generative form of identity where the social is internalised into the body consciously 
and unconsciously, which creates a set of ever evolving bodily dispOSitions, practices, 
habits and tastes. As Krasner illustrates, this habitus is disorientated in the event of 
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loss. The presence of absence is the disruption of expectations, a disruption that is 
experienced bodily and in space. This idea was also captured in Parkes' (1972) 
concept of the 'assumptive world' that describes how what is lost following 
bereavement is not only a person but the sense of reality from which the bereaved 
person made assumptions about world they inhabited. 
Arguments that emphasise the embodied nature of grief often do so in opposition to 
Freud and what is considered to be his disembodied theory of grief. However, I return 
to Freud to demonstrate how psychoanalytic theories of loss and attachment support 
a relational embodied concept of the self. As described in Chapter 2, for Freud 
relationships were fraught with ambivalence due to the way in which people identify 
with others, where the continuation of one's understanding of oneself was in part or 
wholly reliant upon the endurance of another object outside of oneself. The loss of the 
loved object thus brings that ambivalence to the fore. From Freud and Klein's 
understanding of internal objects and how they come to be internalised, the work of 
grief is not about 'taking in' what is 'outside' but an acknowledgment that for the 
object to be lost 'it must have already existed within the subject' (Ahmed, 2004, p. 
160). 
Butler (2003, 2004, 2010) draws upon Freud's essay 'Mourning and Melancholia', to 
describe how grief reveals a fundamental human dependency on others. Loss and 
vulnerability follow from being socially constituted bodies. Yet what grief displays, 
writes Butler, is that people are in relation with others in ways of which they are 
unaware, challenging the notion of an autonomous subject who is in control. As was 
displayed in the last chapter, the work of mourning in Freud came to be interpreted 
as a discrete process with stages and tasks, yet Butler notes that Freud kept changing 
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his mind on when mourning is successful. For Butler, Freud's theory instead suggests 
the ways in which people are liable to 'coming undone' by others. Butler directly 
attacks the notion in grief theories by arguing that grief is not something that can be 
'worked through' but rather something larger than one's plan or choices: 
I do not think for instance one can invoke the Protestant ethic when it comes 
to loss. One cannot say, "Oh I'll go through loss this way, and that will be the 
result, and I'll apply myself to the task, and I'll endeavour to achieve the 
resolution of grief that is before me". I think one is hit by waves, and that one 
starts out the day with an aim, a project, a plan, and finds oneself foiled. 
(Butler, 2004, p. 21) 
Butler positions the relational subject as the given form of the subject, and in doing so 
she builds on Freud to explain that dependency rather than autonomy is the 
fundamental state of human beings, elucidated by the experience and expression of 
grief. The autonomous individual for Butler, rather than being a reality, is 'an 
accomplishment, not a presupposition, and certainly no guarantee' (2004, p. 27). 
Butler highlights that people are not only constituted by their relations with others 
but dispossessed by them. In this framework 'severing ties' is impossible because the 
'I' cannot be thought without 'you'. However, ambivalence arises in the struggle 
between the desire to grasp control and maintain autonomy and the reliance upon 
the other needed to exist. 
This ambivalence is evidence of the way in which objects become incorporated into 
the self, but further how people do not precisely know the ways in which they are 
attached to the objects in which they invest. Ahmed (2010) describes the melancholic 
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figure as one who does not know what has been lost. Melancholia is not an inability to 
let go but an inability to perceive what needs letting go of. As in Klein's theory, 
melancholia arises because the person does not know how to lose (Kristeva, 1989). 
The presence of ambivalence also reveals a different view of agency where the 
attachment that sustains life at the same time destroys autonomy. Berlant (Berlant & 
Edelman, 2014) employs the term 'non-sovereignty' to describe this, invoking the 
psychoanalytic notion of the subject's constitutive division that keeps subjects from 
fully knowing or being in control of themselves. Borrowing from Berlant, melancholia 
and the refusal to recover or let go of attachments to the dead can be read not only as 
a sign of pathology but understood as an active choice to not be sovereign. This is 
explained further in Berlant's (2011) concept of 'cruel optimism', which describes 
how a relation of desire to an object can become cruel by becoming an obstacle to 
flourishing. Berlant's concept is instructive for grieving for while recovery is 
constructed on the understanding that detaching from the lost object leads to 
successful mourning, yet it is the object, as Berlant describes, that is the anchor that 
sustains hope. So while an attachment to the deceased person might act to impede the 
ability to 'move on', that same attachment provides a sense of self, and belonging in 
the world. This is the cruel nature of the optimism for the lost object where the 
bereaved person is then suspended in the space of liminality, for to let go and leave 
the object of desire is to leave the anchor for optimism, and yet staying with this 
fantasy produces unhappiness. 
In this section I have discussed literature that has emphasised the body and 
embodiment in the experience of grief. I have also discussed literature that has 
enabled me to view the relational and affective aspects of bodies, and the importance 
of this relational nature for understanding the experience of grief. However, these 
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bodies are also potentially problematic in a culture that favours autonomous 
individuals where the boundaries between mind, bodies and emotions are clearly 
demarcated. From the literature I have discussed in the previous two sections, I argue 
this is a proposition that is unsustainable and which has led to the shortcomings of 
the dominant grief theories described in Chapter 2. In the next section I focus on 
practices as a way to bridge together the two discussions on emotions and bodies, 
and to centre in on how people are managed, and manage themselves, in the liminal 
space of grief. 
3.2.3 Managing emotions and bodies: affective practices 
In this section I argue that a focus on practice can help to resolve some of the 
shortcomings of the perspectives on affect described in Section 3.2.1, as well bring 
together ideas on how emotions are embodied in practice. I draw on an argument 
first proposed by Wetherell (2012) in her discussion of affect theory and emotion and 
her concept of 'affective practices'. Wetherell argues that the generic category of 
autonomous affect is unhelpful and that, instead, affect needs to be situated and 
studied as part of an embodied process of meaning-making. Wetherell also argues for 
the need not to abandon discourse, as many affect theorists have done, but to explore 
through an analysis of practice how affect interacts with and informs discursive 
meaning-making. An analysis of 'affective practices' is thus not one necessarily 
concerned with following 'flows', but human behaviours that seek to preserve, 
construct and negotiate identities and meaning. 
According to Scheer (2012), a focus on practice in the study of emotions can help to 
bridge dichotomies between structure and agency. Practices not only generate 
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emotions but emotions themselves can be viewed as a practical engagement with the 
world. Practices can be considered as 'vehicles' for emotions or emotions can be 
considered practices in themselves. Both Wetherell and Scheer use a Bourdieusian 
understanding of practice. In Bourdieu's (1990) understanding, subjects are not prior 
to practices but products of them. Bourdieu explained this through his concept of 
'habitus'. For Bourdieu the individual internalises the varying conditions of objective 
social structures and norms producing particular bodily dispositions. These learned 
behaviours become unconscious and habitual. Practices are then guided by a 
'practical sense', which is informed and shaped by the norms and the society in which 
one lives. Bourdieu's concept provides an embodied understanding of practice as well 
as an understanding of what might predispose a person to express emotion in a 
particular way. Bourdieu's model of practice also argues that certain emotional 
practices, including facial expressions, are learnt or inherited from the society in 
which one lives, and are not necessarily 'natural' displays of emotion. 
Thinking about emotions as practices also repositions emotion as no longer opposed 
to rationality but as potentially central to rational action (Barbalet, 2001; Turner & 
Stets, 2005). Barbalet (2001) argued emotions should be understood as essential to 
social structure and processes, as well as the routine operations of social interactions, 
where emotions provide direction and give purpose to action. Viewed from this 
perspective, emotions do not derail rational behaviour but give it meaning. If 
emotions distract persons from their purposes, then, at the same time, emotions 
establish those purposes afresh. Barbalet further described how emotions such as 
confidence and shame serve to produce and maintain social structures, highlighting 
how emotions can produce change but also conformity and sameness. 
74 
Ngai's (2005) description of 'ugly feelings' provides a way of thinking about emotions 
that are not necessarily transformative or disruptive. Ugly feelings are 'minor' 
feelings like anxiety or irritation that do not bring about a release or catharsis but 
rather serve to perpetuate the situation that caused them originally. Thinking about 
affects that suspend agency is an interesting counter to the authors who write about 
the trans formative potential of affect. I argue it is a useful way to think about the 
place of the affective in the everyday and how the practices people carry out in the act 
of 'reproducing life' (Berlant, 2011) are imbued with the affective. 
For example, the organisation of the working day has a particularly important role in 
modern western societies that are governed within a neo-liberal capitalist system (as 
I argue in Chapter 5). Binkley (2009), drawing on Foucault's concept of 'technologies 
of temporalisation' discussed how the organisation of time is central to producing 
'docile' and obedient bodies. As I go on to describe in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, time has an 
increasingly significant role in how grief is both defined and treated, with designated 
time periods marking the line between normal and complicated grieving. As I argued 
in the opening section on liminality, if grief is an emotion that suspends agency, 
reintegration and recovery become reliant on time-limited interventions that reorient 
the bereaved person into a linear sense of time. 
The ways in which affective practices are carried out in the ordinary working day is 
further captured in Hochschild's (1983) understanding of 'emotional labour'. Based 
on Marx's theory of labour (1976), Hochschild described how waged labour was not 
only physical but required emotional work. In her study of air flight assistants she 
explored how the employees traded on smiles and were trained and encouraged to 
express positive emotions as an unpaid part oftheir job. For Hochschild these 'feeling 
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rules' that existed in the workplace were part of a broader emotional management 
that governed people's interactions in their day-to-day lives, and a form of 
exploitation. However, when emotional management becomes institutionalised as 
part of company policy, Hochschild argued this led to a commodification of emotions 
since what is being sold as part of the service is a display of appropriate emotion. At 
its simplest, part of the emotional labour was to smile at customers and at its most 
taxing not to show negative emotions to difficult or abusive customers. Staff thus 
became alienated from their 'authentic' feelings through the required performance of 
emotions. These performances were either 'surface acting', where the person 
pretended to feel an emotion but did not deceive themselves as to their 'true' feelings; 
or 'deep acting' where the pretence became indistinguishable from the 'true' feelings, 
causing a transformation in how the individual felt and related to their emotions. 
While Hochschild's belief in natural 'authentic' feelings is problematic, her analysis of 
how emotions are utilised in work practices illustrates how everyday practices 
become a way of managing the emotions. It also demonstrates the performative 
nature of emotions. In Hochschild's understanding of 'deep' and 'surface' acting, the 
performance of emotions can never be understood to be 'real', rather that the real, the 
unmanaged and spontaneous emotion had to be rescued from the processes of 
emotional management Yet I would argue that performance is central to affective 
practices, and that the performance itself might be considered the 'real' emotion. 
Goffman (1959) claimed that even the most 'authentic' appearing performances are 
managed. For Goffman, emotions were just another 'move' in the 'game' of controlling 
and managing the impression one gives to others. Emotional expression was not 
about relaying the true character of a person but a response to the requirements of 
the social encounter. Authenticity was something that was achieved by the 
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persuasiveness of the performance that required adhering to the 'feeling rules'. 
Further, for Goffman even those emotions performed in private, in the absence of an 
audience, were socially performed. 
Affective practices can also be studied as a way of understanding how people 
construct and maintain identity and not only how they might hide or perform it. 
Valentine (2013) employed Wetherell's concept of 'affective practices' to explore 
responses to death and bereavement through her analysis of people's narratives 
about their continuing relationships with the deceased person. Valentine drew on the 
work on affect to illuminate the role of the body and emotions in managing identities 
of bereaved and deceased people. For Valentine, affective practices referred to the 
'behaviour designed to preserve relationships, identities and continuity of being' 
(2013, p. 385). Grief provided the epistemological site for exploring how individuals 
made sense of the mix of ordinary and extraordinary in the experience of 
bereavement. Valentine described how people managed post-mortem relationships 
through situated affective practices such as memorialising the dead through formal 
and informal rituals. These affective practices were a means to repair identities 
shattered by the event of loss. The practices of meaning-making and continuing 
attachments to the deceased were not something that simply happened as a result of 
a psychological state, but arose out of strategic social action (Unruh, 1983, p. 349). 
In terms of identity repair following bereavement, there has been a considerable 
amount of research on how bereaved people use material spaces as a way to actively 
manage the liminality of grief (Hockey et al., 2002; Horsley, 2008; Maddrell, 2013). 
These studies have shown the meaning of spaces has a role to play in how death and 
grief are experienced, not only in the spaces of the cemetery or the funeral home 
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(Horsley, 2008) where death is expected to be, but also as a site of creativity and 
agency where the landscape is adapted to accommodate formal and informal grieving 
rituals, such as roadside memorials. Maddrell (2013) has described in her work on 
informal public memorials how absence becomes a dynamic 'absence-presence' 
located in material spaces, not just in the psyche. This forms what she calls a 'third 
emotional space' where informal memorials serve to mediate between private and 
public, and between the living and the dead. What these studies have demonstrated is 
how people come to inhabit spaces such as the cemetery to manage the liminal 
experience of grief, and further that these spaces too are liminal in that they forge a 
unique space between the living and dead. However, these spaces also become 
identifiable places in which to locate the deceased person, and in effect bring some 
order to what might be felt as the disorientating experience of grief. Here, the dead 
are not only divided from the living, but they are in effect 'stored' so that the living 
may here interact with the dead, before returning to their lives away from this 
socially designated space of bereavement and death. 
Affective practices can be seen as everyday performances and behaviours that 
emerge in response to social encounters or events, performances that might be 
differently interpreted as conforming to or resisting the dominant 'feeling rules'. 
Affective practices are also important modes of preserving and maintaining identity, 
where identity is something constructed through everyday actions not something 
occurring inside the individual psyche. Describing emotions as practices, I argue, is a 
way to overcome the problems of viewing emotions as uncontrollable intensities that 
come from 'outside-in' and equally the difficulties in arguing for a set of basic 
emotions that emerge from 'inside-out' of the body. It also allows space to reconsider 
the important role of discourse in constructing ideas and norms around appropriate 
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emotional behaviours. Following Bourdieu's notion of practice, emotional expression 
is understood as a learned and habitual bodily practice and not something that is 
merely repressed or induced by feeling rules, as in Hochschild's argument The 
management of emotions can be thus understood as more akin to Foucault's (1988) 
'technologies of the self where individuals act to govern their own behaviour for 
different ends through various practices (a concept I describe further in Chapter 4). 
In the Chapters 5, 6, and 7 I focus on different types of practices that seek to manage 
grief, often in order to achieve the end goal or recovery, but I also highlight practices, 
such as interacting with spaces and objects, that act to preserve and construct 
identities both of the bereaved person and the person who had died. 
So far in this chapter I have drawn on literature that has differently emphasised the 
intertwined nature of emotions, bodies and practices or rituals that combine together 
to produce different experiences of grief. In closing, I now turn to consider what type 
of body or subject emerges from this way of conceptualising grief, as opposed to the 
autonomous resilient individual that recurs in the overly psychological view of grief 
described in Chapter 2. 
3.2.4 Theorising 'the blob' 
In speaking of affective practices it might feel as though a conscious, rational actor 
has replaced the ambivalent melancholic figure discussed in this chapter. Yet to 
emphasise the analysis of affective practices is to move away from categories that 
govern and constrain behaviour to thinking about how the category of an emotion 
does not determine the actions and feelings felt in its wake. I argue a focus on practice 
can allow for the study of grief that acknowledges that people might come to inhabit 
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the structure of grief differently, conforming to or resisting feeling rules. 
In this attempt a quite different, yet unclear vision of the bereaved person and grief 
emerges. The body is both material and beyond materiality, coherent and emotional, 
possessing the capacity to be affected by others and also to remain resistant to them. 
This understanding of the body as always in flux is made possible through a relational 
ontology of the body. This resonates with Deleuze and Guattari's (1984, 1988) 
'nomadic' form of subjectivity where the body is viewed as a constant process of 
becoming. The nomadic subject has 'no terminus from which you set out, none which 
you ought to arrive at' (Deleuze & Parnet, 1977, p.2). The aim of the nomadic subject 
is not integration but rather disintegration, captured in Deleuze and Guattari's 
concept of the 'body-without-organs' that poses a radical counter to the question of 
'being this or that sort of human' (Deleuze, 1990). The 'body-without-organs' 
describes a subject not constrained by binaries, whether the divide between the 
living and dead, or the mind and body. 
While Deleuze and Guattari seek to affirm the potential of the human body and 
liberate it from what they see as unnecessary boundaries, as the name suggests, the 
'body-with out-organs' views the material matter of the body itself as something from 
which to be freed. This is often where the disembodied accounts of affect heavily 
influenced by Deleuze and Guattari derive. However, is there really nothing to be said 
for the human body? This is the question Bloch (2013) posed as he attempted to 
account for how people can be both in process and relational beings and yet also have 
some type of biological consistency that makes people identifiably human. Bloch 
begins his essay by describing the 'universalist vs culturalist' debate that has plagued 
the history of the social sciences in the attempt to define 'human nature'. Critiquing 
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the social construction of the culturalists, Bloch argued that in the attempts by the 
social sciences to capture the 'individual' and 'self there has been a failure to consider 
people as natural organisms. Bloch then proceeded to propose a model of the human 
which, to avoid the ontological underpinnings of categories such as 'self, he called 
'the blob'. The 'blob' is created simultaneously by biology, psychology, history and 
culture. Bloch's model of the blob is an attempt to reconcile the ideas of the social 
sciences, namely anthropology, and those found in the life sciences and to explain the 
multiple and incomplete visions of the human that are produced when in 'the never-
never land of culture without minds and bodies' or in 'the never-never land of minds 
and bodies without culture and history' (Bloch, 2013). 
Bloch distinguished three different levels that compose the blob. The three levels 
exist on a continuum, where neither element can be separated from the other. 
• The 'core self: This involves a sense of ownership and location of one's body 
and a sense that one is the author of one's own actions. This is a type of 
selthood Bloch suggests is shared by all animate creatures, but implies no 
reflexive awareness whatsoever. 
• The 'minimal self: This concerns a sense of continuity in time. This level 
involves the short-term memory required to organise episodes and the ability 
to use information from the past to inform behaviour in the present and the 
future. 
• The 'narrative self: It is the narrative aspect of the blob that allows memories 
to be formed into an autobiography. However, having an autobiography is 
distinguished from being conscious of and using language to speak about one's 
autobiography. Bloch here makes a distinction between two rhetorical styles: 
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those that tell stories about themselves and those that do not. 
Bloch makes this point concerning the 'narrative self to emphasise that this does not 
imply a difference in the nature of the blob but rather a difference in style and means 
of expression. It is here that culture has a clear role to play in shaping the type of 
stories people might tell about themselves. Yet as Bloch points out it is not possible to 
say how much influence culture has until the epistemological status of the thing 
claimed has been clarified. I find Bloch's analysis greatly useful for conceptualising of 
the self without having to fall on one side of the 'universalist vs culturalist' debate. 
Here, mind and bodies are on a continuum, and emotional expression is both bodily 
and socially informed: there is no way to distinguish them from one another. 
The paradox of grief then can be viewed as a paradox embodied by humans 
themselves in that biology and the environment (including other people, language, 
social norms and social structures) one is situated in are always in negotiation. This 
shape and form does not exist prior to this negotiation, at least only in the form of the 
blob that allows such negotiation with the environment to be possible in the first 
place. In Chapter 4 I describe further how I am theorising subjectivity in this thesis, 
drawing on the Foucauldian ontology that suspends judgment on the 'nature' or 
essence of the human body, exploring the questions of how people account for 
themselves rather than asking what people are. 
3.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have tackled two areas of concern that I argue have been largely 
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overlooked in past and present research into grief and bereavement. As discussed in 
the Chapter 2, much grief research rests on the assumption of an autonomous 
individual subject and the belief in grief as a natural emotion. Through this a 
paradoxical grieving figure emerges that is at once a rational and resilient actor and 
yet liable to 'come undone' by the loss of another. I argue that the study of grief has 
been short-sighted in its understanding of emotions and bodies, and I have turned to 
literature from the social and cultural sciences to bring new insight to theorising 
grief. In this attempt I have highlighted the 'unbounded', relational and unconscious 
aspects of the body as well as explored how emotions might not be understood as 
things one innately has or 'catches' from elsewhere but something one does through 
practices, whether extraordinary or mundane, which give form both to the affect and 
to the body itself. By centring the discussion on the concept of liminality my aim has 
been to suggest that theorising grief is best begun with no 'a priori' assumptions of 
what constitutes grief and the person who experiences it. 
In reviewing this literature, I have also addressed, as Hockey et al. (2010) have done 
previously, the impasse between social constructionist arguments that claim human 
beings see and experience their environment in culturally specific ways and the 
everyday experiences of the immediacy of bodily emotional and sensory responses to 
that world. I argue that biology and the social environment are in a constant process 
of interaction, out of which the shape of the person and their grief comes into view. In 
the next chapter I outline the methodological foundation upon which I base these 
theoretical claims on the subjectivity and the emotions. I explain in detail the 
methodological perspective of Foucault and how his way of understanding how 
knowledge and subjectivity is constructed reinforces the central role of practice to 
the study of bodies and emotions. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Methodology and Methods 
4.1 Introduction to the chapter 
In Chapter 3, I challenged what I argue are dominant notions in popular 
understandings of grief and recovery. In challenging these assumptions my intention 
was to propose a different way of conceptualising both grief and recovery. Here I 
detail the methodological approach that underpins my understanding of grief. I draw 
on the work of Foucault (1970, 1971, 1984a, 1984b, 1984c) and the Foucauldian 
approach adopted by Rose (1985, 1989) to consider grief not as an identifiable entity 
but as a historically constructed object. In the first section of this chapter, I introduce 
the methodology of Foucault and how I adopted a Foucauldian approach to the study 
of grief and recovery in a contemporary UK setting. I focus on the themes of 
'problematisations', 'explanations', 'authorities', 'technologies' and 'subjectivities' to 
unpack the key elements of a Foucauldian approach. 
In the second section, I detail the methods I used in my research. I undertook a 
qualitative approach, comprising document analysis of policy and lay literature and 
27 semi-structured interviews. A qualitative approach was well suited to a 
Foucauldian theoretical stance in that it allowed me to explore how grief and 
recovery were defined, practiced and constructed by different individuals and groups. 
By using document analysis and semi-structured interviews, I sought to capture how 
both 'expert' and 'layperson' defined grief and recovery, and the practices involved in 
the management of grief and recovery. I also present information on the participants 
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in the study and the ethics of accessing 'vulnerable' groups. I emphasise how carrying 
out qualitative research is a process by reflecting on the ethical boundaries of the 
interview encounter and how I managed my own subjectivity through maintaining a 
reflexive approach. 
4.2 Methodology 
In Chapters 2 and 3 I reviewed the dominant and alternative explanations of grief in 
past and contemporary literature. In particular, I critiqued the assumption 
underpinning much of the literature - that grief is an identifiable entity that can be 
located within the individual psyche. Though interpretations of grief vary along a 
spectrum from a biological reaction to a socially constructed category, there remains 
a dominant belief in grief as a natural response to loss. As a result, research into grief 
begins with an assumption that grief is 'universal', 'natural' and 'normal'. I argue that 
two problems arise from this assumption. First, when grief is presumed to be present 
in all people an apparent lack of grief at the level of an individual becomes cause for 
concern. Research, then, becomes structured around identifying and remedying those 
grief reactions that deviate from the presumed natural expressions of grief. Second, 
recovery also becomes standardised. Again, deviations from a 'normal' course of grief 
stand out and can be identified by those charged with the responsibility of 
surveillance. Attention is given to encouraging people along a particular course of 
recovery based on the understanding that recovery is desirable, and the failure to 
recover is either a sign of resistance or failure of individual will. 
For Foucault, a methodological approach begins with the understanding that one 
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cannot assume there is anything fundamental about phenomena like grief or more 
broadly about people and the society within which they live. From this perspective, 
people who experience 'complicated grief' are not resisting a natural course but 
transgressing social norms and dominant discourses around what 'normal' grief is 
considered to be. In Foucauldian terms 'normal' is not universal but historically 
situated. It is this destabilisation of universal assumptions about people and society 
that is the starting point for any Foucauldian analysis. Building on the work of 
Foucault, Rose (1989) identified a number of areas of focus in a Foucauldian analysis: 
'problematisations', 'explanations', 'technologies', 'authorities', and 'subjectivities'. I 
use these terms as a guide to elucidate the methodological framework within 
Foucault's work. I begin by defining each term. 
4.2.1 Problematisations 
To focus on 'problematisations' is to question why certain ideas, practices or people 
might emerge as a 'problem' in a particular time and context Foucault's History of 
Sexuality (1976) traced how sexuality had been viewed, repressed and liberated over 
time. In doing so, Foucault revealed that ideas or people become problematic not 
because of something inherent within that person or idea, but because of how it/they 
might pose concerns of a moral, political, economic, military or juridical nature. 
Therefore, analysing problematisations involves asking why something or someone 
comes to be identified as a problem at a certain point in time. It also involves 
acknowledging how problems emerge in relation to other sets of interests. As a 
consequence, revealing that problems are contingent on their relation to a particular 
political, moral or economic context suggests that things could be otherwise. In this 
methodological approach, the aim is to destablise the present and its taken-for-
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granted certainties, in such things as institutions (i.e. the prison system or similar 
orders) and ideas such as sexuality and its underpinning moral code. 
Thus, destabilising the present can foreground alternative ways of conceptualising 
those ideas or persons that might be viewed as a 'problem'. In doing so, less dominant 
ideas come into view. As discussed in the Introduction, it was the question of what 
happens to people who do not recover from grief, which drove my inquiry into what 
comprises recovery and how grief is defined. In the 1961 Preface to The History of 
Madness (2009), Foucault wrote that his intention in the work was to write 'an 
archaeology of silence' that had been created by the language of psychiatry. The 
translation of madness into mental illness for Foucault meant there was no longer a 
common language in which the 'madman' could communicate with 'modern man'. In 
other words, the languages were incommensurable. This rupture in dialogue allowed 
psychiatry to emerge as the means to explain madness in terms of mental illness. 
Similarly, I argue the story of no recovery, the non-recovered, is a story hidden from 
view, its silencing limiting the possible alternatives and scope of recovery. 
How does a story become hidden and how can it be made visible? Foucault claimed 
that 'truth' was not absolute but multiple. Rather than seeing objects or identities as 
singular, they can comprise multiple 'truths' - often produced at the intersections of 
different discourses. Foucault disregarded any universal notion of truth, because he 
argued that universal understandings are historicised, and examining the ways in 
which they are constructed and emerge out of a particular historical context reveals 
this 'truth' fallacy. Put simply, truth is historically located and socially constructed. 
This characterised Foucault's largely 'genealogical' approach to research, which 
involved building a 'critical history' of an object or phenomenon. For example, 
87 
Foucault took the birth of the modern clinic (1963), the prison (1975) and sexuality 
(1976) as objects of study and explored how they became institutions, with what 
purposes, and into what forms and with what rationality. In this way Foucault 
explored how 'truths' about people or objects and ideas were constructed, but his line 
of enquiry went further than simply stating that truth is socially constructed, as Rose 
(1989, p. x-xi) described: 
It is not very enlightening to be told repeatedly that something claimed as 
objective is in fact 'socially constructed'. Objects of thought are constructed in 
thought, what else could they be? So the interesting questions concern the 
ways in which they are constructed. Where do objects emerge? Which are the 
authorities who are able to pronounce upon them? Through what concepts 
and explanatory regimes are they specified? How do certain constructions 
acquire the status of truth - through experimental procedures, 
demonstrations and other interventions? 
For Rose, this line of questioning begins by problematising what is taken to be truth 
and then looking at who is making claims to truth and with what explanations. 
Further, in Foucault's argument power is no longer maintained in a direct line, such 
as that of a king to a prince. Rather, truth claims, that is to say knowledge, becomes 
power. A genealogical approach is not a search for 'origins' or 'truth' but rather how 
ideas come to seen as true. The object then emerges into view through explanations, 
technologies and authorities, as I outline next. 
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4.2.2 Explanations, technologies and authorities 
A key focus of this thesis is to explore and interrogate the cultural discourse around 
grief. The term 'discourse' refers to a body of statements that are arranged in a 
systematic pattern of organisation. The pattern of discourse is formed by rules that 
designate which statements fulfil the conditions to be part of the discourse. 
Therefore, studying discourse is not about taking the perspective of the person who is 
speaking but rather is about looking at what the discourse does, what rules it enacts, 
and how these rules serve to exclude or include. The knowledge of a specific group of 
people (such as people who have been bereaved), or of a subjective state (such as 
grief) is shaped and defined by the dominant discourses, and is what counts as 
knowledge. In Chapters 5, 6 and 7, I present data findings and describe a number of 
different discourses people drew upon to make sense of grief, including therapeutic, 
psychological and political discourses. Grief discourses produce explanations of grief. 
Studying discourse involves exploring how some explanations come to hold 
precedence over others. As I discuss in Section 4.3.7 this involves analysing the type 
of language and 'operative concepts' used. It also includes exploring how and by 
whom explanations are accepted and proved. In Chapter 2, I began this by 
highlighting the explanations used by psychologists and how they were accepted over 
and above other theories of grief. Discourse incorporates not just language but also 
the assumptions made within explanations, and the type of logic or mode of 
articulation. 
The dominance of one explanation over another that forms a particular discourse 
around grief is shaped by who has the authority to make a claim about grief. In a 
Foucauldian line of enquiry the aim is to explore how authority is constituted and 
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what procedures are used to acquire and maintain authority. Further attention is 
directed to alliances and conflicts between different types of authorities. Authority is 
not accepted as 'true' due to its adherence to a particular framework whether legal, 
religious or psychological, but questioned for how it became established so that it 
could claim authority over a particular phenomenon. For instance, with grief and 
recovery as my object of study, in Chapter 2 I questioned why psychology had taken 
such a dominant place in providing an explanation and establishing a public discourse 
around grief. Discourses on grief and recovery are thus intertwined with power, and 
who has the power to make a claim to knowledge about grief, which Foucault called 
'truth claims'. However, in Foucault's theory, contrary to some interpretations, 
Foucault argues that power is no longer merely exerted from an authority above to 
the people below, but emerges in relations between individuals and groups. This is 
illustrated in Foucault's concept of 'governmentality'. Governmentality refers to how 
the conduct of people is governed by a number of different authorities whether of a 
psychological, political, economic, or juridical nature to achieve a particular aim, for 
example, in this case, recovery. Foucault developed the concept as a way of 
identifying certain rationalities of government and how they permeate across 
authorities, political and personal, through 'regimes of truth'. 
The types of technologies used by authorities is also an area of focus within the 
Foucauldian approach that explores what apparatus, interventions, strategies and 
forms of measurement are used in judging the object of study. Within the literature 
on grief, I described how grief came to be measured by psychological testing, or 
diagnosable by a psychiatric manual (DSM -5), and treated with bereavement 
counselling. These are all technologies developed and utilised by authorities that are 
seeking explanations about grief. For instance, I used the accounts of bereavement 
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counsellors and support workers interviewed in this research, to explore what claims 
they were making about grief and, importantly, what sort of interventions, activities 
or practices then take place on the basis of this 'truth' about grief. As touched upon in 
Chapter 2, certain interventions or technologies are used depending on how grief is 
interpreted. Psychological technologies become appropriate when grief is viewed as a 
matter of the individual mind that is measurable and can be categorised as normal or 
abnormal. Crucially, the technologies also transform the object of study in the 
process. In Foucauldian thought technologies are not judging an object that exists 
independently or in 'nature', but it is through the act of naming, measuring, and 
categorising that an object becomes visible, constructed in relation to the authorities 
that seek to make claims about it In other words, the act of measuring is formative of 
that which is measured. 
4.2.3 Subjectivities 
In the same way that a genealogical approach seeks to problematise ideas, Foucault 
rejected the idea of starting out with a theory of the subject (1984c, p. 290). 
Foucault's study of human subjectivity encompassed the ontological (the nature of 
human beings); the epistemological (how the subject is known); ethical (the type of 
selves people should seek to be), and technical (the forms of conduct and practices 
people undertake in order to achieve desirable traits). In terms of the ontology of the 
subject, Foucault's work focused on effacing the particular image of 'man' that had 
dominated western history, rather than assuming a materiality behind it. For 
Foucault the subject was not a 'substance' but a 'form' where the body was to be 
understood not as a brute fact of nature but as a historical entity. A genealogy of 
subjectification takes a particular understanding of the human as the site of a 
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historical problem rather than as the basis of a historical narrative. What aims to be 
revealed is not a universal nature of the subject, but rather the mUltiple forms of 
knowledge that are constructed around the subject. These different forms of 
knowledge 'arm' the subject with a truth that does not reside within (Foucault, 
1984c). 
Rather than composing a history of the person, the aim is to construct a genealogy of 
the relations to the self. This is achieved by focusing not on revealing the 'truth' of the 
subject but highlighting the ways in which 'one plays' at constituting oneself in 
different situations and contexts. In the course of detailing how different bodies are 
produced and managed, the body emerges as a contested site, not a constant but 
shaped and manipulated by different contexts. Subjects are constituted into various 
forms through an ethical relation to the norms and games of truth that govern a 
particular historical context. This production of identities Foucault described as the 
process of subjectification. Deleuze (1990) described the process of subjectification 
as the relationship to force or power that, depending on where the line is folded, 
establishes different ways of existing. It is within these 'folds', as Deleuze puts it, that 
the 'self emerges. 
Subjects are not, however, merely formed by forces of power but develop as 'ethical' 
subjects through the ways in which people come to relate to themselves. Foucault 
(1988) described how people turn to work on themselves through practices he caBed 
'technologies of the self. 'Technologies of the self refers to the ways in which 
individuals experience, understand, judge, and conduct themselves. Foucault 
explained that 'technologies of the self: 
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( ... ) permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others 
a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thought, 
conduct, ways of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a 
certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, immortality. (1988, p. 
18) 
Foucault's explanation of power allows for the understanding of how people govern 
themselves in the promise of transformation into a happier, purer and wiser self. 
Power, in Foucault's terms, is thus productive rather than merely repressive; the 
presence of power produces identities as opposed to repressing them. Furthermore, 
the 'governing of the self changes how people relate to themselves. People work on 
themselves through different 'bodily regimes', for example, carrying out 'grief work' 
as described in Chapter 2. The management of abnormality, which is the focus of 
these technologies, is carried out not only by authorities but also by the individuals 
themselves, as they are encouraged, in Foucault's view, to become 'happier' or 
'recovered' in the name of becoming ethical subjects. 
One of the metaphors Foucault (1975) used to illustrate this mode of self-surveillance 
was the 'panopticon'. The panopticon was an architectural design created by 
Bentham in the mid-nineteenth century and built in prisons, mental asylums and 
factories. Within prisons, the building of the panopticon allowed for prisoners to be 
constantly observed, and yet while the prisoners were aware of being surveilled they 
could not see who was observing them, nor could they see their fellow prisoners. For 
Foucault, this represented a new form of discipline and power that was gained 
through the monitoring of peoples' behaviour, rather than through directly 
repressing peoples' actions. Further, under the awareness of being surveilled, people 
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acted in accordance to the rules demanded of them. This self-governance acted as an 
extension of power - a power that was achieved by the possession of knowledge -
derived through the observation of people. 
4.2.4 Studying subjectivities 
For Foucault there is no true ethical human subject: the subject is created, and is 
contingent on the historical context. The idea of what a subject is depends on the 
prevailing discourse and explanations provided by the relevant authority at a given 
time. In this thesis I am tracking the grieving subject and the different forms grief 
takes whether 'complicated' or 'recovered'. This subject, I contend, in line with 
Foucault's work on subjectivities, does not exist as a material reality apart from the 
way it is constructed by discourses and practices on grief and recovery. I describe 
'figures' of grief, where I refer to representations of types of grief. These 
representations are public, cultural figures, promoted by media, literature or political 
discourse, and that come to impinge on the type of person the bereaved person might 
judge himself or herself to be. I view individual identity as a construction that people 
come to inhabit. Identity is a collaborative construction in that it is not formed purely 
through individual choice, which would presume an autonomous self-determining 
subject (Giddens, 1991), but identity is formed by interaction with other people and 
social structures. In this view I am applying Foucault's conception of subjectivity as 
something that emerges through negotiation with authorities and discourse, and 
through incorporating relational models of the self as discussed in Chapter 3, leaving 
space to consider how people come to make choices about their identity, and the 
extent to which those choices can be seen to be 'conscious' or 'unconscious' ones. 
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As discussed in Chapter 3, 'subject', 'figure', and 'individual' are terms that attempt to 
describe people, but also refer more to cultural expectations than anything decisively 
'human'. In this thesis I seek to avoid the connotations that are attached to terms like 
'individual' or 'subject' and use them only to highlight their use by participants in my 
data. I use the term 'person' in this thesis, albeit tentatively due to what I argue is a 
socially constructed notion of 'personhood'. What constitutes a person has varied 
historically and remains a contested notion in areas such as law and philosophy. I use 
'person' as it is a term more commonly used by both the participants in my study and 
the literature I have analysed and further to avoid over use of the unfamiliar and also 
potentially problematic term 'human'. What constitutes a 'person' or 'human' remains 
a question I seek to interrogate in this thesis. 
Foucault received consistent criticism, particularly from feminist scholars, due to 
what was considered 'gender blindness' in his conception of the disciplined body, 
arguing that he overlooked how different bodies experience the world (McNay, 
1991). This argument points to the larger absence of human agency in Foucault's 
writings. This arguable absence of the materiality and agency of the human body can 
be viewed as an effect of how Foucault sought to decentre the embodied subject as 
the starting point of theory. By contrast, feminist methodological approaches utilised 
autobiography to argue against the disembodied objective stance of theory, 
positioning the experiencing subject and their story at the centre of the formation of 
knowledge (Ramazanoglu, 1992; Stanley, 1993). From this movement towards 
embodied theory arose research and theories that placed the body and the personal 
at the centre of theory, with the aim not being dissimilar to Foucault's, that is, to 
destablise the established and overly masculine domains of thought that had 
maintained the divide between the subjective and the objective, and the body and the 
9S 
mind. 
This approach to an understanding of subjectivity also applied to my own subjectivity 
as researcher. The identity of researcher demanded a particular 'conduct' and to 
perform in a particular way. In Section 4.3.3 below, I reflect on how I negotiated my 
own and my participants' subjectivities during the research. In this process I found 
Spivak's (1988) description of 'unlearning your privilege as loss' especially 
instructive. Unlearning one's privilege as loss means acknowledging the limits of 
one's perspective. Feminist research (Bradotti, 1994; Byrne, 2003; Stanley, 1993; 
Williams, 1993) has argued that all claims to objectivity are based on partial 
perspective, and that all knowledge is situated. Recognising the 'situatedness' of 
knowledge entailed identifying the extent to which the position of researcher limited 
analysis. What makes up the position of researcher and what might impact the 
interview encounter is mUltiple: gender, age, ethnicity, educational status, experience 
of grief and loss, disability or illness, relationship status, epistemological and 
ontological perspectives - to name but a few. Becoming aware of 'privilege' involved 
vigilance to such categorisations, as well as being aware of one's body and the affects 
it might produce. Such vigilance, I argue, is mandatory for any sociologist, who one 
would hope might be somewhat more attentive to the role such categories play in 
constructing identities in social interactions. This is what Bourdieu (Wacquant, 1989) 
called the 'sociology of sociology' where the social researcher analyses how they 
conduct and carry out their sociological analysis through taking a 'second step back' 
and deconstructing the position of researcher. This type of analysis of one's position 
and privilege as researcher was emphasised in the 'reflexive turn' within social 
research, which highlighted and critiqued the influence of researcher subjectivity on 
the collation of data. I describe my own experience of reflexivity in the research 
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process in Section 4.3.6. 
4.2.5 Qualitative methodology 
The psychologists and psychiatrists who carried out the most prominent and 
influential clinical studies in grief and bereavement often used quantitative survey 
methods to gather their data on grief and results are presented in statistical form. As I 
argued in Chapter 2, these tools served to produce a model of grief that failed to 
capture the diversity of bereavement experiences. Law (2009) has argued that 
methods are performative in that they generate realities and not only describe them. I 
was aware that my choice of method would influence how I viewed my object of 
study, and further what forms of 'truth' would become visible in my choice of 
analysis. A qualitative approach provided me with the capacity to have reflexivity 
about how I was positioned toward my object, and to remain vigilant to how my 
choice of method was revealing as well as concealing various 'truths' about grief. 
I chose to use qualitative methods as I aimed to challenge some of the dominant 
theories of grief. I argue popular theories and models of grief assume grief as a 'thing' 
that already exists 'out there' where the aim of the researcher is to seek new modes of 
uncovering, quantifying, measuring and categorising grief. By contrast, a qualitative 
approach can provide the scope to think about how grief and recovery might be 
differently formed and articulated, as well as how definitions of grief and recovery 
emerge. A qualitative approach thus allows the researcher to question the taken-for-
granted categories and to explore the ways grief, for example, is socially constructed 
in order to generate new theoretical perspectives on the topic of study. I argue that 
using a qualitative approach was the best means of fulfilling one of the key aims of 
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this thesis, which was to highlight what happens when people 'fail' to recover from 
grief. Further, qualitative methods aim to capture the experience of the individual or 
group and to discern what is happening in the practices, thoughts and feelings of 
people's lives (Charmaz, 2004; Silverman, 200S). I wanted to map out the 'liminal 
space' of grief and explore what was going on in bereavement care and practice and 
how people experienced the space of grief. A qualitative approach allowed for the 
analysis of individual experiences and to acknowledge the interactions between 
individuals and groups. 
Qualitative methods include the use of interviews, observation, document analysis 
and focus groups to explore how people construct meaning from the world around 
them and make sense of their experiences (Rapley, 2007; Silverman, 200S). I used 
semi-structured interviews and document analysis. In gathering a variety of 
documents I wanted to explore the ways in which grief was defined and interpreted 
from different perspectives and to some extent, how they changed over time. The use 
of documents complemented the Foucauldian approach I had adopted by exploring 
the written discourses around grief and recovery, as well as examining how the 
management of grief was linked to governmentality, for example through the analysis 
of government policy. I also carried out semi-structured interviews to explore how 
the discourses around grief and bereavement were conducted in practice and 
everyday life. In this respect my methodological approach here departed from a 
traditional Foucauldian analysis by the addition of empirical methods to elucidate 
how discourse was negotiated in individual accounts. 
Qualitative interviewing aims to capture people's experiences, opinions and feelings 
in their own words. In conducting the interviews I was interested in how different 
98 
individuals made sense of grief and their views on recovery. The aim of conducting 
interviews was not to capture the pure 'reality' of grief and recovery but to gather 
different interpretations of grief from a variety of viewpoints and to analyse how they 
agreed with, conflicted, or contradicted the broader public discourse around grief and 
with one another. Similarly to the approach of Mol (2008), I aimed to treat 
participants as co-researchers, as ethnographers in their own right. Mol (2008) in her 
study of a diabetes clinic in the Netherlands, sought not only the opinions but also the 
events and activities in which patients were involved. The interviewees' accounts 
extended the observation by informing Mol and her fellow researchers of situations 
of which they 'had no time or licence to go' (2008, p. 11). 
4.3 Methods: How the research was carried out 
Here I describe the methods I used in this research and how and why they were 
suited to the nature of my inquiry. As outlined in the previous section, my aims were 
formed by 'problematising' grief and recovery and focusing on 'explanations', 
'authorities', 'technologies' and 'subjectivities'. To explore these themes I took a 
qualitative approach: analysing documents and conducting 27 semi-structured 
interviews. In exploring the perspectives of two different groups, i.e. the 'expert' 
bereavement care professional and the 'layperson' who had experienced 
bereavement, my aim was to identify the different interpretations that came to bear 
on grief and recovery. In carrying out the research my focus was on exploring the 
following four questions: 
• How are grief and recovery defined in both expert and layperson accounts? 
• How are 'complicated' forms of grief identified? 
99 
• What sorts of practices are undertaken to manage grief? 
• What course of action is taken if a person appears to be struggling to recover 
from grief? 
Within these questions the focus was broadly on three themes, that of meanings: how 
people made sense of grief, and practices: how grief was managed, which in turn had 
an effect on the type of identities people came to inhabit. The interwoven nature of 
meanings, practices and identities I describe are supported by a Foucauldian approach 
to study where the focus is on three areas: of how ideas come to be 'truth', how 
practices and discourses establish objects in certain ways, and how people come to be 
identified as particular types of 'subjects'. 
4.3.1 Mapping the field 
The first part of the field work was the collation and analysis of a variety of 
documents and texts that framed ideas on grief and recovery. I saw this process as 
one of generating an 'archive' (Rapley, 2007) that allowed me to begin to map out the 
current state of bereavement care services across the UK. Gathering the various 
documents therefore enabled me to identify the key organisations and individuals 
that I wanted to approach to participate in the study. The documents I selected were 
all public documents and I analysed them to understand both what the public 
perception of grief was across different 'authorities' and how grief and recovery had 
emerged in particular forms. These documents included: 
• UK government policy documents on mental health, bereavement and end of 
life care 
• Bereavement charity /NGO literature 
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• Autobiographies and biographies 
• Fiction 
• Poetry 
• Newspaper and magazine articles 
• Media coverage in news organisations such as the BBC 
• Online blogs, forums and websites 
The policy documents were selected largely from 2001 onwards, as 2001 saw the 
publication of the first mental health care policy focused explicitly on recovery 
(Department of Health, 2001). Other literature was chosen due to its popularity and 
prominence, for example memoirs that had won awards (Coutts, 2014) or were 
continual bestsellers (Didion, 2006). My interest in the happiness agenda and the 
recovery model began in 2010 at the peak of interest in happiness, and I had collected 
numerous news articles and media items along with related policy documents and 
government-funded research. This archive which I accumulated 'as it happened' 
helped form the backdrop to the story I chose to tell in this thesis. 
In Section 4.3.7 I describe in detail how I analysed the documents along with the 
interview data. From my document analysis, what started to become apparent were 
the different ways grief had been framed by various authorities. In a context of 
government and economic policy focused on well-being and happiness, negative 
emotions, depression and mental distress were framed as something from which to 
recover. Further within grief and bereavement research and practice there was a 
growing interest in researching and categorising complicated and prolonged forms of 
grief, as I described in Chapter 2. In carrying out the interviews I wanted to explore 
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the extent to which grief and bereavement care in England was being shaped by these 
two discourses, of a government agenda to improve the nation's happiness and a 
move to medically diagnosing problematic forms of grief. 
4.3.2 Ethics of researching grief and bereavement 
Following my 'mapping' of the field, I sought ethical approval from The Open 
University Human Participants Research Ethics Committee, including in my proposal 
the organisations to which I intended to seek access to participate in the study. The 
Open University Human Participants Research Ethics Committee approved this 
research on ethical grounds (see Appendix 1.1). I also sought and received ethical 
approval from other organisations: the NHS Research ethics committee, Cruse 
Bereavement Care, and St Christopher's hospice (See Appendix 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4). Each 
organisation had their own ethics approval process that I followed before collecting 
data. 
In carrying out research into grief and bereavement I was aware of the heightened 
importance of effectively managing sensitive issues that can arise, particularly when 
encountering vulnerable groups, as many researchers have discussed (Rowling, 1999; 
Stroebe, Stroebe, & Schut, 2003; Valentine, 2007). As Parkes (1995) noted, bereaved 
people and especially newly-bereaved people are vulnerable, often experiencing 
strong emotions. Parkes further claimed that bereaved individuals are vulnerable and 
thus may have 'impaired judgment' or be unable to concentrate or appraise risks 
(1995). I find such claims regarding bereaved people problematic. When people are 
described as vulnerable, to what and to whom are they vulnerable? Certainly 
sociological research does not set out to exploit or harm anyone in any way, yet the 
102 
question of vulnerability is an interesting one, for it suggests that in some 
circumstances people are vulnerable while in others they are not By labelling 
someone as vulnerable and their view as 'impaired', I argue, acts to silence voices by 
deeming them to be not rational enough. As Ramazanoglu (1992) contends, 'criteria 
of validation which effectively silence subordinate ways of knowing are 
methodologically inadequate' (p. 210). Moreover it implies the researcher is immune 
to vulnerability him or herself, coherent in the face of the 'impaired' participant 
Following Mol (2008), I am of the view that everyone is vulnerable, both participant 
and researcher. Further, as Renzetti and Lee (1993) described, all research has the 
potential to be sensitive, and so sensitivity should not be used to describe only 
particular groups or approaches to research. Often such fears over the sensitivity of 
research can lead researchers to find they begin to 'edit' themselves out (Valentine, 
2007). The fear of enacting harm through the intervention of the interview can mean 
the researcher's body begins to disappear in the chase for elusive objectivity. The 
rigour of the ethics committee, though designed to carry out the important role of 
upholding the integrity of research, can do much to instil fear into the novice 
researcher. Buckle et al. (2010) have argued there appears to be an incongruity 
between the experience of those who participate in qualitative research in 
bereavement who find it to be a largely beneficial and useful experience, and the 
views of research ethics boards. By being too quick to assume how a research 
participant might feel there is a lack of accounting for the opinion of the participants 
themselves. 
Investigating the stories that do not get heard, however, carries risks that are not just 
rhetorical. Over the course of the field work I had to take responsibility for the 
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accounts of my participants, particularly those who had been recently bereaved, 
where I felt responsible for any distress that may have been caused by speaking to me 
about their experiences. In one case, a participant contacted me some time after the 
interview. It was late evening and he seemed clearly distressed and wanting someone 
to talk to. I realised the participant had seen me not only as researcher, but due to the 
personal matters we had discussed, as someone in whom he could confide. I felt 
weighted with the responsibility of his well-being, causing me a great deal of conflict 
in the purpose of my research endeavour. I responded by being empathetic but 
reaffirming the boundaries, making it clear that I could not be accessible to him in 
this way. I sought advice from my supervisors and informed the gatekeeper, who had 
put me in contact with the participant, of the incident. The incident made me realise 
the need to be equipped to deal with 'situated ethics', applying universal standards to 
individual situations. I had an ethics of care to my participants but in my capacity as 
researcher my role did not extend to counsellor or caretaker. Learning where the 
boundaries between the participant and myself were was an ongoing process of 
discovery and learning, as I describe later in Section 4.3.6. 
4.3.3 Recruitment of participants and negotiating access 
Carrying out the analysis of documents and texts provided me with a map of the 
organisations and individuals with a significant role in bereavement care in England. 
This informed my sampling approach, from which I produced a list of key 
organisations and individuals I wanted to include in the research. The participating 
organisations were willing to assist in the research and agreed to forward 
information to relevant individuals inviting them to participate. I accessed 
practitioners and clients of participating bereavement services with notices in 
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information sheets, mailing lists and staff newsletters. I also used social media groups 
and websites to post information about the research. 
Initially I set out to speak with practitioners and clients of NHS bereavement and 
mental health services and received approval from the NHS Research Ethics 
Committee in order to do so. However, it became a struggle to engage NHS services 
with a study of grief. As the research progressed it became apparent that without an 
'inside' contact - somebody that worked within the NHS and was willing to expend 
time to help me access possible participants - that it would prove difficult to recruit 
people to the study. Meanwhile, I had begun to successfully recruit participants from 
a number of bereavement care services outside the NHS. Further, a more significant 
obstacle emerged concerning the topic of my study as I began to approach NHS 
mental health services. Following an initial enquiry I was told by one hospital that 
they did not 'medicalise' grief but saw grief rather as a natural event and perhaps I 
should go and read Freud instead. This experience highlighted the segregation of 
bereavement services from medical services, and how each condition of normal grief 
and complicated grief required particular sets of expertise and care from different 
types of institutions. My enquiry failed as I had failed to recognise the dividing line 
between normal grief and mental disorder, yet as I argue in Chapters 5 and 6, this 
division is becoming increasingly blurred in both policy and practice. 
This was in contrast to the bereavement charities and services I contacted that 
welcomed the research. However, some of the organisations were not as willing to 
allow me to access their clients. For the organisations that were willing for me to offer 
the opportunity of participation to their clients, I worked with the organisations to 
ensure that participation was voluntary. For example I was invited to present my 
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study to the members of a bereavement support group. 
The criteria for bereaved participants consisted of being aged 18 or over and having 
experienced a form of bereavement. When selecting bereaved participants I also 
looked at the possible 'complications' in their grief, for example I was interested in 
people that may have become homeless or alternatively had begun hoarding objects 
as a consequence of bereavement. As a result I accessed participants through routes 
such as online platforms, for instance I placed an advert on the 'Hoarding UK4' 
website (from which one participant was recruited); details of my research were 
provided at a hoarding support group in London (which led to one participant); and 
the cold weather shelter, partnered with participating organisation Caris 
Bereavement Service, put me in contact with two previous users of the shelter who 
had experienced bereavement, and who participated in the study. One participant 
offered to place information about my research on a closed Facebook group designed 
to support young widows, which lead to three participants in the study. 
My interest in recruiting participants through hoarding support groups or the 
homeless shelter at Caris was part of my search for people who experience 
potentially 'complicated' forms of grief. However, this criterion became increasingly 
problematic, as it was a category neither the participants nor I recognised. Further, as 
I began to conduct the interviews, the divide between 'lay' and 'professional' became 
less clear. While I had approached and selected people due to their role (e.g. 
bereavement counsellor), I discovered that their knowledge of grief was not just 
shaped by their professional role, and many of the practitioners I interviewed shared 
with me their own experiences of bereavement. 
4 The Hoarding UK website: http://hoardi0i:uk.ori:/Hoardini:UK-Research.html (Accessed 
6 June 2016) 
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In the process of accessing and recruiting participants therefore I met a few obstacles. 
I believe this was partly due to the way in which bereavement services were 
organised. Some organisations had set protocols to follow such as completing a 
detailed form and including the research proposal, which would then be reviewed by 
an internal ethics committee. Other organisations did not have such procedures in 
place and were satisfied with the Open University ethics approval. This reflected a 
fragmentation in the delivery of bereavement support across England and knowing 
where and how best to recruit participants was not always straightforward. The 
obstacles I faced were also due to the nature of my research topic, which as I 
described, was met with questioning when I approached mental health services, 
rather than bereavement specific services. 
4.3.4 Participant information 
The participating organisations present examples of bereavement care at national 
and local level, each with different forms of public support and funding, training and 
methods. Below I provide further background on the participating organisations: 
Cruse Bereavement Care 
Cruse Bereavement Care is the largest national charity in the UK dedicated to the 
provision of bereavement counselling and the training of bereavement volunteers. 
Cruse's mission, as stated on its website, is to ensure that all bereaved people have 
somewhere to turn when someone dies. Cruse was founded in 1959 and was 
originally dedicated to the support of widows (and very different levels of support 
beyond emotional) but now offers mainly emotional support to adults and children 
who have experienced any form of bereavement. Cruse support largely consists of 
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one-to-one counselling: according to their figures 29,803 bereaved people received 
such support in 2014. Cruse currently has 5,700 volunteers who deliver bereavement 
support. The charity relies upon government grants and donations to fund their 
services but Cruse also have considerable interest in participating in research and 
position themselves as being at the forefront of bereavement care and practice. This 
is shown in their Early Intervention Project, which was launched in 2013 and funded 
by the Department of Health to target people at risk of 'Prolonged Grief Disorder'. 
Cruse's participation in this study accounted for three interviews: one with a 
bereavement support worker, and two interviews with individuals involved in the 
Early Intervention Project. 
Caris Islington Bereavement Service 
Caris (Christian Action and Response in Society) is a charity that provides a 
bereavement service to those who live in the borough of Islington, in North London. 
The bereavement service was established in the early 1980s, as a deanery project by 
the Anglican churches in Islington, managed by the deanery 'Social Responsibility 
Committee'. CARIS Islington resolved to become an ecumenical project, although 
most of its funding relies on the support of local churches. Caris provides training for 
volunteer counsellors, all of whom are already undertaking or have completed other 
formal counselling qualifications. The service Caris provides is open-ended and 
maintains around 40 counsellors and approximately 180 referrals a year of which 
half become clients. Caris also runs a cold weather shelter as a parallel project that 
provides nightly accommodation to over 100 homeless people in total in participating 
churches. Caris carried out their own research into what they discovered were 
notable links between homelessness and bereavement, publishing a report in 2010 
(CARIS Islington, 2010). The counsellors from Caris form the majority of the data on 
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bereavement care practitioners presented in Chapter 6 with six counsellors involved. 
This was in part due to the assistance I received from the Caris staff coordinator who 
approached counsellors to participate in the study in the first instance. 
St Christopher's Hospice 
St Christopher's Hospice was founded by Dame Cicely Saunders in 1967 and is widely 
regarded as the first modern hospice. It is located in Sydenham, South East London. St 
Christopher's is a charitable organisation that relies on donations. St Christopher's 
bereavement services consist of one-to-one and group support delivered by 
volunteers who receive training. I interviewed a bereavement support worker and 
bereavement service senior supervisor at St Christopher's. I also attended a 
bereavement support group to present my research, which led to one further 
participant in the study. 
Grief Recovery UK 
Grief Recovery UK is a not-for-profit organisation, which is the UK branch of the Grief 
Recovery Institute founded in the USA. The Grief Recovery Institute was born out of 
the Grief Recovery Handbook, which was created by John W. James who had 
developed his own unique strategy for recovery from loss following the death of his 
young son. The Handbook (James & Friedman, 2009) declares: 'It's not counselling, 
it's not therapy, it's not an alternative treatment'. The method is described as an 
'action program for moving beyond death, divorce and other losses including health, 
career and faith'. It comprises a series of trademarked steps and activities that 
promise 'completion' and recovery from loss. Grief Recovery UK actively trains 'Grief 
Recovery Specialists' and support is delivered in a group or one-to-one setting. I 
conducted two interviews with the director of Grief Recovery UK as well as attending 
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its training workshop. 
British Associationior CounsellinB and Psychotherapy 
Seven counsellors I interviewed were registered with The British Association for 
Counselling and Psychotherapy (BACP). BACP is a registered charity, formed in 1977, 
with the vision of providing an ethical framework for talking therapies and to provide 
education and training for counsellors. The BACP also accredit training courses for its 
members to undertake as part of their Continuing Professional Development, 
including the Grief Recovery UK workshop. 
Tables 1 and 2 (see Appendix 5) list the names and details of each participant In the 
table of professional participants I have provided each with an identifier to 
distinguish between those who were trained and qualified as counsellors and those 
trained as bereavement support workers (without prior counselling qualifications), 
e.g. bereavement counsellor as 'BC1'. I also spoke with current and former mental 
health service users about their thoughts on recovery and these three participants 
are described in Table 3 (also included in Appendix 6). The nine participants in Table 
2, who told me about their experiences of grief, had experienced different types of 
bereavement and were predominately middle-aged with an average age of 50. In 
some cases the participants had never used any form of bereavement service. My 
selection of participants does not aim to be representative of bereaved people's 
experiences but the smaller number of male participants, three male to six female, 
corresponds to other studies on bereavement that suggest that men are more 
reluctant to participate in research. 
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4.3.5 Conducting the interviews 
Before the interview, each participant was given full details of the research in the 
form of an information sheet and asked to sign a consent form (see Appendices 2, 3 
and 4). The information sheet informed participants of their right to withdraw and 
what would happen to the findings of the project. Participants were assured in 
writing and in person that all research data, including participant details, interview 
data, and field notes and data analysis would remain confidential at all times and only 
be viewed by myself and discussed with my supervisors. All names and any 
identifying places have been changed. All data collected as part of the research was 
stored in a locked cabinet or on password protected computers. Storage of data, at all 
times, followed the guidelines set by the Data Protection Act (1998) and the Freedom 
of Information Act (2000). 
I carried out 27 semi-structured qualitative interviews with 25 participants, across 
England. Each interview was recorded on a digital recorder. I also kept a fieldwork 
diary in which I made notes during interview where necessary and where I wrote up 
thoughts, ideas and reflections after each interview. These notes assisted in adjusting 
or adding questions for subsequent interviews. Interviews were carried out in 
different locations, both public and private, and included counselling rooms, cafes, or 
the participant's home. The participants largely divided into two groups, those 
participating due to their professional role in bereavement care and those who talked 
to me about their personal experiences of grief. I developed two interview schedules 
for the two 'types' of participant (see Appendix 6). I also conducted three interviews 
with people who had experience with the mental health system in England, 
particularly in relation to the recent 'recovery model' of mental health care. 
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For the interviews with practitioners I aimed first to find out more about their role, 
practice and professional background. Secondly, I sought explanations and rationale 
for the type of approach taken towards understanding grief and recovery. Further, I 
wanted to gather empirical examples of handling people with 'complicated' grief, 
which had emerged as a key theme in the analysis of literature and documents. The 
interviews with practitioners were structured around the themes of approach to 
grief, details of treatments and therapies used, definitions of recovery and definitions 
of complicated forms of grief. These areas of focus were derived from my analysis of 
the literature and relevant documents that revealed an inconsistency in the delivery 
of bereavement care services in the UK, which I expand upon in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Further I was guided by the recommendations of a report authored by researchers at 
the University and Nottingham and funded by the Department of Health (2010). The 
report reviewed the current literature on bereavement care services and suggested 
that further research into bereavement care needs to provide details such as: the 
approach used, the frequency, duration and intensity of the intervention, and the 
level of training and professional background of those involved in the delivery of 
bereavement support. This structure enabled me to compare bereavement support 
across the different organisations, and aided in finding data on the components of 
'grief work', presented in Chapter 6. To gain a more detailed understanding in the 
interviews, I constructed hypothetical vignettes or scenarios to illustrate and 
contextualise the questions and to seek a clearer picture of what is done in different 
situations. For example I would ask a bereavement counsellor what course of action 
they would take with someone who was struggling to recover several years or more 
after bereavement 
Before the interview, I clarified the aims and objectives of the research and what 
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participation would involve, both via telephone or email and at the interview itself. 
This was part of the procedure of obtaining consent from participants. This set the 
tone for the interview, introducing some formality into meetings that took place in 
public cafes or participants' homes where, over a cup of tea, the conversation could 
easily become more social. The physical environment influenced the extent to which 
the boundaries of the interview were apparent. In the counselling room setting, for 
example, the interview would almost mirror a counsellor-client exchange. The 
interview format, regardless of setting, drew parallels with a counselling session to 
the extent that my input was limited and I was utilising the skills of active listening. In 
the counselling room therefore it was easier to facilitate this space. The 'props' such 
as lack of noise, comfortable seating, a visible dock, tissue box were present and so 
the boundaries were mostly unspoken and did not require reinforcement. Knowledge 
was thus assembled in interviews through the structuring of the interview questions 
and the responses of the participant but also in the physical setting of the interview, 
the time of day the interview was conducted, body language and creation of a 
'rapport'. As Holstein and Gubrium (1995) identify, interviews are 'collaborative 
accomplishments'. The interview setting produces a 'situated' form of knowledge; a 
different time or place might have produced a different story and different 
interpretation. 
The interviews in most cases lasted for one and a half to two hours. I travelled across 
London and around the country to conduct interviews that took place either in a 
room arranged through one of the participating organisations, the participant's home 
or a public venue. I tended to schedule no more than one interview a day to 
accommodate for any travelling time and to provide time to write up any notes 
following the interview. The order of the interviews was determined by the 
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availability of the participants and so I interviewed practitioners and bereaved 
participants concurrently. I listened to the tape recording on the same day of each 
interview in order to note down initial thoughts and to ensure the interview was 
recorded in full. 
In the interviews with bereaved people I was specifically interested in what types of 
services or help they had received, if any, and their views on recovery. However, the 
interviews with the bereaved participants became less structured as I realised the 
interview provided a space for the participants to narrate their experiences of grief. 
Though I had a set of questions to be answered I began to recognise that the 'data' 
were not only in answers to my questions, but in how the participants narrated and 
made sense of their experiences. As Kehily (1995) identified, narratives are 
constructed differently depending on the audience. I, as the audience of the 
interviewee's narrative, thus had a role in how the stories were shaped and 
accounted for, not only in the questions I asked, but also in the expectations the 
participants may have had of what I wanted to hear. 
The format of the interview assumes a competent, rational, consenting interviewee. 
However, as discussed above and in Chapter 3, within this thesis I am destabilising 
the notion of the intentional self-reflexive subject. Rather, my interest was to explore 
how people differently performed identities. Participants volunteered to participate 
on the basis of their expertise or their personal experience of grief. Identifying as a 
'member' of a group meant participants spoke as members of that group, whether as 
a counsellor or a bereaved person. Arguably, interviews elicit or encourage 
performances of the modern subject. I address this in Chapters 8 and 9, as I began to 
acknowledge the limits of my chosen method to finding the 'unrecovered' person, 
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when one of the key components of finding recovery is through the ability to voice a 
coherent story. 
4.3.6 The reflexive research process 
In qualitative grief and bereavement research the 'situatedness' of knowledge is more 
pertinent when the fact of death and mortality is something 'we' are all 'inside' and 
part of (Woodthorpe, 2007). Oakley (1981) contends from a feminist methodological 
perspective that 'disengagement' from the interview encounter is not possible. Yet 
Rowling suggests grief and bereavement researchers should strive to be neither too 
'in' nor 'out' but 'alongside' participants (Rowling, 1999). Acknowledging the 
situatedness of the knowledge involved being reflexive to my own biases. As outlined 
above, by 'unlearning my privilege' I sought to make conscious the 'impact' of my 
subjectivity on the interview. Being 'reflexive' does not promise objectivity, it is 
rather a strategy that helps to reduce harm to the participants, and being clear about 
one's position as researcher. This reflexivity was something that required constant 
renegotiation in the fieldwork process, and was integral to achieving transparency in 
the influences on the data. 
The clarity of these boundaries was at times problematised by the emotional nature 
of the interviews. Empathy (however that is defined) is commonly agreed as key to 
establishing a 'rapport' with participants (Mauthner et aI., 2002). How rapport is 
'done' successfully, however, appears to rely on the competency of the researcher to 
communicate effectively with the participant, and to gain their trust and confidence 
in a short period of time. Taking a Foucauldian approach to power relations, I 
understood the interview setting was no more bereft of power relations than any 
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other encounter. It was my intention to be as vigilant as possible to the possible 
exploitative effects of the power relations that might form. This also involved 
monitoring my own emotional response to the interviews. Maintaining the stance of 
active listener, and seeking to build a rapport, while maintaining clear boundaries 
was not always straightforward. At times, it seemed that what was 'theirs' and what 
was 'mine' was impossible to disentangle. For example, following the interviews of 
some of the bereaved participants, listening to their accounts of grief and 
bereavement, would lead me to think about the inevitable loss of those close to me. 
My responses to their stories also became data. I thus saw my own body as another 
participant immersed in the space, as illustrated next. 
During a post-interview conversation with the organiser of the Grief Recovery UK 
workshop I disclosed that carrying out the fieldwork was causing me to reflect on my 
own experience of grief. She invited me to attend the personal Grief Recovery 
workshop. As I was attending as a participant I did not use the responses or 
experiences of other attendees as data. What I did use from the workshop as data was 
what I learned from the workshop about the Grief Recovery Method, including the 
facilitation by its leader, to inform my understanding of the method. I also 
documented my own reflections on the workshop as data. However, I was also 
introduced to the group as a researcher and so I was there with a dual purpose of 
'working through' my grief while learning of the techniques and methods of Grief 
Recovery UK that would inform my thesis. I participated in three days of activities 
where I fully participated as a fellow griever - despite my introduction as a grief 
researcher. I carried out exercises in which I had to draw up a timeline of my 'loss 
history'; I had to be open and speak about my losses in front of the other attendees. 
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I only gained access to the workshop by being 'inside', through my mention of the 
struggle I was having with my own feelings during the field work. But being 'inside' 
meant that at times it was difficult to measure my distance from my research object. 
The incident caused me to reflect on how to balance what I, as researcher, wanted 
from the participants with what they might have wanted from me. As researcher, I 
could be clear about what I wanted from the participants but I could not know what 
they might want from me and whether I was prepared to give it. For example, at the 
end of one interview a participant asked me whether I had a 'Significant relationship'. 
When such a question arises it has the potential to destabilise the 'performed' 
researcher identity I had chosen to play. I replied honestly, not knowing what the 
right answer was and whether I had satisfied the curiosity of the participant. 
Through this process of 'unlearning' I still had to find 'somewhere in particular' in 
order to find the 'larger vision' (Haraway, 1991, p. 590). Being reflexive was not only 
about my relationship to the field and to my understanding of grief, but about playing 
the role of researcher more effectively so that my participants could position 
themselves in relation to me. Unlearning my privilege then became about taking 
responsibility for my own emotions. As Haraway remarked: 'Positioning implies 
responsibility for our enabling practices' (1991, p. 587). The example of the Grief 
Recovery workshop highlights the fluid nature of the boundaries despite how many 
frameworks are adhered to. Whether this is a feature of qualitative research in 
general or qualitative research into grief and bereavement in particular it is hard to 
say. I would claim it is a consequence of the 'bodywork' (Seymour, 2007) involved in 
conducting interviews. While carrying out the interviews I was conSistently aware of 
the 'privilege' I had in listening to these stories that without being in the position of 
researcher I would not have access to. There was an element of power in the role of 
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researcher that I had to learn to be comfortable with. As Valentine (2007) and 
Woodthorpe (2007) both discovered I had to appreciate my own role in the research 
and that I too was giving something in the interview encounter that I could only hope 
was of benefit in some way. 
4.3.7 The analysis of the data 
As described above, the data comprised documents - including policy documents, 
newspaper and magazine articles, and lay literature on grief and bereavement - and 
recorded interviews, which were transcribed verbatim. The interview data and 
document analysis required different modes of analysis, which I then brought 
together to build overall themes, a process that I will now explain. 
In carrying out the document analysis I borrowed tools from an approach broadly 
understood as 'discourse analysis', however my method drew very much from the 
Foucauldian strand within this larger field (Kendall & Wickham, 1999). This involved 
highlighting common themes that became codes, such as metaphors that implied 
'recovery as a journey'. These codes were then collapsed into categories, for example 
'individual responsibility', 'hope', 'choice'. In my analysis I focused on three main 
areas: how ideas and people were explained and presented within the text; how the 
text related to other texts; and how the document was used and received. I drew on 
the work of Smith (2001), who has argued documents produce or reflect 'social facts' 
about people or phenomenon. Within my analysis I considered documents as being 
socially produced but which also produce social actions. For example, the theories 
discussed in Chapter 2 were used in practice by the bereavement care counsellors 
and support workers. Following Atkinson (1990), I also acknowledged these 
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documents were used, consumed and shared in different ways and across different 
social and historical contexts. The meaning of the documents lay not only in the 
embedded meaning but how they were received and acted upon. Precisely how a 
document produces action is the empirical question (Smith, 2001). For example, 
government policy documents concerning mental health reforms, discussed in 
Chapter 5, I argue spearheaded a political and economic agenda of 'happiness' and the 
spread of individual psychological therapies. 
The comparison of different documents and literature around grief allowed me to 
analyse the dominance of widely held discourse about grief. The repetition of words 
across texts takes the idea out of the local context and into a wider discourse. 
Following the description of 'explanations' in Section 4.2.2, I focused on the language 
and 'operative concepts' used to describe grief, recovery and bereaved people. This 
entailed noting repetitions of words for example the repeated use of 'choice' or 
'complicated grief. A repetition of words and concepts was significant in identifying 
how thoughts and ideas became a discourse or knowledge. In the analysis I also 
acknowledged how these ideas were presented, for example the form or genre of the 
text A government policy document, for example, has a standard report format in 
contrast to an online forum. The structure of the document allows different claims to 
be made about grief and may seek to persuade by drawing on strategies such as 
linguistic devices, making reference to other authorities such as scientific data, or 
using a personal narrative. 
To analyse the interviews I conducted a thematic analysis by coding the content of the 
data. My focus was to move beyond the meanings of the interview accounts to how 
they connected with other discourses and interventions around grief and recovery. 
During analysis of the interviews I noted connecting themes that began to build up a 
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particular picture around grief and recovery. I read and re-read the transcripts 
several times noting down repetitions and recurrences to construct an initial long list 
of themes and ideas. I was aided by the four questions Hollway and Jefferson (2000, p. 
55) suggest all researchers should consider when analysing qualitative data: What do 
I notice? Why do I notice what I notice? How can I interpret what I notice? How do I 
know if my interpretation is the 'right' one? With subsequent readings of the 
transcripts, the long list came to be refined to three overarching themes that were 
then separated into sub-themes. The themes of'meaning', 'practices' and 'identities' I 
felt best captured the variety in the data and also allowed for multiple stories to be 
told. For example, the meanings people constructed around grief influenced how they 
acted and the types of practices they employed, which in turn shaped the sort of 
identity they adopted. The themes could be used to explain the evolving nature of 
identity, meaning and practices that occur in the liminal space of grief. 
Delving into the stories people tell about themselves and their losses, I was constantly 
struck by how participants, whether practitioners - those trained in ways of speaking 
about grief - or those sharing personal experiences of grief, would speak about grief 
in metaphors. For example grief was often described as a 'dark' place and a sense of 
'going downhill'. These metaphors seemed to be a way of grasping at this thing 'grief 
which kept eluding concrete terms. In Chapter 1 I stated my interest in exploring the 
way 'recovery' is a metaphor that 'hides' and 'obscures' the understanding and 
experience of grief. Rosenblatt (2013) has called for bereavement researchers to 
focus more attentively to metaphor and how people describe grief, rather than 
searching for ways in which grief can be measured. Bleyen (2009) has stated that 
death is impossible to imagine and can only be made present through metaphors. 
Further, he argues, similarly to Lakoff and Johnson (1980), these metaphors are not 
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just linguistic devices but present in thought and practice. Specifically, Lakoff and 
Johnson (1980) argued that metaphor is deeply intertwined with how people think 
and conceptualise ideas. I analysed the metaphors people used to describe grief as an 
insight into the sensory and experiential aspects of grief. Further, Lakoff and Johnson 
describe how these metaphors exist within a cultural system. Metaphors structure 
and organise experience both internally and externally in the actions people make. 
People therefore inherit the types of metaphors they might use to describe 
experiences that tend to have coherence within a larger cultural system. Metaphors 
reflect assumed notions, such as 'grief is a journey', which emerged out of the data I 
collected. 
One of the key metaphors I discovered in my analysis was the notion of grief and 
recovery as 'work'. In Chapter 2, I highlighted the dominant notion of 'grief work'; but 
I also uncovered that this 'work' could take different forms, as I describe in Chapter 7. 
Work was also a recurrent notion in policy and literature on mental health recovery. 
Grief was described as something that could come back to 'bite' and so needed to be 
fought and prevented against and this was done through individual work; a metaphor 
appropriate to a society that encourages people to be employed and frowns upon 
those out of work, as though it is a failure of individual will (detailed further in 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7). The way people described grief therefore had direct 
implications for how they acted upon it, and these descriptions did not exist in 
isolation but were tied to a cultural history and system of thought. 
Thus the choice of metaphor may serve to highlight some aspects of experience, and 
hide others. During the analysis I was constantly aware of this silencing in the text. As 
I came to transcribe the interviews I realised how I walked away from an interview 
encounter carrying one impression but in the process of typing speech into words on 
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a blank page it impressed upon me in a different way. Often this was because how 
people communicated things to me was through mumbles, or gestures, or silences. In 
the interview I understood and interpreted them in one way but this interpretation 
felt lost in the transcribed text It seemed that at each level of communication - from 
narrating the experience into speech, to my capacity to listen, to the recording of 
voices, to the transcription of voices into text, and from the text into themes and 
codes and thesis chapters - something was being lost, or at least did not fit the code I 
had established. I came to understand this 'silence' as key to capturing the experience 
of 'non-recovery', which I explain in Chapters 7 (Section 7.2.) and 8 (Section 8.2). 
4.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have outlined the methodological approach of the thesis. I explained 
how my understanding that knowledge is situated and constructed is suited to an 
empirical enquiry - and how that enquiry can help to make visible less dominant and 
absent discourses that have been overshadowed or even occluded by what Foucault 
would call 'regimes of truth'. I have drawn on the genealogical approach of Foucault 
to describe my focus on 'problematisations' of grief and recovery. In addition, I 
utilised the concepts of explanations, authorities and technologies as themes in my 
analysiS. I also described Foucault's understanding of subjectivities. I argued that 
contrary to his critics, Foucault gives space to consider the materiality of the body 
from which can emerge resistances to discourse and power. However, I seek to 
extend Foucault's ideas on subjectivity by using empirical methods to elaborate 
through individual first-hand accounts the 'figures' of grief identified in document 
analysis. 
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In this chapter, I have tried to emphasise how carrying out the research was a process 
and how my perspective shifted and developed as I negotiated access to the field and 
began to analyse the data. In doing this, I acknowledged my own subjectivity in the 
research and the use of reflexivity in becoming aware of the power relations of the 
research encounter. In particular, this increased my sensitivity in the analysis of the 
data, focusing on the metaphors people used and how this served to highlight and 
obscure aspects of the experience of grief and recovery. As the research unfolded, I 
struggled to put a reality to the figure of the 'complicated griever' whom I had 
encountered in the research literature. In the following three chapters the search for 
the 'complicated griever' is documented alongside the discovery of the ways in which 
grief and recovery are framed, practiced and lived. I present the findings of the 
research beginning in Chapter 5 with an analysis of the cultural framing of grief that 
draws on the data from the document analysis. In Chapter 6 I present accounts of the 
professional bereavement care participants, followed in Chapter 7 by the accounts of 
grief by bereaved participants. 
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CHAPTER 5 
The cultural and political framing of grief 
5.1 Introduction to the chapter 
In this chapter I detail some of the cultural, political and economic factors that I 
contend frame how the bereaved person manages their grief and potential recovery. 
As first described in Chapter 3, I view the experience of grief as a liminal space that 
people have to navigate. For example, the bereaved person negotiates various 
different powerful discourses from those groups and individuals with a vested 
interest in bereaved people recovering from grief. The ways in which someone can 
negotiate this space are multiple and I highlight here some of the key discourses that 
frame the contemporary experience of bereavement in England, and that influence 
how a person might make sense of their grief. The acknowledgement of the broader 
cultural, political and economic concerns is central to the argument of this thesis 
which claims that the ways in which grief and recovery are understood and practised 
can be linked to permutations in contemporary neoliberal governmentality; as 
Arnason's work has demonstrated (Arnason, 2001, 2007; Arnason & Hafsteinsson, 
2003). Throughout this chapter I utilise the concept of 'govern mentality', first 
originating in the work of Foucault and later employed in Rose's (1985, 1989) work 
on the 'psy' disciplines, to consider how diverse authorities, whether political, 
economic, medical, or from popular culture and media, seek to act upon the lives and 
conduct of the grieving person to achieve desirable states of health and happiness 
through 'regimes of truth'. 
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Much research has focused on the changing nature of mourning rituals in the UK and 
detailed the role of funerals and the disposal of bodies in aiding the bereaved person 
to transition into a new changed identity and reintegrate back into 'normal' society 
(Hockey et al., 2001; Walter, 1999). While the changing nature of rituals around grief 
is significant and will be the focus of the opening of this chapter, I also want to draw 
attention to the political and economic factors that frame how 'negative' emotions are 
managed and treated, as well as how recovery from mental distress has been 
transformed by recent developments in mental health care. In doing so, I draw on the 
data gathered from the variety of documents and literature that I analysed including: 
bereavement memoirs, novels and poetry, government policy documents and 
statistics, media coverage, and online websites (see Chapter 4 Section 4.3.1). The aim 
of this chapter is to provide a context for the subsequent focus on the data collected 
from interviews with practitioners and bereaved people in Chapters 6 and 7. In this 
contextual frame, the interview data illustrates how the dominant discourses are 
reaffirmed and perpetuated and also resisted and renegotiated. 
First, I discuss the changing attitudes towards grief in light of the current move 
toward establishing psychiatric diagnostic categories of grief. I contrast the ways in 
which grief appears, on the one hand, to be increasingly a matter of medical concern 
with, on the other, the literary uses of grief, in memoirs, fiction and poetry. In 
particular the grief memoir provides an interesting example that blurs simple 
distinctions between the 'public' and 'private' expressions of grief. I suggest that 
while creative writing and literature potentially provide a privileged site where grief 
and different expressions of grief are accepted, access to this site is not available to 
all. Furthermore, I argue that the expression of grief through literature can be used 
not only as a source of consolation but as a form of 'resistance' to assumed notions of 
125 
appropriate grieving. 
Second, I move into the political and economic arena to describe how the British 
government from the turn of the millennium has become increasingly involved in 
people's emotions and well-being, creating tools to measure the nation's happiness as 
an index alongside economic progress. What has been described as the rise of a 
'happiness agenda' (Davies, 2015) has not only had a great impact on the delivery and 
form of psychological therapies in the NHS but also has spawned a vast industry on 
the cultivation and maintenance of the 'happy life'. Working in parallel with the 
happiness agenda is the popularisation of recovery in mental health care, notably the 
creation of a recovery-focused model of care, which will be the focus of the third 
section of this chapter. While the happiness agenda encourages all individuals to take 
responsibility for increasing their own happiness, the recovery model encourages 
those diagnosed with a mental disorder to recover from their illness. I will explain 
how what began as a liberating message to allow people to live with their mental 
distress became an obligation to recover, where recovery in mental health care has 
come to be defined by professionals rather than service users. 
I will argue that what makes a happy life and what defines recovery are remarkably 
similar to the central tenets of neoliberal values with the repeated emphasis on 
individual choice, rational agency and responsibility. The shaping of the neoliberal 
subject thus sets the scene for how grief is valued and treated in contemporary UK 
society and demonstrates how the concept of recovery emerges to aid people away 
from grief and towards the happy life. 
126 
5.2 Changing attitudes to grief and bereavement in England 
In Chapter 2, I described what had been considered a 'new wave' in bereavement 
research. This new wave revealed how people continued bonds with deceased 
people, highlighting and celebrating the diversity and individualised nature of 
grieving. Alongside this was the declaration of a 'revival' of death (Walter, 1994), 
contesting the notion of death and dying as a social taboo (Gorer, 1965; Mellor & 
Shilling, 1993). Walter (1994) has argued that this revival was evidenced in public 
displays of grief following deaths of public figures or in the aftermath of natural and 
human disastersS, as well as in the focus on individual choice and patient-centred 
care in the delivery of palliative and bereavement services. For Walter this revival 
could be separated into the modern and postmodern period. With the advent of 
postmodernism, he argued, death and bereavement became instances that threatened 
individual identity in the absence of 'traditional' rituals. This conflicted with a 
modern rationalism that saw medicine exert further control over death. This, Walter 
argued, formed a divide between 'public' and 'private' realms of grief where the 
public was unnecessarily encroaching on the private nature of grief. 
Walter's distinction between modern and postmodern attitudes to death and grief 
has been problematised by Amason and Hafsteinsson (2003) and Howarth (2000, 
2007). However, this distinction between modern and traditional forms of mourning 
echoes a common nostalgia found in texts on grief and bereavement where the 
'problem', as it is considered with grief today, is due to an eradication and absence of 
rituals around death that used to provide the means for navigating the liminal space 
5 For example the public mourning over the death of Princess Diana, the 2004 Boxing day 
tsunami in Thailand, and the attack on the twin towers on September 11 th in New York. 
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of grief. On the contrary, I seek to argue in this section that there is a proliferation of 
guidance on how to manage grief; techniques that could be described as 
contemporary rituals. My focus here is on two contemporary areas of concern that I 
contend seek to manage, make sense of and bring order to grief much like formal 
mortuary rites of the past. Those areas to be discussed below are: the interest in 
diagnosing grief as a psychiatric disorder, which many consider a medicalisation of 
grief, and secondly, the continued fascination with grief as a subject for literature and 
autobiographical accounts. 
My understanding of the role of mortuary practices is indebted to Bloch and Parry's 
definition (1982), described in Chapter 3, where mortuary practices serve to reassert 
social order at death and further that social order is, itself, a product of rituals. These 
contemporary rituals, as I describe them, are not simply managing and organising 
grief but reshaping how grief is understood. Rituals around death are productive sites 
that act to produce particular forms of subjects, framed by the performing of certain 
emotions (Davies, 2011). Yet mourning rituals also seek to reintegrate the bereaved 
person back into society (Turner, 1969). In what follows I endeavour to explore this 
complex relationship between an increasingly medicalised approach to grief and one 
that strives to embrace and celebrate the individuality of the griever. In doing so, I 
hope to blur the distinction between the private and public face of grief, a theme that 
remains salient throughout the chapter as I consider the effects of government public 
interventions in individual private emotions and well-being. 
5.2.1 Grief as a mental disorder 
The publication of the fifth edition of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
128 
Disorders (DSM-S) (American Psychological Association, 2013) provoked a flurry of 
controversy in the field of grief and bereavement research and across the practice of 
psychiatry. As noted earlier, the DSM-S made considerable changes that affected the 
treatment and diagnosis of grief as a mental disorder. The first significant change was 
the omission of the 'bereavement exclusion' in the diagnosis of Major Depressive 
Disorder (MDD) that had been included in previous editions of the OSM. This 
exclusion protected bereaved people from being diagnosed with MOD in the first two 
months of bereavement. However, the change was made to the DSM-S following 
arguments that grief, just like other losses, such as becoming unemployed or getting 
divorced, could cause depression. Thus the removal of the exclusion potentially 
meant recently bereaved people could be diagnosed with depression if showing 
symptoms for as little as two weeks. The second significant change was the inclusion 
of the new diagnosis 'Persistent Complex Bereavement Disorder' (PCBD) for further 
consideration in the next edition of the manual. 
The criticism that arose from these changes was twofold: one an objection to what 
was seen to be an increased 'medicalising' of grief; and second, criticism of the lack of 
evidence supporting the category of PCBO. The critique of medicalisation garnered 
wide support from the pages of The Lancet (2012) and the British Medical Journal 
(2013) to Psychology Today whose regular columnist, psychiatrist Allen Frances, was 
one of the OSM-S's most ardent critics and who pleaded against what he argued was a 
medicalising of 'normal' grief (Frances, 2012). The title of Frances' column 'Saving 
Normal' and his accompanying book of the same name (Frances, 2013) set the tone 
for numerous critiques of the OSM-S, described as '[t]he war on grief (Stolorow, 
2014). Grief was positioned as something under threat and to be protected, and 
psychiatric intervention as the de-humanising force intruding into the most human of 
129 
emotions. The Lancet (2012) editorial concluded: '[F]or those who are grieving, 
doctors would do better to offer time, compassion, remembrance, and empathy 
rather than pills' (p. 589). 
However, even among those who most fervently opposed the potential for grief to be 
diagnosed indiscriminately as depression, the belief in complicated or pathological 
forms of grief was widely accepted (Wakefield, 2013a, 2013b; Wakefield & First, 
2012; Walter, 2006). The dispute over the bereavement exclusion was a call to 
protect 'normal' grief, whereas it was agreed 'abnormal' grief was something that 
required intervention (Bryant, 2012). Often, Freud's distinction between mourning 
and melancholia was resurrected in defence of the case for a distinction between 
normal grief, complicated grief and depression. Controversy over the proposed 
diagnosis of PCBO was centred on internal disputes between two well-researched 
categories of abnormal grief: 'prolonged grief disorder' (PGO) proposed by Prigerson 
and colleagues (Boelen & Prigerson, 2012; Prigerson et al., 1996; Prigerson et al., 
2009) and 'complicated grief (CG), the category described by Shear (2010, 2012; 
Shear et al., 2011; Shear et al., 2013). Arguably a product of the initial criticism in the 
preparation stages of OSM-5, amid fears of over-medicalisation, PCBO emerged as a 
faulty compromise. However, 'prolonged grief disorder' as defined by Prigerson has 
been included in the current draft of the 11th version of the International 
Classification of Diseases (ICO-11). 
I argue not enough criticism however has been directed to the inconsistencies in each 
diagnostic category. Boelen and Prigerson (2012) provide a comparison of the 
symptoms of PGD, CG and PCBO highlighting the similarities and also marked 
differences between diagnostic categories. The most notable difference is the length 
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of time a person is required to demonstrate symptoms before diagnosis. While a 
diagnosis of PCBO is recommended only if symptoms are present at least 12 months 
following bereavement, PGD has a shorter time period where symptoms must be 
present for six months before intervention. There are also varying opinions on how 
many people are affected by these disorders. From the seven to ten per cent of 
bereaved people claimed by Shear (2010, 2012) to 15 per cent of all bereaved people 
stated by Bryant (2012) who remarked 'there are over a million new cases of 
prolonged grief in the USA each year, representing a public health issue' (p.10). 
I discuss in detail in Chapter 6 the extent to which prolonged or complicated grief is 
present in bereavement care and practice in England, however, initiatives such as the 
'Early Intervention Project', run by Cruse Bereavement Care and funded by the 
Department of Health, reveal how complicated grief is becoming a prominent focus of 
concern in the UK. While proponents of complicated grief argue that the growth of 
research into the area is merely the recognition of a disorder that already existed and 
experienced by bereaved individuals, there appears to be some ambiguity around 
why complicated grief develops in some people and not others. The ICD-11 beta draft 
definition defines PGD as a: 
[P]ersistent and pervasive grief response characterised by longing for the 
deceased person or persistent preoccupation with the deceased accompanied 
by intense emotional pain6. 
The grief response is defined as prolonged if it has persisted for: 
6 I CO-11 beta draft availa ble at: 
http://apps.who.jnt/classificatjons lied11 Ibrowse Iflen# Ihttp; I lid.who.int/ied lentityl1183 
632314 (Accessed 6 June 2016) 
131 
( ... ) an atypically long period of time following the loss (more than six months 
at a minimum) and clearly exceeds expected social, cultural or religious 
norms for the individual's culture and context. 
It is the 'atypically long' time period, which most clearly demarcates complicated 
from normal grief, and yet as I argued in Chapter 2, whatever 'normal' grief is, is still 
under considerable debate. This has not prevented, it would appear, the creation of 
diagnostic categories that rest on the assumption of a normal course of grief. 
The scientific rigour of the work on complicated grief is much flaunted 7• I suggest, this 
emergence of a scientific understanding of grief in contemporary bereavement 
research and practice, can be viewed as a new form of mourning ritual. Seale has 
described how modern rationality, of which medicalisation is one example, has a 
religious orientation: taking the place of religion in managing procedures around 
death and dying, but producing guidance and meaning that is equally powerful 
(1998). Further, he argued that medical procedures have a ritual aspect that 'frame 
and box experience' and that are designed to reorient the living away from death and 
towards life. The classification of grief into normal and abnormal forms and the 
interventions carried out to enable people to recover from complicated grief can be 
understood, then, as a means of managing the boundaries between living and dead 
people that serves to contain the 'risk' the complicated griever poses (Howarth, 
2000). The complicated griever embodies the liminal space between the living and 
the dead and so presents a danger by virtue of being matter 'out of place' (Douglas, 
1966). 
7 See The Center for Complicated Grief webpage, 'The science behind our work': 
bttp:!lcomplicatedirief.ori/tbe-science-bebind-our-workl (Accessed 6 June 2016) 
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The way in which these medical rituals are used suggests the danger the complicated 
griever might pose to what are considered normal, healthy emotions and behaviours. 
To understand why prolonged grieving poses a risk and has become problematic for 
many requires a wider analysis in the realm of political, economic and societal 
concerns. So far I have touched upon the importance of a time limit in distinguishing 
complicated from normal grief, however, time-limited mourning is present in a 
number of mourning rituals yet it takes on new relevance when considering time 
limits in the treatment and recovery of mental disorders. These time limits, 
established in the creation of a psychiatric diagnosis of complicated or prolonged 
grief, might be considered as a 'technology of temporalisation' (Foucault, 1975) that 
serve to contain mental distress or unhappiness. As I will discuss in section 5.3, such 
time limits on grief take on more relevance in a climate where maintaining happiness 
and well-being and getting back to work is a primary marker of the good citizen. 
Receiving a diagnosis has direct practical implications for the person's social status 
and standing. A diagnosis can help people to access health care; it can legitimise 
contested conditions and provide coherence and a narrative to its sufferers. 
Brown (1995) suggests there is a need to ask of diagnosis: why is it that conditions 
get identified at certain times? And why is action taken - for whose benefit and at 
what cost? As Hacking (1986, 1999) has argued, psychiatric diagnosis is not merely 
the recognition of an illness already present but one that is socially produced. Mental 
illness and disorder are made 'visible' in the individual body through the clinician's 
'gaze', which uses labels and diagnostic categories, and other tools of psychiatry. 
These tools, that emerged with the birth of modern medical practice as Foucault 
(1973) and Rose (1985) have described, sought to localise illness in the body, or 
more specifically in this case, in the mind or brain. As I describe further in Sections 
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5.3 and 5.4, the locating of illness inside the mind meant the cause and management 
of mental disorder became largely a responsibility of the individual. Making sense of 
grief, and managing the bereaved person, therefore involves medical, rational and 
instrumental explanations and practices as well as symbolic ones, which I describe 
next 
5.2.2 A private vocabulary for grief 
In this section I seek to juxtapose the modern rationality of medicalisation with the 
burgeoning creative use of grief in literature, a mode of making sense of grief that 
embraces a sentiment more reminiscent of the Romantic period. Hockey et al. (2001) 
have documented the influence of romantic ideology on mourning practices, where 
responses to death were increasingly understood through an emotional paradigm. If 
the modern 'rationalisation' of grief which has given rise to psychiatric classifications 
can be understood as a product of enlightenment thought, the popularity of the grief 
memoir might be viewed as a continuation of the romantic individual and emotional 
expression through literature. 
In 2015, several of the most prestigious book awards were won by autobiographical 
accounts of grief and bereavement. The Iceberg written by Coutts (2014) who won 
the 2015 Well come book prize and MacDonald (2014) who won both the 2015 
Samuel Johnson prize and the Costa book award for H is for Hawk, received critical 
acclaim for their depictions of grief and loss of a husband and father respectively. The 
success of these titles evidences the continuing popularity of grief as a theme for 
literature. These titles are not anomalies; the bereavement memoir remains a 
consistent bestseller. Lewis's (1961) A Grief Observed, first published in 1961 was 
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recently republished as a new edition, and has been adapted for film and theatre. 
Other popular titles include Didion's (2006) The Year of Magical Thinking, Wild 
(2012) by Strayed (and accompanying film), Oates' (2011) A Widow's Story and The 
Long Goodbye by O'Rourke (2011). As well as fictional work like the recent Griefis the 
Thing with Feathers (Porter, 2015), the post 9/11 grief of Extremely Loud and 
Incredibly Close (Foer, 2005) and classic depictions of grief in Shakespeare's Hamlet 
and Bronte's Wuthering Heights, and even the place of grief in the Harry Potter series. 
Not to mention the great canon of elegiac poetry which serves to provide consolation 
from grief through its accurate expression of the emotions. 
Why might people be drawn to writing about grief? In her memoir describing the 
death of her mother, O'Rourke (2011) wrote her 'pervasive loneliness' was the result 
of 'the privatisation of grief. To write about the experience of grief is to both to find a 
way to express the 'unsayable' of death (Watkin, 2004) and to make public what is 
felt to be private. The popularity of such written accounts of grief then arguably fills 
the gap left between the modern divide of life and death, a gap that the authors such 
as O'Rourke (2011) feel are not quite fulfilled by professional grief literature. When 
the understanding that grief is a 'taboo' persists, then writing openly about an 
experience like bereavement enables people to connect to otherwise hidden and 
silenced stories: they offer guidelines to recovery. 
Dennis (2008) in his analysis of contemporary bereavement memoirs described how 
grief accounts become 'vehicles of information and instruction for fellow citizens in 
the community of grieving' (p. 802). The autobiographical account thus acts to 
provide a map for others in their navigation through the liminal space of grief, 
arguably offering some form of consolation in learning that someone else has also 
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endured a similar sense of pain. Dennis outlines six narrative dimensions of the grief 
memoir: restitution (trying to fix things), evaluative (positive reappraisal), 
interpretive (making sense of it), affirmation (of deceased, of continued relationship), 
affective ( emotional disclosure), and transformation. The well-established narrative 
outline provides a ready format for the reader to enable them to make sense of their 
loss. 
Grievers also turn to language, metaphor, and the imagination to find expression for 
their emotions. Metaphors are often utilised in writing about grief, for example Porter 
(2015) in his short novel Grie/is the Thing with Feathers conjures the image of the 
Crow, famously the talisman of choice for the poet Ted Hughes. In his story of a 
bereaved partner and father and his two young sons Porter draws on the idea of the 
crow as 'stronger than death' and the echoes of Hughes featuring 'Crow' who 
becomes the healing force in the story. A bird also plays the healer, in this case a 
literal bird, in McDonald's memoir of grief in which she decides to train a Goshawk. In 
explaining her actions she remarked: 'You can't tame grief, but you can tame hawks' 
(Willoughby, 2015). In both books the birds, whether fictional or real, become 
symbolic of the grief which they cannot express but also provide a model of being: 
'The hawk was everything I wanted to be: solitary, self-possessed, free from grief, and 
numb to the hurts of human life' (Macdonald, 2014, p. 85). 
In the grief memoir the author and their feelings are made prominent, and so rather 
than a 'death' of the author (Barthes, 1967)8, the biographical details of the author are 
especially relevant. The grief memoir plays a cathartic role for its author. The drive to 
write about one's grief is not always made explicit, more often it is assumed that 
8 However, Barthes himself wrote at length about his feelings of grief following his mother's 
death, see Barthes' 'Mourning Diary' (Barthes, 2011). 
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writing and claiming one's narrative is automatically healing, as I discussed in 
Chapter 1. Finding the words to tell one's story has a central role in the politics of, and 
recovery from, trauma. Grief is widely believed to be an event that disrupts an 
individual's 'self-narrative' (Neimeyer, 2005). This is a belief that rests on a further 
assumption: that each individual possesses his or her own 'narrative-identity'. 
Creating a story about illness or grief remedies the disruption of personal self-
identity caused by traumatic experiences. Coutts described the process of producing 
The Iceberg as one of 'writing against annihilation' (Law, 2014). 
What has been described as a 'narrative turn' in the social sciences sought to 
acknowledge how telling stories is 'universal' and that human beings understand and 
make sense of their lives in narrative (Bury, 2001; Clandinin & Connelly, 2000; Frank, 
2010; Squire, 2005). Gilbert (2002) states that humans are 'naturally orientated' to 
storytelling and use narrative and stories to organise, bring order and structure 
experience. Constructing narratives is considered to be a 'characteristically human' 
process; the 'narrative parsing and organisation of experience are rooted in our 
biology', claim Neimeyer et al. (2014, pp. 487-89). The healing properties of narrative 
have been especially highlighted in studies of illness, and increasingly in grief and 
bereavement, where constructing a narrative is seen to repair disrupted identities 
and enable people to reconstruct their biographies (Bury, 2001; Frank, 2006). The 
emerging field of 'narrative medicine' (Charon, 2006) has embraced the importance 
of narrative to understanding illness, placing emphasis on listening to the story of the 
patient as a means of producing a more humane and ethical medical practice. 
Within the excitement about narratives there is a tendency to overstate the power of 
narration. Frank (2010), for example, enthusiastically describes the 'exceptional' 
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nature of narratives, listing the functions of narrative: narratives connect people and 
enable membership of social groups; narrative is the means through which humans 
learn who they are and learn between good and bad actions. For 'without stories, 
there would be no sense of action as ethical' (Frank, 2010, p. 665). Neimeyer et al. 
(2014) make a further leap inferring from a rather preliminary study using fMRI 
scans on people who had been bereaved (O'Connor, 2012) to suggest that: '[t]he 
human penchant for "storying" events, to organise temporal experience in terms of 
plot structures with meaningful beginnings, middles, and ends, appears to be 
anchored in brain structures' (Neimeyer et al., 2014, p. 487). Similar claims exist in 
support of the healing act of writing, where 'unresolved' trauma can 'easily spill over 
by way of these peptides into our emotions and into the very way our immune system 
interacts with disease' (Watts, 2011, p. 8). 
However, in his essay on oral and written storytelling, Goody (2006) demonstrated 
how narrative is not a predominant characteristic of adult intercourse in purely oral 
(non-literate) cultures. Contrary to beliefs that narrative is a universal form of 
expression, Goody argued narrative is less a universal human trait and more 
something promoted by literacy and the advent of printing, which introduced the 
fictional novel as a narrative form. In his essay 'The blob', detailed in Chapter 3, Bloch 
(2011) described a narrative level to the blob. This narrative level is not an inherent 
mode of cognition as some psychologists might claim, but a form of learnt expression. 
Tilly argued that westerners (1999) acquired standard story packaging, causing 
individuals to organise experience in standard story form. He described a standard 
story structure as composed of a limited number of interacting, independent and self-
motivated characters that make deliberate actions and possess specific motives, with 
the story located in time and place. Tilly and Goody both point out life histories do not 
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just emerge automatically but are heavily constructed by the culture in which they 
are situated. The proliferation of narratives of grief is not merely the freeing of the 
truth about grief but the production of particular types of stories about grief. 
Moreover, it naturalises a type of self that demands personal and emotional 
expression. 
The resistance of a standard story structure is also, then, a resistance to an easily 
classifiable identity. Ramazani (1994) has described how modern forms of elegy 
diverge from the late romantic tradition of death poetry as one of self-definition to an 
'unmasking' of the poet. The modern elegist attacks the dead or themselves and 
refuses orthodox consolation in God or rebirth. Modern elegies tend not to achieve 
but to resist consolation, not to heal but to reopen wounds of loss. This melancholic 
form of elegy provides no answers or solace but is purposely resistant and 
recalcitrant. For example, Ramazani drew on a variety of poets including Seamus 
Heaney and Wilfred Owen who both refused to see any consolation in the deaths in 
the many victims of war, or indeed place faith in the recuperative effect of poetry. For 
Ramazani modern elegies are 'a compromise-formation in response to the 
privatisation of grief (1994, p.15-16). However it would seem that in the act of 
refusing consolation, the modern elegy provides a different form of 'refuge from the 
social denial of grief. The popularity of grief memoirs could be seen in a similar 
fashion in that even if written in the act of refusing recovery the act of writing 
provides its own refuge from the 'impact of the thing' itself, as Lewis (1961) 
described it. And yet for writers or poets to find consolation in the act of writing is 
hardly surprising. The question remains as to how accessible such a vocabulary is and 
what ways people might use such vocabularies to make sense of their grief. 
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I return to thinking about the different types of stories a person might tell about their 
grief in Chapter 7. In this first section I have sought to highlight what I argue are two 
dominant discourses of grief that frame a person's experience of grief. These two 
discourses both strive to make sense of grief utilising quite different types of 
techniques. Science and literature within modern society are divided along the lines 
of the public and the private and the two realms have served to reflect a divided face 
of grief. However, while science utilises psychiatric manuals and literature uses 
metaphor, I suggest that neither one should be seen to be filling a gap left by the 
other. Rather they both produce explanations about the same thing: grief. In the what 
follows I will write more explicitly about the political and economic framing of grief, 
yet while the acts of government and psychologists appear to have more 
consequential effects, in literature and the arts grief is prized with a special human 
value. 
5.3 A happiness agenda 
In late 2010 UK Prime Minster David Cameron announced that the coalition 
government was to begin measuring the nation's happiness (Cabinet Office, 2010). 
The Office for National Statistics (ONS) was directed to introduce a set number of 
questions in their Household Survey that sought to gauge the happiness levels of the 
population. The establishment of a 'happiness index' emerged out of a series of events 
both in the UK and internationally; the central one being the revelation that more 
money and increased gross domestic profit (GOP) did not make people happier. What 
became known as the 'Easterlin paradox' derived from a number of studies by 
Easterlin (2009), which revealed that in developed countries after reaching a certain 
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level of wealth, happiness and well-being plateaued. The identification of an inverse 
relationship between money and happiness led economists and politicians to seek out 
new measures of progress alongside GDP. Cameron's announcement marked the 
beginning of the peak of political and economic interest in happiness and well-being. 
It also tapped into what had become an established sub-field of psychology that 
focused on the fostering of positive emotions. The new field of positive psychology, 
stemming from the former chair of the American Psychological Association 
Seligman's (2002) seminal text Authentic Happiness provoked a wave of interest in 
happiness, an emotion Seligman claimed had been historically neglected in 
psychology with the discipline's over-emphasis on the melancholy. 
Positive psychologists had some impressive claims to make from their research. Lord 
Layard, Labour life peer who became known as the UK's 'happiness tsar' following his 
key text Happiness: Lessons from a new science (Layard, 20lla), extolled some of the 
virtues of positive psychology: 
The exercises positive psychology offers include the systematic practice of 
kindness, gratitude to others, counting your blessings, and exploiting your 
strengths rather than attacking your weaknesses. It also teaches resilience 
and optimism. These two characteristics are apparently better predictors of a 
person's educational achievement than their IQ. And they can reduce your 
annual chance of dying by 20%. (Layard, 2011b, [online]) 
Studies into happiness, often described as 'subjective well-being', relied upon self-
report studies that asked people to measure their level of satisfaction with their life 
on a scale such as Diener's (1994) 'The satisfaction with life scale'. More recently, 
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other methods have been employed such as using mobile phone apps to alert people 
to measure their mood at different points during the day (Heathcote, 2011; 
Kahneman, 2011). The goal of positive psychology was not only to stop people being 
ill, but help them 'be well' by building the 'enabling' conditions of life. As Seligman 
(2002) described, it was about getting people from zero to 'plus five'. In his next book 
Seligman decided 'flourishing' was a better term than happiness confessing that the 
word happiness was 'scientifically unwieldy'. Flourishing had a rather broader remit 
in that even depressed people can flourish: 'I think you can be depressed and flourish, 
I think you can have cancer and flourish, I think you can be divorced and flourish' 
(Seligman, 2011). 
While some thought the plans for a happiness index 'woolly' and 'impractical' 
(Duncan, 2008; The Midlands Psychology Group, 2007), Cameron's announcement 
was met with considerable support The organisation 'Action for Happiness' founded 
by Layard, Geoff Mulgan (formerly Director of Policy in Blair's Labour government) 
and Anthony Seldon (the historian known for his biographies of British prime 
ministers) was re-Iaunched with the goal to make a happier SOciety. Meanwhile, the 
New Economics Foundation (NEF) created well-being as one of its key themes, 
formulating a Happy Planet Index (HPJ) which aimed to show where the happiest and 
healthiest place is to live, and instructing people of the 'five ways to well-being'9. The 
media interest in Cameron's announcement sparked what Davies (2015) has 
described as a 'happiness industry'. From the BBC's 'Happiness Challenge', to laughter 
coaches and happiness phone apps, happiness was at its peak. Nor was the happiness 
trend merely 'woolly' and benign. Happiness skills were being introduced into 
9 NEF's five ways to well-being: connect with people; be active; take notice of your 
surroundings and savour your activities; keep learning; give - volunteer or do something for 
other people. 
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schools and positive psychology tools, led by Seligman, were being used in the US 
military to increase levels of resilience. 
In this section I map out how the emotional well-being of the population became a 
concern for economists and politicians. The political and economic agendas within 
the happiness agenda were, I suggest, hidden within a discourse that revitalised an 
Aristotelian view that happiness is what all people desire. Happiness and the pursuit 
of the 'good life' have long been the concern of philosophers, but in the new discourse 
of happiness, or what Ahmed (2010) referred to as a 'happiness turn', the economic 
and political incentives are all too present; for example, the 'New Labour' -inspired 
Action for Happiness. Within the happiness agenda, happiness is an object, both 
individual and collective which all are encouraged to obtain. In Ahmed's exploration 
of happiness, she examined the individuals who historically have been 'banished' 
from happiness. The history of happiness is not one of inclusivity; the criteria for 
happiness has discounted certain individual and groups, and affected how 'negative' 
emotions are socially perceived and acted upon. I argue, the move towards classifying 
complicated forms of grief can be considered as part of this broader political and 
economic imperative to alleviate the 'burden' of mental disorder and create happier 
more productive citizens. 
5.3.1 No health without mental health 
Following the Second World War and the emergence of the NHS and welfare state, 
government intervention into public health in the UK was expected and largely 
welcomed. However, the rise of policy focused on modifying individual health 
behaviour is arguably a fairly recent phenomenon. The second half of the twentieth 
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century witnessed a trend away from disease prevention being at the level of public 
health, shifting to an emphasis on individual responsibility. This trend was captured 
in policy such as the White Paper Choosing Health: Making Healthy Choices 
Easier, published in 2004 by Blair's Labour government, which set the tone for policy 
decisions that followed with its emphasis on individual choice and responsibility over 
one's well-being. This was also demonstrated later in Cameron's 'Big Society', the 
ethos of which was giving people more control over their lives, in the belief that when 
people are made to feel as if they are the 'authors of their own destiny' their sense of 
self-worth and well-being increases. In a similar vein Layard remarked: 'Any happy 
society is one in which people feel in control oftheir own lives' (Layard, 2011a). 
As a result, government began to fix their gaze on the mental health of the nation. In 
No Health Without Mental Health (Department of Health, 2011) the coalition 
government set forth an improved policy to tackle mental illness. While the principles 
underpinning the report were individual 'freedom', 'fairness' and 'responsibility', 
there was also a great deal of focus on the economic impact of mental illness. 
Commonly described as the 'burden' of mental health (Department of Health, 2011a; 
Wittchen et al., 2011), the report claimed that the cost of poor mental health in 2011 
was £105 billion, accounting for 23 per cent of the total illness burden in the UK. The 
same figures were featured in a government commissioned report published in 
February 2016 by the NHS England independent mental health task force (chaired by 
the MIND charity CEO), which proposed a five forward plan for mental health care 
(The Mental Health Taskforce, 2016). The report coincided with the Prime Minister's 
announcement of an almost billion pound investment in mental health care, adding to 
the estimated 34 billion pounds spent on mental health each year (Department of 
Health, 2016). 
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Wittchen et al. (2011), in their review of statistics across the European Union (EU) 
countries, concluded that one third of the EU population suffers from mental 
disorders: a finding that revealed a much greater burden of disease than previously 
considered. Disorders of the brain, they state, are the core global health challenge of 
the 21st century. No Health Without Mental Health was preceded by a number of other 
government directed reports such as the Foresight Report (2008) that focused on 
ways to create 'positive mental capital'. The report described the 'important societal 
value' of positive mental health: 
(I)ncluding overall productivity. It is an important resource for individuals, 
families, communities and nations, contributing to human, social and 
economic capital. (Jenkins et aI., 2008, p. 15) 
The ways in which 'positive' mental health and mental disorders were positioned is 
clear: mental illness is a costly burden, and well-being is productive, most crucially in 
economic terms. The way to remedy the burden called for the introduction of 
accessible psychological therapies. Layard's report, entitled The Depression Report 
(The Centre for Economic Performance's Mental Health Policy Group, 2006), 
provided an in-depth proposal of a psychological service that would reduce the costs 
of absenteeism and incapacity benefits caused by mental ill health by aiding people to 
recover more quickly and return to work. The Improving Access to Psychological 
Therapies service (IAPT) was thus born, with the 2011 government mental health 
policy including many of Layard's proposals. The IAPT service was set up to provide 
nationwide access to evidence-based therapies in accordance with the National 
Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) guidelines, including therapies of different 
'intensity' levels. The therapy of choice in IAPT was cognitive behavioural therapy 
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(CBT) approved by NICE for its evidence-based success rate, and favoured for its brief 
treatment time. IAPT was thus targeted largely at mild depressive and anxiety 
disorders where the delivery was lightweight with a maximum of six sessions of CBT 
and, in some instances, merely referral to other services or provision of leaflets. This 
included people being referred to bereavement services following an initial contact 
with IAPT, as several ofthe bereavement counsellors I interviewed remarked. 
Addressing mental health in 2011 was particularly poignant in what might be 
considered the lowest point in the economic recession. In the supplementary 
document to No Health Without Mental Health which focused on the introduction of 
talking therapies, Burstow, then Minister of State for Care Services, made explicit this 
connection when he wrote: 'Following the recession, it is clear we need to heal 
emotional wounds, which means we are looking for a psychological recovery outside 
our economic recovery' (Department of Health, 2011b, p. 2). The therapy IAPT 
provided was seen to benefit not only the individual 'but also the nation by helping 
people come off sick pay and benefits and stay in or return to work' (p. 5). Ehrenreich 
(2010) in her book Smile or Die, attacked the 'Pollyannaism' of the happiness agenda, 
arguing it was the delusion of positive thinking that caused the financial crash to 
occur in the first place. Halting economic progress was not in question, even if it had 
been the cause of misery for many. The answer to the economic recovery was not a 
restructuring of the type of neoliberal economics that arguably created the problem 
but a psychological recovery of the citizens bearing the brunt of its aftermath. 
It was not only those considered to be mentally ill who required assistance. The 
research into happiness had revealed that even when presented with accurate 
information people did not always make the 'right' choices about their health. In 
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order to address these 'toxic biases' a government policy unit called the 'Behavioural 
Insights Team' (BIT), was formed. The BIT was quickly dubbed the 'nudge unit' 
referencing Thaler and Sunstein's (2009) book Nudge that put forward the idea that 
people would make better choices for themselves if only their behaviour was 
'nudged' the right way. While standard economic analysis had been based on the 
assumption that humans are rational and behave in their own self-interest, 
behavioural economics rested on the belief that people repeatedly make mistakes 
about what brings them well-being (Cromby & Willis, 2013). 
The happiness agenda and behavioural economics appeared to be utilising different 
types of subjectivities: one that is resilient, self-motivated and in control of their well-
being, and one that is simultaneously at the whim of unconscious drives and 
government nudges. Dolan, who was involved with the creation of the BIT, at his 
inaugural lecture given to the London School of Economics (Dolan, 2011), described 
further why it was that people made the wrong choices about well-being. In doing so 
he presented an almost Freudian vision of the subject, one overrun by involuntary, 
unconscious responses. The choices people make he argued were made 
unconsciously, after which people created a rationale for their behaviour. It is the 
subconscious reasoning that is the 'real' choice he claimed, and the thing the BIT 
strived to capture and manipulate. 
The techniques of the BIT have received criticism raising the question over how much 
the government should intervene in the lives of its citizens in the name of public 
health. More recently it was revealed the BIT implemented a policy encouraging 
benefit claimants to complete an online personality test by threatening to cut their 
benefits (Cromby & Willis, 2013). Freidl and Stearns (2015) have also written about 
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the use of 'positive affect' and positive psychology as a means of coercing people into 
unpaid workfare programmes. In these examples a link between individual 
personality traits and economic productivity was clearly being enforced. 
The IAPT programme in similar ways has been blamed for its simplistiC 
understanding of mental disorder, with critics contending that the IAPT model 
ignores questions about how mental distress occurs (Cromby et al., 2008; Cromby & 
Willis, 2013). This is despite the findings by Marmot and Wilkinson (2006) who 
demonstrated that social inequality is the biggest determinant of individual health 
and well-being. In line with the positive psychology insights that assisted its creation, 
IAPT construes mental distress and unhappiness as a psychological defect from which 
people can recover once in receipt of the appropriate psychological therapy. Binkley 
(2011) has critiqued what he described as positive psychology's 'strikingly truncated 
view of the human psyche' where the emphasis is on a cognitivist approach and 
conscious thought processes, and where thoughts can be manipulated by sheer acts of 
will to alter emotional states. 
Binkley and those who have provided thorough critiques of the IAPT programme 
(Binnie, 2015; Cromby et al., 2008) have linked these developments with dominant 
neoliberal policies in western countries such as the UK. A neoliberal governmentality, 
argue Cromby and Willis (2013), positions citizens primarily as entrepreneurs and 
consumers, emphasising choice, responsibility, self-determination, moral autonomy, 
adaptiveness and flexibility (pp. 242-3). A neoliberal type of governance thus 
produces forms of subjectivity amenable to such an environment. People's emotional 
lives are rethought along the lines of economising principles, 'valued in terms of costs, 
benefits and enterprises, and made subject to a distinct set of economizing 
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techniques' (Binkley, 2011, p. 373). Happiness becomes a regimen, argues Binkley, 
and what Foucault would describe as a regime of truth. Cultivating the happy life is a 
'project' undertaken in the 'intimate space of everyday life' (Binkley, 2011). 
The discourse of well-being has become securely established in health care policy and 
practice and the institutions the happiness agenda set in motion such as the ONS 
happiness index and IAPT continue to develop. Yet following the flurry of media 
coverage, publications and research into happiness around 2010-11, it would seem 
happiness has somewhat faded from view. In its wake has emerged a trend on 
'mindfulness' meditation. 'Mindfulness' is a term used to describe a form of 
meditation derived from Buddhist practices. Its popularity in western societies has 
often been attributed to the writings of Jon Kabat-Zinn who has written a plethora of 
books on the topic, most notably the bestseller Wherever You Go, There You Are: 
Mindfulness Meditation in Everyday Life (1994). In brief, mindfulness has come to be 
understood as way of thinking that focuses on the present without judgment This is 
delivered in a variety of forms, whether through self-help and adult colouring books, 
gardening or phone apps that alert people to have a 'mindful moment' throughout the 
day. The benefits of mindfulness it would appear are numerous: it reduces stress, 
makes people happier and more compassionate, and is as effective as medication at 
curing depression. Curiously, mindfulness has been eagerly adapted to the business 
world as well as politics, where everyone from Wall Street to Westminster are 
commending the wonders of mindfulness (Goldberg, 2015; The Economist, 2013; The 
Mindful Intiative, 2014). 
In this section, I have detailed the contemporary political and economic investment in 
happiness and positive emotions. The ability to measure happiness provided the tools 
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to define happiness in objective terms, but as a consequence of the discovery of the 
'Easterlin paradox' happiness has been defined not as something dependent on the 
structures of society but on individual thoughts and feelings. Happiness has thus 
come to be framed as something within the individual's reach, if only he or she could 
learn to make the right choices about their health and well-being. Mol has described 
how this contemporary 'logic of choice' within health care services in western 
societies promises a level of mastery over one's life but hides what it costs to reshape 
the world in a way that 'situations of choice' are created (2008). Along the same lines 
Borgstrom (2015; Borgstrom & Walter, 2015) has illustrated the limits of the choice 
agenda within end-of-life care where choices over a 'good death' are not always 
possible. 
From how it is thus defined, happiness is perceived as a neutral term, flexible to the 
subjective views of the individual, yet Ahmed (2010) identified how the idea of 
happiness that has evolved is a limited and restrictive one, specifically critiquing the 
way in which the rise and emphasis on happiness is at the exclusion of certain 
individuals, groups and ideas. Happiness is a form of deferred promise; happiness is 
directed towards certain 'objects' that people then strive to attain such as those 
proclaimed to bring happiness by positive psychology like being in work, getting 
married, or spending time in nature. When happiness and positive emotions are 
viewed as the endpoint of all endeavours, unhappiness registers as something that 
gets in the way. Ahmed, instead, posed the argument that unhappiness should be 
treated as more than something to overcome. Yet, as I will go on to discuss, recovery 
from unhappiness and mental distress is precisely the goal that individuals, 
governments and health care services are orientating themselves towards. 
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5.4 The journey to recovery 
Alongside the proliferation of government policy, psychological research and public 
interest in happiness and well-being, was the popularising of a 'recovery model' in 
mental health care. It is not an understatement to note that recovery is one of the 
most significant transformations in mental health care policy in recent times. NHS 
mental health services now declare themselves as 'recovery-orientated' or 'recovery 
focussed'; 'recovery colleges' have been set up around the UK, now numbering 26, 
and recovery is a central focus in psychiatric research (Roberts & Wolfson, 2004; 
Slade et al., 2014; Slade, Adams, & O'Hagan, 2012; Summerfield, 2002). In this section 
I shed light on what recovery means for mental health care policy and suggest why 
recovery has captured the imagination of policy makers and service users alike. I 
draw on data gathered from policy and literature as well as three interviews 
conducted with current and former mental health service users to present the 
different perspectives on the meaning of mental health recovery. Establishing what 
recovery means is no straightforward task and most policy, articles or books on the 
topic will begin with the preface that no one definition of recovery exists. This is in 
part an intentional consequence as mental health service users and survivors first 
embraced the term recovery as a way to describe ways of living fulfilling and 
meaningful lives with their mental illness. Oft-cited definitions of recovery include 
that of Anthony (1993), who described recovery thus: 
[Recovery is] a deeply personal, unique process of changing one's attitudes, 
values, feelings, goals, skills and/or roles. It is a way of living a satisfying, 
hopeful, and contributing life even with limitations caused by the illness. 
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Recovery involves the development of new meaning ~nd purpose in one's life 
as one grows beyond the catastrophic effects of mental illness. Recovery from 
mental illness involves much more than recovery from the illness itself. 
(1993, p. 11) 
Further, another popular definition provided by Deegan (1996) who, in her book 
Recovery as a Journey of the Heart, described the goal of the recovery process: 
( ... ) is not to become normal. The goal is to embrace our human vocation of 
becoming more deeply, more fully human. (1996, p. 92) 
Policy and research papers such as No Health Without Mental Health detailed above 
frequently cite these two definitions. In these definitions of recovery the unique and 
self-defined nature of recovery is emphasised. This reflects the radical beginnings of 
the recovery movement made possible by the anti-psychiatry of the 1970s and the 
rise of a psychiatric survivors' radical movement that demanded change to the 
paternalistic and often oppressive mental health care of the past The contemporary 
model of recovery, however, has also incorporated the consumer movement in health 
care as well the applying the insights of positive psychology where choice, hope and 
responsibility are terms commonly found in descriptions of recovery. 
Recovery thus began as a liberatory message of resistance against the medical model 
of understanding mental illness and what were considered the normative goals of 
psychiatric care; yet has since permeated mainstream mental health services. The 
official introduction of recovery into NHS mental health services was heralded with 
the New Labour government's 'vision' for mental health care in 2001 entitled The 
Journey to Recovery (Department of Health, 2001). In this document the government 
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laid out their plans for modernising the 'defective' and 'chaotic' mental health care 
services of the past, where it was claimed people with mental illness were not 
expected to recover. In the 'services of the future' recovery will be spoken about as 
much as illness, after all 'the vast majority have real prospects of recovery' 
(Department of Health, 2001, p. 24). In this vision, the government employed the use 
of 'we', a 'we' that appears to apply to different groups at different times, whether the 
government, the mental health staff or the service users, for example: 'We will then 
be involved in agreeing a care plan, which identifies our needs ... what we think our 
recovery goals should be' (p. 14). Later the 'we' seemed to refer to staff: 'We need to 
create an optimistic, positive approach to all people who use mental health services' 
(p. 24). The confusion of the author of the document over who 'we' was and what 
'our' needs were presented a bigger effect of the encroachment of recovery discourse 
in policy, where mental health service users were beginning to be seen as humans 
with choices and a voice, blurring the division between mentally ill and well people. 
This theme was illustrated in the emphasis on enabling and empowering citizenship 
as closely tied to recovery, acknowledging a need to aid service users into engaging 
with 'ordinary social activities' and finding a 'meaningful occupation' (p. 25). 
In one respect, the New Labour vision could be considered a noble one, wanting to 
'foster the understanding that mental illness is no more to be frowned at than 
breaking a leg' (p. 25). Yet the 'mainstreaming of recovery' (Rose, 2014) was not 
without its problems. First, recovery was defined in two ways: clinical and personal 
recovery. This distinction, argue Harper and Speed (2012, p. 13) 'functions to 
effectively locate "personal recovery" as an adjunct to clinical recovery, and this 
complementarity avoids recovery being seen as inherently contested'. This somewhat 
distorted the definitions of those like Anthony and Deegan, which policy makers and 
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NHS services were themselves referencing. Recovery was then provided with 
outcomes, such as the 'recovery star' rather than being a unique self-defined exercise. 
The 'recovery star' included the following dimensions: 
Figure 1 The recovery star 
(Copyright: Triangle Consulting Social Enterprise Limited and the Mental Health 
Providers Forum (MHPF)) 
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The parameters of recovery were evolving in a similar vein to the goals of positive 
psychology. This was no coincidence due to the influence of happiness research on 
the recovery model (Slade, 2010). By 2010 recovery had been well-established in 
mental health care policy as demonstrated by No Health without Mental Health, where 
one of its six main objectives was that 'more people with mental health problems will 
recover' (Department of Health, 2011a). As described above, this was the 
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comprehensive mental health strategy put forward by the coalition government. 
Recovery appeared under one of the three values proposed 'freedom, fairness and 
responsibility' (Department of Health, 2011a, p. 16). 'Freedom' in this regard involved 
having: 
[A] good quality of life - greater ability to manage their own lives, stronger 
social relationships, a greater sense of purpose ( ... ) improved chances in 
education, better employment rates and a suitable and stable place to live. 
(2011a, p. 82) 
Ways of measuring recovery were developed inside and outside the NHS from 
survivor-driven initiatives such as Coleman's 'Working to Recovery' training 
workshopslO and the popular Wellness Recovery Action Plan (WRAP) 11 created by 
Copeland in 1997; to programmes that sought to make NHS services more 'recovery-
orientated' such as Slade's 'Recovery Tasks', that included developing a positive 
identity; self-managing the mental illness; and developing valued social roles (Slade, 
2009; Slade et al., 2014). 
The state intervention into recovery approaches to mental health is a recent 
development that can be traced to a longer history of 'moral treatment' (Rose, 1985). 
Many accounts of the recovery model highlight the description of the York Retreat 
written by Tuke in 1813 as a turning point towards the humane treatment of mental 
disorder away from the Victorian asylums, now written about with much disdain as 
'overcrowded', 'awful' and 'appalling' places (Department of Health, 2001). More 
significant, perhaps, was the development of thinking about the causes of mental 
10 The Working to Recovery website: http://www.workinlnorecovery.co.uk/home.aspx 
(Accessed 6 June 2016) 
11 The WRAP website: http://mentalhealthrecoyery.com/(Accessed 6 June 2016) 
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illness that allowed for the changes in the provision for and care of people with 
mental distress, as I describe next. 
5.4.1 A culture of trauma 
Rose (1985) has documented the rise of psychology as a discipline and how it became 
incorporated from the fringes of experimental pseudo-science to a domain of 
knowledge that increasingly came to influence and govern different populations from 
the military to children and families. The First and Second World Wars are thought to 
have provided the catalyst for this change over the twentieth century in the shifting 
perceptions of the cause and treatment of mental disorders. The emergence of the 
shell-shocked soldier has become a poignant figure that motioned this shift from 
understanding the causes of mental distress as moral and hereditary to a physical 
phenomenon (Leese, 2002; Shepard, 2002). Shell shock was remarkable in its 
indiscriminate reach, presenting as a cluster of symptoms previously viewed as 
specific to female hysteria (Appignanesi, 2008; Leys, 1994). The sheer quantity of 
cases of this non-physical injury of war posed an interesting problem to the medical 
profeSSion, which arguably paved the way for the first wide-scale intervention into 
the mental health of the population. 
The treatment of shell shock was a key instance of mental illness becoming a matter 
of 'social hygiene' (Rose, 1989). The occurrence of mental disturbance produced from 
the experience of war rather than an internal trauma based in family history, 
stimulated the experimentation with new behavioural therapies at places such as the 
Maudsley hospital (Marks, 2012) that dispensed with Freudian heavy 
psychoanalytical approaches. With a strong need to get soldiers fit enough to return 
to the front line, behavioural therapies emerged amid an interest in treating the 
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symptoms instead of the mind, an approach that had a more materialistic 
understanding of mental distress. During and following the First World War, society 
witnessed the creation of specialist hospitals such as those at Maghull, the Maudsley, 
and Craiglockhart (Jones & Wessley, 2005). Other notable developments included the 
opening of 'recovery homes' by the Ministry of Pensions and the formation of a 
national network of psychotherapy clinics in 1919-20 (Leese, 2002). Many of the 
doctors who treated shell shock during the war spread across the UK afterwards, so 
the new ideas in psychiatry spread. 
It also cemented a new relationship between psychology and the military, where 
recruits had to undergo psychological screening (Jones & Wessley, 2005; Shepard, 
2002). As Shepard (2002) has documented, this was rediscovered during the Vietnam 
War, giving rise to the establishment of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) as a 
psychiatric disorder in the DSM III in 1980. For Shepard, from this 'rediscovery' of 
trauma emerged a whole 'culture of trauma' that saw debriefing by counsellors after 
traumatic events as common practice (Seeley, 2015) and a rising interest in real-life 
trauma stories as a form of media entertainment. 
I argue this culture of trauma also set the appropriate environment for notions of 
psychological recovery that proliferate today. As Glyde (2014) put it, this 'recovery 
industrial complex' is embodied in the powerful ethos of Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) 
established by recovering alcoholic Bill Wilson in 1935 originally with an evangelical 
Christian and overtly masculine overtone - the solution was for religion to replace 
addiction - to the industrial complex that is Oprah Winfrey promoting her own brand 
of self-help and empowerment (Travis, 2009). It is also possible to point to the 
connection between war trauma and the popularity of 'resilience' in military and 
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security policy. For example, Neocleous (2013) tracked the increase in usage of the 
term resilience over the last decade in US and UK security policy and at global 
organisations such as the World Bank and IMF. Eyre (2009) discovered in her study 
of firefighters who had experienced the September 11th attack in New York that the 
firefighters were encouraged to be resilient, rather than pursue help through 
counselling. Here, resilience, much like in the studies on grief carried out by Bonnano 
(2009), was a counter to the need for bereavement counselling. Rose (2014) has 
described the discourse of resilience as an optimistic one, replacing the anxiety 
involved in monitoring 'risks'. Resilience is understood as a natural human trait that 
can be taught, learnt and cultivated to alleviate and protect against mental illness. 
5.4.2 Resistance to recovery 
The optimism of resilience is evident in materials in recovery, for example from the 
South London and Maudsley's (SLAM) Recovery college prospectus: 
Treatment and support from mental health professionals can be helpful but 
every person with mental health problems can become an expert in their own 
self-management. Whatever challenges you face, recovery involves finding 
the personal resourcefulness and resilience to take back control over your life 
and what happens to you. (South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation 
Trust, 2015, p. 19) 
In this understanding, recovery is possible, no matter how serious the person's 
difficulties; service users just need to find their personal 'resourcefulness and 
resilience'. No Health Without Mental Health clearly stated that recovery was possible 
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for the 'vast majority' of people. Yet when recovery is always possible, and resilience 
is a natural trait that all possess if only enhanced, failing to recover becomes the 
(moral) fault of the individual. It is for this reason among others that the recovery 
model has received criticism from service users and others working within mental 
health care. Recovery is seen as a way of abdicating responsibility for mental distress 
elsewhere; that is to the person experiencing the distress themselves. For an 
increasing number of people, including the service users I interviewed, recovery is a 
shiny gloss on an unchanged and still coercive system, enabling cut backs on services, 
and eradicating long-term care through referring people to recovery colleges as a way 
to discharge them sooner (Braslow, 2013; Harper & Speed, 2012; Rose, 2014). 
The recovery model has also been critiqued for relying on the standard 'deficit model' 
of illness it was originally designed to oppose (Harper & Speed, 2012). As one of the 
interview participants Eva described, recovery had become a "stick" used to measure 
people against. Eva described a culture within one of the recovery colleges where 
recovery was something one had to achieve and then maintain. By establishing 
markers of recovery such as the 'recovery star', it became possible for the relevant 
medical authority to make a judgement on whether or not someone was recovered. 
People then become responsible for adhering to prescribed ways of governing their 
lives, but the medical authority still remains intact - as psychiatrists become recovery 
experts and mental health care becomes 'recovery-orientated' and 'recovery-focused'. 
A contradiction then arises as recovery is described as a unique individual journey to 
self-control and autonomy over one's life, yet it is taught and learnt via a set of 
experts and in adherence to a set of predefined criteria. As the SLAM recovery college 
prospectus further demonstrates: 
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The workshops and courses we run aim to provide the tools ( ... ) to help you 
become an expert in your own recovery. (South London and Maudsley NHS 
Foundation Trust, 2015, p. 6) 
The outcomes of the recovery model have also been criticised for promoting 
normative values. Travis (2009), in her account of the rise of the recovery movement 
in the US, described the goal of recovery politics as inherently 'square'. But recovery 
politics is not only 'square' it has come to coincide with and reaffirm a neoliberal 
government agenda of autonomy and individual responsibility that has its interests in 
retaining the status quo (Braslow, 2013). A group of people have formed on social 
media website Facebook to express their disapproval at the 'neoliberal intrusion' on 
the word recovery in a group they have called 'Recovery in the bin'. The members of 
this group contend that 'recovery' has been colonised and used to discipline and 
control people with mental distress and argue for a 'Social Model of Madness', placing 
mental health within the context of the wider class struggle. Some of the group have 
claimed the title of 'UnRecovered' to replace 'Recovered', as a valid alternative and in 
rejection of the neoliberal and market values now infused in the notion of recovery. 
This refusal of recovery is also a refusal to 'tell our stories'. Once the central act of 
liberation from oppression, telling one's recovery story is now viewed as an 
obligatory gesture to justify and validates one's experience; a form of 
'disempowerment, under the guise of empowerment'12. This shift from 'Survivors 
Speak Out' to 'patient porn' (Costa et al., 2012) acknowledges the performative 
promise of recovery, where service users feel the ideology of recovery is merely 'lip 
service'. 
12 The Recovery in the Bin 18 key principles 2015: http://recoyeryinthebin.or~118-
principles I (Accessed 6 June 2016) 
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Recovery has become conflated with assumed notions of what it means to be a 
functional citizen yet the criteria of what is deemed to bring quality of life are rarely 
questioned. A Journey to Recovery (Department of Health, 2001) described the 
importance of recovery to the rights of a citizen, where those rights included: having 
an acceptable place to live, a meaningful occupation, access to further education and 
training, access to information on entitlements and benefits, and engaging in 
'ordinary social activities'. This vague list of components of the happy recovered life 
mirrors much of the contributions of positive psychology. Yet as Rose has observed, 
'For all that [recovery] goals are meant to be "personal", certain goals are not 
permitted. You cannot decide to go to bed for a month' (2014, p. 217). For instance, 
the recovery colleges deliver courses on how to stop smoking, how to eat better, and 
how to get a job. In these models of recovery there is an implicit judgement of how 
one should successfully live out their personal lives. As one participant Donna 
commented, it as though "you need to recover from being yourself'. In the recovery 
model, 'ordinary social activities' become 'self-care' activities. From the online blog of 
the mental health organisation See Me Scotland one service user (Tate, 2014) 
described her frustration with how recovery had come to 'hijack' day-to-day 
existence: 
I made the point that for many of us lunch is just lunch, those enmeshed in the 
recovery dogma may label it "self-care", a few glasses of wine after a hard day 
is just a few glasses of wine, the recovery dogma labels this "self-medication" 
(and that's bad!). 
To recover from mental illness, to adhere to the model of recovery, involves a 
considerable amount of work on behalf of the service user. To recover involves a 
range of activities such as attending recovery colleges, completing recovery plans, 
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taking medication, getting a job, sustaining good relationships with others, eating 
well, not smoking, creating a new identity, being mindful and taking walks in nature. 
People using mental health services are increasingly finding themselves obligated to 
undertake this sort of 'recovery-work' in the promise of becoming well. A report 
entitled Making Recovery a Reality published in 2008 by the Sainsbury Centre for 
Mental Health describes how recovery can only be resolved if the person can gain 
hope. 'Without hope', the report declared, 'they cannot begin to build their lives' 
(Shepard et al., 2008). Recovery, like happiness, appears as a 'mirage', leading 
towards something that is not really there (Whitwell, 1999). The promise of recovery 
possesses a cruel contradiction in that the highly prized ability to become 
autonomous and have self-control to manage one's life is only possible through 
submitting to experts who help people navigate their way through to recovery. The 
service user is taught how and what to desire, all in the name of self-fulfilment and 
individual freedom. And because recovery is always possible it can only be the 
individual's failure of will or resilience if they are seen to relapse or fail to recover in 
the terms that have been proposed. 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has covered a variety of cultural and political factors that frame grief and 
recovery. The space of grief and recovery is a terrain mapped by changing guidance 
and discourse, from the role of ritual and mortuary practices, to psychiatric diagnosis 
of mental disorders, the politics of happiness and the transformation of mental health 
policy. In this enquiry I have sought to delineate two themes shaping notions around 
recovery, emotions and grief. The first is the appearance of an increasing 
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medicalisation of mental distress and an unprecedented intervention of the 
government into the private and emotional lives of the population. The second is the 
acknowledgment that alongside this there is a celebration of the autonomous 
individual who is resilient, in control and has the power to make choices. At the 
centre is the formation of a subject: a subject that is at once liable to wrong decisions, 
whether grieving too long, being depressed or refusing to recover but then expected 
to be independent and autonomous. Autonomy and resilience can be cultivated, or 
recovered, but it is an autonomy that comes at the price of relying upon the advice of 
experts. The complicated griever, the wealthy but unhappy, the traumatised soldier, 
are some of these figures discussed in this chapter. These figures, through the 
discourse of recovery have found themselves bound to new authorities in the name of 
freedom, a relationship all the more subjectifying because the guidance offered 
appears to emanate from their individual desires (Rose, 1998, p. 17). There is, 
however, the echo of resistance against this 'obligation to be free', a resistance often 
voiced through stories and narratives. However, this is a resistance that embraces the 
forms of individuality and self-expression produced by the type of govern mentality 
against which it is reacting. The privileged site of literature provides a platform for a 
variety of grief expression but arguably, it is a platform gained by learning how to tell 
the right stories. 
In the next chapter I will attempt to pick apart the complexities of 'enacting' recovery 
in practice (McWade, 2015; Mol, 2008) through an analysis of how bereavement care 
is facilitated. By attending closer to bereavement counselling practice, and individual 
accounts of grief and recovery, I hope to illustrate how these discourses are 
negotiated in the everyday lives of those they seek to govern. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Navigating the grief journey: The helpers 
6.1 Introduction to the chapter 
In this chapter I focus on the provision and organisation of bereavement care services 
across England. As I discovered in the course of my fieldwork, bereavement care is 
dispersed in different sites, often situated within or between clinical mental health 
services and the charity and voluntary sector. Due to this lack of centrality in the 
provision of bereavement care services, bereavement care was often delivered by 
volunteers with varying levels of training and utilised a number of different 
approaches. Therefore, in the first section I map out the state of bereavement services 
and organisations, setting the context for the accounts of my participants, all of whom 
worked in different capacities providing assistance to bereaved people. Then I pose 
the question precisely why bereavement, and the people who experience it, require 
care and management from experts and organisations ranging from the government 
to local charities. I argue that it is through the identification of 'need' and an 
estimation of 'risks' that has led organisations to identify bereavement as a public 
health issue. For the bereavement care professionals to whom I spoke, this 'need' was 
self-evident. However, I address how this need came to be identified through the 
calculation of the 'risks' of unattended grief, aided by the development of particular 
diagnostic tools brought about by the rise of psychology as a discipline. 
The public health issue of bereavement has largely been addressed through 
psychological therapies and counselling. Since bereavement counselling has become 
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the default response to managing grief, I chose to interview bereavement care 
professionals as representative of the people who 'manage' grief. In the second 
section I present data from these practitioners and discuss the various models used 
by the counsellors and support workers interviewed in this study and how they were 
transferred into practice. What makes 'grief work' effective in practice was often 
described in more nuanced terms, where bereavement practitioners shied away from 
prescriptive statements. Despite this reticence, I highlight six components that 
emerged across the accounts and that my participants agreed were important to the 
success of bereavement counselling. 
The reluctance to make prescriptive statements about grief work reflected how the 
term 'recovery' in grief and bereavement literature is contested and often 
controversial (8alk, 2004, 2008). Contrary to the embrace of recovery in mental 
health care services (see Chapter 5), recovery from grief was not something that was 
always agreed as being possible, indeed, recovery could seem like a dirty word. I 
introduce the 'Grief Recovery Method' (James & Friedman, 2009) as a contrast to the 
ambiguities of the bereavement counselling endeavour, and as an organisation that 
makes clear and strong 'truth claims' about the possibility of recovery from grief 
through the undertaking of a series of specific actions and exercises. In the third 
section, I discuss these conflicts as well as agreements on what recovery from grief 
entailed and how it was achieved, or not, through the assistance of the expertise of 
bereavement professionals. As highlighted in Chapter 2, there lies a tension between 
the proclamation of grief as natural and normal and the justification of external 
intervention into individuals' grieving. This tension persists in this chapter as I 
explore the facilitation of the grief process, where the knowledge of grief lies not in 
individual experience but the expert's understanding of it. 
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6.2 The state 0/ bereavement services in England 
In 2010 a report, commissioned by the Department of Health, was published that 
reviewed existing literature on bereavement care services (The University of 
Nottingham & Department of Health, 2010). The report aimed to establish what is 
known about current bereavement provision across the UK by reviewing existing 
literature on bereavement interventions. The nature of bereavement care, stated the 
report's authors, encapsulates a number of different services and resources provided 
by the health, education, social care, and voluntary sectors. They found that 
bereavement care was delivered largely in one of three different levels of intensity: 
(i) acknowledgement and information-based services; (ii) one-to-one support and/or 
peer support; and (iii) more intensive therapeutic and structured interventions for 
more complex grief reactions. The report also highlighted the gaps in knowledge 
around bereavement care services such as how much bereavement care services cost 
and the unevenness in the delivery of services. 
The report reflected moves in recent years to better integrate and control the quality 
of bereavement care services, while maintaining the belief that bereavement is 
something that should remain largely a matter for community and social networks 
rather than clinical services. The Bereavement Care Pathways Project was formed in 
2007 with the aid of a Department of Health grant, bringing together Cruse and the 
Bereavement Services Association, and aimed to bridge what was considered a 'gap' 
in the experience of bereaved people and bereavement services in the statutory and 
voluntary sectors. The project resulted in the publication of the Bereavement Care 
Service Standards (Bereavement Services Association and Cruse Bereavement Care, 
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2013) that detailed the 'Gold Standards' for bereavement care and established a clear 
'bereavement pathway' to educate professionals and better connect up services and 
support The Bereavement Care Service Standards provided criteria for what clients, 
carers, staff and volunteers should expect. This included auditing and ensuring 
equality and governance across different services; enabling 'quality control measures' 
to be utilised within the field; establishing a more integrated approach to the delivery 
of bereavement care; and providing a helpful benchmark with which services can be 
compared across the country. 
6.2.1 The need for expert help 
Although the position of bereavement care across different settings and sectors is still 
undergoing some clarification, the purpose of bereavement care is well supported. In 
Chapter 5, I described how mental health had been configured as a 'burden' on 
national economic resources, which provided the basis for psychological 
interventions into the nation's wellbeing and happiness. Bereavement is also viewed 
as an experience that has a detrimental impact on individual health. As Stroebe and 
Schut (2007) argued, bereavement has been associated with excess risk of mortality 
and morbidity. Bereavement is often related to a host of mental and physical 
disorders from cancer and cardiovascular disease (Richardson et al., 2013) to 
attachment issues and depression (Harrison & Harrington, 2001; Sbarra & Hazan, 
2008). The risks are not only to individual health but also to the country's economy 
and society. A report (SECDB project research group, 2013; Stephen et al., 2014) 
published in 2013 sought to estimate the socioeconomic costs of bereavement in 
Scotland. Drawing on three secondary data sets, the researchers concluded that 
supporting spousal bereavement alone cost approximately £20 million annually. 
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Bereavement has other detrimental economic costs in the number of people who 
drop out of employment and take bereavement leave. The report called for a need to 
better calculate the socioeconomic costs of bereavement 'to improve self-
management strategies and resilience in communities' (SECDB project research 
group, 2013, p. 4). 
The National Council for Palliative Care, in partnership with the National 
Bereavement Alliance, published a paper in 2014 highlighting the need to address 
bereavement as a major public policy issue (National Council for Palliative Care, 
2014)' The report entitled Life After Death cited the report from Scotland, estimating 
that England's costs must be much higher at around £150-190 million to the economy 
each year. With deaths predicted to rise 15 per cent by 2035, the paper proposed six 
steps of action including a national review of the impact of financial, administrative 
and economic changes on those who have been bereaved and clear and organised 
rather than 'patchy' bereavement support I argue the findings of these reports serve 
to reaffirm the belief in bereavement as both an individual and public health concern. 
The conventional response to this concern has been an increase in provision of 
bereavement counselling support. In Chapter 2, I described how grief came to be 
understood as an object of psychological study, one measured in normal and 
abnormal forms through the delineation of a grief process. The intervention of 
psychological therapies was founded on the basis of preventing or repairing the 
'derailing' of the 'normal' course of grief (Shear, 2012). 
For Rose (1997), the authority of psychology is justified through its claims to the 
truth of persons and their mental states. Rose argued the 'techne' of the confessional 
was employed by psychology, and created the emphasis on talking therapies in 
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overcoming mental distress. A new relationship between psychological experts and 
those who consult them was thus formed, that Rose (1997, p. 93) described as a kind 
of 'discipleship': 
The relation between expert and client is structured by a hierarchy of 
wisdom, it is held in place by the wish for truth and certainty, and it offers the 
disciple the promise of self-understanding and self-improvement. 
The growth of psychology as a discipline and the tools and measures it developed 
provides an explanation of why grief, as it became an object of study for psychology, 
found its means of cure through psychological counselling interventions. However, 
there is considerable debate and questioning among researchers over the empirical 
value of grief counselling and whether 'grief work' actually works (Jordan & 
Neimeyer, 2003; Larson & Hoyt, 2009; Schut, 2010; Stroebe & Stroebe, 1991). 
A number of reviews have claimed that grief counselling is ineffective and potentially 
harmful, finding that the 'scientifically demonstrated efficacy' of formal interventions 
for bereaved people is 'distressingly low': far below other types of psychotherapeutic 
intervention (Jordan & Neimeyer, 2003). A more recent review concurred with these 
findings, describing the overall quality of studies of bereavement intervention as 
'poor' with results showing 'mixed effectiveness' (Waller et al., 2016). These findings 
that Jordan and Neimeyer (2003) regretfully note as 'surprising' and 'upsetting', 
contrast the powerful discourse outlined in Chapter 2 that began with the 
interpretation of Freud's 'Mourning and Melancholia', that grief is something that 
needs to be worked through with the assistance of a psychologically trained expert. 
Counselling has become a standard response to all forms of traumatic event, yet as 
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Groopman (2004) discussed, the benefits of the common procedure of 'debriefing' 
after traumatic events lacks scientific evidence. Further, Groopman presented cases 
where debriefing and counselling interventions produced unwanted negative effects 
on survivors. 
How precisely 'recovery' is measured in proving the 'effectiveness' of an intervention 
remains debatable and presents a major problem in evaluating the success of 
bereavement counselling. The effectiveness of an intervention in the studies detailed 
above is based largely on the researcher/therapist's estimation of the reduction of 
symptoms, not a self-reported account from the client. 
However, the need for bereavement counselling and support is portrayed by 
bereavement organisations, not as politically or economically directed, but as driven 
by those experiencing bereavement themselves. This belief is supported to an extent 
by empirical evidence such as the nationwide survey conducted by organisation 
Dying Matters13 that polled 2058 adults in the UK. The survey revealed that one in 
five (21 per cent) bereaved people declared they wanted to talk but could not find 
anyone to listen (Dying Matters, 2014). These findings highlight at least some need 
for listeners in the event of bereavement, albeit not a universal need and, indeed, not 
necessarily listeners who come in an expert form. This concurs with the common 
understanding in counselling work, and repeated by the participants of this study, 
that maintains that the client has to be willing to talk and do the work, otherwise the 
role of the counsellor is redundant. An alternative way of thinking about this 'need' to 
receive counselor be listened to could be construed as the result of an increasing 
13 Dying Matters is a coalition of 32,000 members from organisations such as the NHS, 
voluntary and independent health and care sectors, the legal profession and the funeral 
sector across England and Wales which aims to help people talk more openly about dying, 
death and bereavement, and to make plans for the end of life. 
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reliance on the psychological sciences to provide remedy to the troubles of daily 
existence. Bereavement counselling is thus another extension of the 
'psychologisation' of everyday life. The need for a therapeutic response to grief 
becomes self-explanatory once those who have been bereaved come to understand 
and relate to themselves and their grief as matters of the psyche to be resolved via a 
working through of the emotions. 
6.3 What makes 'grief work' work? 
Here I draw upon data based on the insights of interviews with bereavement 
counsellors and support workers to answer the question: what makes 'grief work' 
work? As outlined above, the answer to this question is not always explicit, even to 
those who practice bereavement counselling. For the participants, grief was certainly 
something to be 'worked through' individually or in collaboration with a 
bereavement care professional, with any failure to work it through leading to 
negative consequences and a failure to recover or resolve grief. The components of 
'working through', however, could vary. In this section I highlight six criteria that aid 
successful grief work, as described by the practitioners, but I also highlight how they 
were often interpreted and implemented differently. The six key features I discuss 
are the types of counselling approaches and method employed; the making of the 
bereavement 'expert'; how clients are assessed to receive treatment; the importance 
of safety; counselling as normalisation and the role of emotion work. 
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6.3.1 The type of counselling approach and method 
In general, the psychological method demands statistical evidence to prove the 
significance of its endeavours but within bereavement research there is inconclusive 
and conflicting findings over not only what comprises grief work but also whether 
counselling is the most appropriate means of its facilitation. Despite, or because of 
this, there is a deluge of models that seek to address and explain the grief process. I 
found the counsellors and support workers who participated in the research 
deployed a number of models of grief in their practice as well utilising humanistic 
counselling approaches. My data showed that the approach employed by the majority 
of counselling practitioners was a client/person-centred model derived from the 
work of Rogers (1951) drawing on an eclectic approach. The person-centred model 
was central to Cruse volunteer training. The Caris counsellors had completed or were 
undertaking counselling qualifications before working as bereavement counsellors. 
Consequently, Caris counsellors tended to have a broader range of influences in their 
approach. Some counsellors demonstrated an integrative approach that touched 
upon a number of different theories and techniques including Bowlby's attachment 
theory, Gestalt therapy (Wertheimer, 1938), mindfulness (Kabat-Zinn, 1994) and 
references to psychodynamic approaches and utilisation of concepts such as 
transference and counter-transference, the unconscious, and an emphasis on 
childhood experiences (derived from the work of Freud). 
Rogers' (1951) person-centred approach emphasises the client as expert. It is a non-
directive approach that holds that the client knows her or himself best. The role of the 
counsellor is to be skilled in empathetic understanding and non-judgmental listening 
in order to allow the client to express their feelings. Roger's theory is reliant upon the 
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idea that humans have an inherent potential, and tendency to growth and wholeness. 
This positive view of the person is the 'organismic self, which innately seeks self-
actualisation. However, people also possess a 'self-concept' produced and affected by 
others around them that can conflict with the organismic self if one's self-concept 
becomes distorted. Someone's self-concept can become distorted when there is a lack 
of positive regard and approval from those around them. Thus, the role of the 
therapist is to enable the client to become fully functioning and bring congruence 
between the phenomenal field of experience and the conceptual structure of the self. 
If achieved, this would represent freedom from internal strain and anxiety, and the 
capacity to use talents and abilities, realise potential, move towards complete 
knowledge of self and maintain responsibility for determining one's actions. 
The participants also drew on grief models with many making reference to the dual 
process model (Stroebe & Schut, 1999) (nine out of twelve participants), along with 
Worden's tasks (three participants made explicit reference), continuing bonds 
(mentioned by five participants) and the stages of grief (also mentioned by five 
participants). Also popular were the ideas of 'growing around grief conceptualised by 
Tonkin (1996) and the 'grief wheel' (see Figure 2). These models featured in the grief 
and bereavement specific training that the counsellors and volunteers received at 
Cruse and Caris, and were used in an "integrative" way. The models were often 
referenced by practitioners as useful tools to measure where a client was in the 
process, who also stated they were helpful for the client to "normalise" their 
emotions. As Cruse support worker Susan (BSW1) described using the dual-
processing model with her clients: 
That model's very useful ( ... ) it gives you a visual idea ( ... ) It's sort of a bit of 
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evidence that you can see in a visual way that things are progressing and is 
taking its natural course, however long that may be. 
Caris counsellor Wendy told me that she found Worden's tasks model useful when 
dealing with clients who "seem quite stuck" and the stages model as helpful for 
someone "who's got some sort of abnormality in their grieving". Here models were 
used in a pick and mix fashion depending on "the individual and their pathway", and 
"making use of whatever is available". The 'growing around grief idea by Tonkin 
helped Susan to assess how integrated her client was becoming in the "normal 
world". 
Representatives of the organisations to whom I spoke employed different systems for 
the number of sessions a client received. For example, Cruse and St Christopher's had 
a limit of twelve sessions, offering six sessions in the first instance. Caris was unusual 
in that it offered an open-ended service, where counsellors had an opportunity to 
build relationships over time with clients: a difference the counsellors believed 
affected how they worked. Often time limitations were due to organisational 
restraints that demanded proof of the success of the intervention. Wendy at Caris 
described how the nature of bereavement actually required long-term counselling, 
and unlike other "goal-centred" problems cannot be dealt with in a "brief' way: 
The problem with bereavement is it isn't an easy goal-centred problem. 
There's lots of things you can deal with in a brief way because you can just 
leave out the other stuff and deal with the main, whatever the agreed thing is, 
and like a dentist you don't have to do all the teeth at once. But with 
bereavement I think you probably do, it doesn't work really to focus just on 
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the one thing. (Wendy, BC1) 
By way of contrast, the Grief Recovery Method (GRM) clearly states it is not 
counselling or therapy. The Director of Grief Recovery UK, Ellen, appeared quite 
dismissive of bereavement counselling and of the service provided by Cruse. Speaking 
of her experience: "I've had counselling, I think what they call person-centred, 
whatever that means, and I really didn't like that". Ellen was critical of the lack of 
choice in bereavement care and described it as a "disservice to the bereaved". For her 
the GRM presents something very different, and better. Ellen told me: "It's my goal 
that by the time I retire people won't say Cruse automatically they'll say Grief 
Recovery. That is my mission to knock Cruse off that". 
The GRM is a series of steps, described in the Grief Recovery Handbook, first created 
by John W. James. The steps involve a number of activities that must be followed in 
the stated order. For example, the first step is to write a 'loss history graph', which 
details all the losses people have experienced in their life, loss being broader than 
death, encompassing 'the loss of hopes, dreams and expectations'. The second step is 
to write a 'relationship history graph' for the relationship people wish to find 
'completion' with. This graph documents the key aspects of a relationship with the 
chosen person (deceased or alive) on a timeline. The final step is to write a 
'completion letter' to the person, which again has a very strict format, detailed in 
Section 6.4.1. The key to each activity is that the letter had to be read out to another 
person. Along the way there are a number of exercises and concepts to learn from the 
'six myths of grief to 'short-term energy relieving behaviours' (STERBs). For Director 
Ellen the novelty of this approach was not to be understated: 
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Now I believe, that until John James put the words grief and recovery together 
nobody else had ( ... ) and that's why we changed our name from grief recovery 
to the grief recovery method, so that we could trademark it. 
When I asked Ellen whether the GRM utilised any of the other dominant grief 
theories, she replied: "Nope. That's all head stuff'. The GRM is against 
"intellectualising" grief declaring that grief is a matter for the heart. The dominant 
ideas around grief were thus ignored by the GRM, due to the fact they were seeking 
an "intellectual solution to an emotional problem". Ellen told me that the 'growing 
around grief idea made her "angry" because it's "simply not true". Rather, in the GRM 
grief is "chucked out" and gotten "rid of' through completion. 
In Section 6.4 I explain further the differences in perspective among the participants 
concerning what recovery from grief involves. However, here I want to note the 
seeming ambiguity in the role of the bereavement helper who in different settings 
occupies the position of counsellor, support worker, volunteer or 'coach' who 
provides a 'toolkit'. In the rest of this chapter I intend to separate where possible 
'counsellor' and 'bereavement support worker' to acknowledge the difference in 
levels of training among the participants. I have provided each participant with an 
identifier such as BSW1 or Bel to distinguish between bereavement support worker 
and bereavement counsellors, as described in Chapter 4, Section 4.3. Furthermore, in 
bereavement work and in contrast to work within mental health care, personal 
experience of bereavement is often a desirable feature of a potential candidate that 
can substitute for any lacking in formal counselling qualifications and training, as I 
describe next. 
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6.3.2 The making of the bereavement expert 
A lot of us have got backgrounds with personal experiences, which has led us 
to do what we do now. So you get a connection - it's not formal counselling, 
it's professional we are all properly trained and its professional -but at the 
same time there's lots of empathy, and can't say friendliness but just 
connection and empathy. (Susan, BSW1) 
Like Susan quoted above, the majority of bereavement care practitioners I 
interviewed spoke in some capacity of their own experience of loss and how the 
knowledge of loss either provided them with the incentive to become a bereavement 
counsellor or how it enhanced their work. Susan described how at Cruse "a lot of the 
counsellors and supervisors" were drawn to the work at Cruse because of their own 
experiences. Many of the participants told me of their own personal experience of 
loss in order to explain why they became engaged in bereavement work. Getting 
involved in bereavement counselling was a way to "give something back" and do 
something "positive" following their loss. They also told me that having such 
experience meant that they had something to offer as counsellors, even without 
formal counselling training. This, some of the participants claimed, was because the 
mutual experience of loss was considered to produce a "connection" where the 
potential counsellor could "understand how it feels". A personal experience of grief 
was considered to complement the person-centred approach to practice that 
encouraged the counsellor to imagine and feel the world of the client, despite the 
Rogerian approach encouraging empathy rather than sharing the experience. In one 
case, it was not even the experience of bereavement by death that led her towards 
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bereavement counselling: Caris counsellor Claire described how her experience of 
illness impacted on her: 
I felt, I know something about loss, and I know something about looking at it 
in the face in a way and finding meaning in it. And I think that was, I think that 
was what led me to think yeah bereavement counselling is what I will apply 
for. (Claire, 8C5) 
In all cases, being aware and reflective about one's own 'loss background' was 
included in the bereavement counselling training, albeit in different measures. At 
Caris, for example, counsellors would create their own 'grief map' of losses 
experienced in their own life. This was understood as part of the necessary personal 
development of the counsellors that would bring to awareness any 'unconscious' 
thoughts and feelings around grief and bereavement that might become problematic 
in the counselling encounter and prevent the counsellor from listening to the client. A 
background or experience of loss might be a key incentive to getting involved in 
bereavement counselling, but the personal experiences of the counsellor should not 
enter into the counsellor-client encounter. 
Grief Recovery UK explicitly embraced the practitioner's personal experience of loss 
in the training of their 'grief recovery specialists'. In fact, personal experience was 
considered key to being able to train others. At the Grief Recovery training workshop 
I attended, all trainees had to undertake the 'personal workshop' which had to be 
'completed' in order to undertake the extra day of specialist specific training. Further, 
being able to speak about one's own experience is key to the method. As Ellen the 
Director described: 
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We don't use a professional mask in grief recovery we don't make our faces 
blank, we show our human emotions and we share our personal stuff which is 
a complete no-no [in other methods]. 
Ellen here was highlighting the difference between the GRM and counselling where 
personal disclosure is not standard practice; indeed disclosure from the counsellor 
goes against the counsellor/client contract. In the GRM the idea is that the "leader 
goes first". As demonstrated at the workshop, Ellen showed us her own loss history 
and relationship graph, spoke openly and copiously about her deceased husband as 
well as her father and even her current relationship and wedding plans. She noted: 
"Counsellors would never do that. No, no, no". Within the GRM however, the emphasis 
is on "telling the truth" and showing "real' stuff'. The claim to 'realness' is a repeated 
theme, displayed clearly in another publication Moving Beyond Loss (Friedman & 
James, 2013) which is subtitled: 'real answers to real questions from real people'. 
Speaking about one's loss history was thus used to reveal the 'authenticity' of the 
GRM in contrast to the 'masks' of counsellors. Yet arguably, the 'mask' of counsellors 
is a means to create important boundaries between counsellor and client. For Ellen, 
the principle of 'leader goes first' created 'safety' but it could also create confusion. At 
one point during the facilitation of the Grief Recovery workshop Ellen began to cry as 
she went through her 'relationship graph', asking one of the group to give her a hug. 
Listening to other group members in training the following day questions were raised 
over her credibility, insofar as some being unconvinced she had gotten 'over' the 
death of her husband. Even Ellen was somewhat aware of the confusion: 
It's a really bizarre thing, I have to constantly tread this fine line between 
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Ellen the widow and Ellen the Grief Recovery specialist. So I wear the two 
hats. 
This was in contrast to how Caris counsellor Wendy spoke about the boundaries of 
the counselling setting. These boundaries existed not only in the counselling room 
itself but needed to be embodied by the counsellor. Wendy believed the lack of 
strength of these boundaries would then show themselves when the counsellor was 
taken outside of the familiar setting, to a client's home, for example14, where the 
counsellor and client were away from the familiar props of the counselling encounter: 
My view on it is the boundaries only became confused if the counsellor is 
confused about what counselling is. And you can be in a consulting room 
because someone else set the room up, you can appear to be a counsellor 
much more, but actually fundamentally if the boundaries are confused in the 
home setting then that's because the counsellor is confused. So it shows up 
weak counsellors more but if you're not a weak counsellor then it's a 
marvellous setting ( ... ) so there has to be an ownership on the counsellor's 
side about what boundaries matter and what one's don't. (Wendy, BC1) 
However, as the GRM does not claim to be counselling, the parameters were quite 
different. The role of the specialist is to "teach the steps" of the handbook: "We're not 
messing about with your head, we're not analysing anything", declared Ellen. 
Subsequently, the potential specialists need not undertake formal training or an 
application process. Instead they were required to attend the four day workshopls, 
14 Caris also undertake counselling sessions in clients' homes. 
15 The personal Grief Recovery workshop is priced at £295 for three days. To become 
certified as a specialist, the fee is higher (not disclosed on website). 
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and have "an open mind and open heart". Following the workshop, people were then 
'licensed' as 'Grief Recovery Specialists' to either set up their own one-to-one or 
group sessions using the GRM, charged at a price of their choosing, or incorporate it 
into their existing work. The GRM is also endorsed by the British Association for 
Counsellors and Psychotherapists (BACP) to be taken by trained counsellors and 
psychotherapists as part of their continuing professional development. This 
endorsement by the BACP might appear contradictory considering the GRM's 
opposing beliefs on counsellors sharing personal information with their clients. 
6.3.3 Assessing clients for treatment 
Clients were given different forms of assessment to judge their eligibility for 
counselling. At Caris, I spoke with Linda who carried out the assessments on all 
potential clients. She described to me the process: 
What is it I need to know about this person? ( ... ) I'm going to meet them once 
and therefore I just need to make a sound assessment that takes into account 
risk factors, that takes into account history and how the history of that person 
would be indicator of how they manage grief now. (Linda, BC2) 
Along with a list of questions around the bereavement, Linda's assessment sought to 
estimate the 'risk factors'. Risk factors included suicidal thoughts, self-harm or 'risky 
behaviour'. These forms of 'risky behaviour' were elucidated further in completing 
the CORE-tO (Clinical Outcomes and Re-Evaluation)16 screening measure that is 
commonly used in mental health care practice to screen for signs of depression and 
16 Copyrighted by CORE Systems Trust: https:llwww.coresystemtrustorl:,yk/instruments/ 
(Accessed 6 June 2016). 
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suicidal thoughts by asking clients to agree with a list of statements such as 'I have 
made plans to end my life' or'l have felt unhappy', Thus assessing eligibility was also 
about assessing potential risk. Cruse's Early Intervention Project (EIP) established in 
2013, is a service designed specifically to target 'those most at risk of developing 
prolonged grief disorder', It aims to be a 'fast-track service' to avoid the long waiting 
lists Cruse often has, To qualify for the service the client has to be no more than six 
months bereaved, More than that qualifies someone for the diagnosis of 'prolonged 
grief disorder', The EIP assessment seeks to identify any risk factors that suggest 
someone will develop 'prolonged grief disorder', When I visited the EIP office, the 
manager of the service listed to me the risk factors used on the EIP assessment forms: 
• How close was the relationship to the deceased (were there dependency 
issues)? 
• Did they die in hospital? 
• Was it a sudden/unexpected death? 
• Did they have a problematic childhood? 
• Any current or previous mental health conditions? 
Many services warn against people accessing them too soon after bereavement 
However, Grief Recovery UK took a different approach by helping people immediately 
after bereavement. In the GRM the only qualifying criteria was a "broken heart", 
Within the GRM "fresh" grief was actually favoured for people who had not yet 
'pushed down" the grief, forming the "cut" of grief to an unwanted "scab": 
It's like picking off the scab isn't it, it hurts when you're picking away at it, 
afterwards when it's come off it feels better because it's not itching anymore, 
So they've got the itch, they don't want to face up to the picking at it, 
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but when the cut's just happened, if you could go straight from cut to clean bit 
you would wouldn't you? (Ellen, GRM) 
The hesitancy around encouraging people into counselling too early is the general 
hesitancy in bereavement care to medicalise 'normal' grief. The GRM assumes 
that all grief needs some level of work and help and can find 'completion' through 
the method. Introducing people at the earliest possible pOint means no time is 
allowed for the "scab" to be formed. 
Overall from my data show how key criteria of eligibility for grief work beyond the 
risk factors was simply the client being "ready to do the work". The assessment 
procedures documented the observations of the counsellor and their judgment of the 
client's suitability, but the appropriateness of the intervention also depended on the 
client's apparent willingness "to make the journey", as described by Caris counsellor 
Claire. However as Claire acknowledged, while working through grief may be like a 
journey, it's a journey that's "not for everyone". Embarking on counselling was a 
choice, but one bounded by a set of rules and the counselling method. This can be 
seen as part of the contract between counsellor and client where counselling also 
aims to "give people the opportunity to make choices" (Wendy, BC1). Unwillingness 
to do the work could be read in different ways, and I will return to this point later in 
discussing how 'resistance' is defined. 
6.3.4 Counselling as normalisation 
And it was almost when I gave her permission, to say look it's completely 
understandable and it's completely normal that you would be upset ( ... ) It's 
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completely normal to be feeling the way you're feeling ( ... ) and so to be able 
to dispel that myth, to help to normalise feelings, because I think that's a big 
part of bereavement counselling: it's about normalisation. (Linda, BC2) 
As Linda described, my data show that a big part of bereavement counselling is about 
"normalisation" and "normalising feelings". However, there was some ambiguity 
around how 'normal' and 'abnormal' were defined. Grief was described as individual 
and unique but then also a 'process' that was 'natural' and 'normal'. Normal and 
natural were often used interchangeably and when I explored with participants what 
was meant by 'normal', many of the practitioners had difficulty providing an easy 
answer. It was emphasised that normal could be quite broad. Describing the activity 
of 'normalising' grief was intended to make people experiencing grief feel better, 
rather than to state there is a 'normal way' to grieve. As Daniela put it: "When I talk 
about normalising emotions it's more about being in a world where it's okay to feel 
like all you want to do is lie on the ground and stare at shoes". But normal was also a 
measure aided by models of grief, or as Susan mentioned, "photocopies of all the 
emotions" that she would use so that clients could "see them all written down" and 
learn that what they were feeling was normal, flit gives them something concrete". 
Normal emerged as something to be achieved, as something that has been lost in 
grief, yet at the same time the grief process itself was judged as normal or not. The 
use of the term 'normal grief implied some form of movement forward, in contrast to 
those who got 'stuck'. Cruse bereavement support worker Susan used the 'growing 
around grief model to measure clients' return to 'normality'. Susan drew me a 
diagram to demonstrate, drawing "the grief' as a circle in the centre and then circles 
that would expand around the grief, as she described: 
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And so you can, after the first few sessions you get a feel if they are totally 
immersed in all that or if they are not, you can start (draws circle) went back 
to work for two weeks you can put that outside there, meet up with friends 
now and again. So that's the grief but ( ... ) a person's got a little bit, is in the 
normal world ( ... ) so even though that's their grief, there's a bit of normality 
going on, restoration if you like round there. (Susan, BSW1) 
Grief could be categorised into types, whether "straightforward" and "run of the mill" 
or "complicated" and "risky". Cruse's Early Intervention Project, for example, aimed 
to identify 'complicated grief even before it developed into 'prolonged grief disorder'. 
Thus "complicated" grievers were separated out from the "run of the mill" grievers. 
Participants' inability to express clearly what was normal highlighted the conflict 
that, at times, appeared when emphasising both the individual and unique feelings of 
the grieving client and the belief in a 'natural process' of grief. I return to the 
ambiguity of normality in Section 6.4.1 when I discuss how recovery is negotiated in 
practice. 
6.3.5 The importance of safety 
The participants emphasised that normalising emotions also helped produce safety in 
the counselling encounter. The building of a "safe space" emerged as an important 
component in grief work. A safe space was created in a number of ways, crucially by 
the building of the client-counsellor relationship, so central to the person-centred 
approach. In all approaches confidentiality formed an important part of the contract 
Showing one's expertise as counsellor also created safety. In the GRM this was 
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ensured by the 'leader goes first' policy but for Cruse clients viewing the counsellor as 
professional and 'properly trained' formed safety. Creating a safe space enabled 
clients to "offload" and release previously hidden or unconscious emotions. The role 
of the counsellor was to be someone who could sit with the seemingly unbearable 
nature of grief, as Wendy described: 
So the client is actually in a relationship at last that allows them to cry or not 
cry. Can stand it if you do cry, can stand it if you don't cry and doesn't have an 
agenda about it. And that subtle something transpersonal or unconscious that 
goes on between the client and the counsellor because it's not so much what's 
said it's just, sometimes you're with a person and you know it's just alright if I 
burst into tears. (Wendy, BC1) 
For Wendy safety was often a subtle, unspoken and unconscious agreement between 
the counsellor and client, formed by the strength of the relationship. Adhering to 
boundaries and the contract of the counselling encounter developed a strong, safe 
relationship. Within the safe space the unconscious could be slowly allowed to "perk 
up to consciousness". As Wendy explained, the unconscious was normally kept 
guarded, but the barrier could loosen its grip and a "flood" of thoughts could appear, 
thoughts the client may not have realised they had. It was as though the space formed 
between the counsellor and client allowed the release of emotions that could not find 
release anywhere else. The safety of the space also provided important boundaries 
that could hold the emotions of grief, and find room to undertake the crucial working 
through of the emotions. 
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6.3.6 Emotion work 
We are working with the emotions, grief is all about emotion. (Ellen, GRM) 
As Ellen identified, grief was all about working with the emotions, and the 
participants drew on a variety of, sometimes conflicting, metaphors and images to 
describe the work of grief. Grief was often described as a space to be worked through 
and moved out of: "You can't go round it, you can't go under it, you can't go over it, 
you have to go through it" (Ellen, GRM). But grief was also described as something 
that was "inside" the person that needed to be "externalised". For example, grief work 
was described as "pulling", "hoiking" and "bringing up emotions". Yet emotions and 
grief also had a life of their own and could be resistant to being managed. Emotions 
were viewed as "fluid" and unable to be contained. Emotions could inhabit different 
bodies and be "transferred" on to different people. Daniela described how in 
transferring feelings of grief, people may not recognise their feelings until another 
bereavement or loss: 
( ... ) because they'll then transfer those feelings on to something else or 
someone else. Or say for example you had a mum and a dad, and the dad died 
and the mum and the dad had divorced and the kid was always, grew up with 
the mum and the mum would say oh that's a terrible person and then the dad 
dies. The kid's still not allowed to grieve for the dad because mum's still there 
and mum's still saying what a terrible person this was but when mom dies 
you lose your mom and then you also go, 'shit I lost my dad as well!' (Daniela, 
BC3) 
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For this reason, as trauma counsellor Tony told me, emotions had to be "worked 
through" and "dealt with" otherwise they would "catch up with you" and "come back 
and bite you on the bum". In these differing interpretations, grief was both something 
to be actively moved through but also something that moved the individual. Grief was 
something inside to get rid of or outside the person and in the way. Similarly, the 
emotions that were provided by the person when they were alive, in particular if they 
were bad or abusive feelings and not only positive, could leave a space in the 
bereaved person's life where they look for ways to inflict that feeling upon 
themselves. Daniela (BC3) described to me this transfer of emotions, which led to 
further discussion: 
Daniela: This person might go and then I won't have this shitiness so where 
am I going to get this shitiness from? I'll have to do the shitiness to myself. 
Interviewer: I'm thinking about how people internalise an emotion. It's almost 
like that feeling is there but it can inhabit different bodies. 
Daniela: Yes it's like a possession. It is like a possession, which I am only 
realising now as I am talking about it, which is making me very interested. 
Interviewer: What is the task then when someone has taken on these feelings, 
is it to try and get rid of these feelings? 
Daniela: I guess it would be getting them to see that, to acknowledge it ( ... ) 
how can you do that for yourself now that they've gone, now that role is no 
longer there's. Can you take on that role for yourself ( ... ) I mean that's the 
whole thing: what's your shit, what's somebody else's shit 
The client was provided with different forms of agency in each interpretation, either 
as possessing the control to move out of grief or possessed by grief itself, unable to 
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resist the emotional sway of grief. My data show, as Arnason (2007) and Anderson 
(2001) both identified in their studies of the imagery used by grief counsellors, 
spatial metaphors were employed that assumed an individual inner space, what Rose 
(1985) termed the 'psy' space installed in the modern individual. This inner space 
conjured the 'murky' depths of the client from which emotions could be 'brought up' 
and 'worked through'. Emotions were not always visible to the person experiencing 
them, but they could be named and identified by the counsellor, in an activity Claire 
(BC5) described as "colouring in a picture together". The counsellor 'gaze' (Foucault, 
1973; Rose, 1989) was enabled by the capacity to name and identify emotions and 
thoughts, colouring in the unknown depths of the client. My data showed that what 
presented initially in the counselling encounter was not what was important, 
suggesting that the 'true' emotions could only come to light through the counselling 
process. These methods also required particular displays of emotions, so that crying 
was described as "raw" and authentic and laughing as "avoidance". This emphasis on 
the 'truth' of tears was most evident in the GRM, where at the workshop tears were 
expected: we were given tissue boxes on our arrival. When a small group of the 
workshop attendees found themselves laughing during an activity they were swiftly 
told to keep quiet by the group leader, laughing being an activity of avoiding truth, a 
'short-term energy relieving behaviour'. The encouragement to show emotions thus 
appeared to be limited to particular types of emotions. The appropriate type of 
emotional display was important because in each case emotional expression had been 
endowed with the claim to truth. It seemed whether one laughed or cried was not just 
a transitory affect of the body but a reflection of the deep inner workings of the 
psyche. 
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6.4 Agents 0/ change 
In this section I discuss how counsellors and bereavement support workers aimed to 
facilitate change and recovery. In Section 6.3 I highlighted some of the key 
components of 'grief work' that laid the foundations for the possibility of change and 
recovery. Arguably the counselling contract is established in the belief that people can 
(and need to) change and transform. Using Foucault's ideas around building an 
'aesthetics of existence', I explore how the facilitating of recovery and change 
presents an opportunity for the 'crafting' of the self, for creating oneself as a 'work of 
art' (McDonald & O'Callaghan, 2008). Counselling is a form of work based on the 
psychodynamic tradition of "picking apart your perception of yourself' in order to 
"rebuild it stronger". This notion lies at the heart of the therapeutic endeavour, as 
Daniela (BC3) described: 
[S]omeone described it as all of your clothing and all your skin and bone and 
everything just being taken off and you're just this quivering little thing. ( ... ) 
Then it's about putting stuff back together again. But in the way that you want 
it to look like, not in the way that you've had to make it look like. 
Daniela here describes the crafting process, remaking oneself in the image one 
desired. Implied in this notion was the belief in a "thing" underneath all the "clothing", 
"skin" and "bone" that could be transformed and rebuilt. I then asked Daniela (BC3) 
what she thought that thing was, once everything has been stripped away, she 
replied: 
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The essence of the person, their spirit, the soul. The potential. I think I like 
that word more. The potential of the person. That's what I think is there. Once 
everything else has been stripped. 
This 'thing' was described differently as "essence", "soul", "spirit", and "potential". The 
word potential fits well with the ambitions of counselling and the belief that everyone 
has the capacity to flourish, a potential that can be nurtured, or indeed hindered in 
different ways. As mentioned earlier, the contract between counsellor and client also 
assumed that both parties were ready and willing for a transformation to take place. 
For bereavement counsellors the change is brought about by the method they use: 
talking therapies. Talking about one's feelings in such a manner was seen to initiate 
the change and enable 'movement' and a 'reconfiguration' inside the person. In the 
GRM following the steps in the required order was what brought about change. In 
each approach a method needed to be adhered to by the client under the promise of 
change and transformation. The components above are cited as providing the right 
environment for change to occur, such as establishing safety in order for people to 
"vocalise their pain" and to talk about their feelings. Yet though the components of 
grief work seem fairly clear, how change actually happens did not appear to have a 
set formula in bereavement counselling. This contrasts with the GRM that has a clear 
pathway to 'completion'. 
In what follows I seek to uncover two different types of transformation: one that 
leads to recovery and another that leads to non-recovery. These were commonly 
described as "movement forward" and "stuckness". These descriptions mirrored the 
contrast between linearity and liminality, which I have emphasised throughout this 
thesis. I hope to describe how recovery and non-recovery were negotiated in practice 
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and what sorts of explanations were provided in the instance of failing to recover. 
While failure to recover was not necessarily agreed to be a transformation in the 
same way as recovery, I argue that such a failure is as much a production of the 
bereavement counselling process as recovery. Failure is not a question of blame I 
suggest, but a product of a process that is shaped so that anything less than recovery 
(in the terms proposed) is a failure of the individual. Viewed in this way failing to 
recover becomes less a faulty choice of the individual, explained through moral 
weakness, and more a type of description achieved by fulfilling the right criteria, 
behaving in a certain way or by the showing, or concealing of particular emotions. 
6.4.1 Negotiating recovery 
One of the key questions in this thesis is to ask what constitutes recovery from grief. 
In the literature, reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3 the answers to this question were far 
from conclusive. In Chapter 5, I further analysed how the concept of recovery has 
been taken up and embraced in mental health care yet, in the process of 
mainstreaming, the meaning of recovery has arguably become hollow, used only as a 
rhetoric that seeks to reaffirm dominant political agendas. 
Recovery from grief is particularly contentious in grief and bereavement research 
and theory and, as I have documented so far, straddles an uneasy divide between the 
emphasis on grief as 'natural' and grief as having a 'normal', staged process. As Paletti 
(2008) identified, there appears to be an epistemological divide between researchers 
and practitioners over the use of the concept of recovery, a divide I explore in the 
remainder of this chapter. Counsellors and those who work with bereaved people 
have an investment in helping them to recover, or find relief from their grief. In the 
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data from bereavement counsellors and support workers the term recovery was 
embraced, yet more often different terms were preferred such as "integration" or 
more subtle explanations that grasped at ideas of "movement" and the client 
'inhabiting' new identities. Grief was less well suited to the discourse of recovery 
than, for example, mental disorders, as what has been lost cannot be recovered. In 
bereavement counselling there is no resolution of the initial problem, as Wendy 
(BCl) explained: 
Well I do say to our counsellors that bereavement counselling is just about 
the only counselling where there is no resolution of the initial problem. If you 
come to a counsellor with a phobia you can just get over the phobia, or come 
to the counsellor with some childhood issue and work through it, but actually 
you can never bring back the person who died and so actually what the 
counselling is about is coming to terms with the fact you can't mend it, there's 
no mending this issue. 
It is around this final problem that bereavement counselling and care is positioned as 
providing different but never quite complete solutions to grief. Formal measures are 
used in practice that aimed to capture a client's recovery; these include the CORE 
assessment forms. Though not designed for grief, these are used to measure a client's 
general mental state before and after a series of bereavement counselling sessions. 
Linda, who managed the new client assessments at Caris, described how the CORE-IO 
and CORE-OM forms helped show the "effectiveness" of the service but also by 
comparing the forms before and after the counselling intervention allowed the client 
to "see their own progress almost in black and white". Grief models were also used in 
counselling sessions to enable clients to see their progress. Susan drew out the 'dual 
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process' and 'growing around grief models with clients which she claimed helped 
them see how well they were coping and how they were integrating back into the 
"normal world": 
So it's your new life that has emerged and that's the nice balance, you've got a 
nice big new life with your interactions and new relationships, friendships, 
whatever. It's never the same again ( ... ) when you restore back into recovery, 
whatever you like to call it. It's a new life; it's a different life, you don't go back 
to the same old life. But the lovely idea being that the grief where this person 
that you have lost is integrated within your new life. (Susan, BSW1) 
Linda, who used the 'griefwheel'17 with her own clients, explained why recovery was 
depicted as the higher point to represent hope and what has been 'gained' from the 
loss. In the 'grief wheel' recovery was depicted as an upward movement that could be 
achieved as long as one avoided 'deterioration' and stayed on course. In the 'grief 
wheel', recovery was defined as 'accepting the loss and having an increased interest 
in socialisation, new lifestyle and behaviour patterns and having a greater sense of 
meaning and purpose'. 
17 There are a number of variations on the 'grief wheel'. Figure 2 displays the version used by 
the counsellors at Caris. 
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Figure 2 The grief wheel 
LOSS 
The grief wheel, and its companion models and measures, sought to provide a road 
map for both client and counsellor as they navigated grief and negotiated recovery. 
Behind the tick boxes however, grief often did not follow a straightforward journey. 
The Cruse Early Intervention Project also used the CORE-10 to measure progress in 
their clients. The statistics for 2013-14 displaying a 38 per cent improvement over 
the six-session treatment were proudly shown to me on my visit to the EIP office. The 
use of a further tool, the 'bereavement compass', presented a 33 per cent 
improvement with 90 per cent of those who used the service reporting feeling 'better' 
or 'much better'. Speaking with one of the volunteers about the telephone counselling 
service however portrayed a more ambiguous story of success. The service provided 
a limit of six sessions of telephone counselling. I asked the volunteer, Jane, whether 
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she thought six sessions was enough time to see any improvement. Jane hesitated 
before telling me that in some people she did see some changes, but with others there 
was no change at all. Jane further suggested it could make things worse. Six sessions 
wasn't enough time to "bring up" all the emotions and then work through them 
effectively. Clients could be left with more 'unresolved problems' than they started off 
with. 
Data from bereavement counsellors and support workers did not provide a unified 
vision of what recovery looked like. Participants described the processing of finishing 
with a client as a "long process" that involved "constant reviewing". Caris counsellor 
Claire described it as "very sort of drip, drip, drip" and "not anything like a clear 
road". Many counsellors and support workers described a mutual intuitive sense of 
knowing when the "work is done" and "it's time to say goodbye" by a change in the 
"feel" of the counsellor-client relationship. 
There were, however, markers that practitioners observed and looked for to know 
when the "work was done". These involved recognising that the client was taking an 
interest in their own life again and had started talking more about her or himself than 
the person they had lost. It could also be evidenced by practical things such as 
thinking about going back to work, taking up hobbies, doing new things, and meeting 
people. These new activities were often described as ways of internalising the lost 
person into the client's new life, as Daniela (BC3) explained: 
So people look for ways to keep the deceased in their life but in a way, which 
allows them to live. So you might find the some people take up hobbies which 
remind them of the lost person which then gets them into a place where 
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they're meeting people and doing new things but they are also internalising 
the person that they've lost through this new activity, because maybe it's rock 
climbing or singing or salsa dancing and the person that they've lost was into 
that 
What was being described was thus a shift in the client's identity that allowed them to 
have or rediscover choices via a "loosening" of the grip of grief. Counsellors and 
support workers observed how a client's identity could transform in the counselling 
encounter to inhabit a different sense of self. 
My participants often drew on particular cases to elucidate their ideas, avoiding 
generalisations where possible, and emphasising the individual context Further, they 
appreciated that ways to recovery were individual and idiosyncratic and there was 
not a 'normal' way. In the person-centred approach the client was the only expert on 
what was appropriate grieving behaviour for them, as Wendy (BC1) explained: 
If a client is going to the grave every day and happy to do that and finding it 
supportive and not intrusive, then good for you and who cares if you do that 
for the rest of your life if that's good for you. But you might get another client 
who feels that going every fortnight is too much and is getting in the way and 
they can't stop themselves and they feel like its unhelpful and so, who can 
decide what's normal and not normal, only the client can. 
As argued above, the components of normalisation and safety were key in tailoring an 
individual specific recovery. At the same time there was acknowledgment that 
societal norms had levels of restriction on expressions of grief and recovery, and 
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permitted certain behaviours over others. Recognising the normative requirements 
on emotional expression, Daniela described the process of recovery as "a really 
difficult dance to do" one which "nobody knows what the steps are, nobody knows 
what the bloody music is". For her, and the other counsellors, the counselling setting 
was an opportunity to experiment with revealing thoughts and feelings not permitted 
elsewhere. 
My data show some agreement over recovery as being a sense of "moving forward". 
Movement and stuckness were key terms used by all participants, implying the 
natural process of grief. Recovery-orientated activities, such as letting go of the 
deceased person, were largely viewed as a conscious decision, a choice that was 
fostered by the building of "ego strength" experienced through the counselling 
process. On occasion Freudian terms were employed to identify this movement as a 
"reinvestment in energy" from mourning the person who had died back to the client's 
self (or ego), as Linda (Be2) explained: 
( ... ) what we're hoping at the end of counselling they'll be more forward-
thinking. Because the process of grief means when somebody works their way 
through it then they're able to reinvest all that energy that they spend in 
grieving and need to, but then they start to withdraw that energy from that 
grief and for the mourning of that person and they start to reinvest that 
energy in themselves. 
This enabled clients to become "forward-thinking" and think about the future, moving 
away from the past and into something new. The future was depicted in contrast to 
the "nothingness" of grief, but there was not always a clear vision of what lay beyond. 
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For Claire (8C5) it was just "a different place" beyond the "period of nothingness". 
However, in the Grief Recovery Method that sets out a clear path to recovery through 
their method of 'completion' there is no scope for ambiguity. Completion is gained 
through the writing of a letter that has a very specific format, as presented below: 
Dear .... I have been reviewing our relationship and found some things that I 
want to say ... 
I apologise for ... 
I forgive you for ... 
I want you to know (significant emotional statement) 
The letter was written to the person with whom clients wanted to get 'complete', to 
rid any 'unresolved communications' they might have. The letter had to be ended 
properly by writing 'goodbye' to complete the communication. Not saying goodbye 
risked leaving someone incomplete. The letter then had to be read in front of another 
person in order to become complete. At the workshop when some of the group 
members questioned why the completion letter had to be heard by another living 
person we were told: "I don't know, it just works". In our interview, Ellen further 
explained that they had found through testing that reading the letter to the air or a 
mirror or a grave didn't work. During my attendance at the workshop, I struggled to 
identify in the explanation of completion what precisely was special about the 
method. I wrote in my fieldwork diary how completion was positioned like a 'magic 
wand': 
Completion was described in such a way it felt like a magic wand. And the 
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method was so all encompassing - it heals every type of loss! It was as though 
it could do anything. It was the only answer. Ellen was evangelical about its 
virtues. (Fieldwork diary, September 2014) 
When I asked Ellen whether they might be other ways to get complete, she permitted 
that maybe there were, but then stated she might have thought the same before she 
knew what completion meant In the GRM then recovery can only be achieved 
through a specific activity without which people are incomplete. Yet even completion 
does not provide the permanent recovery it promises. Completion letters could be 
written a number of times to the same person. Ellen described how she needed to get 
complete again with her father, revealed when she started to cry at the workshop. 
"There's some more stuff I've got to get complete with, that's why I started crying". I 
asked Ellen in our second interview whether completion was then a temporary thing. 
"Inevitably it almost is", replied Ellen, "But you can be as complete as possible". The 
purpose of 'getting complete' was to communicate all the 'unsaid' things you needed 
to say. Yet even for Ellen, new thoughts and feelings emerged that needed 
communicating, and so completion became an ongoing process. The act of completion 
was emphasised as crucial but it was a misleading term to describe a process that did 
not appear to have an end point 
Thus, recovery emerged through the frameworks and models and literature and 
methods as a contested site with boundaries never quite defined. Recovery in one's 
life becomes an ongoing project only glimpsed at for a period in the counselling 
encounter. The GRM's promise of completion is flawed as Ellen acknowledged that 
completion can only last temporarily. Recovery and completion are forms of work 
carried out in the promise of self-integration and eradication of 'incomplete 
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communications.' However it is possible to wonder, as I did at the end of the Grief 
Recovery workshop, what might be so wrong about being incomplete. Yet 
'incompletion' is not a desirable option when at the heart of the theory is the belief in 
an autonomous self-contained subject with conscious control over choices. 
Incompletion is a threat to the continuity of this sense of stable personhood and one 
that risks disintegration. 
6.4.2 Resisting recovery 
This same understanding of the subject is at play in the judgment of those who fail to 
recover, formed in the shadow of human potential by which all come to be measured. 
Largely, the bereavement counsellors and support workers interpreted failing to 
recover as a form of resistance to accepting the reality of the bereavement, or as a 
resistance to the method. Resistance could be identified by practitioners in a number 
of external displays of client behaviour but also through the avoidance of, or 
incorrectly performed, internal emotion work. My data show that resisting recovery 
was explained more commonly through reference to "stuckness" or "getting stuck". 
As discussed above, moving forward and stuckness are the metaphors of choice when 
grief is understood and agreed as a process with a start and finish. Stuckness was 
easier to identify when framed by the assumption of time-limited grieving and the 
expectations that accompany the 'normal process' of grief. As Daniela (8C3) explained 
in response to my question: how do you know when someone is stuck? 
When its two and a half years later and they still cry at the mention of 
someone's, the person's name. When it's a year and a half later and they still 
have got all their clothes, when they can't say that the person is dead, when 
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they still talk as if the person is alive. 
My data show that stuckness was signalled by a lack of movement or even a 
movement backwards. Stuckness was becoming "fixated", "immersed" and 
"overwhelmed" by negative and unhelpful thoughts. Stuckness showed itself in a 
variety of different behaviours, some of which as Cruse support worker Susan 
described were "easy to judge". These could include deterioration in general 
appearance and hygiene, disrupted eating and sleeping patterns, and substance 
abuse. Susan also used worksheets to help her identify when clients were not 
functioning at a reasonable level: deviant behaviours were marked by a shift from 
green to amber to "red alert". Other interpretations were less clear-cut but still 
common themes emerged in the practitioners' understanding of stuckness. For Susan 
(BSW1) some types of bereavement could "predispose" people to having 
complications in their grieving: 
There's certain types of death that pretty much, they predispose someone to 
the likelihood of it's not going to be easy. If it's a murder or an accident, road 
traffic accident something sudden, something traumatic. 
The EIP, described in Section 6.3.3, also highlighted pointers that could put people at 
risk of developing complicated grief, including being bereaved by a sudden death. 
Regardless of the type of bereavement, in general my data revealed that 
unwillingness was the popular explanation for why people got stuck and failed to 
progress in their grief. In this unwillingness people actively "bury feelings" and fail to 
"open up". There is an inability to accept the death and they "don't seem to be willing" 
to go back to work, or return to the "normal world" outside the "grief bubble". This 
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'hermit group of mourners' (Jordan & Neimeyer, 2003) also remains resistant to the 
counselling method, a resistance that counsellors and support workers interpreted 
from the cancelling of or turning up late to sessions, or in how clients might save 
talking about "real" feelings to the end of a session. Some participants would speak of 
the unconscious nature of this resistance that drives particular behaviours such as 
forgetting to turn up for a session. According to Wendy the client was unconsciously 
finding ways to keep away from the painful reality of loss. Wendy (BCl) described 
how behaviours could be read to understand the unconscious: 
People who turn up for their appointments an hour early, even though they've 
been coming for a year at 11 they turn up at 10. Why do they do that? Because 
their unconscious was saying I really need to get there. Or people who forget 
their appointment even though they've been coming for a year at the same 
time, because their unconscious is saying we're not doing that this week. 
Quite often you have to look at behaviour and that gives some idea of what's 
going on unconsciously. 
In other interpretations stuckness and resistance were simply being "unprepared to 
change". In the GRM this was due to a rigid belief system and old ideas that 
encouraged people to "push down" their grief. For Ellen stuckness could only be 
understood as the inability to "carry out the steps" for, as she declared, the GRM "can 
help almost anybody". In this thinking, the failure to recover will always be due to a 
lack of adherence to the method, and thus a failure of individual choice, as stated 
clearly by GRM Director Ellen: 
Because I haven't seen the method fail. I have seen people fail the method. 
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While it was not so black and white for the other participants the reality of people 
getting stuck in grief was certainly acknowledged. This was partly attributed by some 
of the practitioners to the fact that a certain level of stuckness was what made a client 
eligible for counselling initially. For the most part stuckness was something that could 
be moved out of provided the client made the right choice and showed willingness for 
the method. However, there were admissions that some people could only be "taken 
so far" or, as mentioned above, some people were considered "predisposed" to 
complications. People could be separated into three categories of response according 
to Ellen: 
So some people will never recover. Some people will bury it deep and act 
recovered. And it only needs the next knock and it can smash it all to pieces. 
And some people fully recover, and I would say I'm about as recovered as it's 
possible to get. 
Arguably in the GRM everyone was stuck if they hadn't encountered or succeeded 
with the method. This point of view is a several-layered judgment that crucially 
presumes recovery, and its failure, are assessable by the monitoring of behaviours. 
For recovery can also be an 'act' or 'performance' put on when grieving feelings had 
not been adequately worked through. Resistance to the method and resistance to 
personal change, read from the point of view of the expert becomes the same thing 
when the method proposed is considered as the only reasonable means to gaining 
self-fulfilment. Resistance then is not only a disagreement with counselling or the 
Grief Recovery Handbook but a resistance to all the things that recovery, completion, 
and integration encompass. Failing to recover in these terms is thus a rejection of 




In this chapter I have highlighted some of the components of bereavement support, 
largely in the format of bereavement counselling, and how such support seeks to aid 
recovery from grief. From my data, I have revealed the nuances, conflicts and 
ambiguities in bereavement counselling, and how the therapeutic response is not 
merely disciplinary but a productive encounter. As elucidated in the work of Arnason 
(1998; 2001; 2007), bereavement counselling is a productive rather than repressive 
setting, where identities are crafted as a co-production. I have drawn attention to the 
context of bereavement support in the UK and the at times inconsistent training in 
and delivery of bereavement care. As Hockey and Small (2001) have discussed, within 
bereavement counselling there appears a proliferation of specialisms but a 
marginalisation from the mainstream. This might be due to the nature of 
bereavement that does not favour brief time-limited therapies such as cognitive 
behavioural therapy more commonly used in mental health care services, to manage 
conditions such as depression. Bereavement counselling and its person-centred focus 
remains little changed and for the most part unaware of the developments in the grief 
and bereavement research literature. This is, perhaps, a result of the emphasis on 
grief as 'normal' and 'natural' and a subsequent shying away from any forms of 
'medicalising' grief. Yet it also indicative of the gap between bereavement care 
practice and the implementation of empirical evidence. 
It is unanimously agreed, however, that grief requires work and is helped by expert 
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intervention: an unsurprising view for those that are invested in the field of 
bereavement support This is reflected in the quantity of bereavement counsellors 
and support workers that explain the value of their role in reference to their own loss 
experience. It could be said that becoming a counsellor is part of the recovery of the 
counsellor. The value of counselling work, and talking through emotions or following 
the steps in the Grief Recovery Handbook are without question considered the most 
effective means to relieving the pain and suffering of grief. In this framing recovery 
and non-recovery emerge as an unwillingness or inability to do the work. Describing 
grief as 'work' is not an accidental metaphor, for the process involves a meticulous 
labour both within the psyche and in the social relational life ofthe person. 
I argue grief work is a technology of the self that is gladly undertaken by the client, for 
the intervention has been rationalised in terms of individual freedom and happiness. 
In Chapter 5, I discussed the ways in which contemporary government had become 
invested in individual happiness and wellbeing, where recovery from unhappiness 
had political and economic benefits. Bereavement care too is increasingly framed as 
reducing the 'burden' of bereavement and preventing the 'risks' of complicated 
grieving. In the counselling setting the move towards recovery becomes an ethical 
rather than political goal phrased in notions of potential and the freeing and 
fulfilment of the self through making the right choices. In this way, as Rose (1997) 
argued, psychological expertise becomes a 'relay' between government and individual 
private lives, where public values are bound to private authorities. 
Here I argue that counselling becomes an arena for the crafting of the self with the 
intention to bring one's identity more in line with one's true nature. Evolving into 
one's true nature my data showed, clearly had its limits and what constituted self-
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fulfilment and the 'good life' were demarcated by the behaviours and activities that 
were read as problematic and getting stuck. What constituted recovery was not 
always made clear and some practitioners insisted that they did not have an agenda 
or goal in mind when dealing with a client. However, the investment in the notions of 
individual choice, autonomy, self-awareness and forming a coherent identity are 
clearly tied to the achievement of recovery or integration. These features were 
considered an unquestionable good. Governing individuals in terms of their freedom, 
however, presents an ethical obligation to the client, which makes the stakes of 
refusal all the greater. Refusing to recover in such a way may condemn someone to 
never recovering or to a performance of recovery that sooner or later will falter and 
for grief to come back to bite. It also ignores the way in which counselling is 
implicated in the construction of the social realities to which it seeks to adjust its 
clients (Arnason, 2007). 
Resisting recovery and failing to recover, is framed not only as a failure of moral will 
but also a resistance of one's true potential. And yet the promise of recovery as 
revealed in the GRM's notion of completion is inevitably a temporary one that 
requires continual work to maintain. Recovery is thus the constant horizon of 
potential, both motivator and cruel promise, but never quite reached. In this way, the 
methods and models developed to guarantee recovery are always in demand when 
the journey to recovery rarely meets its summit and work of the griever seldom 
ceases. 
In the next chapter I enter the world of the client and the forms of 'grief work' the 
bereaved person might undertake to manage their grief; forms of grief work that 
complement and diverge from the guidelines maintained by those who seek to help 
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the bereaved person navigate their way through the liminal space of grief. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Navigating the liminal space of grief: Making the journey 
7.1 Introduction to the chapter 
In this chapter I present the accounts of those negotiating the liminal space of grief by 
exploring three themes of the data: how the participants made sense of their 
experiences, how grief is performed in everyday spaces, and the types of identities 
participants came to inhabit. I view these three themes as interwoven, for instance, 
how participants make sense of their grief has implications for the type of identity 
they might come to inhabit. Yet meanings and identities are entwined with the 
materiality of everyday life where they are acted out, performed and embodied. 
First, I address how bereaved participants in this study made sense of the experience 
of grief. I begin by exploring how participants retold the story of the death of their 
partner or family member and what explanations - both rational and symbolic - they 
drew on to make sense of their experiences. In their accounts participants included 
descriptions of events and activities and also emotions and metaphors. Telling stories 
and giving voice to one's pain is a commonly accepted tool to provide liberation from 
suffering and oppression (Charmaz, 1999; Charon, 2001; Smith & Sparkes, 2008). Yet, 
as I argue, not all stories get to be heard and the act of storytelling reduces the forms 
of expression into 'standard' narratives, excluding those unable to articulate their 
stories. In the second section, I highlight how participants made sense of grief in their 
everyday lives through practical activities that enabled them to negotiate the 
changing material space around them. 'Grief work' in this sense was not necessarily 
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psychological and intellectual work but about managing material spaces and objects 
and structuring a daily routine through actions. 
Third, I explore the identities that participants came to inhabit. Participants either 
claimed an identity in their interview accounts or described how they felt others 
attributed a particular identity to them. These identities were new and changed but 
also old identities were maintained by keeping ties to the deceased person, and I 
illustrate some of the ways in which participants continued bonds. Following the 
frameworks of recovery described in Chapter 6, I consider how some forms of 
relating to the deceased person are considered part of recovery yet others are 
considered as resistant to it. I take a closer look at the 'resistant' identities that 
emerged and ask how resistance can be read when the narrator does not identify 
with the notions of recovery or non-recovery. 
7.2 Making sense of grief 
7.2.1 Rational and symbolic explanations 
Many of the participants in their interview accounts addressed three key areas: the 
process of a partner or family member dying, the event of the death, and the 
subsequent response to the death and feelings of grief. Following the setting up of the 
scene of a death participants continued to describe events that happened after the 
death and which were interspersed with their own feelings and often biographical 
information about themselves, their partner or family member that died and even 
other family members and friends. In line with Arnason's (2000) discovery, I argue 
the participants were constructing not so much a 'durable biography' of the deceased 
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person, argued by Walter (1996), but a story of themselves and their relationship 
with their deceased partner or family member. I found that participants would 
organise their accounts with a mixture of rational and symbolic explanations. On the 
one hand there was a need to confirm the truth of what happened when the person 
died, and yet on the other hand participants referred to signs and metaphors to help 
them make sense of the death and their feelings of grief. 
Most participants narrated their experiences using this structure with little 
prompting from me. I would begin the interview with a question that referred to a 
detail the participants would share with me prior to the interview, such as, "You 
mentioned your husband died four years ago?". This lead in the majority of cases to a 
description of the death; for example, Laura relayed to me how her husband died in 
this way: 
He needed his medication so the two paramedics took him into the 
ambulance ( ... ) when I came down the ambulance was closed up and rocking 
and it was at that point he'd collapsed and he had, it turned out, a ruptured 
aorta ( ... ) Very traumatic. Massive shock. Went into shock for I would say six 
months. I functioned, I went, I was back at work, because we buried him, well 
cremated him on 6th January and he died on 22nd December. 
The participants followed a largely chronological order starting with the story of the 
death and for some, the illness that may have preceded it. Rose, for example, wrote 
me a timeline of her life with her husband, that she emailed to me prior to our 
interview. "A compressed history" she described it, which presented a chronology 
from when they met up to the year of his death. This sense of a need to be thorough in 
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their accounts was common. At the close of the interview, Anne reached for some 
notes she had written beforehand to ensure she had told me all the details. For Anne, 
the death of her husband became a matter for a police investigation, of which she 
spoke at length. The question over the cause of her husband's death propelled Anne 
into a search for the true sequence of events as she explained: 
He fell out of an office window. It was an accident That's what happened. He 
was closing it, and he fell four floors ( ... ) Now in fact what happened was he 
had fallen out of window, at his work, at quarter to seven at night. Now I 
know it was June, but I was busy thinking the high street in (place name 
anonymised). Your head - in the absence of information your head grabs at 
anything it possibly can to make it work, to make sense. 
Following the death of her husband, Anne described the task of reconciling what she 
thought to be true about her husband with the alternative options suggested by the 
police investigation. In this excerpt from Anne's account it is possible to see how 
important it was for Anne to locate the story in time and place, as well to clarify the 
truth of what "in fact" happened. In both Anne and Laura's accounts, there was a 
reliance on - or need for - the 'truth' where the emphaSis was on the maintaining the 
accuracy of the date, time and sequence of events. 
However, participants also readily drew on more symbolic means of making sense of 
death. For example Rose, whose husband died 26 years prior to the interview, 
narrated the account of his death by drawing on signs and symbolic references: 
37, both of us were 37. He was born on a Saturday died on a Saturday. Born 
212 
on third of the month, died on the third of the month. Born at 4.30, died at 
4.30. And I even added to that, he was breech birth and the first thing I saw 
when I was coming down the stairs was his feet ( ... J [W]hen we swapped the 
house and when we moved in, there was this vase oftlowers on the table, now 
I don't know if you know ofthe, there's a superstition do not have lilac in the 
house because they'll be a death in the family, but there was lilac in this 
arrangement and I remember saying oh we shouldn't have, but I adore lilac so 
I left it and we got home and he died, there's a death in the family. It's not 
logical but you can't help but sort of go, it's weird. 
Like Anne and Laura, Rose focussed on the details surrounding the death, which she 
recalled even 26 years later. Yet this emphasis on the factual detail was given a 
symbolic meaning, so that in her narration Rose's husband's death appeared 
somewhat fated. In her description, Rose highlighted details such as the lilac in the 
house and endowed the superstition with meaning, even as she acknowledged, "it's 
not logical". 'Signs' from Rose's husband were present too after his death, and as I 
discuss later, her husband's presence remained very much alive in Rose's life. 
While understanding and knowing the 'truth' of what happened was one part of the 
process of being able to narrate the story of bereavement and grief, it appeared that 
describing the internal experience of grief within a rational framework posed 
difficulties. Participants remarked that they found it hard to describe the feeling of 
loss, saying how "complex", "ethereal" and difficult to "quantify" grief was. 
Participants, therefore, often drew on metaphors to describe their feelings. Grief was 
described as a place of darkness where the "light had gone out", feelings felt "dark" 
and "black" and it was a place that people would move "down" into. Spatial 
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metaphors were present as Laura described widowhood as a "very strange land" with 
"no map". Anne too explained her experience of navigating grief as being lost at sea: 
I needed to try something, to catch at some sort of straw because I did feel 
like a little rubber duck in the most amazing storm at sea, no land, no light, 
just waves and lightning and thunder and no shore. 
While grief was described as a place in which the participants had unwillingly 
entered, the individual bodily effects of grief were described as physical pain. For 
example, the pain of grief was described using physical descriptors such as "spiky" 
and "stabbing" and "raw". Anne detailed in visual terms the experience of grief and 
how she once thought it was just a "metaphor" but discovered the bodily 'affects' of 
grief: 
I always thought that was a metaphor, it's not, it's physical. My whole body 
cavity just screamed in pain and even now, when I'm stressed, my sternum 
feels like all my tendons are pulling off it physically. I just had to this view of 
the inside of my body being this black and splattered cavity where my heart 
and soul had just splattered into a million soggy, pieces. And there's an awful 
lot of, trying to stick pieces back together, and it's still a right old mess. 
The almost violent imagery conjured up by Anne portrayed a vivid picture of the 
embodied experience of grief. In the interview Anne drew on metaphors quite often 
to describe her feelings, acknowledging that she liked to use metaphors. However, I 
suspected that not all participants were as able to convey the embodied experience of 
grief through language, moreover in an interview setting. In Chapter 6, I described the 
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importance of safety the bereavement counsellors and support workers emphasised 
in the counselling setting, where the client was made to feel they were in a 
relationship that could hold the 'unbearable' pain of grief. When participants would 
state things such as: "It's just awful" or "the worst experience of my life" I imagined 
they were referencing this 'unbearable' pain that was hard to quantify and articulate. 
Further, this was a pain the participants described as embodied, evidenced in a 
physical impact on body causing symptoms such as sleeplessness, difficulty eating or 
as Anne described, a pain located around the sternum. 
Therefore, I argue the use of metaphors was one strategy that enabled participants to 
convey the experience of grief; yet there could be a limit to how much meaning could 
be made from the experience of grief. In Chapter 8, I discuss further the limits of 
language (and my chosen method of interviews) in expressing the 'unbearable' 
physical and emotional pain of grief. While the participants would narrate what had 
happened, they also remarked how they had not quite understood what had 
happened. As John remarked over his wife's death: 
Still can't understand why it's all happened, I still don't. I find it difficult to 
accept it, you know, when I'm daydreaming in a way. It's only when I think to 
myself, come out, snap out of it. 
Speaking about the sudden death of her husband Tania told me: 
Yeah it's a bit strange. I sometimes think now did all that actually really 
happen? 
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Listening to the participants' accounts of grief it was as though the rational - or at 
least those explanations that were available - had reached their limit when it came to 
explaining the event of bereavement. Therefore, participants would use rational and 
symbolic explanations interchangeably, as demonstrated by Rose's statement above 
"it's not logical but". For Anne it was the nature of her husband's death for which she 
struggled to find any meaning: 
It just doesn't make sense and, it shouldn't happen. We're in a first world 
country, we can do all sorts of things and yet we can't keep people safe in 
office buildings ( ... ) I never imagined that he wouldn't make it out the front 
door of the office. 
As Anne highlighted, the death of her husband felt nonsensical in a "first world 
country" where she felt accustomed to the idea that she and the people around her 
were relatively safe from immediate threats to life (at least in office buildings). The 
experience of her husband's death thus challenged Anne's whole belief system, her 
sense of ontological security. Anne went on to explain how she had lost her faith as a 
result, unable to 'compute' the death of her husband: 
The thing is through this process, well, I lost all my faith. The point is whether 
you suddenly start seeing signs in everything that drops from the clouds or 
every rainbow, you either go one way or the other. You either talk about 
people looking down from heaven and meeting you again or you say no-one 
could allow that to happen it can't be ( ... ) And there is, even four years later I 
can say to myself what? How on earth? That can't be right, that does not 
compute. 
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Anne's 'assumptive world' (Parkes, 1972) following the death of her husband, had 
been transformed. Anne was then left to search for a new sense of meaning. In doing 
so, Anne referenced the use of signs and heaven that she acknowledged other people 
might use to make sense of death, but found them unsatisfactory. Yet Anne still relied 
on some wider meaning to the universe even as she described she no longer believed 
in the idea of God: 
( ... ) and it was why me? That's not supposed to happen. I've always been as 
nice as I possibly could be, kind. I was dealing with all this anger with God 
until I realised he wasn't there ( ... ) 
Instead Anne found some meaning in the idea of ' multi verses', which enabled her to 
believe the energy and soul of her husband was not destroyed but potentially existing 
in another dimension. 
In this section I have shown how participants strove to narrate a chronological and 
comprehensive story of the death and the character of their partner or family 
member, including fine details of dates and events. However, this need to convey the 
truth of what happened was mixed with references to signs and symbols that 
participants also used to make sense of death and grief. While most of the 
participants competently narrated their stories to me by drawing on narrative 
features such as plot, characters, and metaphor, finding meaning in their experiences 
was a different activity to telling a story about it. 
Despite the individuality of grief, it was interesting to see how the narration of the 
experience of grief was situated in relatively limited 'domains'. Rosenblatt (2000) in 
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his study of parents' narratives of grief found that what the parents talked about fell 
within a limited number of domains including the moment of death and events 
following the death and finding meaning and managing feelings. Participants did find 
various meanings some of which I have described above, for example, Rose's signs 
and superstitions and Anne finding comfort in science and multiverses. However, in 
the next section I want to draw further attention to this struggle to piece together a 
satisfactory story through the account of John, to consider the effects of being unable 
to find the right story. 
7.2.2 Failing to make sense of grief 
What struck me about John's account was his need to find the coherence in what 
happened and the struggle he encountered in living in the face of incoherence. Rather 
than viewing this necessarily as a biological need to narrate, I suggest the focus on 
certain standard narrative forms in western cultures only compounds the events that 
fall outside of this pattern, fostering a need to assimilate them. Here I present John's 
search for coherence and his need to find a satisfactory line of reasoning for his wife's 
death. John's wife died after a short period of illness of terminal cancer. Due to the 
speed of events, John found it was six months after her death, at the point of 
interview, that he was going over the details of the death and questioning things: 
I'm finding it harder to accept that than I did straightaway. But it was very 
quick, it was literally from October, 30th October to the 5th March so it was, 
barely four months ( ... ) and I just feel that it's hard that someone who's 
looked after herself so well, she didn't smoke, hardly drank, kept herself fit, 
ate the right things and wallop done completely, completely wiped out in four 
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months. 
John highlighted details about his wife's lifestyle such as being fit, eating well and 
being a non-smoker that did not fit with the broader narrative of dying of cancer. John 
reflected on the things his wife could have done differently saying he felt "let down" 
that, as a practice nurse, she failed to look after herself like her patients. In retrospect, 
John could see the signs of his wife's stomach pain and how they "missed" them. He 
described how now he had the urge to go over the details of his wife's death to solve 
the puzzle of why she died: 
I keep on looking at it from the point of view that we should've been able to 
see it coming you know. There should have been some indication that, what 
did we miss, what did I miss, what did my wife miss ( ... ) And I kept everything 
at home, I've kept all the paperwork and we tried to make notes about what 
people were telling us. ( ... ) I did think about trying to write it all down and try 
to do some sort of putting it all in chronological order and try to make some 
sense of it all, but I don't suppose. At other times I think to myself well would 
that do me any good in a way, would it just all bring it to, bring it up again and 
then I'd be left with, what would I do with it then you know. So it's a bit of a 
conundrum really. 
John appeared to oscillate between the two plans of action: to sit down and make 
sense of it or to accept he could not do anything about it. It was clear though, 
evidenced by his wrestling over this conundrum that living with uncertainty was not 
a comfortable place to be. I asked John how it felt to potentially live with and accept 
things might not be resolved, he replied: 
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Well, well I'd rather be clear in my mind that where things stood, well you 
know what the problem was, how it came to be, all those issues but I just 
think they're all, well a lot of them are beyond, beyond resolving in effect. You 
can't do that now. So I'm just, it's something that I'm pretty certain that I'm 
just going to have to live with really. Have to sort of say well that's it I just 
can't take that any further and sort of try and get on with life. 
Without an acceptable story of what happened John found he was lacking a resolution 
that had forced him into what I have called a (liminal) space where it was not clear 
where "things stood". In this liminal space, as John ruminated on his recent past, he 
was unable to go forward and "get on with life". He explained how without this 
resolution about what had happened he could not make sense of the present or the 
future: 
It's when you start looking back isn't when you, you can put some sort of 
picture to it all and I think that's probably one of the problems at that 
moment is that I can't do that Because my life has changed so much with my 
wife passing away that until I've got a little bit of history that I can look back 
on and sort of judge where I am at that, whatever, time. Whereas at the 
moment I can't do that. 
I argue that the absence of a "little bit of history" meant John could not locate himself 
in the present and make sense of his life without his wife. Living with unanswered 
questions John was left with a tenuous attachment to the present where, on the one 
hand he recognised he had to just accept and live with it and yet, on the other, the 
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desire to know and make sense remained strong. This sense of ambivalence however 
was not easy to overcome. John acknowledged the only resolution was then to settle 
for the absence of an answer: 
And I suppose I'll have to get over that because there's no way round it, I 
can't, I don't, it'll never be solved that question, I'm never going to resolve it, 
it's just a feeling I've got and I'm going to have to live with it. Can't, I can't, no-
one's going to say, no-one's going to come up with an answer to that problem, 
I'm just going to have to accept that it's happened and just get on with it 
really. Hard. Very hard. 
It seemed that not having a coherent story placed John outside linear time where he 
could not rely on a past and a history that made sense from which to locate himself in 
the present. Instead, John was in a cyclical mode of time, taking each day as it came. 
This was the only way to manage living on where the past was unclear and the future 
was uncertain. Without a story, settling for uncertainty and liminality was the only 
option. Crafting a clear story about the death was one mode of bringing coherence 
and understanding to an incomprehensible event. However, the focus on narratives 
hides the struggle to find a story as described through the account of John, and also 
disadvantages those that lack the language, ability or desire to construct a narrative 
and allow it to be heard. Living outside of this linear narrative structure meant the 
need to build familiar structures in daily life through routine and physical activities 
became increasingly important, as I describe next. 
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7.3 Affective practices and recovery work 
Here, I discuss the practical forms of activity participants described following the 
death of their partner or family member. Participants described a changed world 
where the time and space they inhabited had transformed. Participants described 
feeling as if they were in a world where everything was "black" without a map or 
guide to help them through. I argue that, in such a liminal space the boundaries 
between appropriate and inappropriate behaviours dissolved: Laura, for example, 
described this as "widow brain" that felt "like having cheese in your head": activities 
that were once habitual to her, such as reading, she no longer had the ability to do 
since her husband died. In such a state, while Laura found she lost the ability to do 
certain things, it also provided the opportunity to achieve feats that previously she 
would never have considered. Laura impulsively bought a piano four months after 
her husband died despite being tone deaf. Anne, too, described her brain as "turned to 
Swiss cheese" where "time stops being chronological". 
This fostered a need to "do something" from undertaking more conventional forms of 
'grief work' such as professional counselling to finding new purpose in everyday and 
mundane activities. Participants described the interaction with space and objects, as 
well as the ritualisation of the everyday, as strategies that enabled them to carryon 
living. In this liminal space, being busy in the present helped to locate a self where the 
past was difficult to narrate and the future had been lost. Planning a daily routine 
became necessary to give some meaning to an existence lacking in sense, a meaning 
that was upheld by a person that had now gone. 
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7.3.1 Rituals 
Following on from my discussion in Chapter 3, I argue my data show the 'affective 
practices' employed could be 'formal' rituals or routine everyday activities that took 
on a new purpose in grief. Shortly following the death, participants described a flurry 
of activity. Saadhia described the preparations she had to make following her 
mother's death: 
I was like in a daze and then I thought right I need to get her, pick up her 
shroud, I've gotta get this, I've got to get the house sorted because there'll be 
lots of people coming over to pray. I need to rearrange the furniture, I need to 
make sure there's lots of food, because my Mum would never let anyone leave 
until they've eaten when they've come to our house. I wanted to do all those 
things right because that's what my Mum would have wanted. So I fell into 
this whole sort of roboty thing ( ... ) and it was like I was some kind of robot. 
Like Mum's coming home. 
This feeling of being on "autopilot" was described by many of the participants, where 
physically doing things was emphasised as a way to ward off or manage 
overwhelming feelings. This sense of autopilot was described by Saadhia as a "need" -
and almost as an obligation - to carry on and function, both to ensure she did as her 
Mum would have wanted but also to help others around her and as a form of self-
protection. Saadhia also had more formal rituals to fulfil following Islamic tradition: 
( ... ) we were going to the mosque and she's there ready to have her wash and 
I couldn't wash her because you're not allowed if a woman's menstruating, 
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you're not allowed to touch the deceased. So I gave all my kisses and hugs and 
everything before everyone else took over, and I just watched from a distance. 
( ... ) I had to close her eyes and cover her head, take all her jewellery off and 
straighten her hands and legs. It was stuff I'd read, Islamically, what we're 
supposed to do when someone passes away. So whatever I studied I tried to 
do it practically because I wanted everything to be perfect for my Mum. 
Islamic tradition gave Saadhia clear rules to follow, with practical guidelines in her 
"robot" -like state. However, Saadhia's account was the only one among my data that 
included specific religious rituals surrounding the disposal of the body. These rituals 
aided in the management of the disposal of the body, which, to an extent, enabled 
Saadhia to mark her mother's death, yet she found when dealing with grief she was 
left with no rituals to follow. 
Therefore, my data show a distinction in the participants' accounts between rituals 
concerning the management of the disposal of the body, which were already 
prescribed by the cultural tradition, and the management of grief, which had a less 
clear route to follow. Other participants mentioned arranging and attending funeral 
ceremonies but focused far more on the management of their emotions looking for 
direction from contemporary psychology and therapy in the form of bereavement 
counselling and support groups. Both Tania and Laura described positive experiences 
with Cruse and three of the participants I interviewed had been involved with 
Widowed and Young (WAY), a peer support group for women and men whose 
partner died before age the age of 50. WAY arranged trips for their members as well 
as having a popular online presence. Laura, Tania and Anne described how WAY and 
224 
the forum Merry Widows18 had provided them with an unconditional support from 
people who just "get it". The women described the "immense relief' this provided 
where "no explanation needed". For each of the women WAY and Merry Widows 
helped normalise their grief and also provided some support where they felt there 
was none to be found. Peer support and becoming a member of a group was a useful 
strategy for some but for John attending a grief support group only highlighted the 
individual nature of grief rather than its commonality. For John the emphasis on grief 
as an individual experience meant that although it normalised the feelings of grief to 
an extent, to know other people were going through the "same grief', it also separated 
him from others and forced him to realise there was not going to be a "quick solution 
to it all". 
My data show that, in the absence of traditional rituals, there was an assumption that 
certain activities would be helpful for grief, though these could expand beyond the 
conventional. Tania provided a list of the activities she had undertaken, from 
counselling and the Merry Widows forum to books and reiki in her desire to "get 
fixed": 
I needed to get it fixed, I needed to I needed to be okay. ( ... ) I did all the 
reading, I read millions of bereavement books, the Elizabeth Kubler, didn't get 
on with her at all, the seven steps to grieving I was just like that's not for me 
at all ( ... ) I saw a medium twice, which was a bit bizarre, because I'm not 
really the type of person to see a medium or a spiritual person at all, never 
believed in any of that, but after six months I felt the need to go ( .... ) I don't 
think there's anything I haven't tried. Yeah I tried the crystals, yeah I still 
18 The Merry Widows website: http://www.merrywjdow,me.uk/ (Accessed 6 June 2016) 
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sleep with crystals beside my bed I don't know if it helps at all, reiki which 
didn't really do anything, pretty much spent a fortune on everything going 
( ... ) I think I was trying to get it all done at once ( ... ) I was a bit of a woman 
possessed really. I'd got a whole bookcase of grief books. 
For Tania the need to be doing was strong, whether or not it helped or she "believed 
in any of that". As she described, she was "a women possessed", getting "it all done at 
once". By maintaining the belief that grief was something that could be eradicated by 
specific activities, Tania adopted an approach of trying everything available in order 
to get "fixed" quicker. Tania's search for something that would enable her to "get 
fixed" could be understood as an example of the obligation to recover, where Tania 
reached for some of the available tools society was providing her: grief books, 
mediums and crystals. The pressure to recover might be one impetus to undertake 
various activities. But as Anne described, grief produced a great amount of energy, 
which propelled her to get things done: 
I call it terrible energy, because it is terrible, you cannot sit still, you've got to 
drive and do things all the time, because as soon as you stop, it just, it's like 
out running a tidal wave. And I have to run and run and run. 
As Anne described it, the energy she experienced, similar to Tania's sense of feeling 
"possessed" to get fixed, was not quite in her control. It was the stopping or sitting 
still that both were striving to avoid, and yet they failed to describe exactly what it 
was they were seeking to run away from. However, how energy was used and 
consumed was interpreted differently. As described in Chapter 6, the Director of Grief 
Recovery UK called activities that bereaved people tend to engage in as 'short-term 
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energy relieving behaviours'. For example, eating too much or shopping or gambling 
were time fillers and a "distraction of energy" that "relieve the energy, but they don't 
heal you". This was a trope common in the understanding of grief work, where grief 
had to be dealt with successfully via certain methods else it would come back to "bite" 
years later. Distractions and relieving energies were only a way to help keep the tidal 
wave at bay for a little longer, a wave that would, according to dominant 
understandings of grief, overwhelm you at some point. However, I argue that these 
activities, whether formal or informal rituals, were central to the management of grief 
and the management of self-identity. In the next section, I focus on activities that 
would be considered 'distractions' or 'energy relieving behaviours' in the GRM, and 
how the participants described the important role they had in helping them through 
the liminal space of grief. 
7.3.2 Distractions 
As Hockey et al. (2005) identified, the practical aspects of everyday living such as 
shopping, socializing and cooking were intimately bound up with the 'emotional 
transition of bereavement' (p. 136). Thus, household and intimate work took on 
particular importance in those accounts of participants, particularly John and Paul, 
who were in retirement. The shift in daily routine was also amplified for those who 
had been long-term carers for their partners or parent before they had died. Paul and 
Saadhia had both left their employment to take over caring responsibilities. They 
both described how their daily routine was intimately entwined with another person. 
The absence of that person highlighted how much space had been occupied by the 
work of caring and how the days were timetabled with activities, as Paul described: 
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[Y]ou get a closer bond so it was even more, probably even more painful 
because it, the routine you had, getting up and doing things and looking after 
them and making sure this and doing some washing every day and washing 
her and cleaning up and making sure she's okay and using the commode, 
clearing that up multiple times a day and doing this and doing that you know 
it's (sighs). And then when that's not there ( ... ) 
In a similar way following the death of her mother Saadhia explained: 
And it was, when you get yourself into this routine and timetable, and then 
you hear the voices. I hear her calling me, she used to always say: 'Saadhia, 
Saadhia!' 
For Paul and Saadhia being a carer provided a centre around which their life had 
revolved. The loss of the person they cared for daily made the absence all the more 
acute. For all participants, including those that were not carers, there was a feeling 
that the centre of their life was lost and with it the "incentive" or "motivation" to carry 
on living. Paul described how his dogs created a routine in the absence of an 
incentive, where he felt following the death of his wife he had nothing to do: 
Even now I haven't got an awful lot of incentive, I make myself, I make myself 
get up in the morning have a little bit of a routine, basically because of the 
dogs to be honest ( ... ) so I have to get up and I get up at a certain time and do 
things but apart from that, apart from the fact I go out and do some shopping 
every day or make myself go out, that's really, that's it, I've got nothing. 
Nothing to do. 
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In whatever form, often participants described the necessity of having dependents 
that provided a reason to get up in the morning. Similarly John talked about the need 
to come up with some motivation or find a hobby: 
So I've got to come up with some sort of, things to do in effect, some sort, put 
some sort of motivation into my life you know, whether it's doing some sort of 
charity work or whatever or actually coming up with some sort of hobby that 
I want to do. 
Though he had never "had much of a hobby", finding some activity suddenly had 
taken on a crucial importance in John's life now that his wife was no longer with him. 
For both John and Paul it was the physical act of doing some form of hobby or work 
that they felt they needed in order to face the nothingness of grief. It appeared they 
were attempting to build their own structure by thinking up things to do or getting 
out the house every day. These acted as distractions for them both, which they 
described as "beneficial" to get them away from thinking about themselves or their 
wives: 
( ... ) a diversion, away from being here, get yourself out, go and join a club, go 
and do this and go and do that, go and meet people. (Paul) 
Life's very hectic at times, to be honest with you. And I suppose in effect that's 
been beneficial for me because it's, there's always been something to think of 
apart from me thinking of myself and my wife you know ( ... ) and I think that's 
the main thing for me is if I can keep busy then I can take my mind off my 
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problem. (John) 
Keeping busy through socialising, as well as household activities and family 
responsibilities, was of key importance for John and Paul in that it "diverted" them 
away from "here and myself' (Paul). Paul described how being around people he 
became 'outward' again but, as soon as he came back home, he returned to his "grey 
dark feelings". For John it seemed that managing thoughts and feelings was itself a 
form of labour. John described how he "put off' thoughts and feelings and 
concentrated on other activities such as driving or being with his grandchildren. At 
other times he explained, "It'll hit me and I have to stop what I'm doing and think 
about it". Often, other ordinary needs would interfere with these thoughts such as 
feeling hungry, which would force John to get something to eat which could then 
"change your course of thought". 
However, within this activity, John told me he was doing little for himself that brought 
enjoyment Planning work and things to do was out of the need to have "something in 
the pipeline", which enabled him to "get by". While John was also open to counselling 
interventions, Paul was clear that he needed to deal with grief in his own way. He felt 
counselling could not provide anything he did not already know: the answer for Paul 
was through finding "diversions" from his grief. Laura found, that the activities she 
used to engage in such as reading she was no longer able to, Like John and Paul, the 
loss of her husband also meant she lost the source of motivation in her life. Laura 
described how she would start but not finish anything: 
It's too much effort to finish it, I get bored, and I have no motivation to move 
forward. Because when I get bored with something my husband would go, 
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"Oh we've paid so much money for that and you're just going to leave it there, 
are you really not going to finish it?". He gUilt me and encourage me to move 
forward, but there's no reason to move forward. There's nothing, there's no 
reason to my life. I go to work, I come home, I eat, I do the things I'm 
supposed to do. 
Busying the self with things to do was a strategy to fill the space left by the loss of 
their partners. John reflected spending more time with his grandchildren would 
probably "take her place". Resolution was in the acts of doing, maybe taking up golf or 
getting interested in bowls, John remarked, "I think probably that's how it'll be 
resolved". In these examples, it was as if the experience of grief gave rise to a need to 
be 'doing' where distractions gave a temporary anchor in the liminal impasse of a 
new and meaningless present As Lewis (1961) described in A Grief Observed, grief 
gives life a 'permanently provisional feeling'. I noted this provisional feeling in 
participants' accounts where grief produced a lack of meaning, incentive and 
motivation. In the grief over his wife Lewis wrote there seemed little point in starting 
anything: '( yawn, I fidget, I smoke too much' (1961, p. 30). This was a situation of 
suspended agency, where the practices that the participants undertook were a means 
to counteract the sense that everything had become equivalent in its meaning and 
purpose. This new world brought with it uncertainty and instability which could 
provide new freedoms or destruction. Much like the philosophy of existentialism 
(Camus, 1942; Sartre, 1958) this sense of meaninglessness had the potential to be 
experienced as one of terror and dispiriting futility or of great liberation. 
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7.3.3 Negotiating space and objects 
For the participants, following bereavement was not just a person who was lost but 
also a motivating force in their life, and the routine and structure that had been 
created by living with and being in partnership with another person. In participants' 
accounts, spaces and objects played interesting roles in the management of grief and 
memories of the deceased person. For instance, places such as cemeteries and 
gardens were places that participants would visit and use to mark the 'absent 
presence' of the deceased person (Maddrell, 2013). The influence of the material 
environment on the participants' ongoing relationship with the deceased person was 
evident, and impacted in varying degrees. 
Another significant space, the home, emerged as an important centre for the 
participants' grief. The death of a cohabiting partner or family member either 
fostered a greater (and often ambivalent) attachment to the house and possessions 
or, in the case of Anne and Tania, a need to move out into a new and different 
environment. Alternatively bereavement could lead, in extremis, to homeless ness as 
in the cases of Jamie and Saadhia. An increased ambivalent attachment to the home 
was especially pertinent in John and Paul's account who, after long-term marriages, 
found that without their wives they lacked the motivation to keep things tidy in the 
house, having to learn how to cook or being unable to rid themselves of objects in the 
house. Paul feared that he was becoming a hoarder as he had become "very lazy" as 
his wife was not around to "chase" him and "harass" him about things that needed to 
be done around the house. He was also unable to clear his wife's possessions. He 
remarked that other people had suggested he get rid of his wife's objects but for Paul 
it would be an act of "betrayal": 
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And people say "oh why don't you get rid of them why don't you do this and 
why don't you do that", I can't ( ... ) She's got loads of clothes, loads of things, 
but everything is, the way I look at it Caroline, it's like a betrayal. To me, you 
know. 
I interviewed Paul in his home so I had the opportunity to see some of the objects he 
described. In the living room there were walls of shelves filled with books and DVDs 
and there were clear traces of his wife, a selection of walking sticks resting in the 
corner of the room and a selection of women's perfumes on one of the shelves. When 
Paul explained there was "too much" and "lots of things", I could see clearly to what 
he was referring. He explained how his wife was "possessive" over her things and 
"she knew exactly where almost anything was": 
( ... ) even a tiny little ceramic thimble she would say it's on the third shelf, 
little cabinet down there behind the so and so, she knew, oh yeah she knew. 
Paul was adamant that he would never clear her things out of the house but I did ask 
him what he thought might happen if he were to get rid of those objects. Paul paused 
before telling me he simply could not see himself ever doing it The attachment was 
not to his own objects and possessions only his wife's and those things they shared 
together. John, too, had a similar struggle finding he was still living in the house with 
things exactly where his wife had left them. John was aware that this was not 
necessarily what he "should" be doing. detailing his experience in the hospice 
bereavement group where some of the group members spoke about how they got rid 
of the deceased person's belongings straight away. John acknowledged that, in 
233 
keeping his wife's clothes and leaving the house unchanged, he was "still hanging on 
to her": 
I'm just, I'm not, I don't want to lose her. And I know I have to ( ... ) it's sort of 
like I don't want to lose her yet. And you think, at other times I think to 
myself, "Oh, that's being silly" but I just, well it doesn't hurt anybody just leave 
it as it is, it's only going to affect me so why worry about what other people 
are going to think. 
The only motivator to clear the house of his wife's things was "what other people 
think" and yet John contemplated that leaving things as they were is not really 
hurting anyone. In her exploration of how bereaved people used objects in their 
grieving and memorialising of the deceased person, Gibson (2004, 2008) utilised the 
psychoanalytic concept of 'cathexis' (Freud, 1917) to portray how bereaved people 
held on to material objects, not only psychic objects, as a mode of transitioning 
through their grief. Gibson argued that the objects of the dead carry powerful 
symbols of their presence. My data support this. Gibson noted the transition through 
grief often followed a move away from these objects, the objects acted as an 
intermediary enabling the transfer of the attachment from the deceased person to be 
integrated back into the ego. However, I argue that for some participants, there was a 
constant need to maintain their obvious presence in the everyday life of the bereaved 
person. Objects would 'animate' the presence of the deceased (Hockey et al., 2005) 
temporarily as part of the mourning process or, in the case with Rose, objects would 
become more permanently animated by the deceased person, becoming what Gibson 
(2004) described as 'melancholy objects'. Rose told me: 
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So I've got this knitted old English sheepdog, massive thing, but if you put him 
upside down in the bed beside, it looks just like, it looks just like Simon laying 
there! And he came everywhere with me ( ... ) So it was just like he was there. 
Not only did the character of the deceased person animate objects but was also was 
relocated in space. So while Rose's husband was now brought back to life through her 
sheepdog toy, her husband's ashes were also somewhere out in the river Thames: 
I just poured him out and ( ... ) it goes straight down. No you would not know 
he was there. And I was just literally pouring him around ( ... ) It was amazing. 
And because I always say urn, I always used to say if Simon was turning in his 
grave, I think he's out to the Thames by now, well out in the Thames by now. 
Yeah. If you ever want to picture him, it's an old one, because that's our 
wedding photo. 
Rose then passed me a wedding photo and her husband, represented in the form of a 
photograph, was in another medium. In Section 7.4 I demonstrate in more detail the 
fluid presence of Rose's husband and how he emerged in material objects and spaces 
but also was felt as a bodily presence. 
For my participants, I argue, the home acted like a shrine to the memory of their 
deceased partner where the objects served to keep and sustain memories. But the 
attachment to the home could be ambivalent - both a comforting and upsetting 
reminder. The scene of "going home" was described in several of the participants' 
accounts: 
Going home is the worst thing really. Because that's like you open the door 
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and you, and no matter what happens you expect her to be there, and she's 
not But I find that hard even if I'm going down the shops or whatever. It's 
very hard going home. (Paul) 
But yeah since then I moved house, I moved house nine months after he died. 
just because purely it was such a huge house to keep on and the fact that we'd 
found him there, every time I walked through the door it was a reminder. 
(Tania) 
Some of the participants acknowledged that being left with the sole responsibility of 
the household at times felt overwhelming, leading Paul to become lazy or for Anne to 
move to a smaller home. john told me he had "a freezer full of food" he did not need. 
For john while some objects were retained and provided with meaning, other objects, 
such as too much food, became unwanted clutter. Rose had remained living in the 
house she shared with her husband, living alone for 26 years. Following the death of 
her husband, Rose began to hoard objects. I went to visit Rose in her home to conduct 
the interview. She showed me round her home and her 'clutter' as she described it, 
which had filled some of the rooms of the house so that it was impossible to enter. As 
we spoke we sat in the living room surrounded on either side by boxes of Rose's 
belongings. Rose showed me her bedroom that had just enough space for her to climb 
into bed with a computer and a TV positioned for easy viewing. From how Rose 
portrayed it, she had an almost indifferent relation to the objects that congregated 
around her, as though the stuff had accumulated due to a lack of interest rather than 
out of a strong attachment This lack of care was in stark contrast to how she 
described her husband's control over the home environment; not only in how the 
house appeared but in the running and organisation of their family, where he was 
very much head ofthe family. 
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My data show that, for the participants, holding on to objects was a way of holding on 
to the person who had died, yet conversely, the rejection of the home could be a 
rejection of the influence - positive or negative - the deceased person may have had 
over the home. This was captured in Rose's ambivalent connection to the objects she 
hoarded, where she told me that in the event of a fire there was nothing she would 
attempt to save. Yet her statement was belied by the quantity of belongings that 
surrounded her. Rose contended her hoard had formed out of indifference rather 
than attachment, and her indifference was a result of the dominant role her husband 
had played in their home. However, I argue Rose's accumulation of objects could be 
read as one of resistance to her husband and the way he controlled the home. In his 
absence, Rose in her hoarding was reclaiming the space as her own; crowding out her 
husband's influence, leaving only enough space for her husband that Rose could 
comfortably manage. 
7.4 Inhabiting and resisting identities 
So far I have presented how grief is something that is performed through ordinary 
and everyday practices. As Valentine (2013) has suggested, these 'affective practices' 
enable the repairing of the identities of the bereaved person as well as the preserving 
of the identities of that of the deceased. Here, I consider how new identities are 
formed, or old identities are sustained, through these affective practices. I analyse 
identity as something produced through strategic social action (Unruh, 1983) and 
also as something that can be narrated differently over time. Overwhelmingly, among 
~y participants, identity was something configured in intimate relation with the 
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person who had died and the level of presence the now deceased person had in their 
ongoing life. The narration of identity was thus not solely an individual activity but 
involved the 'impressions' (Ahmed, 2004) of the person who had died. I also consider 
those participant accounts that did not claim an identity, and whether failing to 
narrate an identity can be considered a resistance to or refusal of recovery. 
7.4.1 New Identities 
Participants described how, after bereavement, they felt like a completely different 
person as well as being treated differently by others. Initially, it was a realisation that 
one's external identity had changed despite feeling like the same person, as Laura 
described: 
Laura: You know when you read the novels, the old novels where there's a 
widow in there and she's on the side-lines of everything's that's going on, 
she's no longer in that part of the family. Because I was always a bit the 
matriarch in the family, bossy boots, and that role's gone for me now ( ... ) my 
role has definitely changed within the family, being a widow ( ... ) 
Interviewer: Your external identity has changed to other people. 
Laura: Yes, yeah. And that's bizarre for me because as you see I still wear my 
wedding ring, three years on and I will wear it until I die, because I don't see 
myself as a widow, I still see myself as his wife. 
As demonstrated above, for Laura there was a disjuncture between how others saw 
her and how she viewed herself: "as his wife". In van Gennep's (1960) 'rite of 
passage', to enter a liminal phase is to lose or forget one's pre-liminal status and 
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identity. I argue that the disjuncture felt by Laura revealed how her identity was in 
transition, 'betwixt and between' social positions. To those around her, Laura had lost 
her previous identity and status, yet Laura was not willing to accept the new status of 
widow. This liminal identity could be unsettling to others. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
the bereaved person embodies the divide between living and dead people, polluting 
the clear boundaries between life and death. For example, Paul remarked how as a 
sociable extroverted person he was treated as a "pariah" where people would avoid 
contacting and coming round to see him. The way in which people avoided her after 
her husband's death made Anne feel as though "[bereavement] might be a contagious 
disease". Equally, being placed within this new undesirable category was a motivator 
for Tania, who acknowledged the gulf between the identity she had come to inhabit 
and who she wanted to be: "I just wanted to be Tania again rather than the woman 
whose lost her husband". I asked Tania whether there were moments in her grieving 
where she felt like she was no longer herself, to which she replied: 
Yeah and it annoyed me because I remember thinking I am not this weeping 
wailing depressed woman, I'm not a depressed person by nature. I've always, 
always been quite optimistic and it used, it just really upset, Sitting on my 
own at night thinking this is not me, this is just not me. 
Tania and Anne described how this change in identity also provided the impetus to 
transform their lives in positive ways. Indeed, both Tania and Anne explained how 
they were "quite dependent" on their husbands and narrated a sense of disbelief and 
surprise at the person they had now become. As other people acknowledged her 
change in identity. Anne also recognised for herself that her identity had changed, 
when her friends could no longer understand her: 
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I'm a different me. I can't be that person, because that person is reliant on 
having another half. And I have to be a different me, I have different priorities, 
I have different ways of looking at things, and I'm harder. It's just, you can't 
see life the same way anymore. 
As both women had married their partners in their early twenties, they found 
themselves alone, a new experience in their adult life. This was coupled with being 
forced to take sole responsibility for their family and children. However, this new 
circumstance provided Anne and Tania with new confidence who both felt that they 
were a "better person" now. It was, as Anne described, an "interesting conundrum" 
for Anne liked the fact she was "stronger" and yet would rather be "back there" when 
her husband was alive. Rose too explained how she changed after her husband died 
from "always being the follower on" to taking control over the decisions in her life. 
However, while Tania's change in identity was a process of striving to be "me again", 
for Anne it was a process of learning to be a new person without her husband. She 
explained a scene from one of the Harry Potter films, to describe the feeling, where 
Harry Potter's godfather died and fell through a curtain but Harry could not go 
through as it was a one way door. For Anne this was illustrative of how her husband 
had gone in one direction and Anne had gone in another, which had sent her on a new 
journey. She described this movement into a new life as jumping from one set of train 
tracks to another: 
I think of train tracks where his track went that way, my track went that way. 
I fought so hard physically to bring time back and to follow that track, ( ... ) and 
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it just diverges and diverges ( ... ). So it's just a different journey in my view. 
( ... ) And I felt almost like I was the one who died because I have started a new 
life. It's like being jumped off one set of train tracks and on to another set of 
train tracks that are heading off in a different direction. 
Despite her efforts to follow her husband's train journey they were headed on two 
different journeys for better or worse. Anne had entered a new "blitzed landscape" 
that was a far distance from the "simple person" and "normal" life she used to share 
with her husband. Anne found she no longer recognised herself or the world in which 
she had arrived. In this way, the journey Anne described captured a 'rite of passage', 
where Anne moved through liminality to a new identity. However, as I discuss next, 
arriving at a new identity for the participants was not necessarily a process of 
detachment from the deceased person but one of maintaining, reconfiguring, and 
persisting in . often ambivalent· relationships. 
7.4.2 Relational identities 
Somebody's going to suffer grief in a relationship at the end of the day 
because you're not going to go together. And when that happens it's the most, 
well ooh can't describe it I can't describe it; it just tears you apart inside. 
(Paul) 
For all participants their relationship with the deceased person was both close and 
long term. Following bereavement, participants narrated the difficulty in facing up to 
the realities of entering relationality and the risks involved in the possibility of losing 
the other. It was a risk that, as Paul acknowledged above, was known, but which one 
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was unable to face up to until it actually happens. For Derrida (2001), all 
relationships bring with them a sense of mourning in that the formation of a bond 
rests upon the inevitability of separation. The precarity of ties can feel ameliorated by 
the consistent presence of the other person but in bereavement, the loneliness, loss 
and ambivalence comes to the fore. The feeling of loneliness was particularly marked 
for John and Paul who had spent the majority of their adult lives married and living 
with one partner and now found themselves alone and, as detailed in the last section, 
losing motivation and incentive and the ability to manage the household. As Paul 
described: 
The only way I can describe it is literally part, half of my life has disappeared. 
The light has gone out of my life and it's a sod to deal with it 
Paul narrated at length the life he had with his wife emphasising how close they were, 
never spending a night apart for forty years. For Laura, being in a couple had 
provided the confidence to be herself, a self-confidence which had been lost along 
with her husband. She found she was reluctant to go out to social activities without 
her husband who was six feet tall and "built like the side of a barn". The description of 
his physical presence illustrates how he provided "grounding" for Laura: 
So it makes it quite hard to be social, which has got worse since my husband 
died, much, much worse. Because I have no grounding. He grounded me and 
would say "Dh don't be silly" and there's no-one to do that now ( ... ) So I think 
becoming a widow highlights your inadequacies ( ... ) You're not quite so sure 
of yourself as you are when you're in a couple. 
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Being in a couple provided a protective cushion almost from the outside world to 
which Laura felt exposed without her husband. After the death of her mother, Saadhia 
described how the sense of safety and "belonging" had gone. Saadhia narrated a story 
of an intimate relationship with her mother: 
My best friend, my Mum, everything in one. If I had problems she was there 
and she knew what to say ( ... J And I miss all that because she just gave me 
inspiration, hope, support. 
Saadhia struggled after her mother's death, finding herself unable to maintain a job. 
When she was evicted from her flat Saadhia described feeling "there was no-one 
holding my hand". After finding herself homeless and seeking help from a local 
shelter, Saadhia looked to her mother for inspiration to enable her to remain 
"strong": 
Mum she's still there but she would want me to sort things out and get on 
with it rather than sit in a corner crying for her. 
The presence of her mother persisted in the new life Saadhia was forming, which 
involved finding a place to live and attending counselling sessions. The consequences 
of no longer being a unit were not always easily resolved. Saadhia and Paul described 
how they would still hear the voice of their deceased mother and partner. Paul 
illustrated this to me by mimicking his wife's voice and the distinctive way she said 
his name. For Rose, her husband's presence featured in her life in a more 
encompassing way. Rose regularly spoke with her husband and felt his presence 
particularly at certain times and places: 
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And as I say, I'm not really psychic but sometimes Simon really feels as if he is 
here, certainly driving he takes over. If I'm driving through (place name 
anonymised) or somewhere in that area that I don't know, I go oh Simon 
where am I and I'll just go purely on to autopilot and I'll start driving around 
and I'll find I'm at the main road, and I'll go thank you Simon! Love you! Bless 
you! I've told him I love him and bless him much more than, I don't think ever 
told him when he was alive. Yet we've more conversations, we've better 
conversations now he's gone than when he was here! (laughs) ( ... ) I just talk 
to him as if he was here. You lose things, he's amazing. Brilliant at finding 
things. You lose a CD or a memory stick and you're looking everywhere for it 
and you can't find it and you go Simon please help us. 
It seems, the presence of Rose's husband was useful, preventing her from getting lost 
and helping to find lost objects. Because of this presence Rose explained that she 
hadn't really grieved. When I asked her why she thought she had not grieved Rose 
replied: "It's because he's with me". Rose recalled two incidents where she felt she 
had grieved over her husband's death, where she shortly received a sense of 
reassurance from her husband: 
I got this this, not exactly a hug, but a feeling of it's alright thank you very 
much, we've got work to do. So I wiped my eyes and got on. 
The partnership Rose had with her husband had continued 26 years on after his 
death. I asked Rose whether she had a desire for another partner: 
No! No as I say, he's company enough quite honestly if I want to talk to 
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anyone I can sit there and I know his reactions to conversations so much so I 
know exactly how he would answer things. So sometimes I would come home 
upset and I would go Simon what do I do now and I feel him just say right 
okay, we'd sit down let's go through what is the problem and I would hear his 
thoughts. 
Rose remarked that she felt a closer bond with her husband now in his death than 
when he was alive. She narrated the story of how they met and how they "were 
always destined to be together" and "absolutely in sync all along". Rose described also 
how she begun to take on the characteristics of her husband and how other people 
had commented she sounded, "just like what Simon would have said". The continuing 
intercorporeality of Rose's relationship with her husband illustrates Ribbens 
McCarthy and Prokhovnik's (2013) argument that the personhood of the deceased 
person continues to exist through the body of the remaining partner. 
However, the way Rose narrated her relationship was full of complexities. So while 
she said it felt as if "we're still together" she also described the peace she had not 
being with anyone and being her "own person". Her husband and the conversations 
they had certainly seemed to bring her comfort and reassurance and meant she 
appeared to have not experienced some of the pain of grief expressed by other 
participants. Her seemingly "melancholic" attachment to her husband was 
counteracted by how she acknowledged her role had changed since her husband's 
death. In the absence of her husband she was no longer "just the washer up-er", but 
the head of the family. She described the funeral as her first social activity without 
her husband, wearing red and "larking about with his mates from work". Rose's grief 
was cushioned by the on-going presence of her husband and yet her life was also one 
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in which she experienced more freedom in his absence. 
The ongoing presence, or the ongoing absent-presence of the deceased person, could 
prove overwhelming, as it was for Saadhia before she began to incorporate her 
mother's memory to build a new life. For Rose however the presence of her husband 
was a helpful companion. Yet this post-death identity of her husband appeared in 
contrast to how Rose had described her relationship with her husband when he was 
alive. Therefore, it was not only Rose's identity that had changed but also her 
husband's. For all the participants, as they narrated their experiences to me they 
would speak at length of the character of their partner or family member, 
constructing and re-constructing their identity. This was most marked in Rose's 
account where after death she was provided the opportunity to develop the 
relationship with her husband to what suited her; changing his identity so that she 
was no longer the "follower on". In this way there was no ambivalence about her 
relationship with her husband that made his continuing presence comfortable to live 
with. 
My data show that after death, the relational identity one had inhabited in a 
partnership may continue, but that partnership also continued to change and 
develop. I suggest, the way in which the relationship developed was due to the level 
of control the participants' felt they had over the deceased person's presence. 
Maintaining control meant the presence of the deceased person could be 
incorporated into the self rather than becoming overwhelmed by memories or 
hearing voices. Finding this sense of control meant that the relationship could be 
shaped to one's choosing. In other words it was a way of overcoming the ambivalence 
that existed in the relationship when the other person was alive. 
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7.4.3 Resistant Identities 
Here I reflect on what I describe as 'resistant' forms of identity. I use resistance to 
refer to those forms of activity and identity that are described as examples of people 
failing to recover. These examples of resistance to recovery were described in the 
accounts of the bereavement counsellors and support workers in Chapter 6. The 
resistant identity emerged as something in participant accounts as an image of 
something to avoid. For Tania it was witnessing "career widows" that gave her the 
incentive to get "fixed" by seeing the life and identity she wanted to avoid: 
I do remember going to the WAY Foundation, they had a coffee morning ( ... ) 
and there were women - I can't, I don't know, they were just not like me. I just 
remember walking in going I wouldn't be friends with any of you in real life at 
all. I remember sitting down, they were all chit chattering away, I just sat 
there and burst into tears, this older lady came along and she said "I'm ten 
years down the line and it does get better" and I remember looking at her 
thinking, "Oh my god". And I made my excuses and left and thought I don't 
want to be like this, I don't want to be sat around in widow's groups like this 
ten years down the line ( ... ) I wouldn't go back there, I've never been 
anywhere else to do with WAY. But I remember that terrified me I just drove 
home in floods of tears going, "Oh my god this is it, I do not want to be like this 
woman ten years down the line". 
It seems, rather than fostering a sense of membership, attending the WAY support 
group produced a strong sense of not belonging, allowing Tania to demarcate herself 
from the other women as being "not like me". The "career widows" whom Tania 
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described loved to sit around chatting to other widows, seeming "quite stuck" and not 
wanting to "move on", Tania explained how she and her friends could "spot" the 
career widows: 
We can now spot them a mile off, we're just like oh career widow, which is 
really awful! 
Tania used similar language to bereavement counsellors, describing the career widow 
as being 'stuck' and not wanting to 'move on', For Tania too, recovery or its failure 
was an individual choice, I argue that describing this set of people as "career widows" 
suggests the work that is also involved in remaining "stuck". Life's work becomes 
about widowhood, which for Tania was something to prevent 
The career widow emerged as a performance arguably framed by the cultural 
expectations of widowhood and the obligation to recover from grief. Resistant 
identities, then, were those that performed grief almost too well, but it also included 
those who failed to perform grief at all. Rose explained how, at the funeral, she was 
"laughing and joking" rather than crying, where the vicar thought her sister-in-law 
was the one widowed who, unlike Rose, was dressed in "the full regalia" and wailing. 
After the service a family member came up to Rose to exclaim, "But you could have 
least have cried!" and Rose remarked, "blooming heck I've supposed to have cried". 
Rose's 'failure' to perform the appropriate identity of the widow at the funeral 
permeated the rest of her narrative. In her one encounter with a counsellor Rose 
explained that the counsellor had tried to figure out why she "hadn't grieved". Rose's 
inappropriate display of emotion was construed as a failure to grieve and yet as 
detailed above, for Rose grieving was unnecessary for her husband was not lost but 
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still with her. Reading resistance in the participants' accounts thus produced a more 
ambiguous picture of how resistance to grieving might be interpreted. Using the 
varying frameworks of recovery maintained by the bereavement counsellors, for 
example, meant the participants' accounts came into view as recovered and non-
recovered depending on which framework was adhered to. 
Saadhia narrated her experiences following the death of her mother in which she 
appeared to enter a downward spiral: 
My moods were going down and I was either eating so much to comfort 
myself or I was just like, "No I'm not doing it". I stopped, I stopped listening to 
music, the things I enjoyed I stopped doing all those ( ... ) Emotionally inside I 
wasn't feeling good and I was feeling that I was going to go down and down 
( ... ) and I keep hearing my Mum calling me and I think it's real, when I wake 
up from this sort of sleep I'm like, "Oh my god" and she's not there and I can't 
look at her picture, I just can't do it Because I'm just, then I'm just drowning 
in tears all the time ( ... ) I got to a stage where I was drinking, I was smoking 
and I just wanted to die basically. 
Saadhia's was a story of self-destruction but it was also a story that ended in 
recovery. At the interview she told me that now she could speak about her mother at 
length whereas before she would be unable to speak without bursting into tears. I 
argue my data show that the ability to narrate suffering was a privileged one in that 
being able to speak to me and respond to questions was only possible from a place of 
relative recovery. In this process I discovered that though I had set out to uncover the 
experiences of non-recovery, it was not an experience that could be discoverable via 
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talk and the interview setting. 
Further, the resistant identity comes into view only by its failure to achieve a 
recovered identity. The career widow was a negative identity in the double sense in 
that the career widow was formed by the inability to move on and perform grief 
successfully. Thus, the only way to read resistance was to explore what participants 
did not say and also acknowledge the limits of my listening. This problem was 
illustrated when I met Jamie. I got into contact with Jamie through the cold weather 
shelter at Caris. Caris had carried out their own research into the links between 
bereavement and homelessness and were very keen for me to engage with the area. 
Jamie had cancelled scheduled meetings on more than one occasion and it seemed the 
interview might not happen. He appeared to be a hard person to pin down with a 
hectic and disorganised life. In our interview he did not wish to be recorded. The 
notes I made following the interview were scattered and that is how I recall the 
interview. Jamie was unsure what to say, he told me he'd never spoken to anyone 
before about his experiences. He described incidents where he felt dismissed by other 
people and so decided not to speak to people about his feelings of grief. He told me 
about how his sister died suddenly when he was 16 and then years later his mother 
died of cancer. He told me how he had periods of depression, alcohol addiction, being 
made redundant and homeless. It was a story with little resolution where he had lost 
the two people he loved the most and now experienced a "missing link" in his life. 
I found that listening to a story without resolution was difficult and uncomfortable to 
bear. On reflection, I felt a sense of responsibility to resolve his story, and considering 
the mobile text messages I received from Jamie following the interview it appeared he 
was looking to me too to help resolve his story. I realised I also was complicit in the 
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narrative of recovery and the requirement for a standard story of grief. Yet the 
resistance to recovery is as much a construction as the notion of recovery itself. I 
recognised I was reading Jamie's story as a resistance and a failure to recover because 
I was working within a particular construction of recovery. Resistant identities could 
be acts of performing grief too well or not enough, and they can also be what a person 
comes to inhabit when they fail to narrate the 'right' story. But these identities are 
produced, inhabited and resisted in different ways. 
7.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have presented the ways in which bereaved people navigate their 
way through a new and liminal landscape and the strategic and social activities that 
involved narrating a story around the death, making meaning from experiences, 
engaging in everyday rituals and practices and negotiating space and objects. My data 
show that through this navigation the participants discovered they came to inhabit 
and resist new and old identities, often through a process of relating to the presence 
of their deceased partner or family member. I emphasised the important role of the 
ordinary and mundane activities that might alternatively be viewed as 'distractions' 
from grief work but were described by the bereaved person as crucial to their ability 
to get on with daily life. These forms of work, and not just formal forms of grief work, 
were used as forms of identity preservation and repair. 
In the data from the bereavement 'helpers', the emphasis was very much on the 
internal work of the individual. However, the data from interviews with bereaved 
people highlighted the presence of the dead person and how daily life and identity 
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was structured relationally. At times this presence could be ambivalent, and the home 
space and objects often became the stage upon which the desire to both 'hold on' and 
'let go' was played out. I argue that acknowledging the ambivalent nature of 
relationships with others dead or alive is a better lens through which to view the 
experiences of the bereaved person than describing such a state as 'stuckness'. Using 
such a term as being 'stuck' fails to recognise that there is a great deal of movement 
and negotiation happening. 
Yet the stuckness of wanting to hold on and let go is also a double-bind, where the 
desire for an ever out-of-grasp past resists the construction of a new identity and 
future. As discussed in Chapter 6. for bereavement practitioners, being able to 
construct a new future was an important part of recovery. Yet the transition from a 
future with another person to making plans on one's own met with mixed success 
across the participants' accounts. For example. John. in his wife's absence, had no 
desires or wishes for the future: 
[M]y future basically was, was with my wife. That's the only thing I'd ever 
thought about really that we'd be living together until old age and sitting in 
front of a fire all that sort of thing, reading the paper or something that things 
would. that that would be my future. And that's probably part and parcel of 
the trouble I've got, trying to come to some sort of resolution as to what my 
future is now, in that 1 always saw my future as being with her. 
In the absence of a future all that remained was a persistence to keep going through 
the use of different forms of grief work, distractions. and material objects and spaces. 
Recovery was not necessarily an idea with which participants identified: the vision 
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they narrated was more one of Hmuddling through" (Anne), a "road that's not ever 
gonna run out" (Paul). Similar sentiments appeared across participants' accounts, 
detailing a tiring process of picking oneself up and "plodding". These stories could be 
viewed as the unglamorous face of recovery, stories of plodding and exhaustion and 
getting on with it. 'Getting on with it' might seem a limited goal in the face of the 
transformative power of recovery. Or it is possible that stuckness is the search for 
bigger and better fantasies than the normative vision of recovery, where the future is 
still under revision and identity remains in flux. 
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CHAPTERS 
Discussion of key themes: Meanings, practices and identities 
8.J Introduction to the chapter 
In this chapter I draw together the themes that emerged from the data. In this thesis I 
have argued that people who experience grief find themselves in a state of liminality. 
I have shown that this state of Iiminality is in part fostered by a modern 
fragmentation of grieving practices, leaving no uniform structure to the 'rite of 
passage'. However, I have argued that the individualisation of rituals and practices, 
and the dispersion of authority over death, has not meant that the experience of grief 
is without structure. Rather, through exploring the role of politics, psychiatry and 
bereavement counselling I have shown that a number of theories, policies and 
practices exist that aim to support people through the liminal space of grief, which 
have become new ways of mourning. 
I have also demonstrated conflicts and ambiguities in how the boundaries between 
grief and recovery are negotiated. What it means to fail to recover from grief has been 
at the heart of my inquiry contending that the exploration of non-recovery can reveal 
much about how the boundaries of grief and recovery shift, and how they are drawn 
differently depending on where a bereaved person is located in the liminal space. As 
discussed in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 behaviours associated with complicated or 
prolonged grief were viewed from the practitioner perspective as showing how the 
bereaved person was 'stuck' in their grief, and in turn presented 'resistance' to the 
normal course of grief. I have used Foucault's understanding of resistance to argue 
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rather that this form of resistance is a by-product of the discourse around 'normal' 
grief, which demarcates the boundaries around appropriate emotional expression. 
In the following three sections I bring together these issues and debates under the 
themes of 'meanings', 'practices' and 'identities'. I focus on: how different groups and 
individuals make sense of grief and recovery; the types of 'affective practices' used, in 
order to manage grief; and the identities people come to inhabit in the liminal space 
of grief. I view these themes as interwoven. I argue that dominant discourses around 
grief affect how people experience and make sense of grief, and the ways in which 
grief is interpreted has implication for the types of identities people inhabit Further, 
this process of meaning-making and identity construction is performed and acted 
through embodied practices, both publicly and privately. 
B.2 Making sense 0/ grle/ and recovery 
In this thesis I explored a number of different contemporary western discourses that 
seek to both define and make sense of grief. These discourses have been largely of a 
psychological or psychiatric nature, where understandings of grief have enabled a 
therapeutic response to recovery. I have also considered how grief is framed by 
political and economic concerns as well as how grief is expressed in literature and 
autobiographical memoirs. In my focus on the psychological, political, and cultural 
framing of grief and recovery, I aimed to resist the idea popular in literature on death 
that, with the decline of religion, people are left with no resources with which to 
make sense of grief (Walter, 1999). Instead I explored the discourses that continue to 
shape grief, albeit in different forms. Here, I draw on my data to describe the public 
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and private ways people make sense of death. I argue that making sense of grief 
involves medical, rational, ritualistic and instrumental explanations. For example, 
participants drew upon both rational and traditional discourses, finding symbolic 
meaning in pain and bereavement through signs, superstitions and metaphors but 
also relied on more established ideas such as grief models and bereavement 
counselling to make sense of grief. I also reflect on what happens when there is a 
failure to make sense of grief, drawing on the understanding within counselling and 
therapy that being unable to find meaning from grief is also the cause of being unable 
to recover from grief. 
8.2.1 Public and private narratives about grief and recovery 
One undisputed claim made by participants was that grief was a natural and normal 
emotion. This was stated as a self-evident premise, yet on closer inspection this was a 
multi-layered and contradictory statement Describing grief as 'natural' 
acknowledged the understanding that grief was a universal human emotion, the 'cost' 
of the human inclination to make attachments. Studies of grief that drew on the work 
on Bowlby, who in turn drew on Darwin's understanding of the emotions, promoted 
the view of grief as a biological reaction to loss (Parkes, 1972). This affirmed grief as 
an essentially human emotion, with other researchers claiming sets of facial 
expressions and psychological symptoms to accompany this human response. In 
Chapter 3, I explored the literature around emotions discovering that there is little 
conclusive scientific agreement on what they are. I therefore explored work on 'affect' 
to provide a new take on conceptualising emotions, shifting focus away from the 
mind and instead towards the body. I also considered the arguments of authors such 
as Ribbens McCarthy and Prokhovnik (2013) that emphasised the embodied 
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experience of grief. 
My data show that grief was presented as something indeterminate that could move 
location, defined according to both the 'outside-in' and 'inside-out' theory of emotions 
I introduced in Chapter 3 Section 3.2.1. Grief was alternately described as a 
possession (something internal) or something one could be possessed by (external to 
the person). Both groups of participants - practitioners and laypeople - described 
how grief could be triggered or appear without warning, and that grief was capable of 
being able to 'hit you' unexpectedly. Grief was either inside a person and needed to be 
externalised as presented in the GRM, or something that became incorporated as a 
permanent part of the body, as reflected in the 'growing around' theory of grief. 
Defining grief as a bodily, human emotion was significant for how grief came to be 
understood as a problem of the individual and something the individual was 
responsible for keeping under control. In Chapters 5 and 6, I presented how grief had 
become framed as a problem in the political and economic spheres. Unlimited grief 
becomes a 'burden' in a society that favours happy emotions, efficient mental health 
services and remaining in employment. Howarth (2001) has described how, with the 
destabilisation of religious narratives and a diminished belief in the afterlife, life and 
death have become separated so that death is no longer a continuation of life, but a 
threat to life. Grief too in its expression of loss and death is out of place in a society 
oriented towards life rather than death. It is thus unsurprising that the concept of 
recovery with its allusions to rebirth and revival of the individual has been embraced 
by mental health care, and in models of grief, where recovery serves to rescue the 
individual from the polluted boundaries of death and depression. In Foucault's 
(2003) conceptualisation of modern power, detailed in Chapter 3 Section 3.2.2, he 
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described a shift from a sovereign power, which gained its power from the threat of 
taking life, to the modern form of 'biopower', which gains power from monitoring, 
managing and producing life. For Foucault, biopower 'literally ignores death' (2003, 
p. 248). This ignorance of death, I argue, is evidenced in the politics of the happiness 
agenda. Within the culture of recovery, where mental disorders are framed as an 
economic burden, power is directed to managing the deterioration of life, 
emphasising human productivity and flourishing. 
With the decline of religious narratives that traditionally furnished individuals with a 
world-view within which to make sense of death and feelings of grief, key academics 
have argued that psychology has grown in the western world as a means of providing 
counsel for the internal life of human beings (Howarth, 2000, 2007; Rose, 1985, 1989, 
1998). In Chapter 2. I documented how grief had become an object of concern for 
psychology. The psychological study of grief identified the 'normal' course of grief, 
allowing grief to become measurable and classifiable into normal and pathological 
forms. The psychologists who conducted the early studies of grief categorised the 
experience of grief. describing it as a process with phases and stages. This was 
solidified in Kiibler-Ross's (1970) five stages of grief. As I found among participants' 
accounts, even jf the five stages did not fit the reality, they remained a measure 
against which they defined themselves or, for the practitioners, their client This use 
of the five stages. echoed the findings of Wambach's (1985) study discussed in 
Chapter 2. The similar findings in my data to Wambach's earlier study are evidence of 
the way in which the stages of grief have persisted in the popular imagination, as well 
as professional practice. 
Furthermore, constructing grief into a process standardised the time limit on 
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grieving, establishing a time limit on grief signals when grief should end and recovery 
should begin. My data show that having a sense of the 'normal' course of grief gave 
those working within bereavement care an idea of when grief stopped being normal 
and started being 'prolonged'. However, 'normal' tended to be emphasised by the 
bereaved participants and the bereavement care practitioners not to imply one 
'norm' but to embrace a varied number of behaviours under the category of 'normal'. 
On the one hand, this meant 'normal grief could encompass a wide range of feelings 
and behaviours. Especially for the bereaved participants, the meaning of grief was 
very personal and reflected the idiosyncrasies of their relationship with the deceased 
person. On the other hand, while it was agreed that grief was individually expressed, 
from the practitioner perspective, common traits could be identified. The role of 
'normalising grief was for bereavement counsellors and support workers a way of 
reaffirming grief as a 'natural' human emotion. 
As I described in Chapter 5 Section 5.2.1, the growing medicalisation of grief that 
seeks to provide a scientific rationale for grief has left individual expressions of grief 
the preserve of literature and autobiographical accounts. Bennett and Bennett's 
(2000) study of bereaved participants who experience the presence of deceased 
people was revealing in that the participants interpreted their experience of the 
presence of a deceased person through both a scientific and supernaturalist 
interpretive framework, opting for a different discourse depending on the 
circumstance in which they provided their account This suggests a disjuncture in the 
public narration and private experiences of grief. In Chapter 7 Section 7.2.1, I 
discussed how the bereaved participants used a mixture of both rational and 
symboliC explanations to describe their experiences of bereavement and feelings of 
grief. For instance, Rose described the signs that suggested her husband's pending 
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death, signs not of a medical nature but of a vase of lilac and how it symbolised a 
death in the family. Anne made reference to the story of Harry Potter by J K Rowling 
to symbolise the transition of her husband to another world. Further, Anne told me 
that although her original religious faith had diminished following bereavement, she 
believed in multiverses, and that her husband's spirit lived on in a different 
dimension. Therefore both 'professional' and 'lay' participants, drew on a mixture of 
discourses from formal training and from personal experience of bereavement For 
some the grief theories resonated, others found comfort in spiritual ideas. So while 
the public narrative of grief appears to give a clear outline of stages and tasks, in the 
daily experience of grief people used a variety of discourses to make sense of grief. 
This creative exploration of meaning-making reaches its limit however when one fails 
to make sense of grief. 
8.2.2 Failing to make sense of grief 
In Chapter 7 Section 7.2.2 I introduced the account of John who struggled to make 
sense of his wife's death. John felt the need to write down the timeline of his wife's 
illness and death in the hope that in doing so he would have a clearer understanding 
of, and perhaps an answer to, what had happened. Similar sentiments appeared in 
bereaved participants' accounts; disbelief at the death and dissatisfaction with the 
medical or other authorities to effectively manage, prevent and make sense of the 
death. In participants' narrations of their stories it was the apparent failure of such 
external authorities that hindered their ability to make sense of the death. The 
authorities that people might turn to in order to make sense of death, such as medical 
professionals, had failed to provide a satisfactory discourse that enabled participants 
to make sense of death. 
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Taking into account Frank's (2010) argument that narration is a moral impulse, not 
having a narrative or story about oneself and one's experience apparently has a high 
price. In this line of argument the refusal to narrate one's experience of suffering is a 
refusal of the moral implications of what counts as 'fundamentally' human. In my 
discussion of the recovery model of mental health care in Chapter 5, I detailed how 
the experiences of service users are increasingly presented by mental health services 
as stories of recovery (Carson et al., 2010; Central and North West London NHS 
Foundation Trust, 2014). However, a growing number of service users have argued 
that their stories have been sanitised of elements of resistance and incorporated into 
a neoliberal agenda (Costa et al., 2012; Rose, 2014). For these mental health service 
users the truly radical move has now become to remain silent about one's 'story' and 
refuse to narrate one's life and experiences (Costa et al., 2012). 
This resistance to storytelling has emerged in the realisation that telling one's story 
can have limited reach in producing change. I argue too that in my data, for the 
bereaved participants the ability to narrate their experiences of bereavement was 
different to finding meaning and resolution, or to producing tangible changes, either 
internally or externally. Grief posed a problem that could not be resolved, offering 
only an on-going and never-ending process of adjustment. Grief was an experience 
and feeling particularly resistant to the format of the narrative, even as the bereaved 
participants worked within those structures in their attempt to provide an account of 
their experience in the interviews. Bereaved participants acknowledged the need that 
they felt to recover, fostered by those around them. This need to make sense of grief 
in order to recover was presented in John's account, where the obligation to make 
sense was somehow at odds with his desire to remain mulling over the events of his 
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wife's death. 
The importance of making meaning from grief is compounded by the therapeutic 
notion that the way to recovery results from finding meaning (Neimeyer, 2005). 
Trauma has been described as marking the disjunction between the event and a 
belated incomplete understanding of the event (Caruth, 1995). It is implied that the 
cause, or perpetuation of, mental trauma is not having a coherent story and so cures 
of mental distress are often directed at enabling people to find a story (for example in 
the treatment of PTSD). This is demonstrated in psychodynamic treatment where the 
construction of case histories is used to provide meaning and comprehension of 
events and thus recovery (Goody, 2006). I argue that the danger with implying that 
narration is a mode to healing is that it relies on the normative idea of having a life 
that is accountable in 'standard story' forms. Grief stories are then categorised into 
genres where those who fail to recover or otherwise grieve in a way that could be 
described as complicated become worthy of features in newspapers that highlight 
how certain stories of grief are problematic (for example see McQuire, 2015; Moore, 
2014; Parris, 2009). 
My contention is that the need for a meaningful story relies on an understanding of 
the world and the self that is always coherent and comprehensible. In this view 
people need to find meaning, or be assisted to find meaning; there is no option to 
decide that grief and death are without meaning. Instead I suggest not having a story 
is not necessarily a descent into meaningless chaos. Rather it could be interpreted as 
a process of discovering new meaning, or in the spirit of existentialist thought, 
discovering new freedoms. 
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I have argued that making sense of grief is a public enterprise, and further that grief is 
framed within a modern post-enlightenment discourse that values scientific 
understandings of health and the emotions. Not finding meaning in grief thus 
becomes problematic to the public narrative of grief where there is little space for 
unhappy emotions or stories without an end point While making sense of grief is 
both a formalised activity and increasingly about individual choice and creativity, not 
all stories are permitted in the public narrative. Overall, the types of meanings that 
bereaved participants derived from their experiences were limited to publicly 
accepted psychological paradigms, often using grief models to frame their 
experiences. I argue that failing to make sense of and find meaning in grief poses the 
threat of disorder to the established theories around grief. In a modern culture where 
death cannot be left without a medical cause, the failure to find meaning in grief and 
resistance to fitting experience into a meaningful narrative produces the same 
outcome of non-recovery. 
B.3 Affective practices 
Making sense of grief was an activity that involved not only the ability to construct a 
coherent story but was carried out in embodied physical action. As described in 
Chapter 3, I adopted the use of Wetherell's (2012) term 'affective practices' to express 
the ways emotions are embodied, situated and performed. Here I describe some of 
the affective practices people used to manage grief that I uncovered in my data. 
Similarly to the meanings participants constructed to make sense of grief, these 
practices reflected a mixture of the rational and the symbolic. First I address the 
rational forms of practice found in bereavement counselling and the emphasis on 
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'grief work'. As presented in Chapter 6, grief is viewed as something that needs 
working through via the use of counselling frameworks and methods. Second, I 
consider the symbolic types of practice where grief is expressed and performed in 
public and private spaces. In Chapter 7, I detailed the types of informal practices in 
which bereaved people engaged, negotiating space and objects in the home. I explore 
further these types of informal rituals such as memorialising people in online spaces, 
and voicing narratives, where grief rather than being 'work' becomes a platform for 
individual creativity. Finally, I consider the failure to perform grief, or deviant forms 
of grieving practices that reveal the social norms that constrain the seemingly 
'natural' expression of grief. 
8.3.1 Grief work 
Bereavement practitioners agreed that grief needs work, or working through. This 
belief in the work involved in overcoming grief stems from the early psychological 
studies interpreting Freud's (1917) 'detaching' of the ego from the lost object as 
formal work to be undertaken in the individual psyche. This was further emphasised 
by Worden's (1991) 'tasks' of grief, where the language used clearly denoted grief as 
an active rather than passive process that unfolded naturally. The active need to 
intervene in grief was based on the premise that left unattended, grief could 
transform into pathological forms, or 'unlimited' mourning as Gorer (1965) termed it, 
which had negative consequences for the individual and society. Efforts to ward off 
the possibility of being 'derailed' into 'complicated grief (Shear, 2012), led to the 
creation and need for bereavement counselling, and bereavement care professionals 
whose responsibility was to ensure grief remained on a 'normal' course. However, as 
argued in Chapter 6, whether formal 'grief work' actually aids the bereaved person 
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remains debatable, with some studies finding bereavement counselling to be 
ineffective and potentially harmful (Schut, 2010). However, this is outweighed by 
discourses that highlight the 'socio-economic costs' of bereavement, positioning 
bereavement as a public health concern (SECOB project research group, 2013; 
Stephen et al., 2014). Positioned as a 'risk', the need for expert intervention and the 
management of grief is legitimated as an economic and social responsibility. Grief, 
much like birth and death, is no longer an ordinary life event but a risk, an 
extraordinary event to be governed and one that normalises the role of experts 
intervening into the ordinary. 
Furthermore what 'grief work' actually involves can seem unclear. In Chapter 6, I 
highlighted six key components that appeared in the interviews with bereavement 
counsellors and support workers who assisted in the carrying out of grief work. 
These components: the choice of method, the personal experience of the counsellor, 
the assessment process, fostering safety, the 'normalising' of grief and 'emotion work' 
were not criteria normally described in grief and bereavement counselling literature. 
My data showed that these criteria were not tick box requirements but rather 
elements that emerged in the more nuanced accounts of the bereavement 'helpers' 
that generally avoided describing a set formula for recovery. These elements placed 
emphasis on the qualities of the counsellor and the client as well as considering the 
importance of the choice of method that framed the counselling interaction. Grief and 
its recovery were negotiated in the encounter between client and counsellor. While 
all the elements may be present, the possibility of failing to recover or resistance 
remained possible. This fluid process described by the practitioners was in contrast 
to the inflexible Grief Recovery Method (GRM) where the method was the only means 
to recovery. In the GRM the steps had to be followed in a set order, and as directed, 
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where room for failure was due only to an error of the individual griever and never a 
result of the method. 
In the approaches used by practitioners, failing to recover was framed in terms of the 
client being 'unwilling' to do the work, or by avoiding the work either consciously or 
unconsciously. Of the approaches, the GRM presented the most extreme example 
where the method was the only true means to recovery. However, as the 
bereavement 'helpers' were invested in their own method their commitment to the 
belief in 'grief work' was unsurprising. Describing grief as 'work' is an appropriate 
metaphor when personal life is increasingly framed by productivity rather than 
leisure time. Marx (1976 [1867]), in his description of 'The working day', argued how 
in a system of capitalism the day is ordered so that the body remains consistently 
productive. A neoliberal capitalist system of politics and economics that exists in the 
UK, relies upon 'techniques of temporalisation' (Binkley, 2009) to enable high levels 
of productivity that also impinge on how leisure time is experienced. 
I have argued in this thesis that grief is an experience of liminality. Liminality 
presents the antithesis to work in its lack of rules and temporal structure. This was 
demonstrated in the accounts of the bereaved participants, particularly those who 
were out of work or retired, and how they created their own routine and structure in 
the absence of 'the working day'; an absence amplified by the death of the person 
with whom the everyday was once shared. Within the framework of productive work, 
the practitioners viewed these ordinary activities as 'distractions' from grief work or 
'short-term' fixes yet were described by the bereaved person as crucial to their ability 
to get on with daily life. 
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Even in times of grief, I discovered in my data, the bereaved person is encouraged to 
be productive and do one's homework; the effects of discipline showing their traces 
in conceptualising grief as work. I argue grief work is a 'technology of the self, which 
as Foucault (1988) claimed, people undertake in the hope it will bring them a positive 
value such as happiness. The technology of grief work both expects and produces 
active subjects, willing to follow the method and overcome their grief. Further, 
bereaved people are also managing themselves; doing the work of surveillance on 
behalf of the 'authorities'. Grief work thus becomes a collaborative project. In turn, 
the relationship people have with their own grief also changes, from a subjective 
feeling to something that can be objectively measured and classified and worked 
upon. 
8.3.2 Performlnllrlef 
In light of the death of popular music performer David Bowie, people turned to social 
media to profess their feelings of grief. For some media commentators this was 
evidence that the Internet had returned grief to a communal affair: 
Public mourning-via Twitter, via Facebook, via Tumblr-has become its 
own kind of ritual. (Garber, 2016) 
In Chapter 7, I described the everyday practices in which bereaved participants 
engaged to manage their grief, creating daily routines in the household and 
negotiating attachments to objects. While these activities were carried out in the 
private space of the home, arguably feelings of grief are increasingly expressed in 
public forms of memorialising (Garber, 2016; Seligson, 2014). In particular the rising 
267 
use of online spaces for memorialising those who die is evidenced as a rejection ofthe 
'taboo' around grief. Garber (2016), in current affairs online magazine The Atlantic, 
argued the Internet and social media sites are giving back grief a platform upon 
which people can voice their 'natural' expressions of grief. In this view, these new 
rituals are providing an outlet for the chaotic feelings of grief that had been long 
repressed by the lack of traditional rituals to make sense of and organise death. 
Additionally, social media is apparently encouraging collective grieving, where people 
are forming communities of grief through hashtags, such as #RIPBowie. However, the 
public mourning of celebrities and public figures has occurred with or without social 
media: the mourning of Princess Diana being the prime example. The public 
performance of grief for iconic figures who lived their lives so publicly seems fitting, 
as emotional outpourings by the public punctuated the lives of these public figures. 
Communities for bereaved people exist online in less public settings in the numerous 
online discussion forums designed solely for the discussion of grief. Many of the 
widowed participants with whom I spoke told me of the comfort they found in 
interacting with fellow widows on the 'Merry Widows' online discussion board, 
providing the participants with a sense that someone understood. Online support 
provided a space for grief when it felt "the rest of the world" had failed to understand. 
The 'taboo' around grief is re-emphasised as the bereaved community is 'forced' to 
'go underground', making grief feel like a 'dirty secret' (Sidhu, 2015). Online forums 
also tend to be a space absent of experts, and similar to 'offline' peer support groups, 
arguably people feel more at ease to speak about their experiences with fellow 'peers' 
(Paulus & Varga, 2015). Yet, in a study of online responses to bereavement forums, 
Vargas and Paulus (2013) found that online forums still maintained norms regarding 
how stories were constructed, albeit in a different form to 'offline'. For example, the 
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study found people would narrate the details of their bereavement in order to make a 
claim to the legitimacy of their grief and to be accepted as a member, suggesting 
similar norms around performing grief existed in the online world. 
Social media and the Internet have provided spaces for anyone, including those who 
are grieving, to tell their own individual story. In a similar way to the recovery model, 
the interest in narratives and voicing suffering or injustice emerged initially as a 
radical move to address oppression and inequality. However as argued in Chapter 5, 
stories about grief, mental health recovery and trauma are no longer hidden and 
silenced but seemingly abundant. The 'unspeakably taboo' (Walter, 1999) aspects of 
grief are now shared publicly on online platforms such as 'Modern LOSS'19, which 
encourages people to share their loss story and participate in 'candid conversation 
about grief.' The act of narrating oneself, online or offline, emerges at times as a 
contradictory mix of both a postmodern playful fashioning of selves and identity but 
also a claim to truth and the revelation of fundamental aspects of being human. Grief 
is increasingly performed via new mediums yet the belief is that grief itself remains 
unchanged. In my analysis of literature and memoirs on grief in Chapter 5, I argued 
for the need to acknowledge why people tell stories in certain ways and not others; 
what gets told and what gets omitted. I argue that the narration of the story of grief is 
framed by norms around storytelling and narration but further that in the act of 
giving one's account, one's identity is transformed in the telling. Telling narratives is 
not a process of revealing identity but one of constructing it. Despite the openness 
and diversity that some argue now characterises feelings of grief, boundaries of 
appropriate grieving are still evident, as I discuss next. 
19 Modern Loss website: bttp:llrnodernloss.coml (Accessed 6 June 2016) 
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8.3.3 Failing to perform grief 
In my data I aimed to explore what might constitute a failure to recover. As argued in 
Chapter 6, resistance in the counselling setting was depicted as an unwillingness to 
adhere to the method, as well as a failure to manage emotions appropriately, where 
emotions were either too excessive or lacking. This was crystallised in the Grief 
Recovery UK workshop during a small group exercise when a few of the group 
members burst into laughter. The small group was quickly told by the workshop 
leader to quieten down. Over the weekend, as a group we had been encouraged to 
show our emotions whatever they might be. "Let that be okay with you" was the 
repeated mantra referring to the coming to terms with the feelings of grief we 
experienced. However in this incident it became apparent that what were deemed 
'true' emotions were limited to sadness and tears, encouraged by the individual tissue 
boxes placed under each chair. Laughter was interpreted as an avoidance tactic and 
not a display of emotion. Laughter and other emotions were framed not as merely 
bodily responses but as a display of moral character. Laughing at the workshop was a 
moral failure, a sign of avoiding the work and of preventing completion. 
The moralistic nature of grieving is showcased in 'disenfranchised' forms of grief 
(Doka, 1989). Disenfranchised grief refers to feelings of grief that are deemed socially 
inappropriate. Arguably in modern western societies a hierarchy of grief exists 
(Robson & Walter, 2013), revealing a disjuncture between individual feelings and the 
social role one is expected to perform. Goffman (1959, 1963) in his concept of 'front' 
and 'back' stages described how people put on different performances in different 
contexts. The 'front stage' is where people perform the ideal or socially appropriate 
image of themselves. This role is shaped by the desired impression on the 'audience' -
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the significant others that surround them. Maintaining the performance is vital as a 
'minor mishap' can lead the image that is fostered being 'discredited'. In Chapter 7, I 
presented Rose's description of her husband's funeral where she was "larking about" 
with her husband's friends, only to be told by a member of the family "you could have 
at least cried!". Rose had failed to play the widow, a failure that was highlighted in the 
rest of her narrative where she described a handful of incidents where she had cried 
over her husband's death. The implication was that the emotion of grief must be in 
proportion to the weight of the role one occupied. It seemed that Rose's lack of grief 
was disproportionate to her role as widow. Yet her grief was defined only by the 
display of particular emotions. I argue that Rose's failed performance on the 'front 
stage' highlighted the discrepancy between the front and back regions in a person's 
life. The fear of being discredited - of a 'spoiled identity' - reveals the precariousness 
of positioning identity in the social arena (Goffman, 1963). 
However, as different approaches to grief might show, what can constitute a failed 
performance is context dependent and thus varies considerably. This counters the 
idea that grief is 'natural' and only shows itself in particular forms, such as tears and 
not laughter. Two literary figures showcased in twentieth century classical works of 
fiction illustrate well the disjuncture in role and displays of grief. Meursault, Camus' 
narrator of The Stranger (Camus, 1942) and John, in Huxley's Brave New World 
(Huxley, 1946) both display inappropriate performances of grief following the death 
of their mother in different ways. Camus' The Stranger begins with the death of 
Meursault's mother. His emotional state following his mother's death later further 
incriminates him after he murders a man. As Meursault faces trial the prosecution 
described that he'd 'shown no emotion' on the day of his mother's funeral. His 'calm' 
appearance and apparent lack of remorse implicated his guilt further. Commenting on 
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the character Meursault, Camus (1982) described him as someone 'condemned 
because he does not play the game'. Rather than merely a social failure or outcast as 
Meursault is treated in the novel, Camus described him as someone unable to lie, who 
remained steadfastly to his truth and his true feelings even if they were socially 
provocative and ultimately not only discredit him but condemn him to death. In a 
similar way John is the outsider in Huxley's Brave New World, embodying the old 
'savage' ways of the past. John, at the event of his mother's death openly showed signs 
of distress, and caused a scene: 
The Savage stood for a moment in frozen silence, then fell on his knees beside 
the bed and, covering his face with his hands, sobbed uncontrollably. The 
nurse stood irresolute, looking now at the kneeling figure by the bed (the 
scandalous exhibition!). (Huxley, 1946, p. 228) 
Both John and Meursault refused to play the game but remained 'true' to their 
feelings, a truth contrary to the society in which they inhabited. John found himself in 
a society where ageing and death did not exist. People did not grow up in families and 
have a 'mother', and human relationships were pragmatic with the 'individual' of little 
significance. In the two stories, emotions - in their revelation, or failure to be revealed 
- showed one's true human character, suggesting how closely connected emotional 
display and human nature are considered. In each case the showing and not showing 
of emotions made them both appear less than human to others around them. The 
need to manage grief is revealed in these points of failure that caused disorder in 
social norms. Both characters became a site of disgust in their social faux pas. 
Disgust also carries symbolic meaning as argued by Douglas (1966) who described 
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how 'dirt' is constructed as a by-product of systematic ordering and classification. 
Dirt offends order and must be managed: 'uncleanness or dirt is that which must not 
be included if a pattern is to be maintained' (p. 41). Drawing from the ideas of 
Douglas, dead bodies provoke disgust by their association with 'dirt' and fears of 
contamination. For instance, stories of bereaved people who keep the bodies of a 
deceased person at home feature in the media shrouded in a sense of disgust and 
repulsion (for example see Collins, 2012; Porter, 2014; The Local, 2014). However, in 
some non-western cultures keeping the dead body of a family member in the home 
for several months or more is a traditional custom, such as the Torajans in Indonesia 
who also periodically bring out deceased people from their graves to give them new 
clothes and gifts (Bennett, 2016). Bereaved people, I suggest, have the potential to 
provoke similar feelings of disgust and fear depending on their proximity to the 
deceased person. Staying too attached, but also not attached enough, can produce 
negative judgements. Meursault and John's actions caused disorder that needed to be 
excluded by their removal from society in order to maintain the pattern. Yet disorder 
also provides the material for the pattern by reinforcing social norms. 
The person who fails to perform on the 'front stage' is discredited causing feelings of 
shame and embarrassment (Goffman, 1963). Douglas described how cultures have 
provisions for dealing with ambiguity and anomalies. Some of the practices I have 
detailed here, such as the obligation to carry out 'grief work' and the public 
performance of socially appropriate emotions are arguably practices that seek to 
control and manage grief in different ways. At the GRM workshop the small group had 
to stop laughing and 'play the game'. Those who refuse to play the game have a high 
price to pay taking Meursault and John's fate as symbolic examples. Formulating a 
coherent narrative around one's grief might provide a sense of personal satisfaction 
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and comfort as demonstrated in the accounts of the bereaved participants in Chapter 
7, but it also provides a social function in interpreting and imposing a system on an 
otherwise 'untidy' experience (Douglas, 1966). Furthermore, the comfort one might 
feel at narrating a coherent story about grief can be construed as being due to the 
safety of adhering to social norms and patterning rather than any innate need to 
narrate. 
8.4 Constructing identities 
The ways in which people make sense of and perform grief informs the types of 
identities they come to inhabit Here I discuss the third theme of 'identity', focusing 
on how participants constructed identities for themselves and for others. I describe 
three key identities that emerged in my data, identities that provided different 
trajectories through the liminal space of grief. These three trajectories I outline -
'recovered', 'relational' and 'unrecovered' - are identities that might only be 
temporarily inhabited, rather than an end point in the journey. The temporary nature 
of grieving identities was highlighted in my search for the person experiencing 
'complicated grief which I document further in Section 8.4.3. Different individuals 
and groups through a variety of practices, as described above, constructed the three 
trajectories detailed here such as: psychiatric diagnostic categories, psychological 
research, counselling practice and individual narration. In each case the identity of 
recovered or unrecovered is negotiated and contested by the different parties. The 
identity of 'relational' was one expressed largely by bereaved participants and 
supported by alternative readings of Freud that highlighted the relational nature of 
identity. 
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In Chapter 3, I introduced Bloch's (2011) description of 'the blob' as a way of 
understanding how the categories of 'subject', 'individual', and 'citizen' are social 
constructions that provide different forms to the 'blob'. Taking Foucault's approach in 
the analysis of data, I suspended belief in an essential human subject, which enabled 
me to identify a number of different 'subjects' that appeared in the data. In my 
analysis of 'bereaved people', bereaved people were 'clients' and 'service users' but 
also 'experts'. Bereaved people were 'citizens' of a nation obligated to work and be 
happy and also acted as 'individuals' or as a 'community'. The bereaved person was 
also represented by cultural 'figures' such as 'widows' that proscribed behaviours and 
characteristics. Bereaved people could be diagnosed as 'complicated' or considered 
'normal'. Further bereaved people were often characterised by their continued 
relationships with deceased people, suggesting a relational and distributed sense of 
personhood. Therefore, in emphasising the role of identity, I seek to highlight that 
bereaved people come to inhabit multiple identities as they move across the liminal 
space, none of which I argue can be conclusively defined as 'natural'. 
8.4.1 Recovered identities 
My data show recovered identities can be identified and claimed in different ways. On 
the one hand, recovery is an objective measure in mental health care. Service users 
are actively claiming, and being encouraged to claim, an identity that is 'recovered'. 
On the other hand, subjective definitions of recovery offer· myriad ways of living 
recovery, which embrace the non-normative ways people might live. Throughout my 
data there was a conflict between these two types of recovery, often defined as 
'clinical' and 'personal' recovery, which was not easily reconciled. This was 
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demonstrated in the recovery model itself that, in transforming a subjective feeling 
into an objective measure, had faced considerable criticism. The debate over the uses 
of the term recovery in grief and bereavement also brings these issues to the fore, 
where recovery appears in different guises such as 'integration' and 'adaptation'. 
Bereavement practitioners showed caution over using the term 'recovery', concerned 
about the medical connotations of 'recovery', and instead spoke of "change", 
"movement" and "newness". 
I would argue however that there is a sense of recovery implicit in these descriptions 
in that bereaved people are understood to be coming back to 'normal life'. If 
considered in terms of a 'rite of passage' (van Gennep, 1960) recovery signals the 
return from liminality: changed, but stronger and more efficient. Grief casts people 
out into liminal space erasing past identities, but providing various props to navigate 
one's way back. Recovery is a transformation for the better but it is also a 
transformation back into normal life, constituted by the markers I highlighted in 
Chapters 5 and 6. Tania, for example, described how she just wanted to get "fixed", 
expressing an urgent need to be "me" again. Being recovered was synonymous with 
being a good citizen, keeping stable emotions, being in employment, not being 
dependent on mental health or counselling services, maintaining one's appearance, 
having hobbies, having a social life, to name but a few. Being recovered also described 
internal shifts in the psyche: a withdrawal of energy from the deceased person or an 
integration of the loss into the bereaved person (Freud, 1917). 
Being recovered appeared to be a fine balance that required continual work on the 
behalf of the bereaved person to maintain. The GRM's notion of completion promised 
recovery yet it became evident that completion was only a temporary measure. 
Completion did not signal an end, rather it was a fantasy that forced all those who 
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desired it to constantly carry out the task of 'getting complete' by writing completion 
letters. At the GRM workshop 'completion' was the secret tool we had all come to 
discover. Yet if completion was invariably temporary it was difficult to see the 
difference between completion and being incomplete. The Grief Recovery UK Director 
Ellen told me that "you can be as complete as possible". Yet the concept was self-
defeating in that it demonstrated how relationships and people themselves appeared 
to be unable to remain as whole, integrated beings, but rather tended to experience 
losses, and formed relationships that meant disregarding 'completeness'. 
The promise of recovery is a powerful one as it implies that no matter what might 
threaten the stability of the self, one can prevail. The interest in resilience promotes a 
similar narrative of hope, that people can 'bounce back' from adversity, and 
furthermore that resilience is a natural human capacity. A recovered identity was a 
concrete reality witnessed in the performance of being a good citizen or by a CORE-
10 form ticked off in a counselling room that demonstrated progress. However, being 
recovered also remained a fantasy fostered by a 'cruel optimism' (Berlant, 2011) that 
a resolution could be attained, forcing people into a continual search for completion. 
8.4.2 Relational identities 
In the data from the bereavement practitioners, bereaved people were given an 
identity as normal or abnormal, recovered or unrecovered. In contrast, the data from 
interviews with bereaved people highlighted the presence of the dead person and 
how identity was structured relationally. In the bereaved participants' narration of 
grief it was apparent how much of their sense of self was, and continued to be, 
structured by the presence and absence of the now deceased person. In Chapter 3, I 
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drew on the work of Butler (2004) and her interpretation of Freud's theory of 
mourning to understand how grief can be viewed as an instance that reveals the 
fundamentally relational nature of humans. The ways in which people 'come undone' 
by loss (Butler, 2004) reveals the means by which a person's sense of identity is 
dependent on others. This precarious nature of the self reveals an understanding of 
subjectivity that is not an autonomous bounded subject but formed in relation with 
others, and subsequently faces the threat of destruction in the loss of those others. 
While attachments can be viewed as adaptive from an evolutionary perspective, grief 
is the 'maladaptive' response to separation of those attachments (Archer, 1999; 
Bowlby, 1980; Parkes, 1972). Parkes (2006) described bereavement as the 'price of 
love' that 'starts a search that is doomed to fail'. This contradiction of human relations 
is often bypassed in models of grief that encourage detachment from the deceased 
person, an idea attributed to Freud, even if Freud himself seemed uncertain of its 
validity. For example, I argued in Chapter 2 that the struggle to understand why 
people make attachments only to mourn them lay at the heart of Freud's theory of 
mourning and melancholia. Successors of Freud offered psychodynamic explanations 
of the choices and investment that people make in significant others, but it appeared 
that this complexity of human relations was also absent in theories that promote 
'continuing bonds'. Rather than overcoming the self/other divide, the continuing 
bonds theory relies on it, where continuing bonds involves an individual making 
choices about how they want to incorporate the dead person into their life. Similarly 
within Ribbens McCarthy and Prokhovnik's (2013) argument for an embodied view 
of continued bonds, an 'enfleshed' or separate presence of the dead is largely 
unproblematic, yet the presence of what is bodily absent can often be contentious. 
This material presence persists as 'us' but also may persist with the deceased as a 
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separate other with intentional agency. The continuing bond is one-sided, making it 
not the continuation of a relationship but the formation of a new attachment to an 
idealised version of the deceased person. For Rose, who continued the relationship 
with her husband by regularly speaking to him, the relationship was much improved 
by his death. Her husband's new post-death identity produced a more suitable and 
compliant partner. The fact that Rose had some control over her life allowed for an 
equality in their relationship that was absent when he was alive. 
The ambivalence that emerges in grief, I argue, also reveals how people are in relation 
with others in ways that they cannot always control. For Freud, as Carel (2007) 
points out, all relationships are fraught with ambivalence. Identifying with another 
always places the self at risk of losing control. My data show that ambivalence imbued 
the continued relationships, as participants wrestled with gains in the midst of a great 
loss. For example, in Chapter 7, I described how participants interacted with their 
home space and objects that became the stage upon which the desire to both 'hold on' 
and 'let go' was played out Acknowledging the ambivalent nature of relationships 
revealed more than describing such behaviour as 'stuckness', which I argue glossed 
over the movement and negotiation involved in managing such ambivalence. 
However, I also argue that ambivalent feelings of wanting to hold onto and let go of 
objects or a person also presented a double-bind for the bereaved participants as 
what they desired was also the obstacle to a new identity. 
My data present examples of how bereavement brings the ambivalence of a 
relationship to the fore. Carel (2007) argues that the melancholic views the true 
reality of the process of attachment, comprehending the devastation of not only the 
person but their sense of self invested in the lost object The melancholic is thus not 
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delusional but sees the true extent of what has been lost, while the successful 
mourner carries out the work only to repeat the same process again, risking once 
more loss and devastation. Klein's (1940) theory, outlined in Chapter 2 Section 2.2.1 
proposed an alternative by showing how by restoring one's lost 'good objects' one 
can resolve ambivalence by incorporating the positive and reducing bad feelings. 
The presence of ambivalence revealed the key issues of power and control in 
bereaved participants' ongoing relationships with the deceased. Foucault (1984) 
defined power as being formed relationally, even romantic relationships, he claimed, 
were not free of a need to enact power over each other. In other words, people are 
always non-sovereign in relation to one another, non-sovereignty describing a 
condition of never being fully in control of oneself or of others (Berlant & Edelman, 
2014). Identities formed in relation are always reliant on the other, the construction 
of identity dependent on how one is addressed and how one inhabits and responds to 
that address (Butler, 1997). Grief and the experience of loss, perhaps like few other 
experiences, reveals the hold people have over each other. When viewed from a 
relational perspective, grief is, as Berlant (2008) has described, an experience of 
'irreducible boundedness': a sharp separation from the other whom one had 
imagined to be a part of one's self. This gap between self and other can be 
experienced as loneliness, as it commonly was among the participants. Thus, the act 
of attaching to a new person must always remain optimistic to overcome the 
inevitable risk of loss that is posed when entering into relationality. However, the 
optimism required for the construction of this relational identity could also become 
'cruel' (Berlant, 2011) and an act ofresistance, as I describe next. 
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8.4.3 Unrecovered identities 
Here I explore further how 'non-recovery' or 'resistance' can be read, as well as 
describing my methodological difficulties in finding the person that might inhabit the 
identity of 'unrecovered'. In the course of data collection, I gathered insight into who 
the complicated, 'unrecovered' person might be. Across the accounts of bereavement 
counsellors and support workers differences emerged in how they identified the 
complicated griever. The responses comprised a number of identities: the ones who 
failed to perform grief appropriately, as discussed above in Section 8.3.3; the 'career 
widow' who became consumed with grief; and the person resistant to counselling 
methods who found themselves 'stuck' in grief. 
Overall, however, practitioners agreed that clients had to be willing and able to 'do 
the work'. The failure to do that work was what would contribute to a failure to 
recover. In this way, recovery and non-recovery were in the individual's hands, yet 
counsellors had the capacity to see resistance in their clients, a resistance that would 
be belied by how the clients might present themselves. For Freud (1914), the role of 
the 'physician' was not merely to reveal the 'patient's' resistance to them, as if the 
patient's suffering results from a kind of 'ignorance': 
( ... ) and that if only this ignorance could be overcome by effective 
communication ( ... ) a recovery must follow. ( ... ) But the illness is not located 
in this ignorance itself, but in the foundation of ignorance, the inner 
resistances that are the cause of ignorance and continue to sustain it (Freud, 
1914, p. 7, Italics in original) 
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Revelation will not resolve resistance for one may not know what made one ignorant 
in the first place, hence why it is sustained. Freud argued recovery was attained only 
through the patient's own discovery; the physician cannot just 'show' resistance to 
patient, which may only intensify the resistance. This was reflected in my data where 
counsellors and support workers would opine that what the client first presented 
was often not the 'real' issue. Some counsellors spoke further of how clients remained 
unconscious of what was keeping them stuck, where the counselling setting was an 
opportunity to bring those unconscious feelings to light 
The role of the analyst for Freud was to judge what had been 'negated' and 
'repressed' which he considered the thing that was producing resistance. The aim of 
the analyst is to remove this resistance and encourage confession and awareness. 
However, Freud was clear that accepting the solution of the analyst had to be carried 
out on the patient's own terms. Furthermore, removing the 'inner resistances' was 
not a straightforward activity. What was producing a client's resistance may not be a 
singular thing; this foundation of ignorance may be fostered by multiple factors. By 
contrast, in the GRM, resistance was understood only as resistance to the method. 
When a method is seen as being impossible to fail, only people can fail the method. 
Resistance in the GRM was identified in those who analysed too much and were 
unable to move from the head to the heart, or anyone who queried the method. At the 
workshop, some group members questioned the relevance of certain activities, but 
we were encouraged to "stop analysing" and to do the activities unquestioningly, and 
as such were provided with little evidence of their purpose. 
Resistance was not then necessarily active, more a by-product of a discourse that left 
little room for critique. Incorporating Foucault's ideas on resistance, resistance was 
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the corresponding discourse to power. People get read as resistant when they fail to 
be managed, when they fail to embody the subject that lies at the heart of the 
dominant theory, for example being 'self-integrated' or 'complete'. Resisting the 
method meant resisting completion, recovery and inner happiness. The shadow of 
'non-recovery' at times perpetuated the search for recovery, as presented by the 
"career widow" who spurred Tania on to "not be like that". The unrecovered identity 
was a negative identity made apparent only by distinguishing behaviours by their 
distance from the norm. 
Kauffman (2008) described how without the possibility of recovery from 
bereavement, identity is in a volatile state of diffusion. With no hope of 
transformation there cannot be any reflexive sense of self. In this way the belief in 
recovery is needed in order to construct a sense of identity, to orient oneself in 
liminality. The 'stuck' griever pollutes these boundaries by being neither in one 
category or the other. The creation of diagnostic categories of 'complicated grief and 
'prolonged grief disorder' have provided a set of individual symptoms, demarcating 
the person who has 'derailed' from the course of normal grief. The category of 
complicated grief thus provides them with an identity and enables them to be located 
somewhere. 
Looking for people who failed to recover was a key aim of this research but it became 
a paradoxical task. During the field work, the subject of 'complicated grief and the 
people who might inhabit such a category felt like chasing 'moving targets' (Hacking, 
2007). When I attended the Cruse Early Intervention Project, which was designed to 
target those at risk of developing 'prolonged grief disorder', I was told that 'everyone' 
in bereavement care knew that complicated grief existed and that only now was it 
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receiving the recognition it deserved. However, I found that this embrace of the 
diagnosis was not reflected by the personal experience of complicated grief. The need 
to identify complicated grief was not it seemed a grassroots movement for 
recognition, indeed whoever was being diagnosed with complicated grief or 
prolonged grief disorder seemed particularly hard to find. In my interviews with 
practitioners I asked how someone with complicated grief might be identified. In the 
responses I received it was hard to pin down any specific characteristics, or the 
characteristics were too wide-ranging: from not taking regular baths to unresolved 
childhood attachment issues. The complicated griever could be just about anyone it 
seemed. 
I soon realised that I was searching for a subject that did not exist, and that in my 
searching I too was becoming complicit with the construction of 'complicated grief. 
When I did make contact with a participant who was likely be considered 
'complicated' and of having 'prolonged grief disorder' (Jamie - whom I discussed in 
Chapter 7, Section 7.4.3), I struggled with situating this participant and their story in 
the 'non-recovered' space of grief. I could only find the complicated grieving 
participant if I described them as such rather than the person identifying with the 
description. In other words, I was 'making up' (Hacking, 1986) the complicated 
griever. I was using the classification to find the person who inhabited the 
classification but could not find the person who fitted within it. 
Complicated grief, like other forms and varieties of grief - anticipatory grief, 
disenfranchised grief, protracted grief - was a category that relied upon a notion of 
'normal' grief. Yet when that normal was destabilised and revealed to be non-existent, 
to declare complicated grief existed became untenable. In the same way, I have 
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argued 'normal grief was a construction of bereavement research and practice, so too 
'complicated grief was a social construction, one historically specific to 
contemporary society. If the categories of complicated grief and prolonged grief 
disorder were not serving a population in need, their purpose was to medicalise some 
forms of grief while normalising others. The act of diagnosing complicated grief 
served to distinguish between two sets of symptoms, ones that were 'complicated' 
and ones that were 'normal'. 
Furthermore, the category of complicated grief and the choice to diagnose it relied on 
a belief that people who are stuck will remain stuck, at least without external 
intervention. The choice of term - 'stuck' - was particularly telling when considered 
within the linear process of grief. Getting stuck was getting in the way, taking too long 
and preventing the normal course. Yet, diagnosing people with complicated grief, in 
effect labelling people as stuck (my data showed 'stuck' was commonly used by 
practitioners to refer to 'complicated grief), was a means to lift people out of 
stuckness, something it was assumed bereaved people could not do for themselves. 
The diagnosis of complicated grief delineated a clear problem to be solved, which 
conceivably, allowed grief to become manageable in the psychotherapeutic setting. 
After all, as acknowledged in my data, bereavement when compared with mental 
illness has no resolution, for the deceased person cannot be returned and the 
bereaved person also does not return back to the life and self they knew before. The 
purpose of the diagnosis of complicated grief was thus twofold: to reiterate grief as a 
normal emotion (with a linear course), and to diagnose, in order to treat those that 
were stuck back to normal in line with the process practitioners described as 
'normalisation'. 
285 
As the bereavement practitioners explained, 'normalising' grief was the key purpose 
of the counselling process. Making grief normal produced safety and provided the 
client the coherence to articulate feelings. Bereavement may cause one to confront 
one's own ambivalence and incoherence, producing the 'discrepancy' (Goffman, 
1963) in performance described above in Section 8.3.3. Bereaved people may fail to 
recover by external estimations but they may also fail in their own ethical standing, 
causing them to act in 'bad faith' (Sartre, 1958). Performing grief according to the 
dominant discourses can thus provide comfort or at least the ability to remain out of 
view of the authorities that seek to manage 'abnormal' grief. The failed performances 
of grief described in my data then were less reflective of inner characteristics of the 
individual psyche but rather a product of the bounded categories that demarcated 
behaviours in normal or pathological forms. Depending on one's perspective, 
bereaved people became normal or abnormal as they moved and negotiated the lines 
of power and discourse across the liminal space of grief. Complicated grief was not a 
thing to be found nor, as practitioners and researchers have claimed, a pathology that 
has always existed waiting to be defined. Rather the boundary between normality 
and abnormality - or recovery and non-recovery - was porous and thin. Normality, it 
emerged, was a performance that was always 'incomplete'. 
8.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have summarised the three central themes of meaning, practices and 
identities that emerged from the data. Making sense of grief and how grief is managed 
has particular salience in a contemporary culture with conflicting understandings 
about, and explanations of, the meaning, role and value of grief. In the opening of this 
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chapter I stated my concern with the contradiction between the increasing public face 
of grief and the persistent belief in grief as a social taboo. The practices people 
undertake reflect this conflict where grief is both a site for work and diScipline, yet 
also one of creativity and free expression. Nevertheless the bereaved person 
continues to pose a dangerous threat to stable boundaries by embodying the 
uncertain and dangerous boundary between life and death. 
Focusing on the relational nature of grief, what has emerged is an embodied subject 
whose boundaries are fluid and porous and formed in relation to others, whether 
those others are alive or dead; problematising the notion of the autonomous, 
bounded body. The bereaved person is shaped and undone by relations with other 
bodies and spaces: intimate, political and social. This body becomes open to 
intervention when it falls on the wrong side of the boundary and becomes a 
negotiated and contested site, ever vulnerable and precarious to the power of others. 
This shapeless evolving 'blob', making its way through the liminal space of grief, 
comes into view as a category or kind, an entity with form, on the boundaries and 
intersections of the lines of power, discourse and truth that lay claim to the body, 
mind or brain of the bereaved person. In these intersections a constant negotiation is 
occurring; how well a person might endure in these categories depends on a capacity 
for performance, how well they can play the game, what space there is for resistance, 
and what opportunities the shifting composition of lines (institutions, individuals, 
groups, discourse) allows. 
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CHAPTER 9 
The other side of recovery 
In this thesis I explored how recovery from grief is defined in theory, policy and 
practice. I also have discussed how participants who experienced bereavement 
negotiated the process of recovery. I used the concept of spatialliminality to explore 
the experience of grief: tracking bereaved people as they navigated their way through 
this virtual space. Within the liminal space of grief I focused on the boundaries 
between recovery and non-recovery and how different indiViduals, organisations and 
institutions established, maintained and negotiated these boundaries. To build my 
argument I drew on literature from multiple diSciplines, namely: sociology, 
anthropology, cultural theory and philosophy. I also argued for the benefits of 
interdisciplinary engagements in the study of grief, in particular the insights from the 
established field of the study of the emotions. However my methodological approach 
has remained rooted in a sociological perspective, indebted to the work of Foucault, 
as I sought to 'problematise' and question taken-for-granted assumptions about grief. 
Ultimately my aim was to explore the possibility of 'non-recovery' and what happens 
when people fail to recover (accordingly this chapter is entitled the 'other side of 
recovery'). From this enquiry emerged three themes: meaning - how people, whether 
expert or lay, made sense of grief; practices - how grief and recovery are managed 
and performed; and identity - what type of identities people came to inhabit such as 
'recovered' or 'complicated griever'. 
Here I draw together key conclusions of the thesis, attending to the aims set out in 
Chapter 1. First, I summarise my argument for an alternative way of theorising grief; 
second, I attend to the concept of 'non-recovery' and explain why the failure to 
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recover matters, and third I conclude my search for the 'complicated griever' by 
questioning the reality in the construction. In the closing sections I describe the 
theoretical and practical implications of this thesis and consider possibilities for 
further study. 
9.1 Theorising grief: Suggesting an alternative view 
9.1.1 Problematising grief as a psychological object of study 
In this thesis I have highlighted the shortcomings in how grief is currently theorised 
through a critique of the overly psychologised view of grief, and have proposed an 
alternative way of theorising grief. I emphasised the need to look beyond the 
individual psyche to how grief is experienced, expressed and lived out in everyday 
life, acknowledging how grief is framed and influenced by political and economic 
concerns. As discussed in Chapter 2, the 'scientific' study of grief is a modern 
development, and over the course of the twentieth century grief steadily became an 
object of psychological study. This shift is clearly demonstrated in the history of 
Cruse, and presented in the work of Amason (1998), where the support offered by 
Cruse, once dedicated to supporting widows with diverse matters such as pensions, 
financial budgeting and finding employment, is now almost solely concerned with the 
facilitation of bereavement counselling for adults and children. With the rise of 
research into grief, institutions and organisations such as Cruse, along with academic 
journals and bereavement counsellor training, were formed that disseminated and 
implemented the findings of this research into practice. 
In effect what was being created was a new discipline and profession, shaping 
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bereavement care into what exists today. As part of this shift, grief became something 
that could be identified in people and measured, with its course defined as 'normal' or 
'abnormal'. In other words, grief became something that could be known, upon which 
the growing field of professionals could make claims to the truth of grief. I have 
argued otherwise that the 'natural course' of grief is a socially constructed notion, 
which is revealed in the discrepancy between changing social norms around grieving 
behaviours and how people perform their grief. Later, a new wave of bereavement 
research critiqued the staged course of grief by taking into account the social and 
cultural elements of the experience of grief. However I argued that these theories -
such as 'continuing bonds' - retained the understanding of grief as a universal 
phenomenon. Despite the changes in how grief has been explained over time, 
sustaining a universal definition of grief assumes to know how all people feel. In this 
thesis I have argued that the divide between 'natural' and 'social' aspects of grief is an 
impossible one. I have argued that this is made apparent once grief is situated within 
the broader interdisciplinary study of the emotions, where the extent to which the 
emotions are shaped by biology or socially formed remains elusive. 
As demonstrated in this thesis, the public space of grief continues to be redefined by 
the interests and policies of different groups, whether from psychiatry, the 
government or indeed the bereaved person his or herself. Over the course of the 
century it was not only grief that began to experience 'professionalisation'. In Chapter 
5 I described historical developments that shifted perceptions of mental distress and 
emotions, for instance the prevalence of shell shock in the First World War and the 
culture of trauma and recovery that followed. Within these shifts, the popUlation's 
emotions and mental state came to be understood as something only experts could 
interpret and manage. Moreover, the rise of psychological self-help and counselling 
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coincided with a professionalisation of the management of death and disposal of the 
dead body. Arguably the change of responsibility in the management of death and 
dying resulted in people becoming deskilled in the management of their own grief. 
Yet at the same time, somewhat contradictory to this shift, the management of grief 
was increasingly framed as an individual responsibility. Rather than viewed as a 
consequence of this structural shift in the management of death and emotions from 
layperson to expert, my data show that struggling to make sense of grief was viewed 
as a failure, or resistance, on behalf of the individual who was 'unwilling' to make the 
right 'choice' to recover. 
This structural shift thus became diagnosed in terms of individual will, where the 
individual became the cause of the problem deemed his or her own. As such, victims 
who resisted recovery were blamed for their failure to do so. People entered into a 
new relationship with their emotions and accepted the role of the expert to guide and 
resolve their inner turmoil, and so the 'need' for bereavement counselling became 
self-fulfilling. Furthermore, as detailed in Chapter 5, within a political and social 
climate that emphasised happy emotions, with mental health defined as a 'burden', 
the mental distress produced by grief became a problem from which people were 
compelled to recover. Recovery became an economic, political and social issue, and 
the rationale for expert intervention into the prevention and resolution of individual 
failures was validated. 
9.1.2 Highlighting relationality and ambivalence 
While the psychological perspective may certainly offer valid insight into the 
individual experience of grief, the dominance of the psychological perspective has, I 
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have sought to demonstrate, transformed grief into a diagnosable entity, made 
measurable and classifiable by psychological tools and tests. As a result, knowledge 
about grief that lies outside the remit of psychological testing has remained out of 
view. I argue one of the key elements of grief omitted in the psychological approach is 
the ability to capture the ambivalence of grief. Specifically, ambivalence creates a 
situation of suspended agency, which is why the concept of liminality captures well 
the ambiguous sense of self the participants described to me. I argue that 
incorporating ambivalence can assist in overcoming the paradox within grief theories 
that promote a linear process to recovery. But more than this, the experience of grief 
as one of suspended agency destabilises the vision of the neo-liberal subject: the 
autonomous individual with the capacity to make rational choices. I have argued that 
the emphasis on a linear course of grief, affirms the notion of personhood at the heart 
of models of recovery, such as those popularised within mental health care services. 
Instead I have attempted to revive the Freudian claims that underpin much of the 
research that has promoted recovery from grief as a process of detachment from the 
deceased person. I have argued that Freud's description of mourning and melancholia 
displays how grief reveals the relational nature of the self. Indeed, grief poses a 
paradox to the psychological understanding of grief as a process because the concept 
of personhood that underpins psychological study fails to allow for a subject who can 
remain attached to persons after their death. Relying on an autonomous, resilient 
subject has meant the grieving subject is an uneasy fit for psychological models of 
personhood, by presenting a subject that both requires attachment to others in order 
to flourish but is devastated by their loss. I argue this is an elaboration of the ways in 
which people attach to one another in living relationships. Drawing from 
psychoanalytic theory, the desire for another person is the desire for the idea or 
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object that they present. After bereavement, the remaining person remains attached 
to the same idea or object. The ambivalence that can be felt in grief is a sign of the 
desire for the lost object. The continued bond is thus evidence of how the bereaved 
person learned to re-accommodate this lost object as an 'absent presence'. Freud's 
argument for detaching from the lost object was then, in a sense, the only way to truly 
recover oneself, if recovery means a return of the self before the attachment. 
However, this emphasis on detachment overlooks the ways in which people are 
reconfigured by their attachments and their relationships with others. It might be 
said then that there is no overcoming the ambivalence of grief, as there is no undoing 
the ways in which one has been reshaped by the person now absent 
My aim in this thesis has been to make central the ambivalent relational subject, at 
times incoherent in his or her attachment to others. The presence of ambivalence 
marks this struggle of not knowing how to let go of the deceased person - or of 
holding on in the wrong way - a struggle recounted in the psychoanalytic writings of 
Freud and Klein. Consequently, I have also pointed out the shortcomings of the 
'continuing bonds' theory of grief that attempted to highlight the ways in which 
relationships persist after death. I argue the continuing bonds theory promotes a one-
sided relationship, which is not so much the continuation of a relationship, but the 
persistence of an idealised vision of the deceased person. The continuing presence of 
the deceased person's identity is a construction that the bereaved person creates and 
adapts to their everyday life, reinforcing the individualistic notion of the subject the 
theory set out to criticise. In Chapter 7, I described how the continuing relationships 
bereaved participants had with their deceased partners and relatives continued to 
develop and change. Further, being able to adapt the deceased person's identity 
meant the living person could regain control over the relationship that was not 
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possible when the person was alive. I argue this was a way of overcoming the 
ambivalence that existed within the relationship before death. 
In this thesis I aimed to demonstrate the importance of analysing grief as a socially 
constructed experience that is influenced as much by government policy as it is 
childhood attachment issues. To counteract the emphasis on psychological 
understandings of grief I expanded my analysis beyond the psychological canon of 
grief literature to examine developments in mental health policy and political and 
economic reforms, concurrently with developments in bereavement care practice and 
research. Only by expanding the types of perspective that come to bear on grief and 
its recovery can grief detach itself from the association with 'naturalness', which 
ironically might allow for the 'reality' of grief to come into view. I argue that 
incorporating a variety of perspectives has enabled a better understanding of the 
paradox of grief, so that the bereaved person is viewed in such a way that 
acknowledges the relational and social nature of subjectivity. It also demonstrates 
how grief - and death - is a continuing concern across the disciplines, and not only 
within psychology. 
9.2 Why 'non-recovery' matters 
In Chapter 1, I described my interest in exploring the experiences of people who fail 
to recover. My aim was to analyse non-recovery as a possibility, to bring the concept 
of not recovering to the fore. In this endeavour I was supported by the archaeological 
and genealogical methodology of Foucault who sought to bring hidden histories into 
view. My aim was not to make a judgment on what non-recovery might involve and 
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how the experience might feel, merely to bring the possibility under analysis. 
Furthermore, in arguing for the possibility of non-recovery my intention was not to 
advocate suffering. The question remains - why highlight the option of failing to 
recover: why does not recovering matter? 
In one respect, the argument was simply theoretical: I wanted to draw the edges 
around the contested meaning of recovery from grief by posing the question of what 
it means to not recover. Yet it was also an ethical stance and a belief that other 
experiences were being concealed by the overemphasis, and dominance of, the 
discourse of recovery. I have argued that recovery discourses privileges happy 
emotions and happy citizens, disregarding and labelling problematic the experience 
of the person I have endeavoured to revive in this thesis: the embodied, relationaUy 
formed person who experiences bereavement, suffering, and periods of unhappiness, 
and who may not perform autonomously but is often ambivalently tied to people 
dead and alive. When recovery promotes a vision of the subject that ignores how 
people exist in relation with one another, not recovering matters because it reveals 
the ways in which people are always already vulnerable and non-sovereign when 
faced with the other; how in a sense people are already incomplete and failing to 
recover when recovery means detachment, self-integration and autonomy. 
I have argued that to recover has become an obligation in a society where grief is 
understood within time limits and where 'prolonged' grief is defined as an economic 
'burden' and a political issue. The complicated, prolonged griever is a problem for the 
normal routines of modern western living that prioritises neo-liberal values such as 
efficiency, productivity and autonomy. In this framework, non-recovery emerges as a 
negative, where not recovering is only ever a rejection of recovery, and consequently 
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what recovery represents. The shape of non-recovery is formed out of the shadow of 
what recovery is not, representing the point of failure or resistance. 
As explained in Chapter 1, Kauffman's (2008) description of 'no recovery' stimulated 
my interest in analysing the concept of non-recovery. In his essay, Kauffman explored 
what it might mean if there was no recovery from grief, proposing a world in which 
no one recovers. No recovery was not a transitional state but a condition of human 
existence. I have also argued that non-recovery is not only a suspension in liminality 
but can become a way of living. While the Grief Recovery Method encouraged 
bereaved people toward the never-ending pursuit of completion, my interest in non-
recovery has been to explore what happens when people remain 'incomplete' or get 
'stuck' in grief. Getting stuck presents a problem to linear models of grief, and to the 
linear course of recovery. The practitioners described the "movement" clients would 
experience as they worked through their grief, and the problematic 'stuckness' clients 
experienced when they were "unwilling" to "move forward". Stuckness was thus 
framed as an unproductive place of "nothingness", yet I have suggested that stuckness 
be viewed not simply as a place out of which to move. 
Grief could force someone to exit his or her sense of 'normality' or assumed world, 
but in turn I suggest the liminal space might become the new 'normal' space. For 
example, in van Gennep (1960) and Turner's (1969) description of liminality, 
liminality is only a phase in the rite of passage that is followed by reintegration in 
society. As I presented in Chapter 7, participants experienced everyday life cyclically 
rather than linearly, where plans and routines were carefully crafted on a day-by-day 
basis, yet the future was hard to manage and envision. The period of 'non-recovery' 
may have been only an impasse, but for many of the bereaved participants grief 
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brought with it a new sense of time and space in which they had learn how to live 
with ambiguity and uncertainty. 
Non-recovery might signal the lack of ritual to guide people back towards recovery. 
But as I have sought to demonstrate throughout this thesis it might also signal the 
reality that what comes to be considered as 'non-recovery' is in constant negotiation 
and liable to shift. Recovery and non-recovery are both temporary trajectories across 
the liminal space that can be renegotiated. Non-recovery is not just a negative space 
of nothingness, nor is it static, but also a place of dynamic movement. As I described 
in Chapters 6 and 7, the 'recovered' and 'unrecovered' identities were equally 
transformations in identities, albeit headed in divergent directions. Recovery is a 
performance, or as Kauffman described a 'symbolic' gesture, that is achieved by 
successfully fulfilling the markers of normality. Yet these markers of normality 
continue to shift and change. Failing to play the game and performing grief the wrong 
way could incur a moral judgement from others, and the bereaved person could find 
himself or herself discredited, on the other side of the boundary. 
Non-recovery in contrast denotes the failure to measure up to the 'good life', 
highlighting how recovery has become an obligation of the individual to live a certain 
way, producing a narrowing of perspective in the different ways people might live out 
their lives. Yet, as my data show, the pursuit of normality or the good life requires 
constant work. In the search for recovery and 'completion' bereaved people were 
driven to write and rewrite 'completion letters', carry out 'grief work' and complete 
the 'tasks' and 'stages', all in the name of their own freedom. Aware of the threat of 
becoming 'discredited' in their performance of grief, bereaved people maintain a 
nervous relation to normal, compelled only by the 'cruel' promise of recovery. 
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9.3 The 'complicated griever': Construct or reality? 
In my introductory aims I stated my intention to explore the debates around 
'complicated' and 'normal' grief that were taking place in grief and bereavement 
research and practice. The increasing psychiatric concern for 'complicated' and 
'prolonged' types of grief I argue marked a key shift in bereavement care and practice. 
What I found, as described in Chapter 6, was that in bereavement practice 
'complicated' grief remained a contested and negotiated term. Rather than a self-
evident diagnosis, practitioner definitions of 'complicated grief were at times 
conflicting, ambiguous and vague. The fact that understandings of grief and recovery 
were undergoing this constant process of negotiation, whether in the counselling 
room or the home of the bereaved person, revealed how grief and recovery were 
open to interpretation. My data show that for some participants what constituted 
grief and recovery was very clear to them, but for others less so. How different people 
within the liminal space of grief drew the boundaries between normal and abnormal 
grieving, successful and unsuccessful recovery thus became a central focus of the 
thesis. 
However, this ambiguity became problematic methodologically as I sought to capture 
the account and experience of the 'complicated griever'. At the outset of the study I 
chose not to focus on one specific type of bereavement As a result the liminal space of 
grief was wide open with which to pose the question: what type of grief gets 
complicated? As mentioned, speaking to practitioners surfaced conflicting definitions, 
or definitions that were subtle and vague. From my data gathered from the accounts 
of bereaved people, grief was something experienced and managed in an individual 
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manner, where identities of 'recovered' were actively pursued, or else a settling into a 
new identity that rested neither in 'recovered' or 'unrecovered'. 
As discussed in Chapter 8, I could only find the 'complicated griever' if I became 
complicit with the diagnostic categories of 'complicated' and 'prolonged' grief. Yet I 
struggled to adhere to the category of complicated grief if it was not an identity with 
which the bereaved person themselves identified. Furthermore, the methods I chose 
to employ - qualitative interviews - required participants who could articulate their 
experiences of bereavement and feelings of grief. The ability to construct a narrative 
around one's feelings of grief enabled a level of coherence in the participants' 
accounts, even if that narrative continued to change. I recognised following my 
interview with Jamie, who refused to be recorded and who struggled with knowing 
what to say in the interview setting, that the complicated griever rested in these 
silences, and the inability to articulate their experience. 
What initially felt like a failure to fulfil my research aims soon became a piece of data 
in its own right in that I realised that the dividing lines between normal and abnormal 
while seemingly definite and clear in theory were conflicted and ambiguous in 
practice. But further, my own choice of method was inadequate in capturing the 
experience of complicated grief that out of necessity was constructed on the silence of 
the complicated griever. The psychiatric diagnosis of 'prolonged grief disorder' 
drafted in the ICD-ll, and the proposal of 'persistent complex bereavement disorder' 
in the DSM-S, are identified by external symptoms and self-report measures that ask 
respondents to identify with pre-determined statements. Perhaps by employing these 
tools I could have identified among the partiCipants those at 'risk' of developing, or 
experiencing, complicated grief. As discussed in Chapter 8, Section 8.4.3, the diagnosis 
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of complicated grief makes the problem of grief manageable and provides a clinical 
solution. But without these tools - and the willingness to use them - I alternatively 
sought to question the role of the boundary between 'normal' and 'complicated' grief 
and how the boundary frames grief into two contrasting experiences. Both what 
happens in policy and practice and how people make sense of grief in their own 
words construct the boundary between normal and complicated grief either by 
reaffirming or rejecting it. 
I argue that whatever the 'reality' of the experience of the complicated griever it 
remains in the silences behind the discourse around grief. However, in encouraging 
the silenced into view the researcher faces the problem, as I did, of reviving and thus 
constructing a silent consciousness that did not already exist. The articulation of 
previously hidden silence is, I suggest, changed in the act of narration, and further 
transformed in the researcher's interpretation and representation of those stories. In 
other words, the research process can make the abstract become concrete, but in 
what form stories are produced requires vigilance in order to avoid the reinforcing of 
oppressive discourses. Ultimately as researcher in this enquiry I played an equal role 
in the construction of the complicated griever, by being forced to assume that 
complicated grief was a quantifiable and thus researchable phenomenon. What 
remains to be understood is what happens when people come to identify with the 
category of complicated griever and speak from a place of complicated grief. How 
people might inhabit the diagnosis will impact on how complicated grief continues to 
be defined and measured. Furthermore, once a person speaks as a 'complicated 
griever' their identity will be reconstructed in the telling of their account. This might 
cause the person to move across the boundary from 'normal' to 'complicated', and 
back to 'normal'. But, I suggest, on what side of the boundary the person is located 
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will not only be a judgment of the person who speaks. 
9.4 Limitations of the research 
As with predominately quantitative methods of studying grief, a qualitative approach 
has its own limitations. The liminal space of grief is without clear boundaries and the 
tools at my disposal captured only a small snapshot. However, as the aim of this 
research was not to reflect a true reality but destabilise existing claims, it has been 
my task to point towards alternative modes of thinking about grief that can enable 
further research with scope for employing more and different methods. 
Focusing on any type of bereavement has its gains and shortcomings. I did not want 
to accept the existence of a 'hierarchy' of grief and reaffirm it by choosing one type of 
bereavement over another, and presume one form of bereavement would be more 
likely to predispose a person to complicated grief. I wanted to explore whether any 
form of bereavement can become complicated depending on an array of factors: 
practical, psychological and sociological. For example, in this thesis I did not want to 
claim the death of a child is the 'worst' form of bereavement. I wanted to give voice to 
those 'natural' bereavements too, of older people bereaved of their partner, which as 
revealed in Chapter 7, posed just as much distress for the bereaved person. 
The absence of a particular type of bereavement on which to focus my research posed 
a methodological problem in deciding who to recruit. It also meant that the data 
gathered from the participants included in this study do not speak to a particular field 
of grief and bereavement research. However, in this thesis I have sought to actively 
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avoid making general claims about grief, and further to avoid the segmenting of grief 
experiences found in bereavement research. The search for generalisability and 
'validity' in grief research has encouraged a need for scientific accuracy in studies of 
grief. However, I have argued that this search is reliant upon an unfounded 
assumption of the natural course of grief. I argue the 'natural' course of grief has been 
inextricably intertwined with 'normal' societal expectations of grief. The elaboration 
of universal claims to grief and grouping grief into types, I argue, has not lead to the 
'truth' of the experience of grief but rather constructed further psychologically 
informed norms, epitomised in the psychological construction of 'complicated grief. 
A further limitation of this study, as described above, was my apparent 'failure' to find 
the 'complicated griever'. However, as explained much like my decision to not explore 
a particular type of bereavement, this limitation, meant I could examine how grief 
boundaries and categories were constructed. Further, it allowed me to identify how 
grief itself had been constructed, as a staged process for example, which was not so 
much a construction of reality but a construction framed by the methods used to 
study grief, facilitated by the expanding practice of what became known as 
bereavement care. 
9.5 Implications for further research and practice 
The debates around the 'medicalisation' of grief persist as the leo drafts its eleventh 
edition with the inclusion of 'prolonged grief disorder' (PGD), suggesting the nature 
of bereavement care and practice will continue to evolve in the UK. Further research 
is required to track these changes as they take place on a political and policy level, 
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examining how bereavement care becomes situated in ongoing changes to mental 
health care. As PGD becomes a recognisable diagnosis it will be crucial to explore 
whether and how people come to receive a diagnosis of PGD, investigating the points 
of contestation that may arise in the act of diagnosis. It is not clear how people will 
respond to such a diagnosis, and whether people might come to embrace the label as 
a legitimate form of identification. Will a diagnosis of PGD enable people to make 
sense of difficult grieving experiences? Will people turn more towards medical 
understandings of grief rather than literature, poems and stories (as I described in 
Chapter 5)? Certainly contemporary researchers are actively pursuing the biological 
underpinnings of grief, undertaking neuroscientific studies to understand grief in 
terms of brain chemicals (O'Connor, 2005, 2012). The excitement around exploring 
neuroscience to help explain mental disorders suggests that the focus on the brain as 
supplying the answers to grief will only increase (Rose, 2013; Fitzgerald & Callard, 
2014). The study of grief thus continues to be redefined, albeit from a scientific or 
professional pOint of view. Examining the views and experiences of the bereaved 
person will be crucial to understanding the implications of these developments, 
particularly those considered to be experiencing 'complicated' or 'prolonged' grief. 
Furthermore, research needs to attend to the types of treatment people will undergo 
to 'recover' from PGD and complicated grief. There would need to be consistency 
across the bereavement care organisations in order to implement such treatment, a 
consistency, as described in Chapter 6, which is currently lacking. Drawing from my 
own data on bereavement care practitioners, an increasing emphasis on psychiatric 
diagnosis may serve to widen the gap between the therapeutic approach of a person-
centred volunteer-delivered bereavement counselling service and a clinical model of 
bereavement care. This poses the wider question of who has responsibility over the 
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management of grief. The responsibility for 'complicated grief is clearly situated in 
the hands of the professionals, and yet the emphasis on grief as 'natural' has meant 
historically, bereavement care has separated itself from a 'medical model'. I suspect 
that with the introduction and implementation of psychiatric diagnosis of PGD that 
the purpose and goals of bereavement care will become increasingly uncertain and 
divided. 
I have argued my data show that psychological approaches have dominated the 
experience and recovery from grief, which consequently has reduced the possibility 
for other ways of understanding and managing grief. But further, I have questioned 
the need to manage grief in the first place. Drawing out the implications for practice 
from this thesis, therefore, rests on the hesitancy to make universal claims about grief 
and what should be done about recovering from it. Yet clearly there is a need to 
address individual and collective suffering in a modern western society such as in 
England, where its population arguably are experiencing conflict and confusion over 
how best to live with feelings of grief. The bereavement counsellors I met at Caris 
bereavement service presented a model of care that benefited by being an open-
ended service that allowed for clients to 'work through' the difficulties of grief, and 
was facilitated by counsellors who were trained in a variety of approaches which 
meant grief was understood and dealt with from a wider perspective. While these 
factors enabled, in my view, a better approach within the already existing aims and 
intentions of bereavement counselling, this thesis has argued for a need to challenge 
and critique the constructed need and obligation to recover, around which 
therapeutic discourses and interventions also have been constructed to remedy. 
Acknowledging the possibility of non-recovery from a practice perspective involves 
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acknowledging that the method can fail the person. Shifting responsibility away from 
the individual, and moving away from describing recovery as a result of the 
'willingness' of the client, I argue is crucial for promoting a model of care in 
bereavement services, rather than a (superficial) over-emphasis on individual choice 
(Mol, 2008). To arrive at this point practitioners and the models they employ need to 
acknowledge that a failure to fit the model is not necessarily a failure to achieve 
recovery, or a form of resistance. Bereavement care practice needs to become aware 
of how managing grief is linked to societal norms and political and economic 
concerns that do not necessarily have the interests of the bereaved person at its 
centre. However, as I have demonstrated in this thesis the boundary between 
individual and political concerns is increasingly unclear, as contemporary 
government policy has continued to utilise a discourse of individual well-being, which 
in principle aims to place the individual at the heart of policy. 
Only by acknowledging the ways in which recovery has become an obligation of the 
modern individual, along with an array of other modern demands such as 
maintaining happy emotions and being a hard-working citizen, can new ways of 
practicing, living and experiencing grief be considered. When recovery, completion 
and happiness are no longer positioned as the ever out-of-reach goal to which each 
individual is encouraged to desire and achieve, can bereavement care practice 
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Appendix 2 Participant information sheet: Practitioner version 
When grief gets complicated: A qualitative study into recovery following 
bereavement in the UK. 
Participant information sheet 
Purpose of the Study 
The aim of this research is to explore how people recover from grief following 
bereavement. This research is investigating bereavement care services in the UK and 
the experiences of people who have been bereaved. This project is being carried out 
as part of my doctoral research at The Open University. 
Why have I been invited to take part? 
This project is investigating how recovery from grief is facilitated by bereavement 
care practitioners 
What does it involve? 
A one-to-one interview which should last between one and one and half hours and 
will be tape-recorded if you are happy to do this. You may end the interview at any 
point if you wish. These are some of the areas to be covered at the interview: 
• What approach do you take to grief and bereavement? 
• What sort of treatments or therapies (if any) are typically used? 
• In your own practice, what constitutes a successful recovery? 
• What are the identifiable signs that someone is struggling to recover? 
• What course of action would you take if a person is showing symptoms of 
struggling to recover from grief? 
HoW will my information be kept confidential? 
Each person that takes part in this study will be asked to sign a consent form. Your 
views and contributions will be treated confidentially. All materials will only be 
discussed with my supervisors Dr Carol Komaromy and Dr Sam Murphy (contact 
details at bottom). 
Interviews will be tape recorded and transcribed. All names and identifying features 
will be anonymised and safely stored on password protected, encrypted computers. 
Any hard copies of information will be safely stored in locked cabinets. The data 
collected from this study will be anonymised and kept for up to 15 years and will be 
securely stored at all times after which all information will be destroyed. 
What will happen if I don't want to carry on with the study? 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you 
will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. If 
yOU decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a 
reason. Your participation is voluntary and you may withdraw from the study at any 
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point. If you withdraw following any interviews the data that you have contributed 
will be destroyed. 
What are the possible benefits to taking part? 
This research seeks to illuminate the role of practitioners in helping people recover 
from grief. Further this research aims to highlight the voice of the person who has 
been bereaved and their experiences of recovery. 
Does this research conform to ethical guidelines? 
This study has been approved on ethical grounds by The Open University Human 
Research Ethics Committee. 
What will happen to the results of this study? 
This research will contribute to my PhD thesis. I hope to publish my research in 
relevant journals as well as presenting my findings at conferences related to my topic 
area. The data collected may also be used for book chapters or a monograph. Direct 
quotations may be included in the publication of the research but no details of 
individuals or institutions will be identifiable. 
Further information and contact details 
I hope that you wish to take part in this research. Please do not hesitate to contact me 
if you would like to discuss any aspect of this research or require further information 
before agreeing to take part. I may be contacted bye-mail or phone, details of which 
are supplied below: 
Name: Caroline Pearce 




supervisors contact details: 
Dr Carol Komaromy: Faculty of Health and Social Care, Walton Hall, The Open 
University, Milton Keynes, MK7 6AA. 
Telephone no: _ Email: 
Dr Sam Murphy: Faculty of Health and Social Care, Walton Hall, The Open University, 
Milton Keynes, MK7 6AA 
Telephone no: _ Email: 
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Appendix 3 Participant information sheet: Client version 
When grief gets complicated: A qualitative study into recovery following 
bereavement in the UK. 
Participant information sheet 
purpose of the Study 
The aim of this research is to explore how people recover from grief following 
bereavement. This research is investigating bereavement care services in the UK and 
the experiences of people who have been bereaved. This project is being carried out 
as part of my doctoral research at The Open. University. 
Why have I been invited to take part? 
This project is interested in experiences of living with and recovering from grief. 
What does it involve? 
A one-to-one interview, which should last between one and one and half hours and 
will be tape-recorded if you are happy to do this. In the interview I will be asking 
questions about your experiences of grief and bereavement and feelings about 
recovery. You may end the interview at any point if you wish. During interview you 
are free to not answer any questions if you feel uncomfortable. 
HoW will my information be kept confidential? 
Each person that takes part in this study will be asked to sign a consent form. Your 
viewS and contributions will be treated confidentially. All materials will only be 
discussed with my supervisors Dr Carol Komaromy and Dr Sam Murphy (contact 
details at bottom). 
Interviews will be tape recorded and transcribed. All names and identifying features 
will be anonymised and safely stored on password protected, encrypted computers. 
Any hard copies of information will be safely stored in locked cabinets. The data 
collected from this study will be anonymised and kept for up to 15 years and will be 
securely stored at all times after which all information will be destroyed. 
What will happen if I don't want to carry on with the study? 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part If you do decide to take part you 
will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. If 
yoU decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a 
reason. Your participation is voluntary and you may withdraw from the study at any 
point If you withdraw following any interviews the data that you have contributed 
will be destroyed. 
What are the possible benefits to taking part? 
This research seeks to highlight the unheard stories of bereavement and your 
experiences of recovering from grief. 
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Does this research conform to ethical guidelines? 
This study has been approved on ethical grounds by The Open University Human 
Research Ethics Committee. 
What will happen to the results of this study? 
This research will contribute to my PhD thesis. I hope to publish the research in 
relevant journals as well as presenting my findings at conferences related to the topic 
area. The data collected may also be used for book chapters or a monograph. Direct 
quotations may be included in the publication of the research but no details of 
individuals or institutions will be identifiable. 
Further information and contact details 
I hope that you wish to take part in this research. Please do not hesitate to contact me 
if you would like to discuss any aspect of this research or require further information 
before agreeing to take part. I may be contacted bye-mail or phone, details of which 
are supplied below: 
Name: Caroline Pearce 




. supervisors contact details: 
Dr Carol Komaromy 




Dr Sam Murphy 





Appendix 4 Consent form 
Consent form 
Name of Project: When grief gets complicated: A qualitative study into recovery 
following bereavement in the UK. 
Name of Project Researcher: Caroline Pearce 
Please read the following and sign. 
I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above study. I 
have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had 
these answered to my satisfaction. 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I can withdraw at any time 
without giving any reason. 
I have been assured that my confidentiality will be protected as specified in the 
information sheet. 
I agree that the information that I provide can be used for educational or research 
purposes, including publication. 
--------------------------------------
Name of participant Date Signature 
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Appendix 5 Tables of participants 
Table 1 Bereavement care professional participants 
Name Identifier Role OrgilllislItion 
Wendy BCl Bereavement service Caris Islington bereavement 
counsellor/coordinator service 
Linda BC2 Bereavement service Caris Islington bereavement 
counsellor/coordinator service 
Daniela BC3 Bereavement counsellor Caris Islington bereavement 
service 
Matthew BC4 Bereavement counsellor Caris Islington bereavement 
service 
Claire BCS Bereavement counsellor Caris Islington bereavement 
service 
Kelly BC6 Bereavement counsellor Caris Islington bereavement 
service 
Sarah EIPI Early Intervention Project Cruse . 
Manager 
Jane EIP2 Early Intervention Project Cruse 
volunteer 
Susan BSWI Bereavement support Cruse 
worker 
Marion BSW2 Bereavement support St Christopher's Hospice, 
volunteer Bromley 
I""" Tony BC7 Trauma counsellor, Senior BACP 
supervisor for hospice St Christopher's Hospice, 
bereavement service Bromley 
I'"""Ellen GRM Managing Director Grief Recovery UK 
-pamela BSC Bereavement service Local bereavement service in 





















I\"l' ,It h TV!ll' ()! IWrL',l\'l'llll'llt Ll'll~tllll! 
IIItl'rVIl'W (VI S.) hl'll',l\'l'llll'llt 
46 Husband fell out of a window 4 years 
41 Husband died of sudden brain 2 years 
haermorrage 
51 Husband died suddenly of ruptured 2.5 years 
aorta 
32 Mother died after long illness 4 years 
34 Sister died in accident when he was 16 18 years 
Mother died when he was 24 10 years 
64 Wife died after long illness 1 year 
63 Wife died of cancer 9 months 
63 Husband died of heart attack 26 years 
64 Grandfather when 7 years old 57 years 
Parents later in life 
Participants from mental health services 
Ex-mental health service user. Former Recovery 
College peer worker 
Current mental health service user 
Worked on women's suicide crisis help line 
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Appendix 6 Interview schedule 
Interview schedule - Practitioners 
What approach do you take to grief and bereavement? 
• Is your approach to practice influenced by any theories and perspectives? 
• How do these affect your practice? 
What sort of treatments or therapies (if any) are typically used in your practice? 
• What is the goal/aim of each treatment? 
• Do treatments vary from each individual patient and in what ways? 
In your own practice what constitutes a successful recovery? 
• What are the identifiable signs and symptoms of a successful recovery? 
• Can recovery be measured, and if so how? 
What are the identifiable signs and symptoms that someone is struggling to recover 
from grief? 
• Are these psychological, somatic or socialj environmental symptoms or a 
combination of all three? 
• What are the psychological symptoms? 
• What are the somatic symptoms? 
• What are the social/environmental factors? 
• Is the length of time from bereavement significant? 
What course of action would you take if a person is showing symptoms of struggling 
to recover from grief? 
• Ask for examples 
• When is referral necessary? 
• Are there instances in which it is necessary to diagnose bereaved patients, for 
example as having a form of complicated grief, depression or anxiety disorder? 
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Interview schedule - service users/clients 
Can you tell me about your experiences of using (name of mental 
health/bereavement) service? 
Did you (a) seek out help independently or were you (b) referred by a GP/healthcare 
professional for further support? 
a) When did you seek help for dealing with your grief? 
• Can you explain what influenced your decision to seek out help and support? 
b) When were you referred for mental health/bereavement services? 
• Why were you ref~rred to mental health/bereavement services? 
• Who referred you? 
• How did you feel about being referred? 
What sort of activities have you been involved in to help manage your feelings of 
grief? 
• In what ways do you feel this involvement affected your experience of grief? 
What types of therapies (if any) have you received? 
• In what ways do you feel the therapy has affected your experience of grief? 
What sort oftreatments (if any) have you received? 
• In what ways do you feel this treatment has affected your experience-of grief? 
Have you received a clinical diagnosis, for example, complicated grief, depression or 
anxiety disorder in the course of being treated and/or receiving care for your grief? 
• (if yes) What were the reasons for this decision? 
• Who made the diagnosis? 
• (if no) Do you think that there is (or has been) a situation where such a 
diagnosis would be helpful to you? 
From your own experience what do you think constitutes a successful recovery from 
grief? 
What are your feelings about the term 'recovery'? 
Do you feel recovery should involve help or intervention from bereavement care 
professionals? 
• If yes - In what ways? 
• If no - What sort of role should they play (if any)? 
319 
Bibliography 
Ahmed, S. (2004) The cultural politics of emotion, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press. 
Ahmed, S. (2010) The promise of happiness, Durham and London: Duke University 
Press. 
American Psychological Association (2013) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders, 5th edn, Washington: American Psychological Association. 
Anderson, B. (2009) 'Affective atmospheres', Emotion, Space and Society, 2, 77-81. 
Anderson, M. (2001) "'You have to get inside the person" or making grief private: 
Image and metaphor in the therapeutic reconstruction of bereavement', in 
Hockey, J. Katz, J. and Small, N. (eds), Grief, mourning and death ritual (pp. 135-
143), Buckingham: Open University Press. 
Anthony, W. A. (1993) 'Recovery from mental illness: The guiding vision of the mental 
health service system in the 1990s', Psychosocial Rehabilitation Journal, 16(4), 
11-23. 
Appignanesi, L. (2008) Mad, bad and sad: A history of women and the mind doctors 
from 1800 to the present, London: Virago. 
Archer, J. (1999) The nature of grief The evolution and psychology of reactions to loss, 
New York: Routledge. 
Arnason, A. (1998) "Feel the pain": Death, grief and bereavement counselling in the 
North east of England, Durham University, Unpublished Doctoral thesis. 
Arnason, A. (2000) 'Biography, bereavement, story', Mortality, 5(2), 189-204. 
Arnason, A. (2001) 'Experts of the Ordinary: Bereavement counselling in Britain', 
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 7(2),299-313. 
Arnason, A. (2007) "'Fall apart and put yourself together again": The anthropology of 
320 
death and bereavement counselling in Britain', Mortality, 12(1), 48-65. 
Arnason, A. (2012) 'Individuals and relationships: On the possibilities and 
impossibilities of presence', in Davies, D. and Park, C. W. (eds) Emotion, Identity 
and Death (pp. 59-70). Surrey: Ashgate. 
Arnason, A., and Hafsteinsson, S. 8. (2003) 'The revival of death: Expression, expertise 
and governmentality', The British Journal of Sociology, 54(1), 43-62. 
Atkinson, P. (1990) The ethnographic imagination, London: Routledge. 
Balk, D. E. (2004) 'Recovery following bereavement: An examination of the concept', 
Death Studies, 28(4),361-374. 
Balk, D. E. (2008) 'A modest proposal about bereavement and recovery', Death 
Studies, 32(1), 84-93. 
Barbalet, J. M. (2001) Emotion, social theory, and social structure: A macrosociological 
approach, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Barrett, L. F. (2006) 'Are emotions natural kinds?', Perspectives on Psychological 
Science, 1 (1), 28-58. 
Barthes, R. (1967) 'The death of the author', in Dayton, E. (ed) Art and interpretation: 
An anthology of readings in aesthetics and the pholosophy of art (pp. 383-386). 
Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview. 
Barthes, R. (2011) Mourning diary, London: Notting Hill Editions. 
Bennett, A. (2016) 'Where death doesn't mean goodbye', National Geographic, April, 
53-67. 
Bennett, G. and Bennett, K. M. (2000) 'The presence of the dead: An empirical study', 
Mortality, 5(2), 139-157. 
Bereavement Services Association and Cruse Bereavement Care. (2013) Bereavement 
Care Service Standards. BSA & Cruse. 
Beriant, L. (2008) 'Thinking about feeling historical', Emotion, Space and Society, 1(1), 
321 
4-9. 
Berlant, L. (2011) Cruel Optimism, Durham and London: Duke University Press. 
Berlant, L. and Edelman, L. (2014) Sex, or the unbearable, Durham and London: Duke 
University Press. 
Binkley, S. (2009) 'Governmentality, temporality and practice: From the 
individualization of risk to the 'contradictory movements of the soul", Time & 
Society, 18(1), 86-105. 
Binkley, S. (2011) 'Happiness, positive psychology and the program of neoliberal 
governmentality', Subjectivity, 4(4), 371-394. 
Binnie, J. (2015) 'Do you want therapy with that? A critical account of working within 
IAPT', Mental Health Review Journal, 20(2), 79-83. 
Blackman, L. (2013) 'Habit and affect: Revitalizing a forgotten history', Body & Society, 
19(2-3),186-216. 
Bleyen, J. (2009) 'Defining and conceptualizing death', in Bryant, C. D. and Peck, D. L. 
(eds) Encylopedia of death and the human experience. Thousand Oaks, 'California: 
Sage. 
Bloch, M. (2011) 'The blob', Anthropology of This Century, October(l). 
Bloch, M. and Parry, J. (1982) 'Introduction: Death and the regeneration of life' in 
Death and the regeneration of life (pp. 1-44). Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
8MJ (2013) 'Medicalising and medicating unhappiness', British Medical Journal, 
347(December),345-348. 
Boelen, P. A. and Prigerson, H. G. (2012) 'Commentary on the inclusion of Persistent 
Complex Bereavement-Related Disorder in DSM-S', Death Studies, 36(9), 771-
794. 
Bonanno, G. A. (2009) The other side of sadness: What the new science of bereavement 
322 
tells us about life after loss, New York: Basic Books. 
Bonanno, G. A and Keltner, D. (1997) 'Facial expression of emotion and the course of 
conjugal bereavement', Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 106, 126-137. 
Bonanno, G. A, Moskowitz, J. T., Papa, A and Folkman, S. (2005) 'Resilience to loss in 
bereaved spouses, bereaved parents, and bereaved gay men', Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 88(5),827-43. 
Borgstrom, E. (2015) 'Planning for an (un)certain future: Choice within English end-
of-life care', Current Sociology, 63(5), 700-713. 
Borgstrom, E. and Walter, T. (2015) 'Choice and compassion at the end of life: A 
critical analysis of recent English policy discourse', Social Science & Medicine, 
136-137,99-105. 
Bourdieu, P. (1990) The logic of practice, Stanford, California: Stanford University 
Press. 
Bowlby, J. (1979) The making and breaking of affectional bonds, London: Tavistock. 
Bowlby, J. (1980) Attachment and loss volume III: Loss, sadness and depression, 
London: Hogarth Press. 
Bradotti, R. (1994) Nomadic subjects: Embodiment and sexual difference in 
contemporary feminist theory, New York: Columbia University Press. 
Braslow, J. T. (2013) 'The manufacture of recovery', Annual Review of Clinical 
Psychology, 9, 781-809. 
Brennan, T. (2004) The transmission of affect, New York: Cornell University Press. 
Brown, P. (1995) 'Naming and framing: The social construction of diagnosis and 
illness', Journal of Health and Social Behavior, Extra Issue, 34-52. 
Bryant, R. A (2012) 'Grief as a psychiatric disorder', The British Journal of Psychiatry: 
The Journal of Men tal Science, 201(1), 9-10. 
Buckle, J. L., Dwyer, S. C. and Jackson, M. (2010) 'Qualitative bereavement research: 
323 
Incongruity between the perspectives of participants and research ethics 
boards', InternationalJournal of Social Research Methodology, 13(2),111-125. 
Bury, M. (2001) 'Illness narratives: Fact or fiction?', Sociology of Health & JIlness, 
23(3), 263-285. 
Butler, J. (1997) Excitable speech: A politics of the performative, New York: Routledge. 
Butler, J. (2003) 'Afterword: After loss, what then?' in Eng, D. L. and Kazanjian, D. 
(Eds.) Loss: The politics of mourning (pp. 467-474). Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Butler, J. (2004) Precarious life: The powers of mourning and violence, London: Verso. 
Butler, J. (2010) Frames ofwar: When is life grievable?, London: Verso. 
Byrne, B. (2003) 'Reciting the self: Narrative representations of the self in qualitative 
interviews', Feminist Theory, 4(1),29-49. 
Cabinet Office (2010) 'PM speech on wellbeing', 25th November 2010. Full speech 
available from: https://www.gov.uk/governmentlspeeches/pm-speech-on-
wellbeing (Accessed 6 June 2016). 
Camus, A. (1942) The Outsider, London: Penguin. 
Camus, A. (1982) 'Afterword' In The Outsider, 2nd edn, London: Penguin. 
Carel, H. (2007) 'Death and the Other: The ambivalence of mourning', in Kasher, A. 
(ed) Dying and death: Inter-disciplinary perspectives (pp. 81-90). Amsterdam: 
Rodopi. 
CARIS Islington (2010) Influencing change: Bereavement & homelessness, vulnerable 
people coping and struggling with loss, London: CARIS. 
Carson, J., Holloway, F., Wolfson, P. and McNary, M. (eds). (2010) Recovery Journeys: 
Stories of coping with mental health problems, South London and Maudsley NHS 
Foundation Trust. 
Caruth, C. (1995) Trauma: Explorations in memory, Baltimore: John Hopkins 
324 
University Press. 
Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust (2014) Recovery Stories, 
London: CNWL NHS Trust. 
Charmaz, K. (1999) 'Stories of suffering: Subjective tales and research narratives', 
Qualitative Health Research, 9(3), 362-382. 
Charmaz, K. (2004) 'Premises, principles, and practices in qualitative research: 
Revisiting the foundations', Qualitative Health Research, 14(7),976-93. 
Charmaz, K. and Milligan, M. J. (2006) 'Grief, in Stets, J. E. and Turner, J. H. (eds), The 
Handbook of the Sociology of Emotions (pp. 516-538). New York: Springer. 
Charon, R. (2001) 'Narrative medicine', Jama, 286(15),1897. 
Charon, R. (2006) Narrative medicine: Honoring the stories of illness, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Clandinin, J. D. and Connelly, M. F. (2000) Narrative Inquiry: Experience and story in 
qualitative research, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Collins, N. (2012) 'Hans Rausing hid wife's body as he could not cope with her dying', 
The Telegraph, 14 December. 
Costa, L., Landry, D., Mcfarlane, 8. and Church, K. (2012) 'Recovering our stories: A 
small act of resistance', Studies in Social Justice, 6(1),85-101. 
Coutts, M. (2014) The Iceberg: A memoir, London: Atlantic books. 
Cromby, J., Diamond, 8., Moloney, P., Priest, P. and Soffe-Caswell, J. (2008) 'Our big fat 
multi-million pound psychology experiment', Clinical Psychology Forum, 181, 
34-37. 
Cromby, J. and Willis, M. E. H. (2013) 'Nudging into subjectification: Governmentality 
and psychometrics', Critical Social Policy, 34(2),241-259. 
csordas, T. J. (1994) (ed) 'Introduction: The body as representation and being-in-the-
world', in Embodiment and experience: The existential ground of culture and self 
325 
(pp. 1-26). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Csordas, T. j. (2008) 'Intersubjectivity and intercorporeality', Subjectivity, 22(1), 110-
121. 
Damasio, A. R. (1994) Descartes' error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain, New 
York: Putnam. 
Darwin, C. (1872) The expression of the emotions in man and animals, London: john 
Murray. 
Davies, D. J. (2005) A brief history of death, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Davies, D. j. (2011) Emotion, identity, and religion: Hope, reciprocity, and otherness, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Davies, W. (2015) The happiness industry: How the government and big business sold 
us well-being, London: Verso. 
Deegan, P. (1996) 'Recovery as a journey of the heart', Psychiatric Rehabilitation 
Journal, 19(3), 91-97. 
Deleuze, G. and Parnet, C. (1990) Negotiations 1972-1990, New York:- Columbia 
University Press. 
Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (1984) Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and schizophrenia, 
London: Athlone Press. 
Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (1988) A thousand plateaus: Capitalism and schizophrenia, 
London: Continuum. 
Dennis, M. R. (2008) 'The grief account: Dimensions of a contemporary bereavement 
genre', Death Studies, 32(9), 801-836. 
Department of Health (2001) The journey to recovery - The government's vision for 
mental health care, London: Department of Health. 
Department of Health (2011a) No health without mental health: A cross-government 
mental health outcomes strategy for people of all ages, London: Department of 
326 
Health. 
Department of Health. (2011b) Talking therapies: A four-year plan of action - A 
supporting document to No health without mental health: A cross- government 
mental health outcomes strategy for people of all ages, London: Department of 
Health 
Department of Health (2016) 'Prime Minister pledges a revolution in mental health 
treatment', 11 January. Full speech availiable from: 
https: //www.~ov.uk/~overnment!news/prime-minister-pledges-a-revolution­
in-mental-health-treatment (Accessed 6 June 2016). 
Derrida, J. (2001) The work of mourning, Brault, P. A. and Naas, M. (eds), London: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Descartes, R. (1649 [1989]) The passions of the soul, (trans. S. H. Voss), Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Company. 
Didion, J. (2006) Theyear of magical thinking, London: Harper Perennial. 
Diener, E. (1994) 'Measuring subjective well-being: Progress and oppbrtunities', 
Social Indicators Research, 28, 35-89. 
Dixon, T. (2012) "'Emotion": The history of a keyword in crisis', Emotion Review, 4(4), 
338-344. 
Doka, K. J. (ed) (1989) Disenfranchised grief: Recognising hidden sorrow, Lexington, 
Mass: Lexington Books. 
Dolan, P. (2011) 'Absolute beginners: Behavioural economics and human happiness', 
paper presented at Department of Social Policy Inaugural Lecture. London 
School of Economics, 8 February. 
Douglas, M. (1966) Purity and danger: An analysis of concepts of pollution and taboo, 
London: Penguin. 
Duncan, G. (2008) 'Should happiness-maximization be the goal of government?', 
327 
Journal of Happiness Studies, 11 (2), 163-178. 
Durkheim, E. (1915) The elementary forms of the religious li/e, London: George Allen 
and Unwin. 
Dying Matters (2014) Public attitudes to bereavement survey, London: Com Res. 
Easterlin, R. A. and Angelescu, L. (2009) 'Happiness and growth the world over: Time 
series evidence on the happiness-income paradox', The Institute for the Study of 
Labor (IZA), Discussion paper no. 4060, March. 
Eggers, D. (2000) A heartbreaking work of staggering genius, New York: Simon & 
Schuster. 
Ehrenreich, 8. (2010) Smile or die: How positive thinking fooled America & the world. 
London: Grant. 
Ekman, P. (1992) 'An argument for basic emotions', Cognition and Emotion, 6(3/4), 
169-200. 
Ekman, P. (1993) 'Facial expression and emotion', American Psychologist, 48(4),384-
392. 
Eliot, T. (1932) 'The bereaved family', Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, 160, 184-190. 
Engel, G. (1961) 'Is grief a disease?', Psychosomatic Medicine, 23,18-22. 
Eyre, A. (2009) 'Collective loss and community resilience after September 11', in 
Earle, S., Bartholomew, C., & Komaromy, C. (eds) Making sense of death, dying 
and bereavement (pp. 183-6). London: Sage and The Open University. 
Field, N. P. and Filanosky, C. (2009) 'Continuing bonds, risk factors for complicated 
grief, and adjustment to bereavement', Death Studies, 34(1), 1-29. 
Fitzgerald, D. and Callard, F. (2014) 'Social science and neuroscience beyond 
interdisciplinarity: Experimental entanglements', Theory, Culture & Society, 
32(1),3-32. 
328 
Foer, J. (2005) Extremely loud & incredibly close, Boston, MA: Mariner Books. 
Foote, C. E. and Frank, A. W. (1999) 'Foucault and therapy: The disciplining of grief, in 
Chambon, A. S., Irving, A. and Epstein, L. (eds) Reading Foucault/or social work 
(pp. 157-188). New York: Columbia University Press. 
Footman, E. B. (1998) 'The loss adjusters', Mortality, 3(3),291-295. 
Foucault, M. (1970) The archaeology o/knowledge, New York: Pantheon. 
Foucault, M. (1971) 'Nietzsche, genealogy, history' in Rabinow, P. (ed) The Foucault 
Reader: An introduction to Foucault's thought (pp. 76-100). London: Penguin. 
Foucault, M. (1973 [1963]) The birth 0/ the clinic: An archaeology 0/ medical 
perception. London: Routledge. 
Foucault, M. (1975) Discipline and punish: The birth a/the prison. New York: Random 
House. 
Foucault, M. (1984a) 'Polemics, politics and problematisations: An interview with 
Michel Foucault', in Rabinow, P. (ed) The Foucault Reader: An introduction to 
Foucault's thought (pp. 381-90). London: Penguin. 
Foucault, M. (1984b) 'Preface to The History of Sexuality Volume II', in Rabinow, P. 
(ed) The Foucault Reader: An introduction to Foucault's thought (pp. 333-339). 
London: Penguin. 
Foucault, M. (1984c) 'The ethics of the concern for self as a practice of freedom', in 
Rabinow, P. (Ed.), Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth (pp. 281-302). London: 
Penguin. 
Foucault, M. (1988). 'Technologies of the self in Martin, L. H., Gutman, H. and Hutton, 
P.H. (eds) Technologies 0/ the self (pp. 16-49). Amherst: University of 
Massachussets Press. 
Foucault, M. (1990 [1976]) The history a/sexuality. Volume 1: The will to knowledge, 
New York: Vintage. 
329 
Foucault, M. (2003) '17 March 1976', in Society must be defended: Lectures at the 
College de France 1975-76 (pp. 239-264). New York: Picador. 
Foucault, M. (2009 [1961]) History of madness, London: Routledge. 
Fowlkes, M. R. (1990) 'The social regulation of grief, Sociological Forum, 5(4), 635-
652. 
Fox, N. J. (2013) 'Flows of affect in the olympic stadium', Sociological Research Online, 
18(2). 
Fox, N. J. (2015) 'Emotions, affects and the production of social life', The British 
Journalo/Sociology, 66(2), 301-18. 
Frances, A. (2012) 'DSM-5 is guide not bible - ignore its ten worst changes', 
Psychology Today, 2 December. 
Frances, A. (2013) Saving normal: An insider's revolt against out-of-control psychiatric 
diagnosis, DSM-5, big pharma, and the medicalization 0/ ordinary life, New York: 
William Morrow. 
Frank, A. W. (2006) 'Health stories as connectors and subjectifiers', Health, 10(4), 
421-40. 
Frank, A. W. (2010) 'In defence of narrative exceptionalism', Sociology of Health & 
Illness, 32(4), 665-7. 
Frers, L. (2013) 'The matter of absence', Cultural Geographies, 20(4), 431-445. 
Freud, S. (1914) 'Remembering, repeating and working through', in Philips, A. (ed) 
(2006) The Penguin Freud reader (pp. 391-401), London: Penguin. 
Freud, S. (1917) 'Mourning and melancholia', in Strachey, J. (ed) The standard edition 
of the complete psychological works 0/ Sigmund Freud (pp. 237-258), London: 
Hogarth Press. 
Friedli, L. and Stearn, R. (2015) 'Positive affect as coercive strategy: Conditionality, 
activation and the role of psychology in UK government workfare programmes', 
330 
Medical Humanities, 41(1), 40-47. 
Friedman, R. and James, J. W. (2013) Moving beyond loss: Real answers to real 
questions from real people, Lanham, Maryland: Taylor Trade. 
Fulconer, D. (1942) The adjustive behavior of some recently bereaved spouses. 
Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, Unpublished Doctoral thesis. 
Garber, M. (2016) 'Enter the grief police', The Atlantic, 20 January. Available from: 
http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive 120 16 10 1 lenter-the-~rief­
police/4247461 (Accessed 6 June 2016). 
Gibson, M. (2004) 'Melancholy objects', Mortality, 9(4),285-299. 
Gibson, M. (2008) Objects of the dead: Mourning and memory in everyday life, Carlton, 
Victoria: Melbourne University Press. 
Giddens, A. (1991) Modernity and self-identity: Self and society in the late modern age. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Gilbert, K. R. (2002) 'Taking a narrative approach to grief research: Finding meaning 
in stories', Death Studies, 26(3), 223-39. 
Glyde, T. (2014) 'The recovery position', The Lancet Psychiatry, 1(2),119-120. 
Goffman, E. (1959) The presentation of self in everyday life, London: Penguin. 
Goffman, E. (1963) Stigma, London: Penguin. 
Goldberg, M. (2015) 'The long marriage of mindfulness and money', The New Yorker, 
April 18. 
Goody, J. (2006) 'From oral to written: An anthropological breakthrough in 
storytelling', in Moretti, F. (ed) The Novel Volume 1 (pp. 3-36). Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Gorer, G. (1965) Death, grief and mourning in contemporary Britain, London: Cresset 
Press. 
Granek, L. (2013) 'Disciplinary wounds: Has grief become the identified patient for a 
331 
field gone awry?', journal of Loss and Trauma, 18(3), 275-288. 
Gray, R. E. (1987) 'Adolescent response to the death of a parent', journal of Youth and 
Adolescence, 16(6), 511-525. 
Groopman, J. (2004) 'The grief industry', The New Yorker, 26 January. 
Gundel, H., O'Connor, M.-F., Littrell, L., Fort, C. and Lane, R. D. (2003) 'Functional 
neuroanatomy of grief: an FMRI study', The American journal of Psychiatry, 
160(11), 1946-53. 
Hacking, I. (1986) 'Making up people', in Bagioli, M. (ed) The Science Studies Reader 
(pp.161-171). London: Routledge. 
Hacking, I. (1999) The social construction of what?, Cambridge, Massachussetts: 
Havard University Press. 
Hacking, I. (2007) 'Kinds of people: Moving targets', paper presented at The Tenth 
British Academy Lecture. London, 11 April. 
Hall, C. (2014) 'Bereavement theory: Recent developments in our understanding of 
grief and bereavement', Bereavement Care, 33(1), 7-12. 
Hallam, E., Hockey, J. and Howarth, G. (1999) Beyond the body: Death and social 
identity, London: Routledge. 
Haraway, D. (1991) Simians, cyborgs, and women: The reinvention of nature, New 
York: Routledge. 
Harper, D. and Speed, E. (2012) 'Uncovering recovery: The resistible rise of recovery 
and resilience', Studies in Social justice, 6(1), 9-25. 
Harre, R. (1986) The social construction of emotions, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Harre, R. and Parrott, W. G. (eds) (1996) The emotions: Social, cultural and biological 
dimensions, London: Sage. 
Harris, D. (2010) 'Oppression of the bereaved: A critical analysis of grief in Western 
society', Omega, 60(3), 241-253. 
332 
Harris, E. S. (1991) 'Adolescent bereavement following the death of a parent: an 
exploratory study', Child Psychiatry and Human Development, 21 (4),267-81. 
Harrison, L. and Harrington, R. (2001) 'Adolescents' bereavement experiences: 
Prevalence, association with depressive symptoms, and use of services', Journal 
0/ Adolescence, 24(2), 159-69. 
Hatfield, E., Cacioppo, J. T. and Rapson, R. L. (1994) Emotional contagion. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Heathcote, E. (2011) 'George MacKerron: "I can measure how happy you are - and 
why"', The Guardian, 13 February. 
Hochschild, A R. (1983) The Managed Heart: Commercialization 0/ human /eeling, 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Hockey, J., Katz, J. and Small, N. (eds) (2001) Grief, Mourning and death ritual, 
Buckingham: Open University Press. 
Hockey, J., Komaromy, C. and Woodthorpe, K. (eds) (2010) The mattero/death: Space, 
place and materiality, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. . 
Hockey, J., Penhale, 8. and Sibley, D. (2005) 'Environments of memory: Home space, 
later life and grief, in Davidson, J., Bondi, L. and Smith, M. (eds), Emotional 
Geographies (pp.135-146), Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Hollway, W. and Jefferson, T. (2000) Doing qualitative research differently, London: 
Sage. 
Holstein, J. A and Gubrium, J. F. (1995) The active interview, Thousand Oaks, 
California: Sage. 
Horowitz, M. J., Siegel, B., Holen, A, Bonanno, G. A, Milbrath, C. and Stinson, C. H. 
(1997) 'Diagnostic criteria for complicated grief disorder', The American Journal 
o/Psychiatry, 154(7), 904-10. 
Horsley, P. A (2008) 'Death dwells in spaces: Bodies in the hospital mortuary', 
333 
Anthropology & Medicine, 15(2), 133-146. 
Howarth, G. (2000) 'Dismantling the boundaries between life and death', Mortality, 
5(2), 127-138. 
Howarth, G. (2007) Death and dying: A sociological introduction, Cambridge: Polity. 
Huxley, A. (1946) Brave new world, London: Harper & Bros. 
Jakoby, N. R. (2012) 'Grief as a social emotion: Theoretical perspectives', Death 
Studies, 36(8),679-711. 
Jakoby, N. R. (2014) 'Talking about grief: Conversational partners sought by bereaved 
people', Bereavement Care, 33(1),13-18. 
Jalland, P. (2010) Death in war and peace: Loss and grief in England 1914-1970, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
James, J. W. and Friedman, R. (2009) The Grief Recovery Handbook: The action 
program for moving beyond death, divorce, and other losses including health, 
careerandfaith, New York: William Morrow. 
James, W. (1884) 'What is an emotion?', Mind, 9(34), 188-205. 
Jenkins, R, Meltzer, H., Jones, P. B., Brugha, T., Bebbington, P., Farrell, M. and Knapp, 
M. (2008) Foresight Mental Capital and Wellbeing Project Mental health: Future 
challenges, London: The Government Office for Science. 
Jones, E. and Wessley, S. (2005) Shell shock to PTSD: Military psychiatry from 1900 to 
the Gulf War (Maudsley monographs, no. 47), Hove and New York: Psychology 
Press. 
Jordan, J. R and Neimeyer, R A. (2003) 'Does grief counseling work?', Death Studies, 
27(9), 765-786. 
Kabat-Zinn, J. (1994) Wherever you go, there you are: Mindfulness meditation for 
everyday life, New York: Hyperion. 
Kahneman, D. (2011) Thinking,fast and slow, New York: Straus and Giroux. 
334 
Kehily, M. j. (1995) 'Self-narration, autobiography and identity construction', Gender 
and Education, 7(1),23-32. 
Kendall, G. and Wickham, G. (1999) Using Foucault's methods, Thousand Oaks, 
California: Sage. 
King, 8. J. (2013) How animals grieve, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Klass, D. (2014) 'Grief, consolation, and religions: A conceptual framework', Omega, 
69(1),1-18. 
Klass, D., Silverman, P. R. and Nickman, S. L. (eds) (1996) Continuing bonds: New 
understandings of grief, London: Taylor & Francis. 
Klein, M. (1940) 'Mourning and its relation to manic-depressive states' in Love, Guilt 
and Reparation and Other Works 1921-1945: The writings of Melanie Klein 
Volume I (pp. 344-369) (1975), London: Hogarth Press. 
Konisberg, R. D. (2011) The truth about grief The myth of its five stages and the new 
science of loss, New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Krasner, j. (2004) 'Doubtful arms and phantom limbs: Literary portrayals of 
embodied grief, PMLA, 119(2),218-232. 
Kristeva, j. (1989) Black sun: Depression and melancholia, New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Kubler-Ross, E. (1970) On death and dying, London: Tavistock. 
Lakoff, G. and Johnson, M. (1980) Metaphors we live by, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Larson, D. G. and Hoyt, W. T. (2009) 'Grief counselling efficacy: What have we 
learned?', Bereavement Care, 28(3), 14-19. 
Law, J. (2009) 'Seeing like a survey', Cultural Sociology, 3(2),239-256. 
Law, K. (2014) 'It was my duty to stop Tom being destroyed before his death - and 
Eugene by it', The Evening Standard, 30 June. 
335 
Layard, R. (2011a) Happiness: Lessons from a new science, 2nd edn, London: Penguin. 
Layard, R. (2011b) 'Flourish: A new understanding of happiness and well-being - and 
how to achieve them by Martin Seligman - review', The Guardian, 15 May 
[online]. Available from: 
https: IIwww.theguardian.com/science/2011/may/lS !f1ourish -science-of-
happiness-psychology-review (Accessed 6 June 2016). 
Leese, P. (2002) Shell Shock: Traumatic neurosis and the British soldiers of the First 
World War, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Leichtentritt, R. D., Shamir, M. M., Barak, A. and Yerushalmi, A. (2016) 'Bodies as 
means for continuing post-death relationships', Journal of Health Psychology, 
21(5),738-749. 
Lewis, C. S. (1961) A grief observed, London: Faber and Faber. 
Leys, R. (1994) 'Traumatic cures: Shell shock, Janet, and the question of memory', 
Critical Inquiry, 20(4), 623-662. 
Lindemann, E. (1979 [1944]) Beyond grief: Studies in crisis intervention: New York: 
Aronson. 
Lofland, L. H. (1985) 'The social shaping of emotion: The case of grief, Symbolic 
Interaction, 8(2),171-190. 
Lupton, D. (1997) 'Consumerism, reflexivity and the medical encounter', Social 
Science & Medicine, 45(3),373-381. 
Macdonald, H. (2014) H isfor Hawk, London: Jonathan Cape. 
Maddrell, A. (2013) 'Living with the deceased: Absence, presence and absence-
presence', Cultural Geographies, 20(4), 501-522. 
Marks, S. (2012) 'Cognitive behavioural therapies in Britain: The historical context 
and present situation', Cognitive Behaviour Therapies, 1-24. 
Marmot, M. G. and Wilkinson, R. G. (2006) Social determinants of health, Oxford: 
336 
Oxford University Press. 
Marx, K. (1976 [1867]) Capital Volume one: A critique of political economy, London: 
Penguin. 
Massumi, B. (2002) Parables for the virtual: Movement, affect, sensation. Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press. 
Mauthner, M., Birch, M., Jessop, J. and Miller, T. (eds) (2002) Ethics in qualitative 
research, London: Sage. 
McDonald, M., & O'Callaghan, J. (2008) 'Positive psychology: A Foucauldian critique', 
The Humanistic Psychologist, 36(2), '127-142. 
Mclaren, J. (1998) 'A new understanding of grief: A counsellor's perspective', 
Mortality, 3(3), 275-290. 
McLeod, J. D. (1991) 'Childhood parental loss and adult depression', Journal of Health 
and Social Behavior, 32(3), 205-20. 
McNay, L. (1991) 'The Foucauldian body and the exclusion of experience', Hypatia, 
6(3),125-139. 
McNay, L. (2009) 'Self as enterprise: Dilemmas of control and resistance in Foucault's 
The Birth of Biopolitics', Theory, Culture & Society, 26(6), 55-77. 
McQuire, C. (2015) 'Grieving mother defends decision to buy her stillborn baby 
presents three years after his death: "Placing toys in his room gives me the 
strength to carry on''', The Daily Mail, 7 January. 
McWade, B. (2015) 'Temporalities of mental health recovery', Subjectivity, 8(3), 243-
260. 
Mead, M. (1975) 'Review of Darwin and facial expression', Journal of Communication, 
25,209-213. 
Meier, L., Frers, L. and Sigvardsdotter, E. (2013) 'The importance of absence in the 
present: practices of remembrance and the contestation of absences', Cultural 
337 
Geographies,20(4),423-430. 
Mellor, P. and Shilling, C. (1993) 'Modernity, self-identity and the sequestration of 
death', Sociology, 27(3), 411-431. 
Mol, A. (2008) The logic of care: Health and the problem of patient choice, Oxon: 
Routledge. 
Moore, A. (2014) 'Tragedy in Thailand: It's taken 10 years to accept that my sister 
died in the tsunami', The Guardian, 6 December. 
National Council for Palliative Care. (2014) Life after death: Six steps to improve 
support in bereavement, London: NCPC. 
Neimeyer, R (2005) 'Grief, loss, and the quest for meaning: Narrative contributions to 
bereavement care', Bereavement Care, 24(2), 27-30. 
Neimeyer, R (2006) 'Defining the new abnormal: Scientific and social construction of 
complicated grief, Omega, 52(1), 95-97. 
Neimeyer, R, Baldwin, S. and Gillies, J. (2006) 'Continuing bonds and reconstructing 
meaning: Mitigating complications in bereavement', Death Studies, 30(8), 715-
38. 
Neimeyer, R, Burke, L., Mackay, M. and van Dyke Stringer, J. (2010) 'Grieftherapy and 
the reconstruction of meaning: From principles to practice', Journal of 
Contemporary Psychotherapy, 40(2), 73-83. 
Neimeyer, R, Klass, D. and Dennis, M. R (2014) 'A social constructionist account of 
grief: Loss and the narration of meaning', Death Studies, 38(6-10), 485-98. 
Ngai, S. (2005) Ugly feelings, Cambridge, Massachussetts: Havard University Press. 
O'Connor, M.-F. (2005) 'Bereavement and the brain: Invitation to a conversation 
between bereavement researchers and neuroscientists', Death Studies, 29(10), 
905-22. 
O'Connor, M.-F. (2012) 'Immunological and neuroimaging biomarkers of complicated 
338 
grief, Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience, 14(2), 141-148. 
O'Connor, M.-F., Wellisch, D. K., Stanton, A. L., Eisenberger, N. I., Irwin, M. R. and 
Lieberman, M. D. (2008) 'Craving love? Enduring grief activates brain's reward 
center', Neurolmage, 42(2), 969-72. 
O'Rourke, M. (2011) The long goodbye: A year of grieving, London: Virago. 
Oakley, A. (1981) 'Interviewing women: A contradiction in terms' in Roberts, H. (Ed.), 
Doing feminist research (pp. 30-62), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Paletti, R. (2008) 'Recovery in context: Bereavement, culture, and the transformation 
ofthe therapeutic self, Death Studies, 32(1),17-26. 
Parkes, C. M. (1972) Bereavement: Studies of grief in adult life, Harmondsworth: 
Penguin. 
Parkes, C. M. (1995) 'Guidelines for conducting ethical bereavement research', Death 
Studies, 19(2), 171-81. 
Parkes, C. M. (2006) Love and loss: The roots of grief and its complications, Hove, East 
Sussex: Routledge. 
Parkes, C. M. and Weiss, R. S. (1983) Recovery from bereavement, New York: Basic 
Books. 
Parris, M. (2009) 'I don't want to "get over" my father's death', The Spectator, 12 
August 
Paulus, T. M. and Varga, M. A. (2015) "'Please know that you are not alone with your 
pain": Responses to newcomer posts in an online grief support forum', Death 
Studies, 39(10),633-40. 
Pearce, C. (2008) 'World interrupted: An autoethnographic exploration into the 
rupture of self and family narratives following the onset of chronic illness and 
the death of a mother', Qualitative Sociology Review, 4(1),131-148. 
Pearce, C. (2010) 'The crises and freedoms of researching your own life', Journal of 
339 
Research Practice, 6(1), Special issue on autoethnography as research practice, 
Article M2. 
Pearce, C. (2011) 'Girl, interrupted: An exploration into the experience of grief 
following the death of a mother in young women's narratives', Mortality, 16(1), 
35-53. 
Porter, M. (2015) Griefis the thing with feathers, London: Faber & Faber. 
Porter, S. (2014) 'Wife carried on as man lay dead in home for 9 months', USA Today, 
4 June [online]. Availiable from: 
http://www.usatoday.com/story /news/nation/20 14/06/04 /wife-lived-with-
man-dead-in-home-nine-months/9947321/ (Accessed 6 June 2016). 
Prigerson, H. G., Bierhals, A. J., Kasl, S. V, Reynolds, C. F., Shear, M. K., Newsom, J. T. and 
Jacobs, S. (1996) 'Complicated grief as a disorder distinct from bereavement-
related depression and anxiety: a replication· study', The American Journal of 
Psychiatry, 153(11),1484-6. 
Prigerson, H. G., Frank, E., Kasl, S. V., Reynolds, C. F., Anderson, B., ZUbenko, G. S. and 
Kupfer, D. J. (1995) 'Complicated grief and bereavement-related depression as 
distinct disorders: preliminary empirical validation in elderly bereaved 
spouses', The American Journal of Psychiatry, 152(1), 22-30. 
Prigerson, H. G., Horowitz, M. J., Jacobs, S. c., Parkes, C. M., Asian, M., Goodkin, K. and 
Maciejewski, P. K. (2009) 'Prolonged grief disorder: Psychometric validation of 
criteria proposed for DSM-Vand ICD-ll', PLoS Medicine, 6(8),1-12. 
Ramazani. (1994) Poetry of mourning: The modern elegy from Hardy to Heaney, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Ramazanoglu, C. (1992) 'On feminist methodology: Male reason versus female 
empowerment', Sociology, 26(2),207-212. 
Raphael, 8., Cubis, J., Dunne, M., Lewin, T. and Kelly, 8. (1990) 'The impact of parental 
340 
loss on adolescents' psychosocial characteristics', Adolescence, 25(99), 689-700. 
Rapley, T. (2007) Doing conversation, discourse and document analysis, London: Sage. 
Renzetti, C. and Lee, R. (1993) Researching sensitive topics, Newbury Park, California: 
Sage Publications. 
Ribbens McCarthy, J. and Prokhovnik, R. (2013) 'Embodied relationality and caring 
after death', Body & Society, 20(2), 18-43. 
Richardson, V. E., Bennett, K. M., Carr, D., Gallagher, S., Kim, J. and Fields, N. (2015) 
'How does bereavement get under the skin? The effects of late-life spousal loss 
on cortisol levels', The Journals of Gerontology, 70(3), 341-347. 
Roberts, G. and Wolfson, P. (2004) 'The rediscovery of recovery: Open to all', 
Advances in Psychiatric Treatment, 10, 37-49. 
Robson, P. and Walter, T. (2013) 'Hierarchies of loss: A critique of disenfranchised 
grief, Omega, 66(2), 97-119. 
Rodgers, B. and Cowles, K. (1991) 'The concept of grief: An analysis of classical and 
contemporary thought', Death Studies, 15,443-58. 
Rogers, C. (1951) Client-centred therapy: Its current practice, implications and theory, 
London: Constable and Company. 
Rose, D. (2014) 'The mainstreaming of recovery', Journal of Mental Health, 23(5), 
217-218. 
Rose, N. (1985) The psychological complex: Psychology, politics and society in England, 
1869-1939, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Rose, N. (1989) Governing the soul: The shaping of the private self, London: Free 
Association Press. 
Rose, N. (1998) Inventing our selves: Psychology, power and personhood, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Rose, N. (2013) 'The human sciences in a biological age', Theory, Culture & Society, 
341 
30(1),3-34. 
Rosaldo, R. (1993) 'Introduction: Grief and a headhunter's rage', in Culture and truth: 
The remaking of social analysis (pp. 1-21), Boston: Beacon Press. 
Rose, N. (2014) 'From risk to resilience: Responsible citizens for uncertain times', 
Guest Lecture at The University of Melbourne. Melbourne, Australia, 28 August 
Rosenblatt, P. C. (1993) 'Grief: The social context of private feelings', in Stroebe, M. S., 
Stroebe, W. and Hansson, R. O. (eds) Handbook ofbereavement: Theory, research, 
and intervention (pp. 102-111), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Rosenblatt, P. (2000) Parent grief Narratives of loss and relationship, Philadelphia: 
Brunner /Mazel. 
Rosenblatt, P. C. (2008a) 'Recovery following bereavement: Metaphor, 
phenomenology, and culture, Death Studies, 32(1),6-16. 
Rosenblatt, P. C. (2008b) 'Grief across cultures: A review and research agenda', in 
Stroebe, M. S., Stroebe, W. and Hansson, R. O. (eds) Handbook of bereavement 
research and practice: Advances in theory and intervention (pt>. 207-222), 
Washington: American Psychological Association. 
Rosenblatt, P. and Bowman, T. (2013) 'Alternative approaches to conceptualising 
grief: A conversation', Bereavement Care, 32(2), 82-85. 
Rosenblatt, P., Walsh, P. R. and Jackson, D. A. (1976) Grief and mourning in cross-
cultural perspective, New York: Human Relations Area Files. 
Rothaupt, J. W. and Becker, K. (2007) 'A literature review of Western bereavement 
theory: From decathecting to continuing bonds, The Family Journal, 15(1), 6-15. 
Rowling, L. (1999) 'Being in, being out, being with: Affect and the role of the 
qualitative researcher in loss and grief research', Mortality, 2(2), 197-181. 
Sandler, I. N., Wolchik, S. A. and Ayers, T. S. (2008) 'Resilience rather than recovery: A 
contextual framework on adaptation following bereavement', Death Studies, 
342 
32(1),59-73. 
Sartre, J.-P. (1958) Being and nothingness: An essay on phenomenlogical ontology, 
London: Methuen & Co. 
Sbarra, D. A. and Hazan, C. (2008) 'Coregulation, dysregulation, self-regulation: An 
integrative analysis and empirical agenda for understanding adult attachment, 
separation, loss, and recovery', Personality and Social Psychology Review, 12(2), 
141-167. 
Scheer, M. (2012) 'Are emotions a kind of practice (and is that what makes them have 
a history)? A Bourdieuian approach to understanding emotion', History and 
Theory, 51(2),193-220. 
Schut, H. (2010) 'Grief counselling efficacy', Bereavement Care, 29(1),8-9. 
SECOB project research group. (2013) Socio-Economic Costs of Bereavement in 
Scotland: Main study report, Aberdeen: SECOB. 
Seeley, K. (2015) Therapy aft"er terror: 9/11, psychotherapists and mental health, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Seligman, M. (2002) Authentic happiness: Using the new positive psychology to realise 
your potential for lasting fulfilment, New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Seligman, M. (2011) Flourish: A visionary new understanding of happiness and well-
being, New York: Free Press. 
Seligson, H. (2014) 'An online generation redefines mourning', The New York Times, 
23 March. 
Seymour, W. (2007) 'Exhuming the body: Revisiting the role of the visible body in 
ethnographic research', Qualitative Health Research, 17(9), 1188-97. 
Shear, M. K. (2010) 'Complicated grief treatment: The theory, practice and outcomes', 
Bereavement Care, 29(3),10-14. 
Shear, M. K. (2012) 'Grief and mourning gone awry: Pathway and course of 
343 
complicated grief, Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience, 14(2), 119-28. 
Shear, M. K., Ghesquiere, A. and Glickman, K. (2013) 'Bereavement and complicated 
grief, Current Psychiatry Reports, 15(11),406. 
Shear, M. K., Simon, N., Wall, M., Zisook, S., Neimeyer, R., Duan, N. and Keshaviah, A. 
(2011) 'Complicated grief and related bereavement issues for DSM-S', 
Depression and Anxiety, 28(2), 103-117. 
Shepard, B. (2002) A war ofnerves, London: Pimlico. 
Shepard, G., Boardman, J. and Slade, M. (2008) Making recovery a reality, London: 
Salisbury Centre for Mental Health. 
Shilling, C. (1993) The body and social theory, London: Sage. 
Sidhu, K. (2015) 'A dirty secret called grief, The Guardian, Family Supplement, 10 
October. 
Silverman, D. (2005) Doing qualitative research, 2nd edn, London: Sage. 
Slade, M. (2009) 100 ways to support recovery A guide for mental health professionals, 
Rethink recovery series: Volume 1, London: Rethink. 
Slade, M. (2010) 'Mental illness and well-being: The central importance of positive 
psychology and recovery approaches', BMC Health Services Research, 10, 26. 
Slade, M., Adams, N. and O'Hagan, M. (2012) 'Recovery: Past progress and future 
challenges', International Review of Psychiatry, 24(1), 1-4. 
Slade, M., Amering, M., Farkas, M., Hamilton, B., O'Hagan, M., Panther, G. and Whitley, 
R. (2014) 'Uses and abuses of recovery: implementing recovery-oriented 
practices in mental health systems', World Psychiatry: Official Journal of the 
World Psychiatric Association (WPA), 13(1), 12-20. 
Small, N. (2001) 'Theories of grief: A critical review', in Hockey, J. Katz, J. and Small, N. 
(eds) Grief, mourning and death ritual (pp. 19-48), Buckingham: Open 
University Press. 
344 
Small, N. and Hockey, J. (2001) 'Discourse into practice: The production of 
bereavement care', in Hockey, J. Katz, J. and Small, N. (eds) Grief, mourning and 
death ritual (pp. 97-124). Buckingham: Open University Press. 
Smith, B. and Sparkes, A. C. (2008) 'Changing bodies, changing narratives and the 
consequences of tellability: A case study of becoming disabled through sport', 
Sociology of Health & Illness, 30(2), 217 -36. 
Smith, D. E. (2001) 'Texts and the ontology of organisations and institutions', Studies 
of Cultures, Organisations and Societies, 7, 159-198. 
South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust (2015) SLaM recovery college 
2015/2016 courses. SLaM recovery college prospectus. 
Spivak, G. C. (1988) 'Can the subaltern speak?' in Nelson, C. and Grossberg, L. Marxism 
and the interpretation of culture (pp. 271-313). Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press. 
Squire, C. (2005) 'Reading narratives', Group Analysis, 38(1),91-107. 
Stanley, L. (1993) 'The knowing because experiencing subject: Narratives, lives, 
autobiography', Women's Studies International Forum, 16(3), 205-215. 
Stearns, P. N. and Knapp, M. (1996) 'Historical perspectives on grief, in Harre, R. & 
Parrott, W. G. (eds) The emotions: Social, cultural and biological dimensions (pp. 
132-150). London: Sage. 
Stenner, P., & Moreno, E. (2013) 'Liminality and affectivity: The case of deceased 
organ donation', Subjectivity, 6(3). 
Stephen, A. I., Macduff, C., Petrie, D. I., Tseng, F.-M., Schut, H., Skc1r, S. and Wilson, S. 
(2014) 'The economic cost of bereavement in Scotland', Death Studies, 39(1-5), 
151-7. 
Stolorow, R. D. (2014) The war on grief, Psychology Today, 12 February. 
Strayed, C. (2012) Wild: From lost to found on the Pacific Crest Trail, New York: Alfred 
345 
A. Knopf. 
Stroebe, & Schut, H. (1999) 'The dual process model of coping with bereavement: 
rationale and description', Death Studies, 23(3), 197-224. 
Stroebe, M., & Schut, H. (2005) 'To continue or relinquish bonds: A review of 
consequences for the bereaved', Death Studies, 29(6), 477-94. 
Stroebe, M. (1997) 'From mourning and melancholia to bereavement and biography: 
An assessment of Walter ' s new model of grief, Mortality, 2, 255-62. 
Stroebe, M., Schut, H. and Stroebe, W. (2007) 'Health outcomes of bereavement', 
Lancet, 370(9603),1960-73. 
Stroebe, M., Schut, H. and van den Bout, J. (eds) (2013) Complicated grief: Scientific 
foundations for health care professionals, Hove, East Sussex: Routledge. 
Stroebe, M. and Stroebe, W. (1991) 'Does "grief work" work?', Journal of Consulting 
and Clinical Psychology, 59(3), 479-482. 
Stroebe, M., Stroebe, W., & Schut, H. (2003) 'Bereavement research: Methodological 
issues and ethical concerns', Palliative Medicine, 17(3), 235-240 .. 
Summerfield, D. (2002) 'Effects of war: Moral knowledge, revenge, reconciliation, and 
medicalised concepts of "recovery"', British Medical Journal, 325(7372), 1105-7: 
Tanner, L. (2006) Lost bodies: Inhabiting the borders of life and death, Ithaca & 
London: Cornell University Press. 
Tate, E. (2014) 'Pop-up workshop summary: Debating recovery and discrimination', 
See Me Scotland, 4 November [blog]. Available 
https: Ilseemescotland.wordpress.com/2 014/04/11/pop-up-workshop-
summary-debatjn~-recovery-and-discriminationl (Accessed 6 June 2016). 
from: 
Tedeschi, R. G. and Calhoun, L. G. (2008) 'Beyond the concept of recovery: Growth and 
the experience ofloss, Death Studies, 32(1),27-39. 
Thaler, R. H. and Sunstein, C. R. (2009) Nudge: Improving decisions about health, 
346 
wealth and happiness, London: Penguin. 
The Centre for Economic Performance's Mental Health Policy Group (2006) 'The 
depression report: A new deal for depression and anxiety disorders', London 
School of Economics and Political Science, Centre for Economic Performance 
Special Papers [online]. Available from: 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/archive/00000818. (Accessed 6 June 2016). 
The Economist (2013) 'The mindfulness business', 16 November. 
The Lancet (2012) 'Living with grief, 379(9816),589. 
The Local (2014) 'Woman slept next to mother's body for 5 years', 18 November 
[online]. Available from: http://www.thelocal.de120141118/woman-slept-
next-to-mothers-body-for-5-years (Accessed 6 June 2016). 
The Mental Health Taskforce (2016) The five year forward view for mental health, 
London: Department of Health. 
The Midlands Psychology Group (2007) 'Questioning the science and politics of 
happiness', The Psychologist, 20(7), 422-425. 
The Mindfullntiative (2014) Mindful Nation UK: Interim report of the Mindfulness AI/-
Party Parliamentary Group (MAPPG). London. 
The University of Nottingham and Department of Health (2010) Bereavement care 
services: A synthesis of the literature, London: Department of Health. 
Tilly, C. (1999) 'The trouble with stories', in Pescosolido, B. A. and Aminzade, R. (eds) 
The social worlds of higher education: Handbook for teaching in a new century 
(pp. 256-270). London: Sage. 
Tonkin, L. (1996) 'Growing around grief - another way of looking at grief and 
recovery', Bereavement Care, 15(1), 10-10. 
Travis, T. (2009) A cultural history of the recovery movement from Alcoholics 
Anonymous to Oprah Winfrey, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina 
347 
Press. 
Turner, B. S. (1984) The body and society: Explorations in social theory, London: Sage. 
Turner, J. H. and Stets, J. E. (2005) The sociology 0/ emotions, New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Turner, V. (1969) The ritual process: Structure and anti-structure, Chicago: Aldine. 
Turner, V. (1974) Dramas,fields, metaphors: Symbolic action in human society, Ithaca 
& London: Cornell University Press. 
Turner, V. (1982) From ritual to theatre: The human seriousness 0/ play, New York: 
Performing Arts Journal Publications. 
Unruh, D. R. (1983) 'Death and personal history: Strategies of identity preservation', 
Social Problems, 30(3),340-351. 
Valentine, C. (2007) 'Methodological reflections: Attending and tending to the role of 
the researcher in the construction of bereavement narratives', Qualitative Social 
Work, 6(2), 159-176. 
Valentine, C. (2008) Bereavement narratives: Continuing bonds in the 21st century, 
London: Routledge. 
Valentine, C. (2013) 'Identity and post-mortem relationships in the narratives of 
British and Japanese mourners', Sociological Review, 61(2), 383-401. 
van Gennep, A. (1960) The rites a/passage, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Varga, M. A. and Paulus, T. M. (2013) 'Grieving online: Newcomers' constructions of 
grief in an online support group', Death Studies, 38(6),443-9. 
Wacquant, L. (1989) 'Towards a reflexive sociology: A workshop with Pierre 
Bourdieu', Sociological Theory, 7, 26-63. 
Wakefield, J. C. (2013a) 'DSM-5 grief scorecard: Assessment and outcomes of 
proposals to pathologize grief, World Psychiatry, 12(2), 171-3. 
Wakefield, J. c. (2013b) 'The DSM-S debate over the bereavement exclusion: 
348 
Psychiatric diagnosis and the future of empirically supported treatment', 
Clinical Psychology Review, 33(7), 825-45. 
Wakefield, J. c. and First, M. B. (2012) 'Validity of the bereavement exclusion to major 
depression: Does the empirical evidence support the proposal to eliminate the 
exclusion in DSM-5?', World Psychiatry, 11(1),3-10. 
Waller, A, Turon, H., Mansfield, E., Clark, K., Hobden, B. and Sanson-Fisher, R. (2016) 
'Assisting the bereaved: A systematic review of the evidence for grief 
counselling', Palliative Medicine, 30(2), 132-148. 
Walter, T. (1996) 'A new model of gdef: Bereavement and biography', Mortality, 1 (1), 
7-25. 
Walter, T. (1999) On bereavement: The culture 0/ grief, Buckingham: Open University 
Press. 
Walter, T. (2000) 'Grief narratives: The role of medicine in the policing of griet', 
Anthropology & Medicine, 7(1), 97-114. 
Walter, T. (2006) 'What is complicated grief? A social constructionist perspective', 
Omega, 52(1), 71-79. 
Walter, T. (2007) 'Modern grief, postmodern griet', International Review o/Sociology, 
17(1), 123-134. 
Walter, T. (2010) 'Grief and culture', Bereavement Care, 29(2), 5-9. 
Wambach, J. A (1985) 'The grief process as a social construct', Omega, 16(3), 201-
211. 
Watkin, W. (2004) On mourning: Theories 0/ loss in modern literature, Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press. 
Watts, D. (2011) 'The healing art of writing' in Baranow, J., Dolan, B. and Watts, D. 
(eds) The healing art o/writing (pp. 1-9). San Francisco: University of California 
Press. 
349 
Wertheimer, M. (1938 [1924]) 'Gestalt theory', in Ellis, W. D. (ed) A source book of 
Gestalt psychology (pp. 1-11), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Wetherell, M. (2012) Affect and emotions: A new social science understanding, London: 
Sage. 
Whitwell, D. (1999) 'The myth of recovery from mental illness', Psychiatric Bulletin, 
23, 621-622. 
Williams, A (1993) 'Diversity and agreement in feminist ethnography', Sociology, 
27( 4),575-589. 
Williams, S. (2001) Emotion and sodal theory: Corporeal reflections on the {IrJrational, 
London: Sage. 
Willoughby, N. (2015) "'You can't tame grief': Helen Macdonald on her bestselling 
memoir "H is for Hawk"', Salon, 9 March [online]. Available from: 
http://www.salon.com!2015!03!09!you can%E2%80%99t tame grief helen 
macdonald on her bestselling memoir h is for hawk! (Accessed 6 June 2016). 
Wittchen, H. U., Jacobi, F., Rehm, J., Gustavsson, A, Svensson, M.,· Jonsson, B. and 
Steinhausen, H.-C. (2011) 'The size and burden of mental disorders and other 
disorders of the brain in Europe 2010', European Neuropsychopharmacology, 
21(9),655-79. 
Wittkowski, J., Doka, K. J., Neimeyer, R. A and Vallerga, M. (2015) 'Publication trends 
in Thanatology: An analysis of leading journals', Death Studies, 39(8),453-462. 
Wodak, R. and Meyer, M. (2009) Methods for critical discourse analysis, London: Sage. 
Woodthorpe, K. (2007) 'My life after death: Connecting the field, the findings and the 
feelings', Anthropology Matters, 9(1), 1-11. 
Woodthorpe, K. (2009) 'Reflecting on death: The emotionality of the research 
encounter', Mortality, 14(1), 70-86. 
Worden, J. W. (1991 [1982]) Grief counselling and grief therapy: A handbook for the 
350 
mental health practitioner, 2nd Edn., London: Routledge. 
Wortman, C. B. and Silver, R. C. (1989) 'The myths of coping with loss', Journal of 
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 57(3), 349-57. 
Zisook, S. and Shear, K. (2009) Grief and bereavement: What psychiatrists need to 
know', World Psychiatry, 8(2),67-74. 
351 
